JUDGMENT Mehrotra, J. - This writ petition arises out of proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The petitioners preferred objections before the prescribed Authority (opposite party No. 4). In brief the objections were that the petitioners had purchased 9 bighas 4 biswas from Sodhan Singh, opposite party No. 5 and the said opposite party had made subsequent transfers also and as such the petitioners' transfer stood protected on the ground that he was a bona fide purchaser for value and the opposite party No. 5 had capacity of 20 acres of land and the said transfer in favour of the petitioner should be deemed out of the said area of 20 acres which the opposite party No. 5 could legally retain and could legally transfer. It was further pleaded that in any event the subsequent transfer made by the opposite party No. 5 in favour of a near relative be ignored first in order to determine the surplus area before considering the surplus of which the petitioners were in possession of the land in dispute. A further objection was taken by the petitioners that even if their possession be, deemed not to be legal, still, they had perfected their rights as sirdars of the land in dispute and, therefore, their land could not be taken away under the provisions of the said Act. 2. The aforesaid objections of the petitioners were dismissed by the prescribed Authority on the ground that the said objections were barred by time. The prescribed Authority's judgment was delivered on January 1, 1967. 3. Thereafter, the Prescribed Authority by his judgment dated June 26, 1988 directed that the petitioners be ejected under Section 14(8) of the said Act. Against the said order of the Prescribed Authority the petitioners preferred an appeal before the District 8 Judge, Bulandshahr and on transfer the Civil Judge, Bulandshahr dismissed the said appeal by his judgment dated July 16, 1970. 4. Against the said judgment of the appellate authority the petitioners filed a revision under Section 115, C.P.C. before the court of the District Judge, 8 Bulandshahr. The District Judge by his judgment dated December 7, 1970 dismissed the revision as not maintainable. 4. Against the said judgment of the appellate authority the petitioners filed a revision under Section 115, C.P.C. before the court of the District Judge, 8 Bulandshahr. The District Judge by his judgment dated December 7, 1970 dismissed the revision as not maintainable. The petitioners have felt aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated December 7, 1970 dismissing the revision as not maintainable and have come up in writ against the said impugned order. In support of the writ petition I have heard Shri G.N. Verma, the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel has appeared before me and has made his submissions in opposition to the writ petition. The question involved is a difficult one and as at present informed it seems to be bare of authority. The question is whether after the decision of an appeal by the appellate authority under Section 14(5) of the said Act, a revision under Section 115 C.P.C. would lie or not. It has been admitted before me by the learned Standing Counsel that if it be held that a revision would lie then the revision in the instant case was properly preferred to the District Judge, Bulandshahr as on the relevant date, Section 115 stood amended to provide for a revision before the District Judge. However, the learned Standing Counsel has made it clear that his concession is subject to the rejection of his contention that the Civil Judge in disposing of the appeal was exercising concurrent jurisdiction of the District Judge and was not subordinate to the District Judge for the purpose of Section 115, C.P.C. In case his said contention is accepted by the Court then the revision, if at all maintainable, should have been preferred to this Court. In support of his contention Shri G.N. Verma drew my attention to various provisions in the Act. In Section 3, which is the provision dealing with the definitions, 'prescribed Authority' has been defined in clause (b). It is laid down that 'Prescribed Authority' means the person empowered by the State Government by Notification in the official gazette to perform the functions of a prescribed authority under this Act for such area or areas as may be specified in that behalf." A general notice under Section 9 is to be issued to tenure-holders holdings land in excess of ceiling area for submission of statement in respect thereof. Section 10 provides for notice tenure-holders failing to submit a statement or submitting an incomplete for incorrect statement. Sub-section (2) of the said section lays down; "The Prescribed Authority shall thereupon cause to be served upon every such tenure-holders in such manner as may be prescribed notice together with a copy of the statement prepared under sub-section (1) calling upon him to show cause within the period specified in the notice why the statement may not be taken as correct. The period specified will not be less than 10 days from the date of the notice." 5. Section 11 prescribes for the determination of surplus land where no objection is filed. Section 12 provides for the determination of surplus land by the Prescribed Authority where objections are filed under Section 10. Section 13 provides for an appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority under Section 11(2) or Section 12 to the District Judge. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 says that the 'District Judge shall dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible and his decision thereon shall be final and conclusive and be not questioned in any court of law'. Section 14 provides for acquisition of surplus land. Sub-section (3) of Section 14 provides for objections being filed by any person claiming interest as a tenure-holder or a lessee in possession from a tenure in the surplus land in respect of which the Notification has been published under sub-section (1) of Section 14. Such objections are to be filed before the Prescribed Authority. Against the order of the Prescribed Authority disposing of the objections, the aggrieved party can prefer an appeal to the District Judge in whose jurisdiction the land or any part thereof is situated. Subsection (5) makes provision for such an appeal and lays down that the order of the District Judge shall be final and conclusive and not be questioned in any court of law. Sub-section (8) enables the Collector to take possession of the surplus land by using force, if necessary. 6. Sections 37 and 38 are important and their interpretation is involved in the instant writ petition. Hence, I am reproducing the two sections: "37. Powers of officers and authorities in hearing and disposal of objections and the procedure to be followed. Sub-section (8) enables the Collector to take possession of the surplus land by using force, if necessary. 6. Sections 37 and 38 are important and their interpretation is involved in the instant writ petition. Hence, I am reproducing the two sections: "37. Powers of officers and authorities in hearing and disposal of objections and the procedure to be followed. Any officer or authority holding an enquiry or hearing an objection under this Act, shall, in so far as it may be applicable, have all the powers and privileges of a Civil Court, and follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the trial and disposal of suits relating to immovable property." "38. Powers of the appellate court and the procedure to be followed by it.- (1) In hearing and deciding an appeal under this Act, the appellate court shall have all the powers and the privileges of a Civil Court and follow the procedure for the hearing and disposal of appeals laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." (2) Where, under the provisions of this Act, an appeal has to be heard by the District Judge, he may either hear the appeal himself or transfer it for hearing to any Civil Judge subordinate to him." 7. The Civil Judge by his impugned order dismissed the revision as not maintainable on the ground that while hearing an appeal the District Judge or the Civil Judge would not be a Civil Judge although under Section 38 he shall have 'all the powers and the privileges of a civil court and follow the procedure for hearing and disposal of appeals laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." The appellate authority was said to be a tribunal and not a Civil Court and hence Section 115, C.P.C. would not be applicable according to the District Judge. The case reported in Bal Gopal Das v. Mohan Singh was distinguished on the ground that the same was decided under Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment) Act, 1951 and the provisions of the said statute differed in material respects from the provisions of the Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. The case reported in Bal Gopal Das v. Mohan Singh was distinguished on the ground that the same was decided under Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment) Act, 1951 and the provisions of the said statute differed in material respects from the provisions of the Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the revision was maintainable before the District Judge and the view that in hearing the appeal the appellate authority merely acted as a tribunal and not as a civil court is wrong. He has also contended that the Civil Judge while hearing the appeal is subordinate to the District Judge and, therefore, the revision under Section 115, C.P.C. would be maintainable before the latter. He has placed reliance on the following cases in support of his contention that the revision was maintainable before the District Judge: (1) Chatur Mohan v. R.B. Dixit, 1964 A.L.J. 256 (F.B) (2) Bal Gopal Das v. Mohan Singh, 1964 A.L.J. 358 (F.B). (3) Kesar Sugar Works Ltd. v. State of U.P., 1967 A.L.J. 551. (4) Kedar Nath v. Mukteshwar Tewari, 1973 A.L.J. 679. (5) Marwari Sabha v. Kanhaiya Lal, 1973 A.W.R. (H.C.) 100. (6) Asnew Drums Ltd. v. M.S.F. Corporation, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 801. (7) Daryao Singh v. Board of Revenue, A.I.R. 1952 ALL. 829. (8) Sayeed Ullah Khan v. Civil Judge, A.I.R. 1959 All. 330. (9) Sarju Pd. v. Civil Judge Farrukhabad, A.I.R. 1959 ALL. 717. (10) Charan Singh v. Babu Lal, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 57. 8. The learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the following cases: (1) S.A. Industries v. Sarup Singh, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1442. (2) Mahipal Singh v. Kamta Pd., A.I.R. 1940 Oudh (F.R) 33. (3) Farzad Ali v. Shaukat Ali, 1970 A.L.J. 789. (4) A. and I.S. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 1970 A.L.J. 1319 (F.B). (5) Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of U.P., A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 153. 9. In 1968 A.L.J. 325 it was laid down by a learned Judge of this Court: "As the proceeding arising on a reference under Section 146(1), Cr. P.C. to the Civil Court is a civil proceeding in a court subordinate to the High Court, even some interlocutory orders may amount to cases decided so as to be revisable under Section 115, C.P.C. The civil court on an occasion under Section 146(1) by its order decides a disputed question arising in the proceeding. P.C. to the Civil Court is a civil proceeding in a court subordinate to the High Court, even some interlocutory orders may amount to cases decided so as to be revisable under Section 115, C.P.C. The civil court on an occasion under Section 146(1) by its order decides a disputed question arising in the proceeding. The decision directly affects its own jurisdiction and is likely to affect the ultimate finding which it is required to give on the question referred to it under Section 146(1) of the Code." 10. So it was held that the order passed by the Munsif was revisable under Section 115, C.P.C. 11. In 1964 A.L.J. 256 (F.B.) it has been laid down as under: "A Munsif exercising jurisdiction under Section 7-E of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 is a Civil Court and not a persona designata and that an order passed by him is revisable by High Court under Section 115, C.P.C." 12. In 1964 A.L.J. 358 (F.B.) it has been laid down as under: "The Tribunal constituted under the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 (LXX of 1951) is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, and a revision lies under Section 115, C.P.C. against an order passed by such a Tribunal." 13. In 1967 A.L.J. 551 it has been laid down as under: "The prescribed Authority has under Section 37 of the Act all the powers and privileges of a Civil Court while conducting these proceedings Section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code will be applicable, and the Prescribed Authority will have jurisdiction to extend the time for filing objections." 14. In 1973 A.L.J. 679 it has been laid down as under: "When the District Judge transfers the appeal under Section 22 he really sends it to the appellate court formed under Section 21 (4) of the Act. The power of transfer is exercised by virtue of the Civil Judge being himself the appellate court. Hence, when any order is passed by the Civil Judge in an appeal transferred to him by the District Judge, the Civil Judge does it as an independent appellate court and not as a delegate of the District Judge. The power of transfer is exercised by virtue of the Civil Judge being himself the appellate court. Hence, when any order is passed by the Civil Judge in an appeal transferred to him by the District Judge, the Civil Judge does it as an independent appellate court and not as a delegate of the District Judge. The court of Civil Judge will be subordinate to the District Judge and he will have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against any order made by the Civil Judge. The District Judge had jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide the revision against the order of the Civil Judge." 15. In 1973 A.W.R. 100 it has been laid down as under: "The Civil Judge as specified in the Notification of High Court issued with the sanction of State Government before whom the appeals were to be preferred from the orders and decrees of the Munsif under sub-section (4) of Section 21 being subordinate to the District Judge within the meaning of Section 3 of the C.P.C. any order passed by the Civil Judge would be revisable under the amended Section 115 of the C.P.C. by the District Judge or by the Additional District Judge duly authorised." 16. In 1972 S.V. 801 it has been laid down as under: "The words 'in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure' in Section 32(8) include also the provisions in the Code dealing with appeals. 'Manner' means method of procedure and to provide for an appeal is to provide for a mode of procedure." 17. In 1952 All. 829 it has been laid down as under: "The word 'final' in Section 27 (6) of the Amending Act can only mean not subject to appeal and does not shut out the power to interfere in revision." 18. In 1959 All. 330 it has been laid down as under: "The provisions of the Arbitration Act have been made applicable to an award under the provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act both by virtue of Sections 46 and 47 of the Arbitration Act and also by Section 37 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The provisions of Section 39, Arbitration Act would also apply to a case of an award under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The provisions of Section 39, Arbitration Act would also apply to a case of an award under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. A right of appeal has been expressly conferred by the provisions of the Arbitration Act read with Section 37 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It is not necessary that there should have been separate section in the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act providing a right of appeal. Section 12(6) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is no bar for an appeal because the decision of the arbitrator is final under sub-section (6) of the Section 12 only after the award has been made a rule of the court. Thus the alternative remedy of filing an appeal being available a writ petition will not lie in such a case." 19. The aforesaid view was confirmed by a Division Bench whose decision is reported in A.I.R. 1959 All. 717. 20. The Supreme Court in Charan Singh v. Babu Lal, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 57. approved of the aforesaid decisions of this Court. 21. Now let me take up the cases cited by the learned Standing Counsel. 22. In 1940 Oudh 30 it was laid down as under: "Section 5(2) bars not only a second appeal but revision also. The concluding sentence in Section 5(2) by necessary implication divests the High Court or Chief Court of the revisional jurisdiction conferred by Section 115, Civil Procedure Code Hence, no revision lies against the decision of the Appellate Court granting or refusing instalments." 23. In 1956 S.C. 153 it was laid down as under; "What distinguishes a court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide, the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide, the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether 6 having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court. Under Section 36(2) Representation of the People Act the returning officer has to examine the nomination paper and decide all objections which may be made thereto. This power is undoubtedly judicial in character. But in exercising this power, he is authorised to come to a decision 'after summary enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary." That means that the parties have no right to insist on producing evidence which they may desire to adduce in support of their case. There is no machinery provided for summoning of witnesses, or of compelling production of documents in an enquiry under Section 36. The returning officer is entitled to act suo motu in the matter. While the proceedings before the Election Tribunal approximate in all essential matters to proceedings in civil courts, the proceedings under Section 36 present a different picture. There is no lis, in which persons with opposing claims are entitled to have their rights adjudicated in a judicial manner, but an enquiry such as is usually conducted by an ad hoc tribunal entrusted with a quasi-judicial power. In other words, the function of the returning officer acting under Section 36 is judicial in character, but he is not to act judicially in discharging it. The returning officer deciding on the validity of a nomination paper under Section 36 (2) is not a court for the purpose of Section 195 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the result is that even as regards the charge under Section 193, I.P.C. the order of the Magistrate (Returning Officer) is not appealable, as the offence is not committed in or in relation to any proceeding in a court." 24. In 1965 S.C. it has been laid down as under: - "The expression 'final' prima facie connotes that an order passed on appeal under the Act is conclusive and no further appeal lies against it. In 1965 S.C. it has been laid down as under: - "The expression 'final' prima facie connotes that an order passed on appeal under the Act is conclusive and no further appeal lies against it. The last sentence in Section 43 of the Act, does not restrict the scope of the said expression; indeed, the said sentence imposes a further bar. The expression 'final' in the first part of Section 43 of the Act puts an end to a further appeal and the words 'shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding' bar collateral proceedings. The section imposes a total bar. The correctness of the judgment in appeal cannot be questioned by way of appeal or by way of collateral proceedings. It is true that the expression 'final' may have a restrictive meaning in other contexts, but in Section 43 of the Act such a restriction meaning cannot be given for Ch. VI of the Act provides for a hierarchy of tribunals for deciding disputes arising thereunder. The Act is a self-contained one and the intention of the Legislature was to provide an exhaustive code for disposing of the appeals under the Act. The opening words of Section 43 of the Act 'save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act' emphasise the fact that the finality of the order cannot be questioned by resorting to something outside the Act. An appeal disposed of by a single Judge of the High Court and the appeal from the judgment of the single Judge to a Division Bench thereof are different appeals. An appeal under Section 39 (1) of the Act and an appeal under Clause 10 if the Letters Patent does not form part of a single appeal. The expression 'appeal' in Section 39 of the Act does not take in a Letters Patent appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Therefore, an appeal does not lie under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent for the High Court of Lahore, to a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court against a judgment passed by a single Judge of the said High Court in a second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act." 25. Therefore, an appeal does not lie under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent for the High Court of Lahore, to a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court against a judgment passed by a single Judge of the said High Court in a second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act." 25. In 1965 S.C. 1442 it has been laid down as under: "The expression 'final' prima facie connotes that an order passed on appeal under the Act is conclusive and no further appeal lies against it. The last sentence in Section 43 of the Act, does not restrict the scope of the said expression: indeed, the said sentence imposes a further bar. The expression 'final' in the first part of Section 43 of the Act puts an end to a further appeal and the words 'shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding' bar collateral proceedings. The section imposes a total bar. The correctness of the judgment in appeal cannot be questioned by way of appeal or by way of collateral proceedings. It is true that the expression 'final' may have a restrictive meaning in other contexts, but in Section 43 of the Act such a restrictive meaning cannot be given for Ch. VI of the Act provides for a heirarchy of tribunals for deciding disputes arising thereunder. The Act is a self-contained one and the intention of the Legislature was to provide an exhaustive code for disposing of the appeals under the Act. The opening words of Section 43 of the Act 'save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act' emphasise the fact that the finality of the order cannot be questioned by resorting to something outside of the Act. An appeal disposed of by a single Judge of the High Court and the appeal from the judgment of the single Judge to a Division Bench thereof are different appeals. An appeal under Section 39(1) of the Act and an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent does not form part of a single appeal. The expression 'appeal' in Section 39 of the Act does not take in a Letters Patent appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. An appeal under Section 39(1) of the Act and an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent does not form part of a single appeal. The expression 'appeal' in Section 39 of the Act does not take in a Letters Patent appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Therefore, an appeal does not lie under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent for the High Court of Lahore, to a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court against a judgment passed by a single Judge of the said High Court in a second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act." 26. In 1970 A.L.J. 789 it is laid down as under: "A revision is no doubt maintainable against the ultimate order of the maintainable against conformity with the decision of the Civil Court under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it being the order of a Criminal Court, but sub-section (1-D) of Section 146, Cr.P.C., has been so drafted that it prohibits the revising of the finding of the Civil Court even though it might have 'merged in the decision of the Magistrate'. It provides 'nor shall any review or revision of any such finding be allowed.' This is a clear prohibition against the finding being reviewed or revised not only in a proceeding arising out of specific application for review or revision, but in any manner whatsoever, while there is a bar in sub-section (1-D) of Section 146 against the filing of an appeal against the finding itself the bar against review or revision is not only against an application for review or revision being filed but is against the finding being reviewed or revised in any manner whatsoever. The words used 'nor shall any review or revision of any such finding be allowed, are of wider import than the words 'no appeal shall lie', they are not equivalent to 'no review or revision shall lie', but they connote an absolute prohibition against any interference with the finding in any manner whatsoever. The words used 'nor shall any review or revision of any such finding be allowed, are of wider import than the words 'no appeal shall lie', they are not equivalent to 'no review or revision shall lie', but they connote an absolute prohibition against any interference with the finding in any manner whatsoever. In case the bar against interference had been meant to be restricted to an application in review or revision only against that finding directly, the words would have been, 'no review or revision shall lie from any finding of the Civil Court given on a reference under this section' rather than in the form in which it has been provided under the sub-section by not treating 'review or revision' at par with 'appeal'. Sub-section (1-D) of Section 146 clearly means that the finding shall not be interfered with by a superior court exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 435 or 439 of the Code even when it chooses to call for the record to look to the correctness, legality or propriety of the final order passed by the Magistrate disposing of the proceedings under Section 145. I Held, that in proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. when a reference is made to a Civil Court under Section 146(1), Cr.P.C. the finding of the Civil Court which cannot be challenged in appeal, revision or review cannot be challenged in revision against the order of the Magistrate after he has disposed of the proceedings before him under Section 145 in conformity with that finding." 27. In 1970 A.L.J. 1319 (F.B.) it is laid down as under: "It is well settled that the long title, the short title and the preamble provide a key to the interpretation of a statute. The provisions of the two Acts (U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 and U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act) also reveal that the objects of the two statutes under consideration are very different from each other. Whereas the purpose of the Act is to carve out 'surplus land' from the holding of a tenure-holder so that it could be distributed to the landless labourers or be utilised for public purpose the sole function of the Consolidation Act is to consolidate the scattered holdings in existence in Uttar Pradesh. It is true that the authorities functioning under both the Acts are Tribunals of limited jurisdiction. It is true that the authorities functioning under both the Acts are Tribunals of limited jurisdiction. It is well settled that limited Tribunals must act within the strict limits of the power or authority conferred upon them." 28. I have reviewed exhaustively the case law which was cited before me by the learned counsel of both the sides. In my view the District Judge wrongly thought that the Civil Judge who had disposed of the appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority was not acting as a civil court. It is not necessary for me to discuss the question whether the Prescribed Authority is a court or not under the provisions of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. The real point is whether the appellate authority under the said Act is a Civil Court or not. An appeal lies under Section 13 against an order passed under Section 11(2) and against an order under Section 12(1). Similarly, an appeal lies under Section 14(5) to the District Judge against an order passed by the Prescribed Authority under Section 14(4). While Section 37 refers to officers and authorities Section 38 refers to powers of the appellate court. I think this difference in the nomenclature is not without significance. The District Judge functions as an appellate court. The learned Standing Counsel expressly disclaimed that he was not contending that the District Judge was a persona designata under the said Act but he asserted that the District Judge functions not as a civil court but as a special tribunal. I find it difficult to accept this contention. The District Judge has been described as an appellate court whereas the Prescribed Authority has nowhere been described as a court. In Sections 13(1) and 14(5) that District Judge has been authorised to hear the appeal within whose jurisdiction the land or any part thereof is situate. This obviously refers to the territorial jurisdiction of the District Judge functioning as a civil Court. Section 38(1), in my view, was placed on the statute book by way of abundant caution and I think even without this express provision the District Judge as a civil court would be governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. This obviously refers to the territorial jurisdiction of the District Judge functioning as a civil Court. Section 38(1), in my view, was placed on the statute book by way of abundant caution and I think even without this express provision the District Judge as a civil court would be governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. In Section 38(2) it has been laid down that the District Judge will have the right to hear the appeal himself 'or transfer it for hearing to any Civil Judge subordinate to him'. This obviously refers to the subordination of the Civil Judge to the District Judge under the provisions of the C.P.C. in particular, to Section 3 of the said Code. I have found nothing in the cases cited by the learned Standing Counsel which would induce me to hold that the District Judge acting as an appellate court is ready not a court. I, therefore, conclude that the District Judge functioning as an appellate court under the aforesaid Act is a court and not a special tribunal. 29. However, I think, the impugned judgment of the District Judge can be upheld on an alternative ground which was not canvassed in the court below but which I am entitled to notice as the same is based on a pure question of interpretation of the statutory provision. Both in Sections 13 and 14 where provisions have been made for appeals to the District Judge, it has been clearly laid down that the decision of the District Judge in the appeal shall be final and conclusive and be not questioned in any court of law. I think this provision is a clear bar to the maintainability of any provision against the order of the Civil Judge. I think it cannot be suggested that an order passed by the District Judge himself deciding the appeal shall be final and conclusive and be not questioned in any court of law but an order passed by the Civil Judge disposing of the appeal (which has been transferred to him under Section 38(2) of the said Act) shall not be final and conclusive and can be questioned in a court of law. I think whether the appeal is disposed of by the District Judge himself or by the Civil Judge on transfer, the appellate order passed in both the situations will be final and conclusive and cannot be questioned in any court of law. Any other interpretation will lead to strange results and extraordinary discrimination. It is true that this Court has not agreed with the decision of the Oudh Chief Court in the Full Bench case reported in 1940 Oudh 33, as regards the meaning of the expression 'final'. However, in my view, the cases cited by Shri C.N. Verma learned counsel for the petitioner, are distinguishable on the ground that in none of those cases similar language has been used as has been used in Sections 13 and 14 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. It is not only that the appellate decision has been made final and conclusive; additionally, it has been said that it shall not be questioned in any court of law. I think a revision under Section 115, C.P.C. will also be hit by this prohibition laid down in Sections 13 and 14 of the said Act. I believe the observations in 1970 A.L.J. 789 go to support the view which I have taken. In this view of the matter, in my judgment the District Judge was right in the view which he took that the revision was not maintainable but not on the ground on which he decided the case. 30. I have not found it necessary to enter into the question whether if a revision were to be held to be maintainable it should have been preferred to this Court or it was rightly preferred to the District Judge. I have found some difficulty in coming to a decision on the said point in a situation where a Civil Judge decides an appeal on transfer from the District Judge. Whether a revision will lie to the District Judge against the appellate decision of the Civil Judge or the revision will lie to this Court directly has been a matter on which I have noticed some divergence in the case law and, therefore, in certain other cases I have directed the papers to be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief justice for constituting a larger Bench to decide the said controversy. However, in the instant case the point really does not arise inasmuch as I have held that the revision itself was not maintainable in view of the clear prohibition contained in Section 13(2) and Section 14(5) of the said Act. 31. Coming now to the merits of the appellate decision given by the civil Judge, I do not think I can interfere in the instant writ petition due to a variety of circumstances. It will be seen that the appeal decided by the Civil Judge was under Section 14 (5) of the said Act. Such an appeal is preferred against the decision of the Prescribed Authority under sub-section (3) of Section 14 which I lays down 'any person claiming interest as a tenure-holder or a lessee in possession from the tenure-holder, in the surplus land, in respect of which the Notification has been published, may, within 30 days thereof, file an objection before the Prescribed Authority indicating the extent of his interest in such land'. Neither the Notification under Section 14(1) has been placed before the Court nor a copy of the objection filed by the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority has been made an annexure to the writ petition. It is not before me while I am disposing of the writ petition. Therefore, no relief can be granted which will have the effect of in anyway modifying the Notification under Section 14(1) and similarly no relief can be granted allowing the objection of the petitioner which he filed before the Prescribed Authority. That is one aspect of the matter. Unless a copy of the objection be before me I cannot say what specific objections were taken by the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority-whether in the objections he set up his claim as a tenure-holder or he merely set-forth his claim as a transferee based on the sale deed in his favour. Further, the Full Bench in 1968 A.L.J. 292 has clearly laid down as under; "From the scheme of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, it is clear that there are only two parties before the Prescribed Authority, i.e. the tenure-holder and the State. The transferees are not parties before it and the Prescribed Authority has no jurisdiction to take into consideration their rights or to determine them." 32. The transferees are not parties before it and the Prescribed Authority has no jurisdiction to take into consideration their rights or to determine them." 32. Therefore, the Prescribed Authority could not consider the petitioner's rights as transferees and as I have stated above, there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner was seeking to canvas any claim on the basis of tenure-holdership. In my view, therefore, in the writ petition no relief can be granted to the petitioner and the petition is, therefore, dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.