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1974 DIGILAW 179 (ORI)

BANSHIDHAR PANIGRAHI v. STATE OF ORISSA

1974-08-20

B.K.RAY, G.K.MISRA

body1974
JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - The Petitioner was a police constable in the Malkangiri P.S. In the district of Koraput. A first information report was lodged against him under Sections 342/392, Indian Penal Code on 25-3-1967. He was suspended during the pendency of the Criminal Proceeding on 29-3-1967. on order was, passed that he would be entitled to get subsistence allowance under Rule 90 of the Orissa Service Code. On 3-5-1968 he was convicted and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 80/- in default to R.I. for one month. In Criminal Appeal No. 38 of 1968, the conviction was upheld but the sentence was reduced to Rs. 50/- with a default senfenced. The criminal appeal was dismissed on 3-4-1969. During the pendency of the criminal appeal, on 14-8-1968 a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the Petitioner and he was ultimately dismissed on 9-9-1969, but the order of dismissal as intimated to him on 19-9-1969. On these facts three contentions are raised by Mr. T.V. Murty. They are (a) As the subsistence allowance was not paid regularly and in time there was absence of reasonable opportunity in the departmental proceeding and in consequence the order of dismissal is bad (b) the order of suspension passed during the pendency of the criminal proceeding terminated with the order of conviction and sentence and the Petitioner shall be deemed to be continuing in service thereafter and (c) the Petitioner has been dismissed with effect from 9-9-1969, but he received the order of dismissal, on 19-9-1969 and on order dismissing the Petitioner retrospectively is bad in law and is liable to be quashed. These three contentions require careful examination. 2. In support of the first contention Mr. Murty places reliance on Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. A Constitution Bench in that cases held that where the delinquent had specifically communicated his inability to attend the enquiry due to paucity of funds resulting from non-payment of subsistence allowance, the enquiry was vitiated far his non-participation. No adverse inference as to his sources of income could be drawn from the fact that he did not state them in his affidavit in the writ petition or from the fact that he challenged his dismissal by writ petition immediately after his dismissal and subsequently came in appeal before the Supreme Court. No adverse inference as to his sources of income could be drawn from the fact that he did not state them in his affidavit in the writ petition or from the fact that he challenged his dismissal by writ petition immediately after his dismissal and subsequently came in appeal before the Supreme Court. According to us that decision cannot be taken to be on authority for the wide proposition that wherever subsistence allowance is not paid either regularly or on time, the ultimate order passed in the disciplinary proceeding is liable to be quashed on account of lack of reasonable opportunity given during the proceeding. The ultimate conclusion will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this case, the Petitioner was suspended on 29-3-1967. The disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him on 14-8-1968. A total amount of Rs. 915.20 was paid to the Petitioner from March 1967 till August, 1968 before the close of the departmental Proceeding. The enquiry by taking evidence was held in between 11-3-1969 and 17-3-1969 and the enquiry report was submitted on 9-7-1969. The Petitioner received a further amount of Rs. 543.30 towards subsistence allowance on 13-10-1969, a few months after the enquiry was closed. Taking the length of the departmental proceeding into consideration and the various amounts paid we are of opinion that in the facts and circumstances of this case the Petitioner cannot complain of lack of reasonable opportunity the first contention fails. 3. The second contention is that the Petitioner shall be treated to have been automatically reinstated into service after the criminal case ended in a conviction. The relevant facts far this purpose are that the Petitioner was suspended on 29-3-1967, be was convicted in the criminal case on 3-5-1968 and the criminal appeal was dismissed on 3-4-1969. Reading Rules 93 and 94(a) of the Orissa Service Code the position of laws absolutely clear that if the criminal proceeding ultimately ends in a conviction then the Petitioner cannot be treated to be entitled to the full salary, during the period of suspension Narayan Prasad Rewany Vs. State of Orissa and Another is clear on the point. It is unnecessary to repeat the reasoning mentioned therein. A bare reference to the ultimate conclusion in para 17 will reinforce our view. State of Orissa and Another is clear on the point. It is unnecessary to repeat the reasoning mentioned therein. A bare reference to the ultimate conclusion in para 17 will reinforce our view. A further point to be added is that after the conviction in the criminal case the Petitioner filed a criminal appeal which was dismissed on 3-4-1969. Mr. Murty contended that after the, conviction by the learned trial Magistrate, there was no fresh order of suspension, and as such the suspension order will not be operative proprio vigore during the pendency of the appeal. This contention has no substance. The criminal proceeding continues during the pendency of the appeal. It is one proceeding. Therefore, the order of suspension passed during the pendency of the criminal proceeding continues until final disposal of that very criminal proceeding which includes on appeal arising out of it. The net effect of this analysis would be that the Petitioner is not entitled to full salary from 29-3-1967 till 3-4-1969 then the criminal appeal was disposed of. On 3-4-1969 there would be no suspension order without a further order being passed in the departmental proceeding. The Petitioner shall therefore been titled to full salary from 3-4-1969 till 19-9-1969 when he was dismissed from service. The second contention partly succeeds. 4. The last contention is that the dismissal order was passed on 9-9-1969 which the Petitioner received on 19-9-1969 and that it should be operative from 19-9-1969. The contention is sound and is no longer resintegra. It is concluded by State of Punjab Vs. Amar Singh Harika. The result therefore is that the Petitioner shall be deemed to have been dismissed from service with effect from 19-9-1969 and not 9-9-1969. This contention will succeed. 5. On the aforesaid analysis the writ application succeeds in part and a writ of mandamus be issued directing payment, of salary as Indicated above. As success is partial, there will be no order as to costs. B.K. Ray, J. 6. I agree.