Order.-In these criminal revision petitions orders passed by the various Sessions Judges in the State in revision and also interlocutory orders passed by the Magistrates have been challenged. 2. As those criminal revision petitions give rise to certain common questions of law they have been heard together and disposed of by a common order. 3. The question that arises for decision in Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 571, 577, 578, 579 and 274 of 1974 is whether a revision under section 397 of the Code, of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (to be hereinafter referred to as the "new Code") is maintainable before this Court against the order passed by the Sessions Judge in revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (to be hereinafter referred to as the "old Code") before the "new New Code, came into force on 1st April, 1974. 4. The question that arises for decision in Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 576 and 632 to 643 of 1974 is whether a revision is maintainable before this Court against an interlocutory order passed before the new Code came into force. 5. Those questions arise in this way. In Criminal Revision Petition No. 571 of 1974 the petitioner has challenged the judgment, dated nth January, 1974 passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions judge, Bangalore, in Cr.R.P. No. 34 of 1973, dismissing the appeal filed by him and confirming the order dated 30th July, 1973 passed by the J.M.F.C, Doddaballapur, in C.C No. 781 of 1971, wherein the learned Magistrate has held that at best the accused would have committed an offence under section 447, Indian Penal Code, and posted it for statement under section 243, Criminal Procedure Code. 6. In Criminal Revision Petition No. 577 of 1974, the State (Petitioner) has challenged the order passed by the Sessions Judge, Bijapur, on 19th February, 1974 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 29 of 1973 dismissing the revision petition and confirming the judgment dated 5th July, 1973 passed by the Additional Munsiff and J.M.F.C, Bagalkot, in C,C. No. 984 of 1973, wherein the petitioner was convicted for offences under sections 279, 337 and 338, Indian Penal Code, and sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 50 for each offence and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for three days for each default. 7. 50 for each offence and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for three days for each default. 7. In Criminal Revision Petition No. 578 of 1974 the petitioners have challenged the order dated 2nd May, 1974 passed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Belgaum, in Criminal Revision Application No.22 of 1974 dismissing the appeal as not maintainable and confirming the order dated 1st January, 1974 passed by the J.M.F.C., Belgaum City, in C.C. No. 76 of 1974 ordering summons to the petitioners to appear before the Court on a complaint filed by the complainant for offences punishable under sections 126, 127 read with section 276 of the Mysore (Karnataka) Municipalities Act, 1964, and under section 420 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 8. In Criminal Revision Petition No. 579 of 1974, the petitioner his challenged the order dated 9th January, 1974 passed by the Sessions Judge, Raichur, in Criminal Revision Petition No. 14, of 1973 dismissing the revision petition and confirming the order dated 2nd June, 1974 passed by the Munsiff-Magistrate, Raichur, in C.C. No. 428 of 1973 discharging the accused in that case for an offence under section 500, Indian Penal Code. 9. In Criminal Revision Petition No. 274 of 1974 the petitioner has challenged the order dated 10th December. 1973 passed by the Sessions Judge, Dharwar, in Criminal Revision Petition No. 34 of 1973 dismissing the revision petition and confirming the order dated 31st July 1973 passed by the J.M.F.C., II Court, Hubli, in C.C. No. 473 of 1973 discharging the accused for offences under section 406 and 409, Indian Penal Code. 10. In Criminal Revision Petition No. 576 of 1974 the petitioner has challenged the order dated 10th July, 1974 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, 5th Court, Bangalore City, in C.C.No. 45 of 1968 rejecting the application of the accused filed under section 432, Criminal Procedure Code (old Code), for making reference to the High Court on a point of law. 11. In Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 632 to 643 of 1974 the petitioners have challenged the order dated 1st January, 1974 passed by the J.M.F.C., Belgaum. City, in CC No. 76 of 1974 registering the case and issuing summons to the petitioners for offences under sections 126, 127 read with section 276 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, and under section 420, Indian Penal Code, read with section 35, Indian Penal Code. 12. City, in CC No. 76 of 1974 registering the case and issuing summons to the petitioners for offences under sections 126, 127 read with section 276 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, and under section 420, Indian Penal Code, read with section 35, Indian Penal Code. 12. Before considering the questions which arise for decision, it is necessary to bear in mind the relevant provisions under the new Code. Section 397 (2) reads as under: “The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.” Sub-section (3) of section 397 reads thus: “If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” 13. Sub-section (2) bars the exercise of powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings. Subsection (3) of section 397 (Criminal Procedure Code, (new Code) has given a choice to a person either to approach the High Court or the Sessions Judge to, challenge the correctness, legality or propriety of an order and if he approaches any one of them, further application by the same person is barred to the other of them. 14. The next relevant provision necessary for the questions involved in these petitions is section 484 (1) and (2) of the new Code. It reads as under: “484 (i)-The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is hereby repealed: (a) If, immediately before the date on which this Code comes into force there is any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending, then such appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation, shall be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as in force immediately before such commencement (hereinafter referred to as the old Code), as if this Code had not come into force.” The provisions quoted above repeal the old Code. But, an appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation which is pending immediately before the date on which the new Code came into force shall be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the old Code, as in force immediately before such commencement. 15. The contentions raised at the Bar by the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners are: (1) Revision is a right vested in the litigant and it cannot be taken away by the new Code and it should be dealt with under the old Code. (2) Revision is a proceeding in continuation of the previous proceeding. Therefore, it must be dealt with according to the provisions of the old Code. (3) Even after the disposal of the revision petition the criminal proceedings are deemed to be pending before that Court until the expiry of the period of limitation. Therefore, it has to be dealt with according to the provisions of the old Code. 16. The respondents’ advocates contended that these revision petitions cannot be said to be pending in this Court immediately before the date on which the new Code came into force. Therefore these revision petitions are to be dealt with according to the provisions of the new Code. 17. In the light of the provisions of law quoted above, let me consider the validity of the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. 18. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioners in untenable in view of the enunciation of the law by the Supreme Court in Pranab Kumar Mitra v. State of West Bengal1. The Supreme Court has held that the revisional powers of the High Court vested in it by section 439, read with section 435, do not create any right in the litigant, but only conserve the power of the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognised rule of criminal jurisprudence and that subordinate criminal Courts do not exceed their jurisdiction, or abuse their powers vested in them by the old Code. 19. In the new Code, the corresponding provisions of sections 435 (1) and 439 (1) are retained in their original form in sections 395 (1) and 397 (1) of the new Code. 19. In the new Code, the corresponding provisions of sections 435 (1) and 439 (1) are retained in their original form in sections 395 (1) and 397 (1) of the new Code. Therefore, even under the provisions of the new Code, in view of the elucidation of the law by the Supreme Court, it is futile to contend that the revisional powers of the High Court created a right in the litigant. Therefore this contention fails. 20. As regards the second contention that the revision is a proceeding in continuation of the previous proceeding, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Surinder Singh v. Inder Sain1, has given a complete answer. D.B. Lal, J., in para. 2 of the judgment has observed thus: “At the outset, the learned Advocate-General submitted that the present revision petition having been filed on 30th April, 1974 will not be entertainable, being prohibited under section 397 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure (1973). The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, however, referred to section 384 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, and sought assistance thereunder. According to the learned Counsel, proceedings in revision should be considered to be in continuation of either trial pending before the Magistrate or the first revision submitted to the Sessions Judge. I am afraid, the proposition advanced by the learned Counsel cannot be sustained under law. It would indeed be wrong to say that a proceeding in revision can be considered to be in continuation of the original proceeding from which it may arise.” The learned Counsel referred to Garikapati Veeraya v. Subbiah Choudhary2. But the mandate that emerges from that decision with great respect to their Lordships is not applicable. Their Lordships were considering a certain appeal that was filed in continuation of the suit filed before the enforcement of the Constitution and in that connection observed that the legal remedy of appeal was really a step in the series of proceedings all connected by some intrinsic unity and could be regarded as one legal proceeding. In the present case we are dealing with a revision and not with an appeal. It can hardly be considered that a remedy by way of revision is inherent or embedded in any manner in the original proceeding instituted before a Magistrate. In the present case we are dealing with a revision and not with an appeal. It can hardly be considered that a remedy by way of revision is inherent or embedded in any manner in the original proceeding instituted before a Magistrate. Therefore, in my opinion the analogy cannot be drawn from a civil remedy of appeal, as contradistinguished from a special remedy of criminal revision provided under the Criminal Procedure Code. In a criminal revision there is not even a right reposed in the petitioner to be heard on merit. It is nonetheless a discretionary remedy to be granted or refused by the Court in the exigency of situation. Apart from this in the above noted decision their Lordships have themselves mentioned that the position would be different where the Legislature itself had taken away expressly the remedy. In that contingency even the appeal would not be entertainable. If we persue sub-section (3) of section 397 of the present Code, we find that the remedy of a second revision is clearly barred therein. 21. I am in respectful agreement with the observations made in the above decision of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. It is therefore not possible to, accede to the contention that a revision should be considered to be in continuation of the original proceedings from which it has arisen. This contention therefore fails. 22. In support of the third contention Mr. Gunjal learned Counsel for the Petitioner in Criminal Revision Petition No. 274 of 1974 urged that if a person could file a second revision petition under the old Code within the period of limitation and if the said period was to expire after 1st April, 1974 then the petition filed by him after 1st April, 1974 but before the expiry of the period of limitation, the second revision petition is still maintainable under the old Code. He invited my attention to the provisions of section 484, sub-clause (3). He invited my attention to the provisions of section 484, sub-clause (3). It reads as under; "Where the period prescribed for an application or other proceeding under the old Code had expired on or before the commencement of this Code, nothing in this Code shall be construed as enabling any such application to be made or proceeding to be commenced under this Code by reason only of the fact that a longer period therefor is prescribed by this Code or provisions are made in this Code for the extension of time." 23. The above provision merely lays down that where the period prescribed for an application or other proceeding under the old Code had expired on or before the commencement of the new Code, the new Code cannot be construed to enable any such application to be made or proceeding to be commenced under the new Code by reason of the fact that a longer period is prescribed under the new Code or provisions are made in the new Code for extension of time. This section does not lay down that where the period prescribed for an application or other proceeding extends beyond the date on which the new Code came into force that such application or proceeding are governed by the provisions of the old Code. If this was the intention of the Legislature, it would have expressly said so. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of Shri J.S. Gunjal. The above provision expressly denies the extension of the period of limitation to a litigant in criminal case. 24. Therefore, the question for determination is whether revision applications instituted in this Court after the new Code came into force are governed by the provisions of the old Code or the new Code. This question involves the interpretation of the words "If immediately before the date on which the new Code came into force there is an appeal, application, trial, enquiry or investigation pending". In section 484 (2) (a) of the new Code, in the opening sentence the principal clause is in the present tense. The intention of the Legislature has to be gathered from the words used in the section. In section 484 (2) (a) of the new Code, in the opening sentence the principal clause is in the present tense. The intention of the Legislature has to be gathered from the words used in the section. If there is an appeal or application pending immediately before the date on which the new Code came into force, such appeal or application shall be disposed of according to the provisions of the old Code and further, if there is trial, enquiry of investigation pending immediately before the date on which the new Code came into force such trial shall be continued, enquiry held and investigation made in accordance with the provisions of the old Code. The words "there is any appeal, application, trial, enquiry or investigation pending" has direct reference to the time and the Court in which such proceeding was pending. These words cannot be construed to mean and include the Courts to which such proceeding may come or instituted at subsequent stages. Therefore, I am of the view that the subsequent stages arising out of any proceeding pending in any Court before the commencement of the new Code are not governed by the provisions of the old Code, but are governed by the provisions of the new Code. In this view of the matter, it is clear, that under section 397 of the new Code the present revision petitions which arose out of the revision petitions filed before the Session" Court after the new Code came into force are not maintainable. 25. There is other reason which supports the above view. In my opinion, the intendment of the Legislature in incorporating the drastic changes in the new Code is to shorten the duration of the trial and expedite the disposal of the criminal cases in the criminal Courts. That object would be defeated if the subsequent stages of a pending proceeding instituted after 1st April, 1974 are to be governed by the provisions of the old Code, as those proceeding would involve delay in their disposal. Therefore, I am of the view, that where a revision petition by a person is dismissed by the Session Judge before 1st April, 1974 his order is final and no second revision petition, by the same person lies before the High Court as the power of the revision vested in the High Court does not create any right in favour of such person. Since these criminal revision petitions are instituted by the same person or persons before this Court after 1st April, 1974 it cannot be said that they are pending before this Court immediately before the date on which the new Code came into force. Therefore, the Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 571, 576, 577, 578, 579 and 274 of 1974 are not maintainable. 26. Let me now examine the question of maintainability of Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 576, 632 to 643 of 1974 which are filed against the interlocutory orders passed after the new Code came into force. 27. Criminal Revision Petition No. 576 of 1974 is against the order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, 5th Court, Bangalore, rejecting the application filed by the accused under section 432 (3) of the old Code for making reference to the High Court on the point of law. 28. In Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 632 to 643 of 1974 the challenge is against the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Belgaum City, registering a case and issuing of summons to the petitioner-accused for various offences under the Mysore Municipalities Act, 1964 and Indian Penal Code. 29. The question for consideration is whether the orders passed by the Magistrate in these criminal revision petitions are interlocutory orders. 30. The new Code does not define the words interlocutory orders. In Kuppuswamy Rao v. The King1, the principle of law relating to final and interlocutory order is enunciated. Kania, C.J., in para. 6 of the judgment has observed thus: “The question then is what is the meaning of ‘judgment, decree or final order of a High Court’ in this section? The expression ‘final orders’ has been judicially interpreted and its meaning is now well settled. In Solatium v. Warner2, Lord Esher, M.R. discussed the meaning of the expression ‘final order ‘in these terms: If their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purpose of these rules, it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory”. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory”. Fry, L.J. remarked as follows: “I conceive that an order is ‘final’ only where it is made upon an application or other proceeding which must, whether such application or other proceeding fail or succeed, determine the action. Conversely I think that an order is ‘interlocutory’ where it cannot be affirmed that in either event the action will be determined.” Lopes, L.J., said as follows: “I think that a judgment or order would be final within the meaning of the rules, when, whichever way it went, it would finally determine the rights of the parties.” In Rozson v. The Altrincham Urban District Council No. 13, Lord Alverstone, C.J., held that the real test for determining the question was: “Does the Judgment or order, as made finally dispose of the rights of the parties”?“ 31. In paragraph 11 of the Judgment Kania, C.J., has observed thus: ”......We have noticed above, the meaning given to the expression ‘final order’ by the English and Indian Courts. Those decisions were in civil cases. We think that the same meaning should be given to that expression in criminal cases also, that is to say, it must be an order which anally determines the points in dispute and brings the case to an end.“ 32. The meaning of the words, ‘interlocutory order’ has been interpreted be the Supreme Court in State of UP. v. Col. Sujan Singh and others4. In para. 8 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has observed thus: ”The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the order of the High Court dated 23rd November, 1962, in the criminal revision was a final order within the meaning of Article 134 (1) of the constitution. The material part of the said article reads: "An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India..." We find it difficult to hold that the order under appeal is a final order within the meaning of the said article. In Seth Premchand Satramdas v. The State of Bihar1. In Seth Premchand Satramdas v. The State of Bihar1. It was held that an order of the Patna High Court dismissing an application under section 21 (3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944, to direct the Board of Revenue, Bihar to state a case and to refer it to the High Court was not a ‘final order’. This Court, speaking through Fazal Ali, J., defined the expression ‘final order’ thus: ‘It seems to us that the order appealed against in this case cannot be regarded as a final order, because it does not of its own force bind or affect the rights of the parties.‘ Though this definition is given in a different context, it will equally apply to that expression in Article 134 of the Constitution. Can it be said that the Special Judge in allowing the petition of the respondents to call for the production of a document from the Union Government is a final order in the criminal proceeding? The criminal proceedings were taken against the respondents for an. offence under section 6 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The proceedings are now pending in the Court of the Special Judge. In the course of those proceedings the respondents filed an application for the production of a document by the Union Government and that was allowed by the Court. The said order is only an interlocutory order pending the proceedings. It does not purport to decide the rights of the parties, namely, the State of U.P. and the accused. It enables the accused to have the said document duly proved and exhibited in the case. It relates only to a procedural step for adducing evidence. The High Court; confirmed that order in revision. But the learned Counsel contends that it negatives the claim of privilege made by the Union Government and, therefore, it decides against the right of the Union Government to withhold the production of the document. Assuming that the order decides some right of the Union Government, on which we do not express any opinion, the Union Government is neither a party to the criminal proceedings nor is it a party either before the High Court or before us. The indirect effect of that order on a third party to the proceedings, who does not seek to question that order, does not deprive the order of its interlocutory character. The indirect effect of that order on a third party to the proceedings, who does not seek to question that order, does not deprive the order of its interlocutory character. We, therefore, hold that the order made by the High Court is not a final order within the meaning of Article 134 (1) of the Constitution." 33. In the light of the enunciation of the law by the Federal Court and the Supreme Court I will proceed to examine whether the orders challenged in these criminal revision petitions are interlocutory orders or not. 34. In Criminal Revision Petition No. 576 of 1974 the order challenged is the order rejecting the request to refer certain matters to the High Court. This is clearly an order passed on an interlocutory application. It does not finally determine the points in dispute and bring the case to an end. Therefore, it must be construed as Interlocutory Order. Similarly in Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 632 to 643 of 1974 the petitioners have challenged the orders taking cognizance and issuing of summons to the petitioner-accused. The Magistrate taking cognizance and issuing summons to the accused to appear before the Court is not a final order. It is also in the nature of an interlocutory order and it cannot be challenged under section 397 of the new Code. 35. The provisions of section 397 (2) bars the exercise of revisional powers under sub-section (1) of the said section with regard to interlocutory order. Therefore, I am of opinion that Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 576 and 632 to 643 of 1974 are not maintainable. 36. W.K. Joshi, learned Counsel for the petitioners, however, contended that if a criminal revision petition under section 397 is not maintainable the same may be converted into criminal petition filed under section 482 of the Code and the relief granted to the petitioners. 37. It is true that the High Court has inherent powers to interfere with the proceedings of a subordinate criminal Courts at any stage of a proceeding, if it finds, that there is abuse of process of Court if any, or otherwise to secure ends of justice. This power should be sparingly exercised. The inherent powers can be exercised in cases where on account of a legal flaw or the alleged facts do not constitute an offence. 38. In Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. This power should be sparingly exercised. The inherent powers can be exercised in cases where on account of a legal flaw or the alleged facts do not constitute an offence. 38. In Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 632 to 643 of 1974 bare statement of facts of the case are insufficient to convince this Court that these case are fit cases for interference at an intermediate stage by invoking the inherent powers of the Court. Further the admitted circumstances of the case would not show that it would be a mock trial if the case is allowed to be proceeded with. Therefore, it is not possible to accede to the request of W.K. Joshi. In this view of the matter, Criminal Revision Petitions Nos. 576 and 632 to 643 of 1974 are not maintainable. 39. In the result, criminal revision petitions are dismissed as not maintainable.