JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - The Plaintiff sued for a declaration that he was the adopted son of Defendant No. 1 and claimed that the alienation made by Defendant No. 1 on 10-10-1966 in favour of Defendants 2 and 3 was a sham transaction, not affecting his interest in the property. It was further alleged that the Defendant No. 1 had executed a valid deed of adoption on 2-7-1956 (Ext. 4) on the day following the actual adoption which he cancelled on 11-10-1966 (Ext. 5) on the plea that the Plaintiff refused to come and stay with him. 2. The Defendants 1 to 4 filed a joint written statement and claimed that the disputed property was the self-acquisition of the Defendant No. 1. There was no adoption of the Plaintiff by the Defendant No. 1 and the deed of adoption said to have been executed by Defendant No. 1 was a fraudulent one which had been manipulated by the natural father of the Plaintiff. Having come to know of the fact that he had been duped, the Defendant No. 1 had already cancelled the deed of adoption. The sale in favour of Defendants 2 and 3 was said to be consideration and on ground of pressing necessity. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge came to find that the Plaintiff was the adopted son of the Defendant No. 1. The disputed property was found to be the self-acquisition of Defendant No. 1, and the sale by Defendant No. 1 in favour of Defendants 2 and 3 was therefore, valid and it was otherwise binding. Accordingly, while declaring the Plaintiff to be the adopted son of Defendant No. 1, he dismissed the other relief of the sale deed in favour of Defendants 2 and 3 being set aside. 4. The Plaintiff did not challenge the finding in regard to the alienation. The same has, therefore, assumed finality. The Defendants filed on appeal challenging the finding of adoption. The lower appellate Court reversed the finding regarding adoption and directed dismissal of the suit. This second appeal has been carried against the reversing decree of the learned Additional District Judge. 5. Ordinarily the question of adoption would be one of fact and there would be hardly any scope to entertain a dispute in relation to it in second appeal. Mr. This second appeal has been carried against the reversing decree of the learned Additional District Judge. 5. Ordinarily the question of adoption would be one of fact and there would be hardly any scope to entertain a dispute in relation to it in second appeal. Mr. Patnaik for the Appellant, however, contends that the judgment of the lower appellate Court is not in accordance with law; materials on record which were referred to by the learned Trial Judge have been overlooked. There has been no appropriate discussion of the evidence and though it is a judgment of reversal, reasonings have not been given for differing with the trial Court and the finding has been reversed without any justification indicated in the judgment. 6. In support of the claim of adoption on behalf of the Plaintiff, both oral and documentary evidence had been adduced. As far as the documents are concerned, they consist of the school admission register (Ext. 1) wherein the Plaintiff has been described as the son of Defendant No. 1. p.w. 1, the Head Pandit, came and proved the signature of the Defendant No. 1 in the said document. It is true that the Defendant No. 1 disputed his signature in the document. As d.w. 5, he stated: I never went to school for admission of the Plaintiff nor I signed in any admission register. P.W. 1 is the Head Pandit. In cross-examination, it has been brought out that he is on agnate of the Plaintiff Defendant No. 1. He stated that the Defendant No. 1 got the Plaintiff admitted into the school, supplied the details which were incorporated in the admission register and signed in the admission register as appearing in Ext. 1. The learned Trial Judge accepted p.w. 1. The lower appellate Court has given no reasons as to why p.w. 1 should be discarded. It is true that the Defendant No. 1 has denied his signature, but in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Lower appellate Court had no justification to discard Ext. 1. The other documents relied upon are Ext. 4 the deed of adoption as also Ext. 5 the deed of cancellation. That the Defendant No. 1 executed a deed of adoption is not in dispute. 1. The other documents relied upon are Ext. 4 the deed of adoption as also Ext. 5 the deed of cancellation. That the Defendant No. 1 executed a deed of adoption is not in dispute. In paragraph 8 of the written statement, it was pleaded: ...The Defendant No. 1 never wanted to take the Plaintiff in adoption nor did he take him in adoption on 1-7-1956 or on any other day nor is there any reason to believe the factum of adoption. No giving and taking ceremony was performed regarding the alleged adoption nor did the Defendant No. 1 execute or register a deed of adoption on 2-7-1956. There was a dispute between the Plaintiffs father Madan Mohan Das and Defendant No. 1 regarding a boundary wall. It was settled by the mediation of some gentlemen that the Plaintiff's father and Defendant No. 1 would execute a joint registered agreement relating to the dispute and Defendant No. 1 only knows some how to sign, he is otherwise is illiterate. Therefore, the Defendant No. 1 relying on the representation of Plaintiff's father executed a document and got it registered without knowing the contents of the document.... The certified copy of the deed of adoption was received in evidence on 2-8-1968. The learned Trial Judge found that due notice had been given as required under the law to the Defendant No. 1 through his counsel to produce the original of the deed of adoption. In the plaint assertion had been made that the original of the deed of adoption was with the Defendant No. 1. There was no dispute of this fact in the written statement. Therefore, custody of the original deed of adoption was accepted to be with the Defendant No. 1. In spite of notice to produce the document, the same was not placed before the Court. Foundation for receiving secondary evidence as required under the Evidence Act has thus been laid. The register maintained in the Sub-Registrar's office was produced before the learned Trial Judge and was exhibited. A copy thereof is Ext. 4. There is a categorical admission in this deed that the Defendant No. 1 had adopted the plain tiff in a formal ceremony in accordance with law in the presence of relations, friends and gentlemen of the locality. The learned Appellate Judge in his judgment made the following comment. A copy thereof is Ext. 4. There is a categorical admission in this deed that the Defendant No. 1 had adopted the plain tiff in a formal ceremony in accordance with law in the presence of relations, friends and gentlemen of the locality. The learned Appellate Judge in his judgment made the following comment. There is no convincing evidence as to what happened to the original of Ext. 4. In the absence of loss of, the same, Ext. 4 cannot be admitted as secondary evidence.... This comment was unwarranted in view of what had been stated in the judgment of the trial Court. The order sheet of the trial Court dated 20th of February, 1968 contains the direction at the instance of the Plaintiff for production of the document by Defendant No. 1. In terms of that day's order, at page 36 of the lower Court records, the receipt of service of the notice on counsel for the Defendant No. 1 is available. The learned Appellate Judge failed to apply his mind to the record and ruled out Ext. 4 without the slightest justification. The comment of the learned Appellate Judge- There is recital in Ext. 4 to the effect that the Defendant No. 1 adopted the Plaintiff as his son, but there is no recital that there was giving and taking ceremony in the adoption seems to be equally without any basis. In Ext. 4, there is a clear narration that the adoption ceremony had been performed by following the appropriate rites. The Defendant No. 1 has been described to be a man of 58. In Ext. 4 there is narration that no son was born to him, his wife was dead and there was no scope for begetting a son and, therefore, the Defendant No. 1 wanted to adopt a son. He obtained the consent of Madan and his wife, the natural parents of the Plaintiff, and in the presence of caste people, friends and Bhadraloks, there was due ceremony of adoption by performing the appropriate rites. Unless, Ext. 4 is established to be a fraudulent document, the burden of which was certainly on the Defendant No. 1, this document does contain on admission and is available to be used in support of the Plaintiff's claim. The next document is the deed of cancellation. Unless, Ext. 4 is established to be a fraudulent document, the burden of which was certainly on the Defendant No. 1, this document does contain on admission and is available to be used in support of the Plaintiff's claim. The next document is the deed of cancellation. That a deed of cancellation was executed on 11-10-1966 by the Defendant No. 1 is admitted in paragraph 12 of the written statement. The Plaintiff required the Defendant No. 1 to produce the original of this deed and there was a similar direction. The Defendant No. 1 made a statement that the document was not in his custody. The learned Trial Judge did not believe him and proceeded to accept the certified copy after the Sub-Registrar's Book was produced in the Court and was duly exhibited. This document was received in Court without objection and was marked as Ext. 5. Later in the day. In application appears to have been filed objecting to receipt of this document. The learned trial Judge did not deal with this aspect of the matter though on that day in the order sheet he directed that the matter would be examined in the judgment. The lower appellate Court did not deal with this matter at all. Before me, however, a serious controversy was raised as to the admissibility of Ext. 5. Mr. Mohapatra for the Respondents claimed that until it was established that the original of Ext. 5 was with the Defendant No. 1 and in spite of notice he was not producing it, the foundation for receiving secondary evidence of this document was not laid and the learned Trial Judge made a mistake in receiving such evidence. Mr. Patnaik for the Appellant on the other hand, takes the stand that such a contention is not open to be raised after the document has been exhibited. The question that is raised has often arisen for consideration of Courts and usually the dictum of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of AIR 1943 83 (Privy Council), is referred to as the guideline. In the case of Dula Dei and Others Vs. Jadi Bewa and Others Barman, J as he then was in this Court observed: The sale deed Ext. B, dated June 6,1940 was proved by Defendant No. 6 as d.w. 6. The learned lower appellate Court discarded Ext. In the case of Dula Dei and Others Vs. Jadi Bewa and Others Barman, J as he then was in this Court observed: The sale deed Ext. B, dated June 6,1940 was proved by Defendant No. 6 as d.w. 6. The learned lower appellate Court discarded Ext. B as according to him this document has been properly proved for neither the scribe nor the identifier has been examined to prove the certified copy of the document. It, however, appears from record that the document was admitted as on exhibit without objection. The learned lower appellate Court made on error in law in so discarding the document. It is settled law as decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council that where the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof put forward is irregular or insufficient, it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial before the document is marked as on exhibit and admitted to the record.... In the case of Kamal Lochan Pujhari v. Mitrabhanu Biswal 32 (1966) C.L.T. 343, Narasimham C.J. referred to the dictum of the Privy Council and a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M. Ramappa v. M. Bojiappa 1964 S.C.D. 358, and stated: ...It must therefore be held that by allowing this document to be marked as on exhibit without objection-on the very date on which Plaintiff No. 1 was specially questioned about the will and he gave unsatisfactory answers, Plaintiff No. 1 waived, his right to raise formal objection to the production of the secondary evidence of the original will which as already shown, was in his custody.... In the case of Annapurna Sahuani Vs. Narendra Prasad Sahu and Others a Bench of this Court again dealt with the same problem and it was stated: ...Law is well settled that if the objection confined only to the mode of proof, it must be taken at the earliest point of time when the documents are tendered in evidence in the trial Court. The objection is not permissible to be raised at a subsequent stage or in appeal. A similar contention was raised when a copy of a registered will was admitted in evidence without sufficient foundation being laid for its admission. The objection is not permissible to be raised at a subsequent stage or in appeal. A similar contention was raised when a copy of a registered will was admitted in evidence without sufficient foundation being laid for its admission. The contention w 18 overruled in Padman v. Hanwanta AIR 1915 P.C. 3, as the objection had not been taken at the appropriate stage.... A Full Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Balakrishna v. Ganesa AIR 1954 TC 209, also took the same view. There is no dispute that at the time when the certified copy of the deed of cancellation was received in evidence as Ext. 5, no objection was raised. As the record shows, later on application was filed objecting to the reception of secondary evidence of the document. This objection certainly was not to be accepted and the learned trial Judge, therefore, had rightly accepted secondary evidence of the deed of cancellation. Mr. Mohapatra next contended that it had not been established by the Plaintiff that Ext. 5 was the deed of cancelation executed by the Defendant No. 1. This contention is on the footing that Defendant No. 1 had stated that the deed of cancellation had been scribed by a person different from the person who has scribed the original of Ext. 6. That the Defendant No. 1 was not speaking the truth is clear from the feature that in Ext. 4 there is on endorsement (Ext. 4/A) saying that by the original of Ext. 5, the said adoption deed has been cancelled. That apart, the trial Court had given cogent reasons which have not at all been dealt with by the lower appellate Court in regard to the acceptability of the original of Ext. 5 as the deed of cancellation. I do not think, there is force in Mr. Mohapatra's contention that the original of Ext. 5 is not the deed of cancellation. In this deed of cancellation there is on admission that the Plaintiff had been taken in adoption. The learned Trial Judge rightly came to hold that the defence story that this narration had been got incorporated by the Plaintiff's natural father in a fraudulent way has no legs to stand upon. The natural father of the Plaintiff (p.w. 7) and the Defendant No. 1 are close relations. The learned Trial Judge rightly came to hold that the defence story that this narration had been got incorporated by the Plaintiff's natural father in a fraudulent way has no legs to stand upon. The natural father of the Plaintiff (p.w. 7) and the Defendant No. 1 are close relations. The defence plea is that Defendant No. 1 realised that he had been duped by p.w. 7 and, therefore, wanted to have cancellation of the deed of adoption. Once he knew that p.w. 7 had duped him in taking Ext. 4 from him, for the preparation of Ext. 5, p.w. 7 could not have been relied upon and there could be no scope for p.w. 7 to manipulate the narrations in the cancellation deed. 7. On the basis of the documentary evidence, therefore, there is enough material to show that there had been on adoption. According to the trial Court, the oral evidence corroborated the Plaintiff's story of giving and taking. The learned Appellate Judge having discarded this weighty documentary Evidence was not prepared to attach importance to the oral evidence. The appellate Court also lost sight of this broad features in the case, namely that Defendant No. 1 was old and was a widower p.w. 7 and the Defendant No. 1 were close relations. Therefore, the question of adoption would have been prima facie acceptable. The admissions contained in the several documents (Exts. 1,4 and 5) were also' weighty pieces of evidence which certainly go a long way to support the oral evidence of the factum of adoption by following, the prescribed rites. p.w. 6, a neighbour of the Defendant No. 1 came to support the claim of adoption. There is nothing in his evidence to disbelieve him. p.w. 7, the natural father of the Plaintiff has also come to support the claim of adoption. These two witnesses have spoken about living and taking. It is true that It is in p.w. 7's interest to support the claim of adoption. If his deposition was not supported by Defendant's own admissions, it may have been necessary to look for corroboration. 8. In view of what has been stated above, the only conclusion that can be reached is that the lower appellate Court vacated the judgment of the trial Court without assessing the material on record and by overlooking material features available in the record. 8. In view of what has been stated above, the only conclusion that can be reached is that the lower appellate Court vacated the judgment of the trial Court without assessing the material on record and by overlooking material features available in the record. The judgment of the lower appellate court is thus vitiated. 9. I would accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the appellate Court and direct that those of the trial Court be restored. The net result, therefore, would be that the Plaintiff be declared as the adopted son of Defendant No. 1, but the claim to set aside the alienation is refused as the decree of the trial Court in that regard has become final. In view of the relationship of the parties, it is appropriate to direct them to bear their own costs throughout. Final Result : Allowed