JUDGMENT Jagmohan Lal, J. - This second appeal has been filed by a plaintiff whose suit for injunction has been dismissed by the courts below. The brief facts of the case were that one Wasi Hasan Mirza was the owner of a piece of land of which a lease for 99 years was granted by him to the plaintiff-appellant in the year 1947 by means of a registered document for building purposes. To the north of the land so demised, there was some other land belonging to the lessor which was described in the lease deed as Rasta belonging to the lessor. Subsequently the plaintiff constructed a factory building on the land leased to him. To the east of this land there was a public road. The plaintiff wanted to keep the gate of his factory towards east opening on that public road so that his vehicles including trucks could enter his factory through that gate. But that would have meant substantial wastage of the land out of the land demised to him by Wasi Hasan Mirza by keeping it as open land for the passage of trucks. In order to avoid that wastage of land the plaintiff requested Wasi Hasan Mirza to grant him a right of passage over the land lying to the north of the demised land which was already in use of the lessor as a passage so that the plaintiff could open a gate in his factory in the northern side and use this passage. Thus the trucks and other vehicles would enter this passage from the public road in the eastern side and from this passage they could have access into his factory through the northern door. Wasi Hasan Mirza agreed to grant this right of passage to the plaintiff on payment of Rs. 75/- by him vide his letter dated 6th May, 1953 Ext. 2. The plaintiff paid Rs. 75/- to Wasi Hasan Mirza through the receipt dated 9-5-1953 Ext. 3. Thereafter the plaintiff opened a door in the northern side in his factory building and through this door his vehicles had an access to his factory by passing over the passage land of Wasi Hasan Mirza in the north. Wasi Hasan Mirza then transferred this land in the north of the plaintiff factory on which this right of passage was granted to him, to the defendant-respondent for Rs. Wasi Hasan Mirza then transferred this land in the north of the plaintiff factory on which this right of passage was granted to him, to the defendant-respondent for Rs. 100/- by means of a sale deed dated 29-6-1954 Ext. A-l. Some time after that the defendant-respondent started interfering with the plaintiffs right of passage over this land with the result that the plaintiff filed a suit for injunction against him claiming a right of passage. Originally the plaintiff had set up a case of licence granted by Wasi Hasan Mirza under the document Ext. 2. Subsequently a case of easement granted under Sec. 8, Easements Act was set up. 2. The claim of the plaintiff on both these grounds was contested by the defendant-respondent. Before the amendment of the plaint by means of which the alternative case of easement was set up, the trial court framed the following two material issues - 1. Whether plaintiff had a right of passage and to pass his trucks through the land in suit as alleged. 2. Whether the defendant is not bound by the right of the plaintiff. 3. The trial court held the documents Exts. 2 and 3 to have been duly executed by Wasi Hasan Mirza who was dead at that time. Relying on those documents and other evidence the learned Munsif held that the plaintiff has a right of passage and to pass his trucks through the land in dispute as claimed by him. But under Issue No. 2 he held that since this right of passage was claimed by the plaintiff only as licenses the defendant as transferee of the servient tenement was not bound by this licence under Sec. 58 of the Easements Act. The suit was accordingly dismissed. 4. The plaintiff filed an appeal against that decision. The lower appellate court allowed the plaintiff to amend the plaint and set up a case of an easement imposed by the owner of the servient tenement under Sec. 8, and thereafter framed the following issues which were remitted to the trial court for recording findings thereon :- 1. Whether the plaintiff has a right of easement to pass his trucks through the land in suit and to maintain the same as his passage? 2. Whether the defendant is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the alleged right of easement as alleged ? Whether the plaintiff has a right of easement to pass his trucks through the land in suit and to maintain the same as his passage? 2. Whether the defendant is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the alleged right of easement as alleged ? If so its effect ? 3. Whether the alleged letter and Receipt Exts. 2 and 3 were written after the sale with full knowledge of the defendants but were antedated in order to get over the effect of sale? If so its effect ? The trial court found under the first issue that the right of passage granted to the plaintiff under the letter Ex. 2 was only a licence and not an easement. Hence the issue was found in the negative. Under the second issue he held that the defendant was a bona-fide transferee for value without notice of the alleged right of easement granted by his transferor Wasi Hasan Mirza in favour of the plaintiff. The third issue was answered in the negative with the observation that there was no direct or indirect evidence to show that these documents had been antedated. 5. On receipt of these findings by the lower appellate court no objection was filed on behalf of the defendant-respondent with regard to the third issue which was decided against him. But the plaintiff-appellant filed objections on the findings recorded under the first two issues remitted by the lower appellate court. Strangely, the Civil Judge who decided the appeal after the receipt of these findings took the view that the documents Exts. 2 and 3 were not actually executed by Wasi Hasan Mirza at the time they purport to have been executed but that they were executed after he had transferred the land in dispute to the defendant-respondent in June 1954 and that these documents had been antedated by Wasi Hasan Mirza in collusion with the plaintiff. This finding of the learned Civil Judge is wholly perverse and it was not open to him to record that finding after a finding on the third issue remitted by him had been returned by the trial court which was not objected to by any of the parties. To this extent the judgment of the learned Civil Judge suffers from a patent error. 6. The Civil Judge further endorsed the finding of the trial court that under the documents Exts. To this extent the judgment of the learned Civil Judge suffers from a patent error. 6. The Civil Judge further endorsed the finding of the trial court that under the documents Exts. 2 and 3 only licence was granted in favour of the plaintiff by Wasi Hasan Mirza and no easement was created even if those documents are assumed to have been executed before the sale deed in favour of the defendant was made by Wasi Hasan Mirza. At best, these documents granted a licence to the plaintiff which was not an irrevocable licence under Sec. 60 (b) of the Easements Act and the defendant as transferee from Wasi Hasan Mirza was not bound by this licence under Sec. 58. 7. The first and the foremost point that arises for decision in this case is whether the document Ext. 2 executed by Wasi Hasan Mirza grants an easement or mere licence to the plaintiff to use the land in dispute as a passage for his vehicles to have access to his factory built on the land in respect of which an earlier lease for 99 years had been made in his favour by Wasi Hasan Mirza. In this document Ext. 2 which is in the form of letter addressed by Wasi Hasan Mirza to the plaintiff, the writer after introductory remarks about his straitened financial position on account of which he was compelled to demand a price from the plaintiff before granting the right of passage prayed for by him, made the following material averments as translated in English :- "(1) I have no objection to grant you also a right of passage as requested by you in the Rasta existing in the Imambara which has been described by me (in the lease granted in favour of the plaintiff) as Rasta of first party. (2) If you pay me Rs. 75/- by way of Nazrana will grant you full right of passage for the duration of the lease of the land granted to you in December 1947 for the use of the building which you are constructing on the demised land or construct thereon in future. After that you can open your gate towards north. (3) By this grant in lieu of the money so demanded from you, you will have greater easement (Ashayash) and your factory from the public easily reach your factory from the public road. After that you can open your gate towards north. (3) By this grant in lieu of the money so demanded from you, you will have greater easement (Ashayash) and your factory from the public easily reach your factory from the public road. At this time you will have to make very small alteration in your building plan for opening a door towards north and thereby saving enough space from the demised land for the purpose of your factory. I hope you will accept my proposal about payment of money for this right." 8. The amount was paid by the plaintiff to Wasi Hasan Mirza on 9-5-1953 and he granted a receipt for it vide Ex. 3 reciting therein that he received that money with reference to his letter dated May 6, 1953. 9. From the above terms under which this right of passage was granted by Wasi Hasan Mirza to the plaintiff on the land which was already designated by him as Rasta of the lessor in the lease deed executed favour of the plaintiff in the year 1947 it is evident that this right was granted for the more beneficial enjoyment of the factory building which the plaintiff was constructing at that time on the demised land and it was specifically stated that this right of passage as granted by Wasi Hasan Mirza would continue for the benefit of the plaintiff for the full term of the lease made in December 1947. Under that right of passage it would be open to the plaintiff to bring all types of vehicles from the public road to his factory through this northern door by passing over the land in dispute and thereby saving enough building space from the demised premises which he otherwise would have to leave if he had to keep his gate in the eastern side opening on the public road and without having a right of passage on the land in dispute in the north. 10. 10. In my opinion, these terms of grant clearly bring it within the term easement as defined in Sec. 4 which lays down that an easement is a right which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses, as such, for the beneficial enjoyment of that land, to do and continue to do something, or to prevent and continue to prevent something being done, in or upon, or in respect of, certain other land not his own. The plaintiff as a lessee of the land demised to him in December 1947 by Wasi Hasan Mirza was obviously an occupier of that land. The easement that was claimed by him on the basis of this grant was for the beneficial enjoyment of the factory building on the land earlier demised in his favour by Wasi Hasan Mirza. This right of way was obviously to be exercised on land that did not belong to the plaintiff. So all the essential ingredients of Sec. 4 are fulfilled in this case. 11. Now the chief distinction between an easement and a licence to use land in a particular manner is that whereas an easement cannot be extinguished (except in the modes mentioned in the Act) merely at the will of the granter, a licence is generally revocable at the will of the person who has given it; and whereas a licence is merely personal and does not run with the land, an easement is always appurtenant to the dominant tenement. A licence merely confers privilege to do some act on the land without passing any estate therein, but an easement creates an estate in the land distinct from the ownership thereof. An easement possessed the qualities of inherit-ability and assignability but these qualities are generally inconsistent with a licence, which is terminated by the conveyance of the land by the party giving the licence. 12. In the present case it is evident from the terms of the grant contained in Ext. 2 that the right of passage granted to the plaintiff was to continue for the full duration of the lease made in his favour of the dominant tenement in the year 1947. During that period it was not open to the granter to revoke that right. The right so granted was obviously meant for the beneficial enjoyment of the other tenement occupied by the plaintiff as a lessee. During that period it was not open to the granter to revoke that right. The right so granted was obviously meant for the beneficial enjoyment of the other tenement occupied by the plaintiff as a lessee. The burden of this easement was imposed by the granter under Sec. 8 on the land which was still owned by him and used to be designated by him as a Rasta. The duration of the easement which was co-terminus with the lease of the dominant tenement already granted to the plaintiff by the owner of the servient tenement clearly suggests that the right of passage was to be enjoyed not only by the lessee himself but also by his transferee if he chose to transfer his lease rights in the dominant tenement. On the terms of the document under which this right of passage was granted by Wasi Hasan Mirza to the plaintiff it cannot be held that it was merely a licence allowing the plaintiff to use the land in dispute as a passage and such right of passage could be denied to the plaintiff or his assignee by the granter simply by revocation of the licence or the same could be ignored by the transferee of the granter. 13. In this connection the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent placed reliance on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nalin Ghosh v. A.P. Modak, 69 C.W.N. 503. In this case it was held that a licence is purely a personal privilege and1 does not go with the land independently of the person involved and that a licence does not create an interest in the immovable property. So far as this proposition of law is concerned, I am in respectful agreement with the observation made by the learned Judge. But on the interpretation of the agreement under which the permission was granted in that case by the owner of the dominant tenement it was held that it was a case of licence and not of an easement. In placing this construction on that particular agreement his Lordship also appears to have taken into consideration the fact that the permission was granted by an informal document though for the creation of an easement a registered document was in his opinion required by Sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Sec. 2(6) of the Registration Act. In placing this construction on that particular agreement his Lordship also appears to have taken into consideration the fact that the permission was granted by an informal document though for the creation of an easement a registered document was in his opinion required by Sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Sec. 2(6) of the Registration Act. On this point, the learned Judge appears to have recorded a dissent from the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Bhagwan Sahai v. Narsingh Sahai, I.L.R. 31 Alld. 612, in which it was held that an agreement by which the owner of a house undertook to permit the owner of an adjoining house, when he built a second store which was in contemplation, to discharge rain water and also water used for daily household purposes to the premises of the former, was a grant of an easement within the meaning of Sec. 4 of the Easements Act and did not require registration, not being a transfer of ownership as contemplated by Sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. So that decision of the Calcutta High Court is of no help in construing the document Ext. 2 in this case which on its terms clearly grants a right of easement as stated above. 14. It was then argued that since in 1953 when the alleged grant was made by Wasi Hasan Mirza he was the owner of both these tenements though in respect of one of them he had granted a lease for 99 years in favour of the plaintiff in the year 1947. The plaintiff as a lessee of the dominant tenement could not acquire easement on the other land belonging to his lessor in view of the Full Bench decision in Abdul Rashid v. Braham Saran, A.I.R. 1938 Alld. 293. It was held in this case that a lessee of the land which he has taken for building purposes is not in the position of an owner of immovable property under Sec. 12, Easements Act for the purpose of a right of way and hence such person cannot acquire the right of way by easement over other land owned by his lessor. That was however a case in which the lessee claimed to have acquired the alleged easement by prescription under Sec. 15 and it was with regard to that model of acquisition that it was held that the lessee not being himself the owner of the immovable property within the meaning of Sec. 12 could not acquire such easement on other land belonging to his lessor. As a lessee he was no doubt holding the dominant tenement on behalf of the lessor but he could not be said to be acquiring this easement on behalf of his lessor. On the other hand, the easement was claimed by him as against his lessor which was not permissible in terms of Sec. 12. This does not however apply to the grant of an easement made by the lessor himself under Sec. 8. The lessor as owner of the servient tenement had full right to impose a burden on that tenement in favour of his lessee of the dominant tenement for the duration of that lease. This was clearly permissible under Sec. 8 and there was no other legal bar in making such a grant of easement. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the right of passage which was granted by Wasi Hasan to the plaintiff under the document Ext. 2 in the year 1953 was an easement of way of which the duration was until the determination of the lease of the dominant tenement already granted to the plaintiff and that easement would run with the land. The question whether or not the defendant who is the subsequent transferee of the servient tenement from Wasi Hasan had knowledge of this easement is immaterial. It may however be mentioned that the land that was sold to him was lying in the shape of a passage and it had also been specifically called as a way of Wasi Hasan in the lease deed executed by him in favour of the plaintiff in the year 1947. By the time the sale deed was executed by Wasi Hasan Mirza in favour of the defendant-respondent the plaintiff had constructed his factory and his vehicles including trucks went from the public road to his factory through this passage. By the time the sale deed was executed by Wasi Hasan Mirza in favour of the defendant-respondent the plaintiff had constructed his factory and his vehicles including trucks went from the public road to his factory through this passage. It was, therefore, the duty of the transferee to enquire about the imposition of the easement on this land by the transferor and if he omitted to do so he cannot get rid of this easement which would run with the land. 15. The courts below have also observed that the plaintiff has not demarcated his passage which he claimed over the land in dispute. The plaintiff claimed a right of passage for men and vehicles including trucks on this land and it was for the owner of that servient tenement to define that passage so long as he did not cause any inconvenience to him. He has a right to do so even now. So the mere fact that the plaintiff himself did not define any strip of land out of the land owned by the defendant over which he claimed this right of passage has no material bearing on this case. 16. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgments and the decrees of the courts below are set aside. The plaintiffs suit for injunction is decreed. The defendant-respondent is restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs right of passage for men and vehicles including trucks to reach his factory through the land in dispute so long as the lease of the land granted to the plaintiff by Wasi Hasan Mirza on December 4, 1947 continues in force. But in view of the faulty pleadings of the plaintiff which led to this prolonged litigation, I order that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.