JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - The Plaintiff is in appeal against the confirming judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge of Puri in a suit for recovery of money. 2. The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant No. 1 as karta of the family consisting of the two Defendants borrowed a sum of Rs. 1128/- from him on 13-12-1953 on the basis of a promissory note (Ext. 1) agreeing to pay interest at the rate of Rs. 1-9-0 percent. The loan was used for the benefit of the family. On Plaintiff's demand, the Defendant No. 2 on behalf of both the Defendants made three part-payments of Rs. 120/-, Rs. 1001- and 50/- on 20th of June, 1955, Both of May 1958 and 25th of March, 1964 respectively and the Defendant No. 1 made a similar part payment of Rs. 100/- on 27-4-1961, These part payments were duly endorsed by the respective payer-Defendants in their respective hands on the back of the promissory note. As the remainder was not paid in spite of demand, the suit was instituted on 23-3-1967. It is alleged that the suit was instituted within limitation in view of these acknowledgments. 3. The Defendants in their joint written statement denied the receipt of the consideration and took the stand that it was a kaida obtained from the Defendant No. 1 by one Bhaskar Panigrahi in favour of the Plaintiff who was Bhaskar's gumastha. The part payments were said to be nominal and the suit was claimed to have been barred by limitation. 4. The learned Trial Judge found that the promissory note (Ext. 1) was genuine and for consideration, but it was not for family interest. The question of maintainability with reference to the provisions of the Orissa Money-Lenders Act raised in the written, statement was not pressed. The payments made by the Defendant No. 2 did not save limitation and the suit was accordingly held to have been barred by limitation and was therefore, dismissed. 5. The learned Appellate Judge accepted the defence of limitation and accordingly affirmed the decree of the trial Court. The Plaintiff assails the judgments and decrees of the Courts below in this second appeal. 6. That the promissory note (Ext. 1) is a genuine document and under it full consideration passed and that repayments as noted on the backside of Ext. 1 and marked as Exts. The Plaintiff assails the judgments and decrees of the Courts below in this second appeal. 6. That the promissory note (Ext. 1) is a genuine document and under it full consideration passed and that repayments as noted on the backside of Ext. 1 and marked as Exts. 1/a to 1/d are genuine, are no more in dispute. Mr. Patnaik for the Plaintiff-Appellant raises two contentions. (i) In view of the admission of Defendant No. 2 in the acknowledgments on the body of the promissory note the finding that the loan was not for the joint family is contrary to law; and (ii) the finding relating to limitation is not tenable. 7. The promissory, note did not indicate that the Defendant No. 1 Ramachandra was making the loan qua karta of the family. In one part of the document, the necessity was described for the purpose of meeting his household expenses. The Courts below appear to have lost sight of the fact that in all the three endorsements made by the second Defendant he had made on admission that the Defendants 1 and 2 belonged to a joint family and that the repayment was being made on behalf of both. The Plaintiff had claimed in the litigation that the loan was incurred on behalf of the joint family by the karta. Exts. 1/a, 1/b and lid are the endorsements of 1955, 1958 and 1964 respectively made by Defendant No. 2. In each of these endorsements, the Defendant No. 2 has stated that the repayment was being made on behalf of himself and on behalf of his undivided brother Ramachandra Pratihari (Defendant No. 1). The Defendant No. 2 was examined as d.w. 3 and these endorsements were confronted to him. The Courts below appear to have lost sight of the fact that the Defendant No. 2 admitted the position that the two Defendants were in a coparcenary and the statement in the acknowledgments would give rise to on irresistible inference that the loan was for the joint family. The finding of fact in the Courts below has been reached by overlooking such a material piece of admission and, therefore, is on erroneous one not binding on this Court. Mr. The finding of fact in the Courts below has been reached by overlooking such a material piece of admission and, therefore, is on erroneous one not binding on this Court. Mr. Mohapatra for the Respondents was given notice of this fact and though originally he took the stand that the finding of the Courts below on this score was one of fact not open to be touched by this Court, ultimately he conceded that his approach was mistaken and the mistake in the Courts below entitled this Court to dislodge the finding which turned out to be erroneous and to record the appropriate finding flowing from the evidence. I would accordingly in disagreement with the finding of fact reached in the Courts below, hold that the loan was incurred by the joint family for a joint family purpose. 8. Mr. Patnaik has contended that the repayments, which amount to acknowledgment in law, by the Defendant No. 2 under Exts. 1/a and l/b had been duly ratified by the Defendant No. 1 and in view of the ratification made in 1961 by the Defendant No. 1 when he made the endorsement-Ext. l/c-the Plaintiff accepted the second Defendant to be duly authorised to make the endorsements in the promissory note by way of, acknowledgment and, therefore, allowed the second Defendant to make, the last endorsement on 25-3-]974 (Ext, 1/d) which final endorsement saves the limitation for the suit. For his proposition he relies upon a series of Madras decisions. In the case of Rangasami v. Somasundaram AIR 1928 Mad. 173, it was said: ...Section 21 (of the Limitation Act) further provides that nothing in Sections 19 and 20 shall render one of several joint contractors chargeable by reason only of a written acknowledgment signed or of a payment made by or the agent of any other or others of them. Then nothing more appears, than that one of several co-obligors has made a payment, or on acknowledgment of liability, such payment or acknowledgment will not have limitation against the other obligors of the debt. It has to be shown that he made such payment or acknowledgment not only on behalf of himself but also as the duly authorized agent of his co-obligors. Such authority however need not be express; it may be inferred from the conduct of several co-obligor. In this case there were three successive endorsements. It has to be shown that he made such payment or acknowledgment not only on behalf of himself but also as the duly authorized agent of his co-obligors. Such authority however need not be express; it may be inferred from the conduct of several co-obligor. In this case there were three successive endorsements. The 2nd endorsement A-2 was made more than three years after the date of the pronate and at a time when in the absence of authority on the part of the co-obligor who made the first payment the suit as against the rest would be barred. It must be held that the person who made a second endorsement did by his conduct ratify the prior payment of Rs. 250/-, which had already been made and the payment of which was endorsed on the pronate on the 12th June, 1916. So also when the 3rd endorsement was made on 24th May, 1922 by the four executants including the Defendant the only inference to be drawn from their conduct is that they held themselves as still bound under the promissory note by reason of the two prior endorsements evidencing part-payments which had already been made to the Plaintiff there-for. A Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of T.S.P.L.S. Thinnappa Chettiar by agent A.S. Arunachalam Chettiar Vs. Putti Krishna Rao and Others extended the principle of ratification by agency to a similar situation. A Bench of the Hyderabad High Court in the case of Moosa Bhoy v. Kristiah AIR 1952 Hyd. 79, laid down that there may not be on express agency proved. Law recognises agency by estoppel that is to say if a person allows another to transact with third parties on his behalf and makes them believe that person who is transacting with third parties is doing so on his behalf then such person who allows third parties to believe that a person was acting on his behalf will be bound by the transactions entered into by the ostensible agent. The first two endorsements on the promissory note had been made by the second Defendant. When the first Defendant made the third endorsement (Ext. 1/c) obviously be accepted the position that the first two endorsements were in order. The first two endorsements on the promissory note had been made by the second Defendant. When the first Defendant made the third endorsement (Ext. 1/c) obviously be accepted the position that the first two endorsements were in order. Those having been made by the second Defendant, while he made the third endorsement, the Plaintiff was led to believe that the second Defendant was acting with the authority of the first Defendant and, therefore, when the promissory note was going to be barred by limitation in 1964, he allowed the second Defendant to give it a fresh lease of lite by making on endorsement of acknowledgement. The said decision, therefore, certainly applies to the facts of this case. Two other decisions referred to are of Annamalai Pallar and Anr. v. P. Natesa Iyer AIR 1915 Mad. 307 and Dev Shanker Dolia Vs. M.H. Fernandez and Another, . These are cases of joint promisors. In view of the finding already reached that the loan was actually on behalf of the family, it indeed is a case of joint promissory though the second Defendant had not joined in executing the promissory note. These two decisions would, therefore, lend support to the propositions of Mr. Patnaik. The last of the decisions relied upon by Mr. Patnaik is one of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the Case of Ramakrishna Reddi and Another Vs. P. Dasa Muni Reddi and Another. Here again, it was a case of several promisors and following the principle laid down by the series of Madras decisions, the learned Single Judge accepted on acknowledgment by one to be with the authority of the other promisors. Mr. Mohapatra had relied upon the following decisions to support his contention that the Defendant No. 2 who was the younger brother was not entitled to act on behalf of the family so as to bind the coparcenery. Lachhmi Narain v. Daya Shankar AIR 1918 Oudh 323 P. Rama Pattar Vs. A. Viswanatha Patter, Lakshmi alias Ammu Ammal, V. Anantarama Patter and Parameswaran, minor by guardian, ; Ram Krishan v. Hirde Ram AIR 1923 Lab. 135. Lachhmi Narain v. Daya Shankar AIR 1918 Oudh 323 P. Rama Pattar Vs. A. Viswanatha Patter, Lakshmi alias Ammu Ammal, V. Anantarama Patter and Parameswaran, minor by guardian, ; Ram Krishan v. Hirde Ram AIR 1923 Lab. 135. It is not necessary to consider the principles indicated in these cases, as in the present case I am satisfied that the Defendant No. 1 had ratified the acts of the second Defendant and on account of ratification by the karta, the acts of the junior brother, must be deemed to the those of the karta. In view of what has been said above, I would hold, disagreeing with the Courts below, that the Defendant No. 1 represented to the Plaintiff that the second Defendant had his authority to make the acknowledgments. This was represented to the Plaintiff by the Defendant No. 1 making the third endorsement in 1961 approving of the two endorsements by the second Defendant made in 1955 and 1958 respectively. The Plaintiff having accepted the position that the second Defendant was authorised on behalf of the first Defendant to deal with the matter, allowed the second Defendant to make the last endorsement under, Ext. 1/d in 1961. The Defendant No. 1 is thus bound by the endorsements made by the second Defendant. The suit is, therefore, within limitation having been filed within three years from the date of the last acknowledgment. 9. Once it is found that the loan was for the joint family, I see no justification for not passing the decree against both the Defendants land 2. Accordingly, I would allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of the Courts below and direct that the Plaintiff's suit shall be decreed for the principal amount and interest at 12 percent thereon from the date of the promissory note till the date of suit and at 6 percent thereafter for the period during the pendency of the suit against both the Defendants. On the principal amount to be decreed, the Plaintiff shall have future interest of six percent until realisation. The Plaintiff shall be entitled to costs of the litigation throughout. 10. When the matter was argued, Mr. Mohapatra had concluded by submitting that it was a case where leave to appeal to the Division Bench should be granted. On the principal amount to be decreed, the Plaintiff shall have future interest of six percent until realisation. The Plaintiff shall be entitled to costs of the litigation throughout. 10. When the matter was argued, Mr. Mohapatra had concluded by submitting that it was a case where leave to appeal to the Division Bench should be granted. Having given my anxious consideration to the matter, I see no justification as to why the matter should be allowed to be litigated further before a Division Bench. Leave prayed for is, therefore, refused. Final Result : Allowed