Judgment :- 1. The questions arising for decision in these civil revision petitions is whether the first counter-petitioner in each of these cases is entitled to restoration of possession under S.13A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964, as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (Act 35 of 1969), for short the Act. Act 35 of 1969 will hereinafter be referred to as the Amending Act. 2. The facts which gave rise to civil revision petition 1341 of 1973 necessary for deciding the case are the following. The revision petitioner therein pursuant to the decree for redemption in O.S. No. 75 of 1121 recovered possession of the property on 28-11-66. After coming into force of the Amending Act on 1170, the first counter-petitioner applied for restoration of possession under S.13A of the Act on 25-6-70, to the Land Tribunal, Quilon. The Tribunal by the order sought to be revised allowed the restoration of possession. Thereafter an appeal was taken by the revision petitioner before the appellate authority under the Act but the appeal was dismissed. This revision petition is directed against the appellate order. 3. In civil revision petition 1521 of 1973 the decree for redemption was passed in O.S. No. 253 of 1962 on 18 7 67. Pursuant to the decree the revision petitioner therein obtained possession on 28 8 67. The first counter petitioner applied for restoration of possession on 29 6 70 under S.13A of the Act before the Land Tribunal, Quilon. The Land Tribunal allowed the application. There was an appeal by the revision petitioner before the appellate authority under the Kerala Land Reforms Act and that appeal was dismissed. The revision is directed against the appellate order. 4. Act 35 of 1969 came into force on 1170. The Amending Act contains the provision that "it shall come into force on such date as the Government may by notification in the Gazette appoint" and the Government have the power to appoint different dates for the coming into force of different provisions of the Amending Act. The provisions with which we are concerned in these cases are S.4A (1) (a) and 13A which came into force on 1170. In fact all the sections in the Amending Act were brought into force on that day. S.4A (1) (a) is in these terms: "4A. The provisions with which we are concerned in these cases are S.4A (1) (a) and 13A which came into force on 1170. In fact all the sections in the Amending Act were brought into force on that day. S.4A (1) (a) is in these terms: "4A. Certain mortgagees and lessees of mortgagees to be deemed tenants: (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or in any contract, custom or usage, or in any judgment, decree or order of court, a mortgagee with possession of land, other than land principally planted with rubber, coffee, tea or cardamom, or the lessee of a mortgagee of such land shall be deemed to be a tenant if (a) the mortgagee or lessee was holding the land comprised in the mortgage for a continuous period of not less than fifty years immediately preceding the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969". 5. Reading the section by itself it is clear that in order that the section might apply the mortgagee must hold the property mortgaged for a continuous period of not less than 50 years immediately preceding the commencement of the Amending Act. Immediately preceding the commencement of the Amending Act cannot be understood as was contended to mean at some anterior period before the commencement of the Act. Every word in the section will have to be given its due weight. If 'immediately' was not in the section perhaps it was possible to contend that at the time of the commencement of the Act the mortgagee need not have been in possession. Even this is doubtful and we shall express no final opinion on this matter for there are sections in the Act which have used the words preceding the commencement of the Act without the prefix 'immediately'. All that is necessary to emphasise is that 'immediately preceding' can have no meaning other than that at the time of the commencement of the Amending Act the mortgagee must be holding the property. Such holding must have been for a continuous period of not less than 50 years. It was not urged before us that the mortgagees in the two cases had not been holding the property for a period of 50 years before they were dispossessed. Such holding must have been for a continuous period of not less than 50 years. It was not urged before us that the mortgagees in the two cases had not been holding the property for a period of 50 years before they were dispossessed. The only point urged was that the mortgagees were not holding the property for a continuous period of not less than 50 years immediately preceding the commencement of the Act. This contention has to be accepted for that is the only meaning that can be given to the section. 6. Counsel for the respondent however submitted that read with S.13A the Amending Act must be taken to have commenced not on the date on which it came into force by virtue of the notification issued by the Government under S.1(2) of the Amending Act, namely on 1170, but on the dates of dispossession. This contention we will have to examine. We shall therefore read the relevant part of S.13A which is sub-section (1) thereof. "13A. Restoration of possession of persons dispossessed on or after 1st April, 1964. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, or in any contract, custom or usage, or in any judgment, decree or order of court, where any person has been dispossessed of the land in his occupation on or after the 1st day of April, 1964, such person shall, if be would have been a tenant under this Act as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, at the time of such dispossession, be entitled subject to the provisions of this section to restoration of possession of the land". 7. The argument was that the words "if he would have been a tenant under this Act as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, at the time of such dispossession" clearly introduces a fiction which extends to the Amending Act being made retroactively operative so as to commence from the various dates of dispossession of the persons seeking relief under S.13A. If that was the intention of the legislature there would have been no difficulty whatever in stating simply that the Amending Act should be deemed to have come into operation on the dates of dispossession for the purpose of granting relief under S.13A. Such words are significantly absent in S.13A. If that was the intention of the legislature there would have been no difficulty whatever in stating simply that the Amending Act should be deemed to have come into operation on the dates of dispossession for the purpose of granting relief under S.13A. Such words are significantly absent in S.13A. S.13A enables restoration of possession of the properties of persons who are tenants under the Act. So the question whether a person dispossessed was a tenant under the Act or not will have to be determined. In cases to which S.7A is attracted there will be no difficulty in granting relief under S.13A even if there had been dispossession before the date of commencement of the Amending Act because of Explanation II to S.7A which provides that a person shall be deemed to be in possession notwithstanding any court record of dispossession. But when we come to S.4A (1) (a), we think the elements of the section would not be satisfied even when the section is read with S.13A for, all that S.13A requires is to apply S.4A (1) (a) to the facts of a case and then determine whether the person dispossessed was a tenant at the time of his dispossession. If the condition that a mortgagee should have been in possession at the time of the commencement of the Amending Act is not satisfied, no relief can be granted under S.13A, for the person dispossessed was not a tenant under S.4A (1) (a). On might think that there is an anomaly in that in certain cases restoration is possible while in other cases by the very terms of the section no such restoration is possible. This may not be an anomaly for we must attribute to the legislature a purpose in making the distinction. The type of tenancy created by S.4A (1) (a) is somewhat peculiar. A person who cannot be considered to be a tenant according to the ordinary concept has been made a tenant under that sub-section and so the legislature in its wisdom might have restricted its application only to such cases where, a mortgagee continued to hold the property at the date of the commencement of the Amending Act. Certainly we cannot assume that the purport of the section as it is worded had not been fully grasped by the legislature. Certainly we cannot assume that the purport of the section as it is worded had not been fully grasped by the legislature. So it seems to us to be clear that the legislature intended that this new provision must have effect only from the date of commencement of the Act. This view is fortified by the fact that the provision in S.4A (1) (a) has not been made retroactive by any express words in S.13A. The words occurring in S.13A cannot be construed as extending the operation of the Amending Act to an earlier date than the date on which it came into operation or the date from which it commenced for, to give such a meaning to those words would have the effect of altering the very words of S.4A (1) (a). If that was what was intended there must be much clearer provision. In the absence of any such provision we have to hold that the first counter-petitioner in each of these cases was not a tenant within the meaning of S.4A (1) (a) in the Act at the commencement of the Act. No restoration could therefore have been ordered. 8. We allow these revision petitions and set aside the orders allowing restoration of possession. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs throughout. Allowed.