Judgment :- NATARAJAN, J. 1. Defendants 1 to 3 in O.S. No. 266 of 1970 on the file of the court of the Subordinate Judge, Dindigul are the appellants. 2. The material point that arises for determination in this appeal filed by the defendant-(the first defendant being a firm of which defendants 2 and 3 are the partners) is whether the building in the suit property which the appellants took on lease under a registered lease deed dated 26th July, 1965, a registration copy of which has been marked as Ex. A.10 is a ‘building’ within the meaning of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, XVIII of 1960, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) so as to entitle the appellants to claim the protection afforded to tenants by the provisions of the said Act. The suit property consists of a cinema exhibition theatre with all its furnitures, fittings, fixtures, cinematograph projectors with all accessories and other appliances, known as Sakthi Talkies in Dindigul town. The theatre is owned by the plaintiff who is a public limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and originally, the plantiff was running the cinema exibition business in the theatre through its authorised representatives. In the year 1960, the Board of Directors as well as the shareholders of the plaintiff company decided to lease out the theatre consisting of the building, fixtures, furniture, machinery, cinema equipment and all accessories by calling for tenders by public advestisement. When, for the said purpose, tenders were called for, the first appellant who was one of the tenderers gave the highest offer and his tender of Rs. 1,750 per month for the theatre was accepted by the plaintiff company. Thereafter, a registered document of lease, Ex. B-1, dated 19th August, 1960, was entered into between the plaintiff and the first appellant for a period of five years. Among other stipulations contained In the document, it was also provided that the first appellant should pay a rent of Rs. 750 per month for the building and a rent of Rs. 1,000 should be paid for the fixures, furniture, equipment, machinery, etc., and two separate schedules were drawn up, one containing the descriptive particulars of the building and the other containing the particulars of the machinery, equipment, etc. According to the plaintiff, the lease under Ex. 750 per month for the building and a rent of Rs. 1,000 should be paid for the fixures, furniture, equipment, machinery, etc., and two separate schedules were drawn up, one containing the descriptive particulars of the building and the other containing the particulars of the machinery, equipment, etc. According to the plaintiff, the lease under Ex. B-1 was a composite lease, even though the building and the machinery had been described in two schedules and the rent offered to be paid by the first appellant was split up into two categories to make it notionally appear that a sum of Rs. 750 was to represent the rent for the building and a sum of Rs. 1,000 was to represent the rent for the machinery. After the expiry of the period of five years provided for under Ex. B-1 in 1965 the plaintiff company again resolved to lease cut the theatre for a further period of five years and consequently, tenders were once again called for. On this occasion also, the first appellant responded to the call for tenders with the highest bid of Rs. 3,000 per mensem for the theatre and, very naturally, the plaintiff accepted the tender of the first appellant. Thereafter, as a result of the consensus arrived at between the parties, instead of the lease transaction being covered by a single deed as in Ex. B-1, two separate deeds were entered into, the first one being a registered deed of lease relating to the building portion of the cinema theatre, and the second one being an unregistered agreement relating to the machinery, equipment, furniture and fittings part of the theatre. Ex. A-10 is a registration copy of the lease deed that was so entered into between the parties on 26th July, 1965, and Ex. 11 the unregistered agreement which was contemporaneously executed by the parties on the same day. As before, a sum of Rs. 750/- out of the tender of Rs. 3,000 made by the first appellant for the theatre was apportioned towards the rent of the building under Ex. A-10, and the balance amount of Rs. 2,250 was included in Ex. A.11 and treated as rent for the machinery and equipment. As before, a sum of Rs. 750/- out of the tender of Rs. 3,000 made by the first appellant for the theatre was apportioned towards the rent of the building under Ex. A-10, and the balance amount of Rs. 2,250 was included in Ex. A.11 and treated as rent for the machinery and equipment. The plaintiff would have it that, though the parties to the lease arrangement created two documents, one relating to the lease of the building and the other relating to the lease of the equipment, machinery etc., the lease was a composite one, and it was so understood by the parties when they brought into existence the two lease deeds. As the lease of the threatre granted to the first appellant was to expire on 18th August 1970, the plaintiff, even prior to the expiry of the lease period, decided to lease out the theatre again for a further period of five years and to call for tenders from the public for taking the theatre on lease. The fourth defendant, who was originally arrayed as the second defendant in the suit, came forward with an offer to take the theatre on lease on rent of Rs. 4,000 per month. The first appellant wanted a continuance of the lease, but when directed by the plaintiff to canalise his offer in the form of a tender, failed to act accordingly, and it later transpired that it was with a design the first appellant failed to submit his tender. After considering the tenders received by the plaintiff in response to its advertisement, the plaintiff accepted the tender of the 4th defendant and in order to put the fourth defendant in possession of the theatre, called upon the first appellant, by means of a notice dated 16th June 1970 under the original of Ex. A.14, to surrender possession of the cinema theatre on 18th August 1970. The first appellant sent a reply, Ex. A.15, contending therein that the lease of the theatre building in his favour would be covered by the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, that as such, he was entitled to be in possession of the building on and with effect from 19th August 1970, as a statutory tenant and that he was not bound to act upto the terms of the demand made by the plaintiff in its notice, Ex. A.14. A.14. The first appellant followed his reply notice by instituting a suit in O.S. 1122 of 1970 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Dindigul, praying therein for a declaration that he is entitled to the benefits of the Act and for an order of injunction in his favour from being evicted from the building. An interim order of injunction was also sought to be obtained by the first appellant in the said suit and this led to certain incidental proceedings between the parties, but it is not necessary to make reference to them in this appeal. It was thereafter, the plaintiff company came forward with the present suit O.S. 266 of 1970 praying that a decree for possession should be passed in its favour and furthermore, the first appellant should be called upon to pay damages or profits of Rs. 12,000 for a period of two months from 18th August 1970 and future mesne profits or damages for use and occupation at such rate as may be fixed by the court under O. 20, R. 12, C.P.C. 3. Resisting the action of the plaintiff, the first appellant contended in the written statement that though the theatre as well as the machinery, furniture, fittings, etc., belonged to the plaintiff, the building and the machinery were never treated as a composite entity by the parties when they entered into the lease arrangement. The first appellant contended that the rights of the parties to the action had to be determined with reference to the lease arrangement effected on 19th August 1965, and specifically pleaded that, with a view to avail to the tenant the benefits of the Act so amended in 1964, a separate and independent lease was created over the building of the cinema theatre under the original of Ex. A.10, and as a consequence of the consensus forged between the parties at the relevant time and execution of a separate lease deed for the building alone, the first appellant had, undoubtedly become entitled to invoke the provisions of the Act to his aid and maintain his possession of the building uninterruptedly as a statutory tenant. The first appellant explained away Ex. The first appellant explained away Ex. A.11, the unregistered lease deed relating to the machinery, equipment, furniture, etc., as an independent transaction dissociated, in content and context, from the lease of the building and refuted the plaintiffs contention that the two documents were inseparable and formed part and parcel of the same transaction so as to make the lease of the building and the equipment as components of a composite arrangement. It was expressly pleaded by the first appellant that it did not take the building and the machinery as a going concern and further added that the plaintiff had no right to let out the building to third parties so long as it was entitled to be in occupation of the building as a statutory tenant. The first appellant justified the filing of the suit, O.S. 1122 of 1970, on the plea that as it apprehended forcible dispossession at the hands of the plaintiff, it had to safeguard its rights by seeking the protection of the court. Various other pleas were also projected by the first appellant relating to inter se monetary payments and adjustments between the parties, but they do not require mention as they are not germane to the issue involved in the appeal. The claim of the plaintiff for past mesne profits at Rs. 12,000 was attacked by the first appellant as an unjust and unconscionable claim, and with regard to future mesne profits or damages the first appellants case was that it was not bound to pay anything more than Rs. 3,000 per month. 4. The claim of the plaintiff for past mesne profits at Rs. 12,000 was attacked by the first appellant as an unjust and unconscionable claim, and with regard to future mesne profits or damages the first appellants case was that it was not bound to pay anything more than Rs. 3,000 per month. 4. The 4th defendant, who was originally arrayed as the second defendant in the suit and who was subsequently arrayed as 4th defendant consequent on the present second and third defendant being made parties to the suit as the partners of the first defendant on account of the death of one C.T. Ramanathan, the managing partner of the first defendant, filed a separate written statement and raised the plea that it was an unnecessary party to the suit and that as it has been deprived the opportunity of running the cinema theatre from 19th August 1970 though its tender had been accepted by the plaintiff as the highest bid, it was reserving its right to proceed against the plaintiff by instituting separate action for recovering the loss and damages caused to it by the plaintiffs failure to deliver possession of the cinema theatre to it. 5. The following issues were framed for trial by the learned Subordinate Judges 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession prayed for? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the damages for use and occupation and if so, at What rate? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the future profits and if so, at what rate? 4. Whether the first defendant is a tenant entitled to the benefits of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act as contended by the first defendant? 5. Whether the first defendant is entitled to any amount as claimed in para. 15 of the written statement and is he entitled to claim such amounts without payment of court fee? 6. To what relief if any, is the plaintiff entitled? The suit, O.S. 1122 of 1970, which had been filed by the first appellant in the District Munsif court for declaration and injunction was also brought over to the file of the Subordinate Judges Court and renumbered as O.S. 258 of 1971. 6. To what relief if any, is the plaintiff entitled? The suit, O.S. 1122 of 1970, which had been filed by the first appellant in the District Munsif court for declaration and injunction was also brought over to the file of the Subordinate Judges Court and renumbered as O.S. 258 of 1971. The plaintiff resisted the said suit of the first appellant and contended that the first appellant was not entitled to be in possession of the cinema theatre after the expiry of the lease on 18th August 1970 and that the rights and obligations of the parties had to be determined with reference to the composite lease entered into between them and not with reference to the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 6. The learned Subordinate Judge framed the following issues in the said suit. 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration and injunction prayed for? 2. Whether the third defendant is a necessary and proper party to the suit? and 3. To what relief, is the plaintiff entitled? 7. Both the suits were jointly tried and common evidence was recorded in O.S. 266 of 1970. After considering elaborately the rival contentions of the parties and the evidence relied on by the parties the learned Subordinate Judge held, under issues 1 and 4 in O.S. 266 of 1970, that the lease in favour of the first appellant was a composite lease, that the first appellant was not a tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act and that therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the suit property. Under issues 2 and 3, the learned Subordinate Judge rendered his decision that the plaintiff was entitled to damages and future profits at the rate of Rs. 4,000 per month as that was the rate at which the 4th defendant had agreed to take the theatre on lease. No finding, was given on issue No. 5 as the first appellant when called upon to pay the requisite court fee withdrew his counter-claim with liberty to file an in dependent suit for the amount claimed by him. With regard to O.S. 258 of 1971, the learned Subordinate Judge found all the issues against the first appellant who was the plaintiff therein. With regard to O.S. 258 of 1971, the learned Subordinate Judge found all the issues against the first appellant who was the plaintiff therein. After giving six months time to the first appellant to deliver possession of the cinema theatre, the learned Subordinate Judge, by his judgment and decree dated 10th November, 1972, decreed O.S. No. 266 of 1970 and dismissed O.S. 258 of 1971. It is in these circumstances, defendants 1 to 3 have preferred this appeal which is directed against the judgment and decree in O.S. 266 of 1970. 8. As has been pointed out by us at the very outset of this judgment, the matter for consideration in this appeal is whether the lease of the building and the machinery, equipment, etc., by the plaintiff in favour of the first appellant on 26th July, 1965 under the deeds, Ex. A.11 and the original of Ex. A.10, is a composite lease in respect of a going concern and thereby a transaction to which the provisions of the Act will not apply or whether the two lease deeds are disjunctive in character and the lease of the building effected under the original of Ex. A.10, an independent transaction which has the effect of attracting the provisions of the Act as to entitle the first appellant to sustain his possession of the building even after the expiry of the lease period in his role as a statutory tenant. Mr. K. Parasaran, learned counsel for the appellants, sought to prevail upon as the stand-point of the appellants and make us agree that the lease deeds were not composite in character and that what was taken on lease by the first appellant under Ex. A.10 was only the building portion of the theatre and not the cinema business which was till then carried on by the plaintiff, as a going concern. The bed-rock on which Mr. Parasaran placed reliance to raise the edifice of the appellants case is that in as much as the parties to the agreement had expressly deviated from the pattern of the lease adopted in Ex. The bed-rock on which Mr. Parasaran placed reliance to raise the edifice of the appellants case is that in as much as the parties to the agreement had expressly deviated from the pattern of the lease adopted in Ex. B-1 and brought into existence two separate lease deeds, one as regards the building and the other as regards the projector, equipment, machinery, etc., and as the rent for each item of leased property had been separately estimated and quantified, the only logical conclusion that could be drawn from such act of the parties is that the consensus arrived at by the parties was that lease of the building was to be an independent and disjointed transaction, and would therefore squarely fail under the provisions of the Act and constitute the property leased under Ex. A.10 a building as defined in the Act. We are clearly of opinion that the contention of Mr. Parasaran in this behalf cannot be accepted. The lease agreements entered into between the parties under Exs. A.10 and A.11, whether construed in conjunction with the earlier lease under Ex. B-1 or construed independently after blacking out the back drop afforded by Ex. B-1, will, undoubtedly, amount to a composite lease and the taking cover of a going concern as such. For a clear understanding of the situation, it becomes necessary to make reference to the three lease deeds, Ex. B-1, A.10 and A.11. We have already stated that the plaintiff company was carrying on the business of exhibiting cinema pictures in Sakthi Talkies and in the year 1960, the Directors of the plaintiff company desired to lease out the cinema theatre and to call for tenders from intending bidders in that behalf. On such tenders being called for, the first appellant gave the highest bid of Rs. 1,750 and, pursuant to the bid being accepted, the parties entered into a lease deed under Ex. B.1. Though the total rent of Rs. 1,750 that was offered by the first appellant was split up into two amounts of Rs. 750 and Rs. On such tenders being called for, the first appellant gave the highest bid of Rs. 1,750 and, pursuant to the bid being accepted, the parties entered into a lease deed under Ex. B.1. Though the total rent of Rs. 1,750 that was offered by the first appellant was split up into two amounts of Rs. 750 and Rs. 1,000 as representing the rent for the building and the rent for the machinery, the lease deed makes it very clear that what was leased out to the first appellant was only the going concern of the cinema theatre as such and that the symbolical severance of the total rent into the categories so as to make it appear that a portion of the rent amounting to Rs. 750 will go towards the rent for the building and the balance of the amount of Rs. 1,000 will go towards the rent for the machinery, was only a fictional arrangement for certain motivated reason which had nothing to do with the composite character of the transaction or the lease of the cinema theatre as a going concern. Such an arrangement which was the outcome of the consensus forged in the minds of the parties at the time they entered into Ex. B-1 had not in our opinion, been disturbed in any manner and on the other hand, had been adopted and implemented by the parties five years later also when the first appellant was granted a further lease of the going concern for another term of five years. The only conceivable and perceptible difference between the earlier lease and the subsequent lease is that as against a total rent of Rs. 1,750 which the first appellant had undertaken to give for the going concern under the original lease, the first appellant agreed to give a higher rent of of Rs. 3,000 per month in order to exercise his rights as before over the going concern for a further period of five years. The fact that two lease deeds, one a registered instrument in so far as the building is concerned and the other, an unregistered one in so far as the machinery is concerned, were executed, cannot and will not make any difference in situation or alter the nature and character of the agreement entered into between the parties. The fact that two lease deeds, one a registered instrument in so far as the building is concerned and the other, an unregistered one in so far as the machinery is concerned, were executed, cannot and will not make any difference in situation or alter the nature and character of the agreement entered into between the parties. The true nature and character of a transaction is not to be judged from external features or superficial factors, but must be gathered from the intention of the parties as reflected in the entirety of the situation and a conspectus of all the factors. It is not the form, but the content, it is not the semblance, but the matter, that must be taken note of in determining the true intention of the parties at the time they enter into an agreement as between themselves. Viewed in this perspective, we find a multitude of circumstances which unmistakably prove the composite nature of the lease entered into between the parties, though apparently there is a splitting up so as to project an image of severalty of transactions and that the composite lease itself was in respect of a going concern. At this juncture, we may usefully refer to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court as to the test that is to be applied to find out whether lease transactions, entered into by parties under two or more lease deeds are to be treated as inseperable components of a single transaction or separate transactions having” no community of interest with each other. In Sultan Brothers v. Commissioner of Incometax A.I.R. (1964) S.C. 1389, the Supreme Court had to consider whether the lease of a hotel on a monthly rent of Rs. 5,590 for the building and a hire of Rs. 5,000 for the furniture and fixtures was part and parcel of a single transaction so as to attract S. 12 of the Incometax Act for assessing the income derived by the lessor, or a transaction capable of severance in respect of the building and the furniture so as to attract S. 9 of the Incometax Act for assessing the income derived for the building, and S. 12 for assessing the income derived from the furniture. Dealing with the matter, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held thus:— “It seems to us that the inseparability referred to in sub-Sec. (4) is an inseparability arising from the intention of the parties. That intention may he ascertained by framing the following questions; Was it the intention in making the lease and it matters not whether there is one lease or two, that is separate leases in respect of the furniture and the building—that the two should be enjoyed together ? Was it the intention to make the letting of the two practically one letting? Would one have been let alone and a lease of it accepted without the other? If the answers to the first two questions are in the affirmative, and the last in the negative then, in our view, it has to be held that it was intended that the lettings would be inseparable.” (Italics ours) Applying such a test, we are very clear in our, minds that though the plaintiff and the first appellant entered into two lease deeds, one relating to the building and the other relating to the machinery, the irrefragable intention of the parties was that the building and the machinery should be enjoyed together and that neither party would have even dreamt of the building alone being let out without the machinery and equipment and vice-versa the machinery alone being hired without the building being rented. We will immediately proceed to make a reference to the several facts and features in lease agreement entered into between the parties which have made us reach the conclusion that the lease was a composite one and related to the running of a cinema theatre as going concern. XXXX [Discussion relating to facts is omitted: Ed.] 9. The recitals, conditions and stipulations in the two documents are so closely interwoven and inter-twined that it is impossible to extricate the purport and effect of one document from the other and propound a theory that the transaction under each of the two documents has a viable status recognisable in law. We are therefore unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Parasaran, that the execution of two lease deeds under Exs. A.10 and A.11 as contra-distinguished from the execution of a single lease deed under Ex. We are therefore unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Parasaran, that the execution of two lease deeds under Exs. A.10 and A.11 as contra-distinguished from the execution of a single lease deed under Ex. B.-1 in respect of the building portion and the equipment portion of the cinematograph concern, clearly reveals that the parties deliberately made a departure from the earlier agreement as reflected in Ex. B.1 and that such deviation from the wonted practice is not capable of any other explanation than that the parties intended to mutilate the lease transaction into two disjunctive parts devoid of any inter se impact on each other. 10. From an entirely different perspective also, we are able to notice the fallacy in the contention of the appellants about the lease of the building being independent of the hiring of the equipment, machinery etc. From the relevant provisions in Ex. A.10, to which we have already made reference, it can be seen that the first appellant is obliged to use the building only for the purpose of cinematograph exhibition and further enjoined not to remove the fixtures, fittings, etc., from the leased premises except for the purpose of necessary repairs. Ex. A.11 also contains a similar restriction as to the manner in which the first appellant is to make use of the furniture, equipment, machinery etc., during the lease period of five years. If the appellants were to be allowed to remain in possession of the building alone as statutory tenants, what is to become of the machinery, equipment and furniture? The first appellant has clearly obliged itself by the contract not to remove the machinery, equipment etc., from the premises. Can the appellants be heard to say that irrespective of the stipulation the first appellant will be entitled to retain the building alone as a statutory tenant and remove the fittings and furniture? Or, in the alternative, can the appellants be heard to say that after the lease period of five years is over, the appellant ought to be permitted to retain possession of the theatre on payment of Rs. 750 for the building alone without paying any rent for the machinery which, as we have already stated above, cannot be removed from the premises except for the purpose of repairs. 750 for the building alone without paying any rent for the machinery which, as we have already stated above, cannot be removed from the premises except for the purpose of repairs. If such anomalous or absurd consequences were to flow as a sequel to the contention projected by the appellants, it is futile for the appellants to contend that the first appellant bad requested, and the plaintiff had conceded, that as and with effect from 19th August, 1965, the lease transaction was to be severed into two and a separate lease created over the building alone so as to enable the first appellant to bring the lease within the purview and operation of the Act. 11. The splitting up of the total rent of Rs. 3,000, offered by the first appellant under Ex. A.6 into a sum of Rs. 750 as rent for the building and a sum of Rs. 2,250 as rent for the machinery and incorporating such rent particulars in Exs. A.10 and A-11 can have no significance at all. It must be remembered that under Ex. B.1 also, the rent for the building was only Rs. 750 and the rent that was allocated for the machinery was Rs. 1,000. Under Ex. A.10 the rent reserved for the building is the same sum as reserved in Ex. B-1, but the rent allocated towards the hire of the machinery is the enhanced amount of Rs. 2,250. An ambulatory glance of the reply notice, Ex. A.15, issued by the first appellant and the averments in the written statement serves the useful purpose of exposing the fallacy of the contentions of the appellants. Though in Ex. A.15 and the written statement, the first appellant has contended that the lease of the building had nothing to do with the lease of the machinery, this is what the first appellant has stated as regards the conditions of the machinery and its utilisation value. In Ex. A.15, be has stated as follows: “The projector, furniture, equipment and fittings in the theatre are so old and useless that my clients had to spend large amounts in repairing them. In Ex. A.15, be has stated as follows: “The projector, furniture, equipment and fittings in the theatre are so old and useless that my clients had to spend large amounts in repairing them. The frequent break-down of the machinery has cost considerable loss and inconvenience to my clients and strictly speaking, the company has no legal or moral right to claim any hire charges for the useless junk which were already old and which have become scrap over the years.” In its written statement, this is what the first appellant has stated “This defendant also submits that the machinery and furniture were furnished when the theatre was erected in 1947 and the machinery and furniture considerably deteriorated and the machinery is also damaging the film of the producers This defendant further submits that better machinery and furniture, etc., are available at half the hire cost mentioned in the agreement of 1965 This defendant has used very many articles of his own like generator, motor pump and other furniture etc., as will be revealed by the Commissioners report.” 12. Thus on his own admission, the first appellant has characterised the machinery as junk and of scrap value. Yet, strangely enough, the first appellant has offered a hire charge of Rs. 2,250 for this ‘junk and scrap’ as against hire charge of Rs. 1,000 given by it under Ex. B-1. It cannot be contended by the appellants that between 1965 and 1970 the machinery which was worth paying a hire of Rs. 2,250 per month had suddenly become junk and scrap, especially when the first appellant bad also set forth in Ex. A.15 and the written statement that it had been periodically spending amounts for repair and maintenance of the machinery and the furniture and that by such acts, the first appellant has been keeping the furniture, fittings and equipment in the best condition possible. If the lease arrangement was not a composite one, but was a double phased one, one phase relating to the building and the other phase relating to the machinery, the first appellant would not have committed the folly of entering into a ludicrous transaction of paying enhanced rent of Rs. 2,230 for the ‘junk and scrap’ that went into the name of equipment, machinery and furniture fitted in the theatre. It is, therefore clearly perceptible that the increased rent of Rs. 2,230 for the ‘junk and scrap’ that went into the name of equipment, machinery and furniture fitted in the theatre. It is, therefore clearly perceptible that the increased rent of Rs. 3,000 which the first appellant offered as against the rent of Rs. 1,750 under Ex. B-1, was intended to cover the lease of the theatre as a going concern for a further period of five years and not as representing a sum of Rs. 2,250 for the machinery alone and a sum of R s. 750 for the theatre. This is yet another circumstance which makes the case of the appellants a hopelessly untenable and unsustainable one. 13. Having adverted to the salient features which are germane for consideration in deciding the controversy, we may, with advantage, refer to a decision of the Supreme Court and two judgments rendered by this court itself of which one was rendered by one of us. Uttamchand v. S.M. Lalwani A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 716 was a case where the nature of the lease of a dal mill building with fixed machinery in sound working order and accessories had to be determined in order to find out whether the dal mill was an ‘accommodation’ within the meaning of S. 3(a) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1955, and whether the Rent Control authority had jurisdiction to determine the standard rent. Rejecting the contention that the lease was essentially concerned with a lease in respect of the dal mill building and that what was really leased out was the mill as such, the Supreme Court held that the dominant intention of the parties when they entered into a transaction was a primordial factor for consideration to decide a question as to whether a lease agreement between the parties in respect of a building fitted with machinery etc., was to be deemed a lease of the building portion alone or the building and the machinery as a going concern. Dealing with the case, the Supreme Court held as follows:— “It is not a case where the subject matter of the lease is the building and along with the leased building incidentally passes the fixture of the machinery in regard to the mills in truth, it is the mill which is the subject matter of the lease, and it was because the mill was intended to be let out that the building had inevitably to be let out along with the mill This is not a lease under which the appellant entered into the building for the purpose of residing in the building at all; this is a case where the appellant entered into the lease for the purpose of running the dal mill which was located in the building The fixtures described in the schedule as to the lease are in no sense intended for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building. The fixtures are the primary object which the lease was intended to cover and the building in which the fixtures are located comes in incidentally.” The same line of reasoning can be adopted in the instant case also. Of necessity, the projector, sound equipment, furniture etc., are essential pre-requisites for the purpose of running a cinema house, and it is while taking such items for the purpose of running the cinema that the first appellant had also to take a lease of the building in which the machinery equipment and furniture were located. The apportionment of a higher rent for the machinery than for the building would also justify the inference that what was really sought to be taken on lease by the first appellant was not the building as such but the cinema house itself as a going concern. 14. The apportionment of a higher rent for the machinery than for the building would also justify the inference that what was really sought to be taken on lease by the first appellant was not the building as such but the cinema house itself as a going concern. 14. Abdul Gaffor Sahib v. Pals Theatre 84 L.W. 295 which was decided by one of us, is a case where the lessee of a cinema theatre held over the property under the pretext of being a statutory tenant under the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and the lessor of the cinema house objected to the Board of Revenue granting renewal of C form licence in favour of the lessee alleging that he had terminated the lease and as such the possession of the quondam lease was unlawful and therefore, the order of the Board of Revenue granting the C form licence should be quashed by the High Court in its exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. To decide the controversy, the question had also to be gone into, as to whether the lessee of a cinema house and the equipment therein compositely leased out to him by the owner of the cinema house was entitled to claim that such portion of the lease as related to the building was severable from the other clauses in the lease deed relating to the equipment and afforded ground to the lessee to contend that the lease of the building ought to be governed by the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960. Repelling the contention, it was held that if the lease is a composite one in the sense that the lease comprised of both the cinema house and the equipment, the lease is outside the purview of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. We have already indicated that though the lease of the building and the machinery were apparently sought to be effected by the plaintiff in favour of the first appellant under the two lease deeds in the instant case, nevertheless, the two lease deeds are, part and parcel of a single transaction and are therefore as much composite in character as the transaction would be if it had been reduced to writing in a single deed. 15. 15. Another Bench of this court consisting of Ismail and Palaniswamy, JJ. had also to consider in Pals v. Abdul Gafoor Sahib 86 L.W. 65, the very same controversy as is referred to above, in the appeal which was preferred by the tenant to assail the finding of the trial court that a composite lease of a cinema house together with machinery, fittings, furniture etc., created a tenancy which fell outside the purview of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. After elaborately considering the case law on the subject, the Bench held that a lease of a cinema house together with fixtures, equipments, furniture, projector, amplifier, speaker, monitor, screen etc., was unmistakably a lease of a composite character and as such, the lessee was not entitled to contend that the lease comprised a plurality of transactions and therefore he was entitled to remain in possession of the building even after the expiry of the lease period by invoking to his aid the protection offered to statutory tenants by the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The decisions rendered in these judgments are in pari materia to the conclusion reached by us in the instant case and indeed they afford reinforcement to our decision in the case. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the contention of the appellants that the lease of the building under Ex. A.10 was independent of the lease of the machinery under Ex. A.11 and that as such, the appellants are entitled to remain in possession of the building after the expiry of the lease period, and justify such possession of theirs on the pretext that the property demised under Ex. A.10 is a building as defined under the Act and thereby confers the rights of a statutory tenant on the first appellant. The learned trial Judge has come to the right conclusion on this aspect of the matter, and we therefore affirm his findings on issues 1 and 4. 16. Having failed to convince us on the main ground of defence taken by the appellants in the case, Mr. Parasaran would, hesitantly contend that, in any event, the learned Subordinate Judge ought not to have awarded as damages and future mesne profits to the plaintiff at the rate of Rs. 4,000 per month. This contention is also equally devoid of merit. Parasaran would, hesitantly contend that, in any event, the learned Subordinate Judge ought not to have awarded as damages and future mesne profits to the plaintiff at the rate of Rs. 4,000 per month. This contention is also equally devoid of merit. Admittedly, the fourth defendant was one of the persons who came forward with a tender to take the cinema house on lease for a period of five years with effect from 19th August 1965. It is common ground that in the said tender, the 4th defendant offered to pay a consolidated sum of Rs. 4,000 for the cinema theatre together with its machinery, equipment furniture etc., and such offer being the highest that was received by the plaintiff, was accepted by the Directors of the plaintiff. Had it not been for the cantankerous stand of the first appellant, the plaintiff would have put the 4th defendant in possession of the cinema concern and derived from him the lease amount of Rs. 4,000 every month. In those circumstances, there is no grace at all in the appellants trying to contend that the learned trial Judge ought not to have filed the damages for the period of two months prior to the filing of the suit and the future mesne profits or damages at the rate of Rs. 4,000 per month till date of delivery of possession. The appellants themselves had not adduced any evidence to show that the offer of the fourth defendant was a bogus one and that the plaintiff could not have derived a rent of Rs. 4,000 per month by leasing out the theatre and the equipment. As a matter of fact, Mr. Parasaran frankly concedes that he is unable to place his hands on any portion of the evidence in the case to contend that the award of Rs. 4,000 per month as damages and future mesne profits is, in any manner, excessive or unjustified. We see no justification, therefore, to interfere with the finding of the learned trial Judge on the quantum of damages that is to be awarded to the plaintiff for the period beyond the expiry of the lease and till such time the plaintiff is able to obtain delivery of possession of the demised property. 17. In the result, we find no merit in the appeal and consequently, the appeal is dismissed with costs to the plaintiffs. 17. In the result, we find no merit in the appeal and consequently, the appeal is dismissed with costs to the plaintiffs. The appellants are granted three months time from this date to vacate the premises.