JUDGMENT : 1. THE Rule with which we are concerned in this case involves a question of jurisdiction. 2. A suit was filed by the plaintiff respondent on January 27, 1968, in the city Civil Court, for a declaration of title to a printing press and news paper, possession, and for other consequential reliefs. The suit was valued by the plaintiff at Rs. 3100/- It is not in dispute that at the relevant date the court had jurisdiction to try suits not exceeding Rs. 10,000/- in value under the Calcutta City Civil court Act, 1953. In the year 1969, sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Act act was amended and the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court was raised to rs. 50,000/-. No retrospective operation was, however, given to the said amendment. 3. SUBSEQUENTLY, the defendants raised a dispute regarding the valuation of the suit. By an order dated July 31, 1972 the value of the suit was increased to Rs. 22,500/- Thereupon, the plaintiff duly paid the additional court fee as directed by the order. The defendants raised a further issue, namely, the issue of jurisdiction of the court to try the suit 4. IT was contended before the learned Judge that me court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit at the time when the suit was instituted; the proper value of the suit having been Rs. 22,500/- as was subsequently found by the court. In those circum stances, counsel argued, the plaint should be returned for presentation to a court which has jurisdiction to try the suit. On behalf of the plaintiff, it was submitted that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, having been raised meanwhile to Rs. 50,000/-by the amendment in the Act, the city Civil Court is the only court which has jurisdiction to try the suit. If the plaint is returned, it will have to be filed in the same court. The learned judge took the view that to accept the defendants contention would he "to put a premium on the fetish of inane formality robbed of real sub stance. "In that view of the matter, he decided the issue of jurisdiction in favour of the plaintiff and refused to make an order for return of the plaint. Some of the defendants have come up on revision against the said order. 5. "In that view of the matter, he decided the issue of jurisdiction in favour of the plaintiff and refused to make an order for return of the plaint. Some of the defendants have come up on revision against the said order. 5. THE suit was initially valued by the plaintiff at Rs. 3100/-. The City civil Court, Calcutta, was, therefore prima facie competent to try the suit under sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Calcutta City Civil Court Act when by the order dated July 31, 1972 the value of the suit was raised to rs. 22,500/- the amendment had come into force, by reason of which, the high Court had lost its jurisdiction to try the suit. Having regard to the fact that at the material time, the City civil Court had acquired jurisdiction to try the suit, the plaint could not have been returned under Section 14 of the Act for presentation to the High court which, as I have already said, had no jurisdiction to try the suit any more. The learned Judge was, there fore, justified in his refusal to make an order for return of the plaint. 6. MR. S.K. Acharyya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, relied on Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code Civil Procedure which provides for return of the plaint to be presented to the court in which the suit should have been instituted. In our opinion, the case is governed by section 14 of the Calcutta City Civil Court act and not by Order 7 Rule 10 of the code. On the principle generalia specialibus non derogant where a specific provision exists in a Special Act and the case is governed by the Special act, it is not permissible to invoke an identical provision of a general Act in any event, if section 14 of the Calcutta city Civil Court Act is not of any avail, Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code is equally of no avail to the petitioners for the very same reason, namely, that on the date of the order, the City Civil court, Calcutta, had acquired jurisdiction to try the suit. In Shiv Bhagwan v. onkarmal, reported in A.I.R. 1952 Bombay, 365, a Bench of the Bombay High Court presided over by Chagla, C.J., held that if a court had jurisdiction to try a suit when it came on for disposal, it cannot refuse to assume the jurisdiction by reason of the fact that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it at the date when it was instituted, the reason being that no party has a vested right in- procedure. Procedural law must be applied at the date when the suit or proceeding comes on for disposal. In the present case, the principle enunciated by the learned Chief Justice applies proprio vigore. 7. IF one were to engage oneself in a battle of technicalities, it could be said that sub-section (2) of section 5 of the Calcutta City Civil Court Act,-as it originally stood, provided that "the City Civil Court shall have jurisdiction and the High Court shall not have jurisdiction to try suits and proceedings of a civil nature not exceeding Rs. 10,000/- The section was and is silent on the question of competence of the court to entertain or receive a suit or a proceeding. This is in sharp contrast with the language of clause 12 of the Letters Patent of the High Court which empowers the High Court to receive, try and determine suits of every description Needless to say, this is only a technical but not a tenable argument. If a court is not competent to try a suit, it is useless for the court to entertain it. 8. MR. Acharyya sought to rely on section 8 of the Bengal General clauses Act which corresponds to section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The section provides that unless a different intention appears, the repeat of an Act would not affect anything duly done or suffered there under. In this connection, reference was made to hasan Nurani Malak v. S.M. Ismails assistant Charity Commissioner, AIR 1967 S.C. 1742 and the decision of a full Bench of this Court in Tarak chandra Mukherjee and Ors. v. Ratan lal Ghosal, AIR 1957 Cal. 257 . In the latter case, Chakravartti C.J. pointed out in course of his judgment, that the scope of the provision is confined to the original scope of what is saved. It is not wider. v. Ratan lal Ghosal, AIR 1957 Cal. 257 . In the latter case, Chakravartti C.J. pointed out in course of his judgment, that the scope of the provision is confined to the original scope of what is saved. It is not wider. The section does not extend any repealed act as regards its duration, nor en larges any such Act as regards its scope, but only preserves accrued rights and liabilities as they were under the repealed Act and also proceedings so far as they might be commenced or continued under it by excluding from them the operation of the repeal. 9. IN our opinion, the section is of no assistance to the petitioners. The question is whether the City Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit at the date when it comes on for trial and not whether the court had jurisdiction to receive the plaint at the date when it was filed. The question of jurisdiction has, therefore, been correctly decided by the learned Judge. The Rule is discharged but we make no order for costs. Let the records go down with utmost expedition. Rule discharged.