JUDGMENT-The only question that can be reasonably considered in the present petition is whether the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal which is a Court of appeal under section 33 under the provisions of the Maharashtra Agricuiiural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 was justified in taking the view, firstly, that the appeal was barred by time and secondly, that there was no good ground to condone the delay in filing the appeal. 2. The other part of the order as is reflected in paragraph 9 of the Tribunal’s order holding that the petitioner landholder was having surplus land to the extent, of 46 acres, 12 gunthas, is not in dispute. If the appeal is held to be in time or the delay caused in filing the appeal was liable to be excused, the result will be that the, present petitioner would be adjudged as having surplus land to that extent. 3. The present proceedings were started before the Special Deputy Collector, Land Reforms at Yeotmal. After the enquiry which appears to have been completed at 'Wani on 11-9-1970 the case was fixed for arguments at Yeotmal on 23rd of September 1970. The land-holder was represented by his counsel and arguments Were heard on that day. The order-sheet shows that the landholder was directed to file selection before 30-9-1970 and the case was closed for orders. On the next date, i.e. 30th, it does not appear that counsel appeared before the authority. The order-sheet states that none was present and orders passed. It was further stated that the order should be communicated. It was directed that notice to the landholder for the purpose of statement was also to be issued. On 24-10-1970 notice was directed to be issued to the landholder. On 6-11-1970 order-sheet reads that the Officer could not go to Wani due to work in the office. The matter was then posted to 20-11-1970 at Wani. It does not appear that though order-sheet of September 30, 1970 directed communication of the passing of the orders any step was taken by the office of the Special Deputy Collector to give effect to that order. After receipt of the notice relating to selection, the landholder applied for copy on 10-12-1970 and got it on 19-12-1970 and filed the appeal on 22-12-1970. 4. After receipt of the notice relating to selection, the landholder applied for copy on 10-12-1970 and got it on 19-12-1970 and filed the appeal on 22-12-1970. 4. Under section 35 of the Act the appeal is required to be filed in 60 days from the date of the declaration. Thus taking the date as 30-9.1970 as the date of declaration under section 21, the filing of the appeal on 22nd December 1970 would be barred by time. 5. This view has been taken by the Tribunal on the footing that proper declaration was made on 30-9-1970 as the landholder was present on the earlier date by his counsel and the earlier order-sheet had given the date as 30-9-1970. No exception can be taken to that approach which is available on the record itself. This appeal would be barred by time. 6. However, the question is whether the Tribunal, in all fairness, should or should not have exercised its powers to condone the delay. The records indicate that on 30-9-1970 the advocate who was engaged by the landholder was not present. It does not indicate that the date of the passing of the order was in fact made known to the landholder himself. That being the position, the authority in its discretion had directed that the landholder should be communicated with the making of the declaration or the passing of the order. In fact such a communication did not reach. The material in that respect is available on record. It is only after coming to know that the order is made, the landholder moved in the matter and obtained the certified copy. Even the order of the authority directing communication of the declaration to the landholder is evidence of the fact that the landholder was not aware of the making of the declaration. The fact that the landholder had engaged counsel would not be decisive in such matters for it is the landholder who must possess of the knowledge of the fact of making of the order. Therefore all of the attending circumstances should be taken into account before the question whether sufficient cause has been made out or not can be fairly decided. There was nothing to indicate that the landholder had set up the plea of ignorance as an afterthought or he was not acting bona fide. Therefore all of the attending circumstances should be taken into account before the question whether sufficient cause has been made out or not can be fairly decided. There was nothing to indicate that the landholder had set up the plea of ignorance as an afterthought or he was not acting bona fide. He had taken on the other hand all the steps and had engaged the lawyer. His affidavit, therefore, that he was not aware of the declaration till he received the notice ought to have been accepted, particularly when valuable rights in property were involved in such matters. 7. It is not expected of the State in such serious proceeding to stand by the technicalities by putting forth or supporting such pleas of limitation and consequent denial of relief in appeal. Purpose of the Ceiling Act which takes away the landed property of the citizen or restricts his right under the provisions of the Act in that regard would be frustrated if the authorities uphold such technical approaches avoiding broad, fair and liberal treatment of the cause before them. Bona fide claimants who are neither aware of the orders made nor are present when the same are written would heavily suffer. Concept of "sufficient cause" as understood by law of limitation no doubt puts the burden on the party to 'satisfy the authority about it while applying the same, 'however, no rigid or static straight jacket formula can be conceived. The nature of remedy, the rights that are being affected, the complete of the proceedings as disclosed by the record along with the conduct of the party all must be 'weighed together; Even the factor that there is no other party who can seeks to assert of getting any valuable right by the bar of limitation just like in civil senses, should assume its own importance in ceiling proceedings. Strictly speaking there is no is as such between State and the landholder. The enquiry .is statutory and proceedings are compulsive. The citizen therefore as far as possible upon proof of bona fides in appealing to the authority and furnishing reasonable grounds in explaining the time should not be refused the remedy of appeal. Here was a landholder who was obviously prosecuting the proceedings diligently and as soon as he became aware of the order had taken steps to file the appeal. Here was a landholder who was obviously prosecuting the proceedings diligently and as soon as he became aware of the order had taken steps to file the appeal. The order was to be communicated to him and was not as such communicated. That was a factor that supported landholder's affidavit in that regard. The Tribunal was therefore not justified in refusing to condone the delay in appeal. 8. Under the facts and circumstances, therefore, the delay has been properly explained and the appeal was to be adjudged as filed within time upon excuse or condoning the excess time taken in presenting the same. 9. Once this finding is reached and the order of the Tribunal that the delay was not liable to be excused set aside, the result is that the other part as indicated above in that the present petitioner-landholder has a surplus to die extent of 46 acres and 12 gunthas has to be restored. 10. The Tribunal remarked that because the tenants against whom no relief was sought were not made parties there was defect in institution of the appeal. That was patently erroneous approach. Provisions of section 33 of the Act which permit an appeal by aggrieved persons do not indicate that any other person must be joined as necessary party. It is the person who is affected by an order of the Collector who is clothed with a right of an appeal. To that appeal, reasonably, he is only the complaining party. Such appeals should in all propriety be heard in the presence of the State and, therefore, the State is proper and necessary party. If there is any contest between other persons, they may also be joined initially or later on directed to be joined as parties. But non-joinder of any of such parties would not tender the appeal itself incompetent. In the nature of things the appeal is continuation of the grievance against an order, declaration etc. made under section 21 of the Act and not a lis independent thereof. Same powers which are exercised by the original authority would also be available and exercisable by the appellate authority. The view expressed by the Tribunal to the effect that merely because the tenants against whom no relief in appeal was claimed were not before the Tribunal the appeal was not properly constituted, cannot be sanctioned. Same powers which are exercised by the original authority would also be available and exercisable by the appellate authority. The view expressed by the Tribunal to the effect that merely because the tenants against whom no relief in appeal was claimed were not before the Tribunal the appeal was not properly constituted, cannot be sanctioned. In the text of the 'Act there is no warrant for such an assumption. Everyone who participates in an enquiry under section 14 or 17 leading up to declarations or orders under section 21 need not be joined initially. For here appeal is more or less a statutory petition for reversal of orders, declarations etc. that affect the appealee. Tribunal would be fully competent to direct joinder of parties if it felt that any question requires the presence of such a person or party. Non-joinder however, would not result in dismissal of the appeal itself. 11. As a sequal to the above the present petition is allowed. The order refusing to condone delay is set aside, so also it is found that appeal was, properly constituted. It is further held as declared in paragraph 9 of the order; of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal that the landholder the present petitioner has surplus land to the extent of 46 acres 12 gunthas and proceedings on that basis will now ensue. Under the circumstances, there would however be no orders as to costs. Petition allowed.