JUDGMENT George Abraham Vadakkel, J. 1. In this petition the petitioner prays for certiorari quashing Exts.P-2 memo of charges and P-7 summons besides Exts.P-9 order and P-10 notification; the learned counsel for the petitioner, however, confined his case to Exts.P-9 and P-10. 2. The attack on Ext. P-9 order is that the 2nd respondent Board abandoning half-way an enquiry which was being held under the Kerala State Electricity Board Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations (briefly C.C.A. Regulations), and, invoking the Kerala State Electricity Board (Employees Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Regulations, 1969 (shortly, Tribunal Regulations) caused the 3rd respondent to hold the enquiry afresh in respect of the same delinquency. The submission is that, the 2nd respondent once decides upon one or the other of the authorities mentioned in regulation 16 (2) (b) of the C.C.A. Regulations as the authority to conduct a formal enquiry, the 2nd respondent is not competent to go back upon that decision and choose another authority as the enquiring authority. On the facts of this case, it is argued that the Board appointed its Chief Vigilance and Security Officer as Special Officer to conduct the formal enquiry as is evident from the order Ext. P-4, but, after the enquiry began the Board decided to have the enquiry conducted by Tribunal set up by the State (1st respondent) for disciplinary proceedings, and that the Board, as required by regulation 6 (c) of the Tribunal Regulations, requested the 1st respondent to refer the case to the Tribunal, whereupon the 1st respondent referred the case to the Tribunal (3rd respondent) as per Ext. P-9 order. (The Special Officer and the Tribunal are authorities mentioned in regulation 16 (2) (b) (v) of the C.C.A. Regulations). Relying on regulation 16 (2) (a) of the C.C.A. Regulations, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that, after the preliminary investigation contemplated by that clause is over, the investigating authority has to take a decision as to whether a formal enquiry is to be conducted or not, and if he decides to conduct such an enquiry, he has to forward the records of the case to one or the other of the several authorities or officers mentioned in clause (b) and order that a formal enquiry be conducted. The gist of the argument is that thereafter, and at any rate, after the authority directed or ordered to hold the formal enquiry has started functioning, the Board has no power to drop the proceedings and order a fresh enquiry by another authority. 3. The submissions are ingenious and attractive, but, I am afraid that they are devoid of merit. The proposition, if correct, should govern all cases and whatever be the stage at which the second enquiry authority is constituted; whether the first authority has started functioning or not is an irrelevant consideration; it is also immaterial as to who the first authority is: and equally so, as to who is chosen as the second authority. Acceptance of the proposition can, in my view, create a stalemate, at least in a case where the person who is constituted as the authority, by supervening disqualification, like bias or prejudice for whatsoever reason it be (and there can be innumerable reasons such as relationship, financial transactions, etc.) is unable to continue as the enquiry authority, but is not disqualified to hold the office by virtue of which he happens to be so constituted, (for example Head of the Department, Appointing Authority) so that there is no question of a successor-in-office coming in; the authority constituted cannot continue the proceedings and no other authority can be constituted. It would defeat the very purpose of the regulations. The regulations are framed under section 7(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, and are therefore statutory in character. They are to be construed so as to further the purpose for which they are framed. 'The office of the Judge is to make such construction as will suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress all evasions for the continuance of the mischief. (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn, pp. 96 and 137). No precedent was cited before me. Nor does the Act prohibit such a course. I am not prepared to hold that the Board is incompetent to withdraw the proceedings from one authority, and direct another authority to hold the enquiry afresh. There may be instances when this Court can and may come to the aid of a person against whom an enquiry afresh by another authority is ordered mala fide or in colourable exercise of jurisdiction, or for victimisation or harassment. But that is a different aspect altogether. There may be instances when this Court can and may come to the aid of a person against whom an enquiry afresh by another authority is ordered mala fide or in colourable exercise of jurisdiction, or for victimisation or harassment. But that is a different aspect altogether. No such case was argued before me nor was any material placed before me, to come to any such conclusion. Colourable exercise of a power has to be established by the party pleading it. The attack on Ext. P-9 order fails. 4. Under section 9 (2) of the Kerala Enquiries and Summonses Act, 1960, as amended in 1962, the 1st respondent is enabled to confer on officers like the 3rd respondent power to issue summonses for appearance, for production of documents, etc. Ext. P-10 is such a notification issued under section 9(2). According to the petitioner the enquiry directed to be held by the 3rd respondent does not concern the conduct of a public servant, a condition necessary to attract section 9 (2). 5. Here, I have to examine the preliminary objection raised by the learned Government counsel, and that is: the petitioner has no locus standi to move for certiorari to quash Ext. P-10 notification. In short the argument is that none but the person summoned or required to furnish evidence (for convenience, the witness) can protest against testimonial compulsion the expression, understood in its larger meaning, i.e., none without authority of law can compel another to give evidence. The question is: can anyone other than the witness to whom process is issued requiring him to furnish evidence object to such act or to the conferment of power to issue processes. I am for this part of the case assuming that issue of processes under power obtained by Ext. P-10 notification by the 3rd respondent amounts to compulsion, and also that Ext. P-10 notification is, in law, incapable to invest him with any power to issue processes. 6. It is well-settled that the most stringent of the rules evolved out of the protection afforded by law against testimonial compulsion, a rule which has been elevated to the status of constitutional guarantee in many countries including ours (in England it is only a rule of evidence) viz., a person accused of an offence shall not be compelled to be witness against himself can be waived by the accused. That, evidence given voluntarily is not hit by Article 20 (3) of the Constitution is recognized in T.G. Gaokar v. R.N Shukla A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1050. The same court in an earlier case, M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi 1954 S.C.R. 1077 in discussing the scope of Article 20 (3) said: "Whether it (protection) is available to other persons in other situations does not call for decision in this case."� The scope of the principle is discussed in one of the earliest cases of the Supreme Court of United States of America, Brown v. Walker 161 U.S. 591-40 Law Edn. 819 as follows: "Stringent as the general rule is, however, certain classes of cases have always been treated as not falling within the reason of the rule, and therefore constituting apparent exceptions. When examined, these cases will all be found to be based upon the idea that, if the testimony sought cannot possibly be used as a basis for, or in aid of, a criminal prosecution against the witness, the rule ceases to apply, its object being to protect the witness himself and no one else much less that it shall be made use of as a pretext for securing immunity to others. Thus, if the witness himself elects to waive his privilege, as he may doubtless do, since the privilege is for his protection and not for that of other parties, and discloses his criminal connections, he is not permitted to stop, but must go on and make a full disclosure" This passage makes it clear that the object of the rule is to protect the witness himself and no one else, and that the witness may elect to waive the privilege since it is for his protection and not for that of other parties. 7. No decision was cited at the bar to support the theory that a party to the proceedings is entitled to question the power of the authority issuing processes. As seen from the discussion above made, constitutional guarantee afforded to an accused person is only for his benefit and, he can waive the same since it is not for the protection of others. As seen from the discussion above made, constitutional guarantee afforded to an accused person is only for his benefit and, he can waive the same since it is not for the protection of others. Likewise, in my view, protection against testimonial compulsion in situations other than those envisaged by Article 20 (3) and afforded to persons other than those accused of an offence, is only for the benefit of those persons, who, for that reason, are free to waive the same. The protection afforded in both instances, is, after all, only against compulsion. I am of the view, that a person in the position of the petitioner before me, is not competent to challenge the conferment of power on the 3rd respondent to issue processes as provided for in section 9 (2) of the Act, though the evidence furnished by witnesses in pursuance of such processes could (and would) be used against him. Even assuming that Ext. P-10 notification is in law incapable of conferring the powers it purports to have conferred on the 3rd respondent, still, it is purely a matter for the witness to decide whether he should honour the summons served on him, whether he should appear in compliance thereto, whether he should answer the questions put to him or should make the discovery or produce the documents as required of him by the 3rd respondent. He can, if he so chooses dispute and question the competency and authority of the 3rd respondent at every stage; he can defy the summonses and can treat himself as not bound to answer all or any of the questions put to him. Equally so he can, with immunity, refuse to make the discovery or to produce the document. In short, even if it be a case of no jurisdiction on the part of the 3rd respondent to take out steps under section 9 (2), the witness can waive the want of jurisdiction and furnish evidence. To put it in a nut shell, it is for him (the witness) and only for him, to decide whether to keep mum or to co-operate in the enquiry. 8. To put it in a nut shell, it is for him (the witness) and only for him, to decide whether to keep mum or to co-operate in the enquiry. 8. I am reminded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that his client is one who will be affected by the evidence, and that therefore, one who is interested in the notification; that he is not a mere busy body who seeks to interfere in things which do not concern him, but one who has a genuine grievance about the notification in that it will prejudicially affect him. But the difficulty in his (petitioner) way is that there is another person, the witness, who is immediately and primarily affected by the notification as well as by the summons that might be (or might have been it is stated at the bar that the examination of witnesses is over) issued by the 3rd respondent in pursuance of the notification, and in purported (I am assuming, without deciding) exercise of his power under the Act: a person who can waive want of power on the part of the 3rd respondent. So far as the petitioner is concerned, with reference to Ext. P-10 notification, he can be said to be only one who is likely to be affected, if two contingencies happen, the witness obeys the summons and he speaks or otherwise furnishes evidence against the petitioner. Since the happening of these two contingencies depends upon the personal volition of the witness, in my view, the petitioner is not entitled to question the conferment of the power on the 3rd respondent, nor the issue of summons by him, nor the furnishing of the evidence by the witness. To the rule, that no one without power can procure by coercion the positive volitional evidentiary acts of another (testimony is every positive volitional act of a person which furnishes evidence) Sharma case 1954 S.C.R. 1077, there is a sequel, a principle deducible from the rule: No one can stop a person from giving evidence on his own volition, be it in pursuance of summonses and other processes taken out competently, or be it, as a result of such processes taken out incompetently. 9. Two decisions of this Court were cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the argument that Ext. 9. Two decisions of this Court were cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the argument that Ext. P-10 notification cannot confer any power on the 3rd respondent to issue summonses, Alexander v. State of Kerala 1971 K.L.T. 749 and State of Kerala v. P. J. Alexander 1972 (I) L.L.J. 869, the latter confirming the first said decision. By a notification, similar to Ext. P-10 notification, issued under section 9 (2) of the Act, the State purported to confer power on the Inquiring Authority constituted under rule 8 (2) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, the powers of a civil court mentioned in section 9 (2) (a) to (f). The learned Single Judge held: "So far as the inquiry against the petitioner is concerned, the effect of Ext. P-2 is to make certain additions to the provisions of the All India Services Rules. That is clearly an invasion by the State into a subject exclusively allotted for the Centre. The All India Services Act and the Rubs framed thereunder fully provide for and are exhaustive regarding inquiries conducted under them. The State is incompetent to add provisions to them and that is what it has done by Ext. P-2."� The Division Bench which heard the appeal thus summarised the case: "We do not propose to go into details in this case. Both parties agree that the inquiry is held under, the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules of 1969. Both parties also agree that, under the said rules, the Tribunal had no power, which a Civil Court had, under the Code of Civil Procedure. Both parties further agree that it was this lacuna that was sought to be filled up by Ext. P-2". and said: "If the Tribunal has no such powers (it is conceded more or less that it was because the Tribunal had no such powers that Ext. P-2 was passed), then certainly the State Government has no power to pass an order like Ext. P-2 conferring additional powers on the Tribunal. It may also be noted that Ext. P-2 was passed under section 9 of the Kerala Enquiries and Summonses Act of 1960 as amended by Amendment Act of 1962, which applied only to inquiries against State officers and not against All India Services officers. P-2 conferring additional powers on the Tribunal. It may also be noted that Ext. P-2 was passed under section 9 of the Kerala Enquiries and Summonses Act of 1960 as amended by Amendment Act of 1962, which applied only to inquiries against State officers and not against All India Services officers. Therefore, by taking power under the said Act, no power can be conferred on a Tribunal functioning under the All India Services Rules."� As stated earlier while examining the preliminary objection, for the purpose of that discussion I assumed (without deciding) that section 9 (2) cannot be invoked by the 1st respondent, and I proceeded to discuss the objection on the basis that the 1st respondent was not competent to issue Ext. P-10 notification for the reason that the petitioner is not a public servant. (So far as this case is concerned, it is not disputed that the 3rd respondent is, if, as held by me, Ext. P-9 order is valid, an officer deputed by the 1st respondent legally and competently). However, the question raised by way of preliminary objection is not about the effect of Ext. P-10 notification, but as to who can raise the question. Such a question was not raised in the aforesaid decisions, Therefore, these decisions are not in any way helpful to the petitioner to get over the preliminary objection pertinently raised and successfully canvassed for by Mr. Sukumaran, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent. 10. I sustain the preliminary objection regarding the competency of the petitioner to challenge Ext. P-10 notification. The petitioner is not competent to challenge the same. I make it clear that I have not pronounced upon the competency or otherwise of the 1st respondent to issue the same, nor as to whether the petitioner is a public servant within the meaning of that expression in section 9 (2) of the Act, nor also as to whether the 3rd respondent has derived the powers of a civil court in respect of the matters enumerated in section 9 (2) of the Act by virtue of Ext. P-10 notification. 11. The Original Petition fails and the same is dismissed, however, without any orders as to costs.