JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is preferred by defendants 2 to 6, appellants, against a preliminary decree passed in a partition suit briefly in the following circumstances : plaintiff, respondent No. 2, instituted a suit for partition against the principal defendant, respondent No. 1, and the present appellants of certain joint immovable and movable properties claiming 1/3rd share therein. We need not repeat the facts of the case in details for those have been set out by the learned trial Court. The case briefly, however, of the plaintiff is that after the death of the father of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 their mother shashibala inherited the disputed properties in limited interest as widow. But before her death she surrendered her life estate to the extent of 1/3rd share each according to the wishes of the father in favour of both the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and also the present appellants who were the sons and daughters of another daughter who died during the life-time of her husband, haridas. Thus the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the present appellants while being in joint possession in respect of the disputed properties according to their l/3rd undivided share each executed an agreement for appointment of two arbitrators for effecting partition of the disputed properties by metes and bounds according to 1/3rd share each of the parties which, however, did not materialise. The respondent No. 1 who also had the custody of all the disputed movable properties refused to effect any amicable partition in spite of demand according to the respective shares of the parties. 2. THE suit was contested by the respondent No. 1 and in the written statement apart from the general denial of material allegations of the plaint she asserted that the present appellants being the heirs of a pre-deceased daughter were not entitled to any portion of the disputed properties as reversioners of the last full make owner. Her further specific case was that the immovable properties in disputed were acquired by the mother and not the father. The present appellants also appeared and supported by their written statements the case of the plaintiff. But unfortunately that written statement, it is undisputed, was not accepted by the Court as they failed to pay costs to the plaintiff for acceptance of the written statement. The present appellants also appeared and supported by their written statements the case of the plaintiff. But unfortunately that written statement, it is undisputed, was not accepted by the Court as they failed to pay costs to the plaintiff for acceptance of the written statement. Upon the respective pleadings of the parties the main question for consideration was whether there was surrender of the life estate by the mother of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and in any case, whether there was any family arrangement entered in to by the parties under which the present appellants were entitled to 1/3rd share of the properties. The learned trial Court took the view that there was neither any surrender nor any family arrangement and thus the appellants were not entitled to any share but the plaintiff-respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were each entitled to 1/2 share in the disputed properties. The learned trial court also found that both the immovable and movable properties were acquired by the father and not by the mother and the movable properties except the sale-proceeds of Dacca house for which there was no evidence in all other movable properties in existence the respondent No. 2 was entitled to 1/2 share in all such properties. Accordingly, the learned trial Court passed the preliminary decree on declaration of the above shares of both the respondent nos. 1 and 2. That is how, in short, the appellants felt aggrieved and preferred the present appeal. The main question, if not the only question, is whether firstly, there was any surrender by the widow mother of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of present group of appellants and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to the extent of 1/3rd share each; secondly, in any case, whether there was any family arrangement entered into by all the parties under which the appellants were entitled to 1/3rd share in the disputed properties. 3. ON the first question it appears that the learned trial Court recorded that the Advocate for the respondent no. 2 conceded before it that his client was not able to prove the surrender by shashibala of her life interest. 3. ON the first question it appears that the learned trial Court recorded that the Advocate for the respondent no. 2 conceded before it that his client was not able to prove the surrender by shashibala of her life interest. Upon this concession, the learned trial Court thought that if the story of surrender fell through then the story of family arrangement also would go; nevertheless, the trial Court considered first the oral evidence adduced in this case on behalf on the plaintiffs but rejected such evidence as most of them did not speak about surrender and some important witnesses were not examined. In any event, the evidence of the independent witnesses were uncorroborated. Equally, on consideration of the documentary evidence namely, the agreement for reference to arbitration for partition (Ext. 1) and succession certificate (Ext. 2), it was of the opinion that case of the alleged surrender and family arrangement was not established. In our opinion, on the facts of this case the oral evidence adduced by the parties have got to be tested in the light of the subsequent acts and conduct of the parties as revealed in the documentary evidence adduced in this case. We have been taken through the oral evidence adduced by the parties as also the documentary evidence and it is not necessary for the purpose of this case to discuss such evidence in details. There may be discrepancies in the oral evidence adduced by the plaintiffs but such discrepancies in our opinion, does not totally demolish the case of surrender. For by subsequent acts and conduct of respondent No. 1, as revealed in the arbitration agreement and the succession certificate, it seems clear that the mother Shashibala must have surrendered her life interest according to the desire of her husband in favour of the appellants as also the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. If it is not so, why then the respondent No. 1 entered into such an agreement for referring the matter to arbitrators for the purpose of effecting partition by metes and bounds. It is clearly stated in the document that the present group of appellants would get 1/3rd share and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 will get 1/3rd each. If it is not so, why then the respondent No. 1 entered into such an agreement for referring the matter to arbitrators for the purpose of effecting partition by metes and bounds. It is clearly stated in the document that the present group of appellants would get 1/3rd share and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 will get 1/3rd each. In paragraph 13 of written statement the respondent denied the existence of any such agreement for amicable partition and then stated that she was induced by Pran gobind Das, the father of the present appellant Nos. 2 to 6, who colluded with the respondent No. 2 to compel her "to agree to give 1/3rd share in the estate of Shashibala or Haridas to defendant nos. 2 to 6. But the defendant No. 1 refused to such illegal proposal etc. ". No evidence has been adduced by the respondent No 1 to show that there was in fact any such collusion or that they induced or compelled the respondent no 1 to agree to give to the present appellants 1/3rd share. The trial Court found, we think rightly, that execution of the arbitration agreement (Ext. 1) has been proved. It has also given a number of reasons to say that the respondent no. 1 and her husband who were the witnesses in this case had no regard for truth and that being so, it would not be proper for the court to place any reliance upon the testimony of these two witnesses. It is therefore clear that the respondent No. 1 evidently agreed to give 1/3rd share to the present appellants and that is sufficiently reflected in the arbitration agreement and also succession certificate which was obtained by the respondent No. 1 along with the respondent No. 2 and the present appellants in respect of certain movable properties. This then being the position, there is no reason to suppose that the story of surrender by the mother of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was altogether a myth. The learned trial court rejected the case of surrender on the view that the recitals from these documents by themselves could not establish such surrender and family arrangement. This then being the position, there is no reason to suppose that the story of surrender by the mother of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was altogether a myth. The learned trial court rejected the case of surrender on the view that the recitals from these documents by themselves could not establish such surrender and family arrangement. We, however, think that these documents, even if they do not directly establish such surrender, will in all probabilities of the case tend to prove that there must have been such surrender by the mother of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 4. MR. Banerjee has, however, contended on behalf of the respondent that such transfer by the widow of her life interest in favour of persons who were not reversioners cannot be valid. It is said that the present appellants being the heirs of a pre-deceased daughter were not the reversioners and therefore any surrender by the widow of her life interest in their favour was invalid. In support of his contention Mr. Banerjee has cited before us a decision of the judicial Committee in Rangasami gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden 46 I.A. 72 arid also a decision of the Supreme Court in M. Nagi Reddy v. Dulli Duraija Naidu 1951 S.C.R. 655 to show that though under the Hindu Law it is permissible to a widow to surrender the estate to the next reversioner, a widow cannot validly surrender in favour of a reversioner and strangers jointly. It appears that while the proposition laid down in the case before the Judicial Committee cannot be disputed the point actually decided would be of little assistance to the respondents in this case. In that case, while considering the distinction between power of surrender and renunciation and the power of alienation for certain purposes it was held amongst other things, that "it is settled by long practice arm confirmed by decision that a Hindu widow can renounce in favour of the nearest reversioner if there be only one or of all the reversioners nearest in degree if more than one at the moment. That is to say, she can, so to speak, by voluntary act operate her own death". The other question was the necessity for alienation with which we are not concerned. That is to say, she can, so to speak, by voluntary act operate her own death". The other question was the necessity for alienation with which we are not concerned. In the Supreme Court, decision what happened was that a Hindu widow who inherited her husband's estate executed a deed described as Deed of Release in favour of her daughter as her next reversioner and the daughters husband jointly. In that context, the supreme Court held on review of long line of decisions of different High Courts along with the above decision of the judicial Committee that it could not accept the view that "the transfer made by a widow of her entire estate in favour of the reversioner and an outsider jointly would operate as a surrender of the whole estate to the immediate reversioner and a transfer of a half share in it to the stranger. This, of course, is subject to any rule of estoppel that may, on proper materials, be urged against the presumptive reversioner. This is precisely the view that has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in (1) M.T. Jagrani v. Gaya A.I.R. 1933 Allahabad 856 and in our opinion this is the correct view to take" we, however, think that applying the principle laid down by the Supreme court to the instant case, the surrender being in respect of l/3rd share in favour of the appellants who were not reversioners either actual or prospective, the rule of estoppel will operate against the daughters, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, who became at the same time presumptive reversioners and got the property absolutely after the widows death by virtue of Section 14 of the hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is quite clear from the Arbitration Agreement that both the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 accepted such surrender, be it by way of transfer or not, in favour of the present appellants in 1/3rd share of the entire estate. They also jointly along with the appellants, as noticed earlier, obtained a succession certificate in respect of certain shares etc. It is quite clear from the Arbitration Agreement that both the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 accepted such surrender, be it by way of transfer or not, in favour of the present appellants in 1/3rd share of the entire estate. They also jointly along with the appellants, as noticed earlier, obtained a succession certificate in respect of certain shares etc. So, by their own acts and conduct, it seems clear that the respondent No. 1 cannot now turn up to challenge the validity of such surrender made by the widow In our opinion, on the facts of this case the rule of estoppel, as observed by the supreme Court, will apply against the respondent No. 1. Mr. Banerjee has also cited another Supreme Court in phool Kuer v. Pem Kuer A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 793. It is not necessary to discuss this case in details for while considering the question of a valid surrender it substantially followed the proposition laid down in the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in M. Nagi Reddy's case (Supra). We are therefore not impressed with the argument that there being surrender of a fraction of the estate by the widow in favour of the appellants who were not reversioners, it became totally ineffective. Secondly, the question is whether there was any family arrangement and if so, whether such family arrangement was binding on the parties including the respondent No. 1. The learned trial Court, as appears, mixed up the question of surrender with the family arrangement. We think on the facts of this case the approach to the question on this aspect of the matter was not correct. For even if the story of surrender goes there is no reason to suppose that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 who were limited heirs could not even then give a fraction of the estate inherited by them to the appellants by way of family arrangement. It appears that the trial Court did not consider the documentary evidence along with other evidence on record and surrounding circumstances to find out whether independently of the plea of widow's surrender a case of family arrangement between the respondents and appellants was established. We cannot agree to the line of reasoning adopted by the trial Court in discarding the documentary evidence merely because these documents by themselves failed to establish a case of surrender. We cannot agree to the line of reasoning adopted by the trial Court in discarding the documentary evidence merely because these documents by themselves failed to establish a case of surrender. In fact, if there was a valid surrender further question as to proof of family arrangement would be unnecessary for effecting partition by metes and bounds according to the shares of the respective parties on the basis of such surrender. It would therefore be necessary to examine the evidence adduced in this case to see whether case of family arrangement has been sufficiently substantiated. It is well-established that a family arrangement need not necessarily be embodied in any document. It would be sufficient if the evidence both oral and documentary adduced in a given case will reveal that such family arrangement or settlement must have been made at some point of time in the past, as held by the Supreme Court in madho Das v. Mukund Ram A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 481, "a family arrangement can as a matter of law be implied from a long course of dealings between the parties" and "the conduct of various members of the family is relevant to show that their actings viewed as a whole suggest the existence of the family arrangement". Now, turning to the evidence in this case, we find that in the arbitration agreement the parties agreed to have the entire properties partitioned on the basis of 1/3rd share for each of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the group of the appellants respectively by the help of two arbitrators. In this arbitration agreement the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 clearly admitted and agreed that they along with the present group of appellants jointly agreed to have equal 1/3rd ownership and rights in respect of all the movable and immovable properties left by Hari Das and they also made it clear that they gave up all kinds of plea of objections, claim, rights and demands etc. in respect of equal title and possession of one another and have since been possessing and enjoying the same without dispute. Then it is stated, on the plea of inconvenience of joint possession and enjoyment, they decided to make amicable partition of the same by appointing arbitrators in three equal shares. in respect of equal title and possession of one another and have since been possessing and enjoying the same without dispute. Then it is stated, on the plea of inconvenience of joint possession and enjoyment, they decided to make amicable partition of the same by appointing arbitrators in three equal shares. The arbitrators, it would appear, were appointed not for the purpose of deciding the dispute as regards the title but for effecting partition by metes and bounds and for making allotment of properties on the basis of 1/3rd share each. The other peculiar feature of this document is that in case of difference of opinion between the parties the arbitrators will make the award according to the will of the majority. It is true that the arbitration fell through owing to death of one of the Arbitrators but that fact by itself will not help the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to release themselves from the arrangement already made for sharing the properties along with appellants in undivided 1/3rd share each. We have also found that prior to this agreement the respondent No. 1 along with the present appellants and the respondent No. 2 applied for and obtained a succession certificate on 12th April, 1955 jointly in respect of certain debts and securities specified in the certificate. It is undisputed that on the strength of this succession certificate the parties collected the debts and securities for which the certificate was obtained. So, this documentary evidence if considered along with oral evidence and the surrounding circumstances in this case which we have already discussed would clearly reveal a course of conduct which viewed as a whole would tend to establish conclusively the existence of family arrangement. That being so, it would be clearly binding on all the parties to such family arrangement. (See as relied on by Mr. Bose on behalf of the appellants Ram niranjun Singh v. Prayag Singh, I.L.R. 8 cal. 138 Pullaiah v. Narasinham, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 481 (supra), S.S. Pillai v. K.S. Pillai A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2069) Mr. Banerjee has, however, sought to contend that since the appellants were not members of a joint family and also the reversioners they cannot claim any title to the property. Any arrangement or settlement, therefore, it is submitted, made between the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the appellants could not be effective as a family arrangement. Banerjee has, however, sought to contend that since the appellants were not members of a joint family and also the reversioners they cannot claim any title to the property. Any arrangement or settlement, therefore, it is submitted, made between the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the appellants could not be effective as a family arrangement. In aid of such contention he has cited a decision of the judicial Committee in Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal and Anr. 45 I.A. 118 and also a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madno Das v. Mukund Ram (supra). We do not think that these decisions lay down such a broad proposition as put form by Mr. Banerjee On the contrary, preponderance of judicial opinion seems to be in favour of the view that even though the parties to the family arrangement do not constitute joint family or they have doubt about their antecedent title, a family arrangement even between the rightful claimants and such parties would still be effective and binding as valid family arrangement between the parties. It is not necessary to discuss in details a long line of cases in this connection cited by mr. Bose. It would be sufficient to say that this view finds support in a Bench decision of this Court in Radharani dassya v. Brindarani Dassya A.I.R. 1936 Cal. 392, Ramguada v. Babushaheb 54 I.A. 396, as also decisions of the Supreme Court in (7) Pullaiah v. Narasimham A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1836 and S.S. Pillai v. K.S. Pillai A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2069. Applying therefore the above principle to the facts of the present case, it seems clear that even though the appellants were not the members of a Hindu joint Family or they had no right to inherit the property as the reversioners, the family arrangement proved in this case would still be effective and binding as between the appellants and the respondents. The appellants would thus be clearly entitled to get 1/3rd share of all movable and immovable properties in dispute in the present litigation. This apart, on the authority of the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in S. S. Pillai's case (supra) rule of estoppel would clearly apply to respondent No. 1 and 2 who became the ultimate reversioner by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. This apart, on the authority of the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in S. S. Pillai's case (supra) rule of estoppel would clearly apply to respondent No. 1 and 2 who became the ultimate reversioner by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. They cannot now be permitted to go back from their own commitment and retract from the contract which they made once with clear and open mind. In our opinion, the decision of the trial Court on these main questions was not contract. 5. THIS brings us to the next question as to whether the immovable properties described in "b" Schedule of the plaint was the self-acquired property of the mother of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It appears, this question was given up by the learned Advocates of both sides and was consequently, we think rightly, not decided by the trial court. 6. AS regards the existence of movable properties described in the plaint schedule as considered by the trial court no argument was addressed to us by either side. It is unnecessary again to consider the evidence in details regarding these properties and we do not find any reason to differ from the view taken by the trial Court. In our opinion, the conclusion reached by the trial Court as regards the existence of several items of movable properties on facts is correct. For the reasons however, already given it must be held that the plaintiffs and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the appellants together are each entitled to 1/3rd share in respect of both movable and immovable properties in dispute. 7. ACCORDINGLY, this appeal is allowed. We modify the judgment and decree of the trial Court to this extent that the plaintiffs' suit is decreed in the preliminary form with declaration that the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 is entitled to 1/3rd share and the respondent No. 1 (Defd. No. 1 in the suit) is entitled 1/3rd share and the appellant nos. 1 to 5 jointly shall get 1/rd share in all the movable and immovable properties in suit. No. 1 in the suit) is entitled 1/3rd share and the appellant nos. 1 to 5 jointly shall get 1/rd share in all the movable and immovable properties in suit. The respondent No. 1 is directed to effect amicable partition in respect of all the properties as mentioned in schedules A and B except Item No. 8 of schedule A to the plaint within 8 weeks from today in terms of the preliminary decree In default, the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 or the appellant shall be at liberty to apply for appointment of pleader-Commissioner to effect the partition by metes and bounds according to the shares declared herein in terms of the preliminary decree. In all other respects preliminary decree passed by the trial Court shall stand. The Cross-objection is not pressed and is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.