JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, J. - Zahir Ahmad Budhanvi has filed this appeal against the Judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court, dated 9th February, 1968, dismissing his petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 2. The petitioner was art Assistant Teacher in Islamia Inter College, Saharanpur. Managing Committee of the institution appointed a sub-committee consisting of five persons, which included Sri Anwarul Islam, Manager of the Institution, to enquire into various charges levelled against the petitioner. The sub-committee submitted its report holding that the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved. Two members of the committee recommended that the petitioner be reduced in rank whereas two other members, including Sri Anwarul Islam, were of opinion that his services should be terminated, but the third member did not express any opinion on this aspect. The Managing Committee considered the report of the Sub-Committee and agreed that the charge levelled against the petitioner were made out and resolved that he should be reduced in rank. As required by the Intermediate Education Act, the matter was referred to the District Inspector of Schools for approving the proposed punishment. - The District Inspector of Schools, on 2nd March, 1965 approved the action proposed by the Managing Committee and directed that the petitioner be down-graded from lecturer's grade to that of trained graduates grade, and that no salary for the suspension period, except the subsistence allowance, be paid to him. It appears that while the matter was pending consideration by the District Inspector of Schools, the fifth member of the Sub-Committee viz. Abdul Khaliq, directly submitted his report to him on 1.9.1961 recommending that the petitioner be removed from service. However the resolution passed by the Managing Committee down grading the petitioner and seeking approval of the District Inspector of Schools for that action was not modified. 3. As, before the District Inspector of Schools gave his approval to the action proposed by the Managing Committee majority of the sub-committee had formed an opinion that petitioner should be removed from service, Sri Anwarul Islam presented an appeal before the Regional Appellate Committee (Deputy Director of Education) with a prayer that the punishment approved by the District Inspector of Schools be modified and as recommended by majority in the sub-committee the petitioner be removed from service. The Deputy Director of Education, Meerut Region informed the Manager that the appeal filed by him could not be entertained as District Inspector's decision was in conformity with the resolution passed by the Managing Committee which in the circumstances had no locus-standi to question the same. He also directed the Management to implement the order dated 2.3.1965 passed by District Inspector of Schools immediately. 4. The petitioner was also aggrieved by the order of the District Inspector of Schools passed on 2.3.1965. He also preferred an appeal against that order which was heard by the Deputy Director of Education (Regional Appellate Committee) who affirmed the finding that the Charges levelled against the petitioner were fully established, opinion on those charges the petitioner deserved to be removed from service. Accordingly he passed an order dated 17.2.1967 modifying the order of the District Inspector of Schools and directing that petitioner's services be terminated with effect from the date of service of the order upon him. 5. The petitioner then filed this petition under Art. 226 of the constitution before this Court and prayed that the order of the Deputy Director dated 17.2.1967 be quashed and the respondents be directed not to implement the same. Before the learned single Judge he pressed the petition only on two grounds viz. (1) It was not open to the Regional Appellate Committee or the Dy. Director of Education Meerut to enhance the punishment awarded by the District Inspector of Schools on the basis of the recommendation made by the Managing Committee of the institution. (2) Sri Anwarul Islam Manager of the Islamia College, Saharanpur who was in the position of the complainant and witness was biased against the petitioner. He should not have participated in the deliberations of the Sub-Committee appointed by the Managing Committee. His participation in the deliberations of the Sub-Committee vitiated the entire proceedings. 6. The learned single Judge repelled both the contentions and dismissed the writ petition. The petitioner has pressed this appeal precisely on the same two grounds. 7. The petitioner did not raise the question regarding Sri Anwarul Islam's bias either before the Sub-Committee itself or in the appeal filed before the Regional Appellate Committee. 6. The learned single Judge repelled both the contentions and dismissed the writ petition. The petitioner has pressed this appeal precisely on the same two grounds. 7. The petitioner did not raise the question regarding Sri Anwarul Islam's bias either before the Sub-Committee itself or in the appeal filed before the Regional Appellate Committee. In the circumstances we agree with the learned single Judge that the petitioner should not be permitted to raise this question in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution specially when other members of the Sub-Committee did not agree with Anwarul Islam's recommendation that petitioner be removed from service and the Managing Committee also did not endorse the same. If there was any substance in petitioner's case that Anwarul Islam was biased and he had raised that ground at the earliest the Managing Committee might have removed the defect by replacing Anwarul Islam by some one else. Moreover, considering the nature of the allegations contained in the charge-sheet served upon the petitioner we are not satisfied that Sri Anwarul Islam was in the position of a witness qua those charges and as such was either biased or disqualified from serving on the Sub-Committee. We may also point out that in this case the petitioner has merely prayed for the quashing of the order dated 17.2.1967, passed by the Deputy Director of Education. There is no prayer that the entire disciplinary proceedings including the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools , approving the action of the Management of down-grading the petitioner be quashed. As the petitioner has not prayed for the quashing of the order of the District Inspector of Schools, approving the action proposed by the Managing Committee , the question whether the proceedings before the Sub-Committee which merely made certain recommendations to the Managing Committee were vitiated becomes redundant and academic. In these circumstances the only question that survives for consideration is whether an appeal filed by the petitioner, the Deputy Directer of Education had jurisdiction to enhance the punishment imposed by the District Inspector of Schools. In these circumstances the only question that survives for consideration is whether an appeal filed by the petitioner, the Deputy Directer of Education had jurisdiction to enhance the punishment imposed by the District Inspector of Schools. Section 16-G(3) of the Intermediate Education Act runs thus :- 16-G(3) (a) No Principal , Head Master or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any dimension in emoluments or served with a notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. The decision of the Inspector shall be communicated within the period to be prescribed by regulations. (b) The Inspector may approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove of the notice for termination of service proposed by the management. Provided in the cases of punishment before passing orders the Inspector shall give an opportunity to the Principal, Head Master or the teacher to show cause with-in a fortnight of the receipt of the notice why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted. (c) An appeal against the order of the Inspector under clause (b) may be made to the Regional Appellate Committee constituted under clause (d) within one month from the date of such order being communicated to the packs concerned and the Regional Appellate Committee may after such enquiry as it considers necessary confirm the order or set aside or modify it and the order passed by the Regional Appellate Committee shall be final." 8. Relying upon a decision of this Court in Baleshwar Prasad v. Managing Committee of Mahabodhi Higher Secondary School, Sarnath, 1961 A.L.J. 722 as affirmed by a Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 183 of 1961 decided on 12th May, 1966, the learned single Judge held that the Regional Appellate Committee had under Section 16-G (3) (c) of the Intermediate Education Act jurisdiction to modify the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools. In the context, the expression `modification' as used in that section conferred upon the appellate authority a power to enhance the punishment imposed upon the teacher. The Deputy Director of Education had jurisdiction to change the punishment of down-grading the petitioner into one of terminating petitioner's service. 9. In the context, the expression `modification' as used in that section conferred upon the appellate authority a power to enhance the punishment imposed upon the teacher. The Deputy Director of Education had jurisdiction to change the punishment of down-grading the petitioner into one of terminating petitioner's service. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner urged that whereas under clause (b) of Section 16-G(3) the District Inspector of Schools has been given a power to approve , disapprove, reduce or enhance the punishment proposed by the Management, sub-clause (c) authorises the Regional Appellate Committee to confirm, set aside or modify an order under clause (b) passed by the District Inspector of Schools. In clause (c) the word `modify' has been used in the sense of alteration of such a character in a manner so as to tone down or soften the rigidity of a thing. The Regional Appellate Committee, therefore, could only either confirm or set aside or tone down the rigour of the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools. It could not, while modifying the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools, enhance the punishment imposed by him. 10. We are unable to accept the submission that the expression `modify' does not enable the Regional Appellate Committee to enhance the rigour of the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools. While it is true that the word' modify' can be used in the sense of effecting a change so as to tone down the rigour of a thing, it is also used in the sense of merely making an alteration. The meaning and scope of the expression `modify' as used in the section has to be gathered from the context in which the word has been used. It is apparent that sub-clause (c) of Section 16-G(3) enables the management to file an appeal in a case where a District Inspector of Schools has reduced the punishment sought to be imposed by it. In such a case the appeal on behalf of the Management can only be for increasing the punishment imposed by the District Inspector of Schools. The expression `modify' therefore simply means altering the punishment imposed by the District Inspector of Schools either by increasing or by reducing the same. In such a case the appeal on behalf of the Management can only be for increasing the punishment imposed by the District Inspector of Schools. The expression `modify' therefore simply means altering the punishment imposed by the District Inspector of Schools either by increasing or by reducing the same. We accordingly agree with the learned Judges who decided Baleshwar Prarad case that the expression `modify' as used in Section 16-G(3) really means altering the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools, It enables the Regional Appellate Committee to increase or decrease, depending upon the circumstances, the punishment inflicted by the District Inspector of Schools. 11. This, however, is not the end of the controversy. Sub-clause (1) of Section 16-G(3) empowers the District Inspector of Schools (1) to approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment proposed by the Management and (2) to approve or disapprove the notice of the termination of service proposed by the Management. The question that arises for consideration is, whether under Section 16-G(3) of the Act, the Regional Appellate Committee could exercise the power to modify the punishment imposed upon the teacher so as to enhance the same, even in a case the appeal is only at his instance and the management, for some reason, has not or is not in a position to file an appeal against the order passed under Section 16-G(3) of the Act. 12. Learned counsel for the Managing Committee urged that the expression `modify' used in Section 16 G(3) of the Intermediate Education Act, empowers the Appellate Committee to enhance the punishment imposed by the District Inspector of Schools and as its jurisdiction is co-extensive with that of the District Inspector of Schools, it had full jurisdiction to enhance the punishment approved by the District Inspector of Schools. 13. The scheme underlying Section 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act is that whenever the Management intends, to punish a teacher by way of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank etc., it has to take steps to obtain the approval of the District Inspector of Schools. Clause (b) authorises the Inspector to approve or dis-approve or enhance or reduce punishment proposed by the Management. If he approves or enhances the punishment, the teacher, who may be aggrieved by his order can file an appeal before the Regional Appellate Committee. Clause (b) authorises the Inspector to approve or dis-approve or enhance or reduce punishment proposed by the Management. If he approves or enhances the punishment, the teacher, who may be aggrieved by his order can file an appeal before the Regional Appellate Committee. However, if he disapproves the action proposed by the Management the teacher will have no grievance and it will be the management which alone, being aggrieved by the order passed by the Inspector, can take the matter up in appeal before the Regional Appellate Committee. If the Inspector, instead of approving the punishment, reduces the same, both the management and the teacher may take the matter up in appeal before the Regional Appellate Committee. Under sub-section (3), the Regional Appellate Committee has been authorised to hear and dispose of the appeal filed by either of the two parties and to confirm or set aside or modify the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools. It is obvious that the scheme underlying this section envisages that the power to confirm, set aside or modify the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools has to be exercised by the Regional Appellate Committee in order to dispose of the appeal made to it. It is not necessary that the three powers mentioned in the section must be exercised simultaneously in all appeals filed before the Appellate Committee. The Appellate Committee is expected to make only such order which the disposal of the particular appeal requires. Thus, in an appeal filed by the teacher, the Regional Appellate Committee may either confirm, reduce (modify) or set aside the punishment awarded by the District Inspector of Schools whereas in an appeal filed by the Management it may either confirm or enhance (modify) the punishment imposed by the District Inspector of Schools. 14. Under Section 33 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 and Section 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1956, both the assessee and the Income-tax Officer, who consider themselves aggrieved by an order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, have been authorised to approach the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for necessary relief Section 33(4) of the 1922 Act and Section 254(1) of the 1961 Act confer power on the Appellate Tribunal in more wide terms-viz. "The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit". "The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit". The Bombay High Court, in the case of Bhor Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1963) 48 I.T.R. 376 held that although the expression "pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit" gives a very wide power to the Appellate Tribunal to pass any order, yet in an appeal by an assessee it cannot enhance his assessment. It emphasised the use of the words "thereon" and observed that both the Income-tax Officer and the assessee had been authorised to file an appeal against an order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Tribunal could pass only such orders as were necessary for the purpose of disposing of the particular appeal with which it was dealing. In an appeal filed by an assessee it could not pass an order which could properly be made in an appeal filed by the Income-tax Officer. An order of enhancement could be obtained only in an appeal filed by the Income-tax Officer. Notwithstanding that qua the exercise of appellate powers the expression `thereon' does not find place in Section 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act, the Scheme underlying the section is similar to that which underlies Section 33(4) and Section 254(1) of the Income-tax Act of 1922 and 1961. Section 16-G empowers the Regional Appellate Committee to make an order confirming, setting aside or modifying the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools for the purposes of disposing of the particular appeal filed either by the Management or by the teacher. In dealing with the appeal tiled by the teacher it is not to pass such order which could appropriately be passed in an appeal filed by the Management. In our opinion the principle underlying the decision in Bhor Industries' case with which we fully agree applies to the disposal of an appeal filed before the Regional Appellate Committee under Section 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act. 15. In our opinion the principle underlying the decision in Bhor Industries' case with which we fully agree applies to the disposal of an appeal filed before the Regional Appellate Committee under Section 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act. 15. We wish to make it clear that the considerations for interpreting the word modify' in a section dealing with appellate power in a case where the appeal lies only at the instance of one of the parties to dispute may be different and in such cases it may be possible to hold that while modifying the order appealed against, the appellate authority may pass an order which is more rigorous so far as the appellant is concerned. But that is not the case before us. 16. Learned counsel for the Management urged that the power to modify which includes the power to enhance the punishment awarded by the District Inspector of Schools had been conferred on the Regional Appellate Committee generally in the interest of efficiency in the management of Educational institutions in order to see that the educational institutions do not deal with their teachers too leniently so as to impair its . discipline and efficiency. Accordingly, if the Regional Appellate Committee finds that a punishment which has been awarded to the teacher is too lenient it should be in a position to achieve the object underlying this section by enhancing punishment proposed to be inflicted by the Management. The section should be so interpreted that the object underlying it may be achieved not with standing that there is no appeal by the management for enhancement of punishment. We are unable to accept this submission. The scheme underlying this section clearly indicates that it is the District Inspector of Schools who has been entrusted with the responsibility of achieving the aforesaid object. No order of punishment by way of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank etc. can be effective unless approved in him. He has also been given the power to enhance punishments. The Regional Appellate Committee has not been given such a supervisory jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction to deal with the case arises only when an appeal is made to it. No order of punishment by way of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank etc. can be effective unless approved in him. He has also been given the power to enhance punishments. The Regional Appellate Committee has not been given such a supervisory jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction to deal with the case arises only when an appeal is made to it. If no appeal is filed it will not be able to make any alteration in the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools, notwithstanding that the District Inspector of Schools might have approved a punishment, which, according to the Regional Appellate Committee was not in the interest of discipline and fair management of the Institution. The Regional Appellate Committee has been appointed so that a party which is aggrieved by an order passed by the District Inspector of Schools may approach it and get the hardship caused to it mitigated. It will thus be seen that the object to achieve which power has been conferred on the Regional Appellate Committee is not the same as the object to achieve which the power has been conferred on District Inspector of Schools under Section 16-G of the Act. 17. We are accordingly of opinion that while dealing with an appeal filed by the teacher it was not open to the Regional Appellate Committee (Dy. Director of Education) to enhance the punishment proposed by the Managing Committee and approved by the District Inspector of Schools. In this case we find that the Management did prefer an appeal to the Regional Appellate Committee which was rightly dismissed on the ground that when the District Inspector of Schools had approved the action proposed by it, it had no locus standi to maintain the same. It is rather odd that after dismissing the appeal filed by the Management, the Dy. Director of Education made an order which could, if at all, appropriately be made in that appeal, in an appeal filed by the teacher specially when he could not suo motu exercise the power of enhancing the punishment imposed upon such teacher. 18. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Judgment under appeal is set aside. The petition filed by Zahir Ahmad Budhanvi is partly allowed. The order dated 17th February, 1967, passed by the Dy. Director of Education is quashed. 18. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Judgment under appeal is set aside. The petition filed by Zahir Ahmad Budhanvi is partly allowed. The order dated 17th February, 1967, passed by the Dy. Director of Education is quashed. The case will now go back to him for disposing of the appeal in the light of the observations made in this judgment. It is made clear that while interfering with the order passed by the Deputy Director, we have not doubted the correctness of the finding recorded by the Dy. Director of Education that the charges levelled against the petitioner were fully established. Parties to bear their own costs.