PRADYOT KUMAR BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE short and important point involved in this Rule is whether the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (2nd Amendment) Act, 1973 is a valid piece of legislation. The amendment which is a subject matter of the litigation is as follows: - ?the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973?. An act to amend the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. Whereas it is expedient to amend the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, for the purposes and in the manner hereinafter appearing; it is hereby enacted in the twenty-fourth Year of the Republic of India, by the Legislature of West Bengal, as follows: - 1. This Act may be called the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973. 2. In the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as said Act), for the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 7, the following proviso shall be substituted, namely: - ?provided that where the intermediary agrees in writing that the whole of the compensation money payable to him including the amount recovered by the State Government under the provisions of section 9, if any, may be adjusted against the arrears recoverable from the intermediary under this sub-section no other mode of recovery shall be adopted for the recovery of any such arrears, except the balance, if any, remaining due after such adjustment, and suits and proceedings, if any, pending for the recovery of any such arrears shall remain stayed until such adjustment has been made. ? 3. In sub-section (4) of Section 44 of the said Act, the words, ?until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect? shall be omitted, 4. Section 46 of said Act shall be omitted. 5. After section 57a of said Act the following section shall be inserted, namely: - 57b (1 ). ? 3. In sub-section (4) of Section 44 of the said Act, the words, ?until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect? shall be omitted, 4. Section 46 of said Act shall be omitted. 5. After section 57a of said Act the following section shall be inserted, namely: - 57b (1 ). Where an order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 39 directing the preparation or revision of a record-of-rights, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application for the determination of rent or determination of the status of any tenant or the incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of-rights relates, and if any suit or application, in which any of the aforesaid matters is in issue, is pending before a Civil Court on the date of such order, it shall be stayed, and it shall, on the expiry of the period prescribed for an appeal under sub-section (3) of section 44 or when an appeal has been field under that sub-section, as the case may be, on the disposal of such appeal, abate so far as it relates to any of the aforesaid matters. (2) No Civil Court shall entertain any suit of application concerning any land or any estate, or any right in such estate, if it relates to - (a) alteration of any entry in the record-of-rights finally published, revised, made corrected or modified under any of the provisions of Chapter V, (b) a dispute involving determination of the question, either expressly or by implication, whether a raiyat or an intermediary is or is not entitled to retain under the provisions of this Act such land or estate or right in such estate, as the case may be, or (c) any matter which under any of the provisions of this Act is to be, or has already been enquired into, decided, dealt with or determined by the State Government or any authority specified therein, and any such suit or application which is pending before a Civil Court immediately before the commencement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973, shall abate so far as it relates to all or any of the matters referred to in clause (a), clause (b) or clause (c ). (3) Any dispute referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2) may be decided by a Revenue Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Settlement Officer, specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, who shall dispose of the same in such manner as may be prescribed. Provided that in deciding a dispute under this sub-section the Revenue Officer shall not reopen any matter which has already been enquired into, investigated, determined or decided by the State Government or any authority under any of the provisions of this Act. (4) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Revenue Officer made under sub-section (3) may appeal to the prescribed authority not below the rank of a Settlement Officer, within such time, in such manner and subject to payment of such fees as may be prescribed. (5) A decision made by the Appellate Authority under sub-section (4) shall be final. Explanation: - In this section - (i) suit includes an appeal. and (ii) an authority includes an authority to hear an appeal. This Act was passed by the West Bengal Legislative Assembly on the 9th May, 1973. Apurba Lal Majumdar, speaker west Bengal Legislative Assembly?. Dated the 10th May, 1973 ( 2 ) THE amendment came into force on 12th July, 1973. On 24th July, 1973 draft rules were framed. It was stated that the draft rules will be taken into consideration on or after the 16th August, 1973. At the date of hearing, however, on 28th August, 1973 the final draft was not brought to my notice when the bill was introduced in the West Bengal Legislative Assembly, objects and reasons for the Act stated to be as follows: - (I) ?implementation of the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal Act 1 of 1954), has been greatly impeded due to institution of suits in Civil Courts by intermediaries and big and big raiyats. A very large number of such suits have been pending in different Civil Courts for years together. When the Act itself contains provisions for appeals which are heard by Tribunals and Special Judges, there is no reason why implementation of the Act and distribution of land which vested in the State by the operation of the Act, to landless cultivators, should be further delayed through recourse to Civil Court. When the Act itself contains provisions for appeals which are heard by Tribunals and Special Judges, there is no reason why implementation of the Act and distribution of land which vested in the State by the operation of the Act, to landless cultivators, should be further delayed through recourse to Civil Court. It is, therefore, necessary that the jurisdiction of Civil Courts should be effectively barred and all pending civil suits should abate so far as they relate to alteration of any entry in the record-of-rights, power to retain land and matters which are to be or have already been enquired into or determined under the provisions of the Act. (II) It is also necessary to provide for adjustment of arrear Government dues against the whole of the compensation payable to an intermediary who is willing to have the dues so adjusted. (III) The Bill has been framed with the above objects in view?. C. R. 2287 (W) of 1973, C. R. No. 2273 (W)-2286 (w)of 1973, C. R. No. 2274 (W) to C. R. 2276 (W) of 1973 and C. R. No. 2285 (W) of 1973 are all heard together as common questions of law are raised in all these cases. ( 3 ) MR. Arun Kumar Dutta on behalf of the petitioners argued that Section 57b (1) is nothing but the re-enactment of the provisions of Section 46 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. Under Section 57 (B) (1) of the Act, the Civil Court's jurisdiction in so far as the determination of rent or determination of the status of any tenant or the incidents of any tenancy in the record of rights is concerned, has been taken away. Mr. Dutta, therefore, argued that though specifically in jurisdiction has been taken away, still the Civil Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the issues in the suit relates to those matters and the suit cannot automatically abate. ( 4 ) MR. Arun Kumar Matilal contended and agreed with Mr. Arun Kumar Dutta that automatic abatement of the suit was not indicated by the Legislature. Mr. Matilal contended that the ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and all the civil actions must be amenable to jurisdiction of Civil Court. ( 5 ) MR. Basanta Panda and Mr. Arun Kumar Dutta that automatic abatement of the suit was not indicated by the Legislature. Mr. Matilal contended that the ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and all the civil actions must be amenable to jurisdiction of Civil Court. ( 5 ) MR. Basanta Panda and Mr. Bhunia contended that Sections 46 and 57 B (1) of the amending Act are matters during the preparation of records of rights and that they only provide for the abatement of the suit pending preparation of the record of rights. After the record of rights are prepared, suits can be filed and the provisions cannot be made in respect thereto by the Legislature. ( 6 ) MR. Ranjit Kumar Banerjee contended that the possession and title are two different concepts of law. An abatement of all pending cases is an arbitrary action and unreasonable restriction. The effect of the amendment means that the question of title cannot be agitated and the record of rights even if wrong, must be taken to be conclusive. ( 7 ) ON behalf of the respondents, three different sets of lawyers have appeared led by Mr. Hemendra Chandra Sen and Mr. P. K. Sen Gupta and Mr. Sachin Das Gupta, three sets of argument were advanced. Mr. Sen argued that the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act was enacted for nationalization of land and for establishing socialistic pattern of Government. Section 3 of 1973 Act makes an amendment of Section 44 (4) of the Act by which the words ?until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect? were deleted. It is argued by Mr. Sen that omission of these words does not very much challenge the question of presumption of record of rights and the records of rights does not by that process become conclusive. The record of rights is only a presumption and nothing else. Section 57 B (1) is not a new section but is a repetition of Section 46 of the parent Act of 1953. ( 8 ) MR. The record of rights is only a presumption and nothing else. Section 57 B (1) is not a new section but is a repetition of Section 46 of the parent Act of 1953. ( 8 ) MR. Das Gupta on this aspect of the question contended that Section 57b (1) relates to the suits in respect of the matter enumerated in the body of the Section and in so far as it relates to the said matters the record of rights are conclusive and cannot be challenged by way of suit and the suit in respect thereof abates. Mr. Das. Gupta contended that under section 46 of the parent Act which is in pari materia with the present section 57b (1) the suit could have been filed but by the present Act of 1973 the suit is barred but in the proceedings under section 37 to 47 regarding the preparation of record of rights the petitioner herein has only alternative remedy for adjudication of their grievances. Mr. Bhunia states that the State Government directed to the effect that all suits automatically abate. It is argued by Mr. Das Gupta that it cannot be so. Suits do not abate automatically and the order must have been passed by the Courts concerned before the abatement. It is argued by Mr. Dasgupta that it is for the Court to determine the process concerning the abatement of suits and only if the suit comes within the mischief of the section relating to the issue mentioned in Section 57b (1) suits can be abated. It is further argued by Mr. Das Gupta that any other suits not coming within the mischief of Section 57b (1) of the Act are not barred. It is further argued that Section 57b (1) of the Act does not take away the rights to adjudicate the question of intermediary. It is further argued by Mr. Das Gupta that any other suits not coming within the mischief of Section 57b (1) of the Act are not barred. It is further argued that Section 57b (1) of the Act does not take away the rights to adjudicate the question of intermediary. ( 9 ) IN so far as Section 57b (1) is concerned it appears to me that it cannot be said that the said Section is bad on the ground as argued aforesaid, Section 57b (1) makes it clear that during the preparation of record of rights, no Civil Court shall entertain any suits or application for the determination of rent or determination of the status of any tenant or the incidents of any tenancy to which the record of rights relates should be stayed pending the same and after the order is passed and an application under Section 44 (3) is either filed or it shall on the expiry of the time prescribed for an appeal under Section 44 (3) of the Act it shall abate. It appears to me that the record of rights can be prepared an during the preparation of record of rights the right of the Civil Court to entertain such suits in respect of such matters is either stayed or the suit abates. Unless such provision is made, there may be difficulties in the matter or the process of preparation of record of rights. Such provisions were there in Section 46 of the parent Act which came for interpretation in (1) 63 C. W. N. , 521 (D. N. Bose v. Sk. Safui) and (2) 64 C. W. N. 561 (Kalipada Mondal v. State of West Bengal ). In all those cases it has been held by this Court while interpreting section 46 of the Act that such provisions are valid. ( 10 ) THE Legislature has a right to take away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of any matter coming within mischief of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act which can be decided by the Tribunal under the Act. Here this has actually been done by the provisions of Section 57b (1) of the Act. ( 10 ) THE Legislature has a right to take away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of any matter coming within mischief of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act which can be decided by the Tribunal under the Act. Here this has actually been done by the provisions of Section 57b (1) of the Act. Section 57b (1) makes it clear that during the preparation of record-of-rights the suit must remain stayed and after the order is made and the time for appeal expired, the suit will abate or in the other words u/s 44 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act the parties to the proceeding may file objections. If he is aggrieved he can file appeal u/s 44 (3) of the Act. In that view of the matter though the Civil Court's jurisdiction has been taken away, the parties aggrieved have been provided with adequate alternative remedy under the Act. If the Tribunal is constituted under the Act and within the four corners of the statute the Civil Court cannot have any jurisdiction to agitate the same question over again by a suit as the suit itself has been specifically barred by the Legislature. As it has been held by the Supreme Court in (3) AIR 1965 S. C. 1942 (Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay ). It has been held that ?where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunal the Civil Court's Jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure?. It is, therefore, clear that the suit will be stayed under Section 57b (1) or will abate after a certain time and no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application regarding the determination of rent or determination of the status of any tenant or the incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of-rights relates and if it is found that the statutory tribunal u/s. 44 of the Act has acted without jurisdiction or in violation of the principle of natural justice. Apart from the question of determination of rent or determination of the status of any tenant or the incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of-rights relates, of course the Civil Court's jurisdiction is not ousted or in other words, in spite of the specific jurisdiction of the Civil Court, still the Civil Court will have power to decide the question. If it is found that the constitutional validity of the section is sought to be challenged r of that matter the principle of natural justice is violated, it does not come within the mischief of section 57b (1) of the Act. This provision of section 57b (1) must be given full effect and section 57b (1) cannot be said to be ultra vires Art. 14 or 19 of the Constitution as has been argued by the petitioners. ( 11 ) THE next section, is 57b (1), (2) and (3) upon which both the sides strenuously argued that the said section is ultra vires the Constitution of India. Section 57b (2) provides that no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application concerning any land or any estate, or any right in such estate, if it relates to (a) alteration of any entry in the record-of-rights finally published, revised, made, corrected or modified under any of the provisions of Chapter V, and if such suit or application is pending before a civil court immediately before the commencement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973, shall abate so far as it relates to all or any of the matters referred to in clause (a), clause (b) or clause (c) or in other words, any suit pending will abate, if it relates to alteration of any entry in the record-of-rights finally published, revised, made, corrected or modified under any of the provisions of Chapter V of the Act. ( 12 ) MR. Arun Dutta and Mr. Matilal argued that the said section is ultra vires the power of the State Legislature. The Act is repugnant to section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, inasmuch as the entertainment of the suit is barred. Item No. 13 of List III of Schedule VII is in the concurrent List and the provision has already been made in the Civil Procedure Code for entertaining the suit. The Civil Procedure Code is an existing law under Art. 366 (10) of the Constitution of India. Item No. 13 of List III of Schedule VII is in the concurrent List and the provision has already been made in the Civil Procedure Code for entertaining the suit. The Civil Procedure Code is an existing law under Art. 366 (10) of the Constitution of India. Item No. 12 of the said List provides for evidence and oaths which has been provided in the Evidence Act also. This is also an existing law under Art. 254 of the Constitution, it is argued by Mr. Dutta. It is argued by Mr. Dutta that the provision of Section 57 92) (a), (b) and (c) is ultra vires Article 254 (1) of the Constitution. Mr. Matilal contended that the present enactment is beyond the competence of the Legislature and is colourable and fraud on Legislature's power. It is argued by Mr. Matilal that the present State Legislature is trying to amend the Civil Procedure Code by which the suit including an appeal abates and therefore by the colourable exercise of power, the Legislature also sought to amend the Civil Procedure Code and the Evidence Act in the gurb of amending the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. Section 57b (1), it is argued by Mr. Matilal, takes away the right of intermediary to file a suit but did not either to file an appeal against an order passed u/s. 44 (2a) or the unamended section 44 (4) but now the suit is barred. The persons, whose cases have been decided and those intermediaries whose cases have not been decided, cannot avail of the remedy provided in the Act. All pending cases abate and in respect of the non-pending cases' remedy has been provided in the statute. It is argued that it is arbitrary and is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India and it violates the principle that wherever there is a right there is a remedy. ( 13 ) ON behalf of the respondents Mr. Das Gupta argued that the provision is not repugnant. It is argued by Mr. Das Gupta that the State Legislature is competent to legislate in view of Item Nos. 35 and 45 of List II of Schedule VII. In my opinion, the contention that the State Legislature is incompetent to enact the present legislation is wholly incorrect under List II, Schedule VII of Item Nos. 18 and 45. It is argued by Mr. Das Gupta that the State Legislature is competent to legislate in view of Item Nos. 35 and 45 of List II of Schedule VII. In my opinion, the contention that the State Legislature is incompetent to enact the present legislation is wholly incorrect under List II, Schedule VII of Item Nos. 18 and 45. It is clear that the State Legislature is competent to enact the legislation regarding the land, that is to say, rights in or over land as also in respect of land revenue, including the assessment and collection of revenue, the maintenance of land records, survey for revenue purposes and records of rights and alienation of revenue. In the present case this has actually been done by the State Legislature by the exercise of power given to the State Legislature in Item Nos. 18 and 45 of List II of Schedule VII. It is clear that the Civil Procedure Code refers to the litigation generally between the parties and a creation of tribunal for the purpose of Act is a special matter ancillary to the power of the State Legislature. So also is an Evidence Act. In my opinion, on that ground it cannot be said that Section 57b is ultra vires the State Legislature. While deciding the identical question. The Federal Court held in (4) Uday Chand v. Samarendra (1947) F. C. R. 1 (F. C.) that though there is a separate entry for Civil Procedure in Item No. 4 of List III of the Government of India Act, 1935 the Civil Procedure is used in a general sense as the procedure applicable to litigation generally. It does not include a special law of procedure which is applicable only to a litigation regarding a special matter. It is further stated in the case of (5) Megh Raj v. All Rakhin, (1947) F. C. R. 77 (86) (PC) that entry No. 65 of the Govt. of India Act 1935 is wide enough to create and determine the powers and jurisdiction of Court in respect of land, as a matter ancillary to the subject of entry 18. With this view, there cannot be, in my opinion, any dispute. The legislature is competent to create a special tribunal for the purpose of dealing with the question under the Special Act. With this view, there cannot be, in my opinion, any dispute. The legislature is competent to create a special tribunal for the purpose of dealing with the question under the Special Act. The Legislature is competent under Item No. 18 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution to enact such legislation. In my opinion, therefore, there is no substance in this contention that the legislature is incompetent to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and to establish a statutory tribunal for the purpose of deciding the cases within the four corners of the statute. ( 14 ) THE next point urged by Mr. Matilal is that the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973 do not come under the protection of Art. 31 of 31a of the Constitution of India, and as they do not come within the mischief of Art. 31a (1) (a), it is argued by Mr. Matilal that the present amendment has no relationship with the question of acquisition of any estate or any right therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights. ( 15 ) MR. Das Gupta on behalf of the respondents also agrees that the present amendment does not attract Art. 31a of the Constitution and in other words, in order to see the validity of the provisions of Act, Article 14, 19 or 31 will have to be considered. Mr. Sen Gupta, however, appearing for the Government took a different stand altogether. He argued that Art. 31a applies and therefore the amendment is immune from attack because of the violation of the Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act provides for the acquisition of estates, of rights of intermediaries therein, and of certain right of raiyats and under-raiyats and of the rights of certain other persons in land comprised in estates by the State. The Act provides for the assessment and payment of compensation in respect of the vested land to the intermediaries. Section 6 of the Act give the right to intermediaries to retain such land as retainable under the said Section. Section12 provides for payment of adinterim compensation in respect of the vested land after assessment of the compensation payable to the intermediaries under sub-section (1) of the Section 14 or sub-section (5) of Section 15 as the case may be. Section 6 of the Act give the right to intermediaries to retain such land as retainable under the said Section. Section12 provides for payment of adinterim compensation in respect of the vested land after assessment of the compensation payable to the intermediaries under sub-section (1) of the Section 14 or sub-section (5) of Section 15 as the case may be. Section 14 provides for the preparation of Compensation Assessment Roll. Section15 provides for filling and disposal of objection to Compensation Assessment Roll prepared under section 14. Section 16 provides for the preparation of the compensation assessment Roll and u/s 17 the assessment of compensation is fixed. Section 19 makes a provision for contents of the order of the compensation officer under section 15 or 15a. Section 20 provides for an appeal against the order passed by the compensation officer under section 15 or 15a or under proviso (b) of sub-section (2) of section 25 to a Special Judge appointed for the purpose of this section. Section 21 is a provision for final publication of the Compensation Assessment Roll. Under Section 22 the compensation office has a power to correct any bonafide mistake in the compensation assessment Roll and Sections 23, 24 and 25 make provisions for payment of compensation. Section 39 of Chapter V of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act provides for the preparation f record-of-rights. Section 40 to 43 provide for fixation of rent of vested land to the State Government. Section 44 provides, inter alia, that when a record-of-rights has been prepared or revised, the Revenue Officer shall publish a draft of the record so prepared or revised in the prescribed manner and for the prescribed period and shall receive and consider any objections which may be made to any entry therein or to any omission therefrom during the period of such publication. When all such objections have been considered and disposed of according to such rules as the State Government may make in this behalf, the revenue officer shall finally frame the record and cause such record to be finally published in the prescribed manner and make a certificate stating the fact of such final publication and the date thereof and shall date and subscribe the same under his name and official designation. An officer specially empowered by the State Government may, on application within 9 months or within 18 years from the date of final publication of the record-of-rights u/s. 44 (2a) of the Act, reopen the record-of-rights and revise any entry in the record finally published after giving the persons interested an opportunity of being heard and after recording reasons therefore. Under section 44 (3) any person aggrieved by an order passed in revision under sub-section (2a) may appeal in the prescribed manner to a tribunal within such time as has been prescribed. Under Section 44 (3a) the certificate of final publication referred to in sub-section (2) stating that a record-of-rights has been finally published on a specified date, shall be conclusive proof of such publication and of the date thereof. The State Government may, be notification, declare with regard to any specified area, that a record of rights ha been finally published for every village included in such area and such notification shall be conclusive proof of such publication and furthermore under section 44 (4) every entry in the record-of-rights finally published under sub-section (2) including an entry revised under sub-section (2a), made u/s. 42a, or corrected u/s. 45 or section 45a, shall, subject to any modification by an order on appeal under sub-section (3), be presumed to be correct until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect. ( 16 ) NOW section 44 (4) has been amended by the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973, by which the words ?until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect? has been omitted. Therefore at the present moment, after an entry, finally published under section 44 (2), to be presumed to be correct under Section 57 B which has been inserted by the present Amendment Act, 1973. Before the amendment of this Act it was open to any person to file a suit for correction of the record-of-rights if he is aggrieved by the record-of-rights finally published. The record-of-rights could have been used as evidence and presumed to be correct unless it is proved by the contrary evidence to be incorrect. Section 57b takes away the said right and therefore the section is ultra vires. ( 17 ) THE section 44 (4) of the Act after the amendment provides that the entry in the record-of-rights ?shall be presumed to be correct. ? Section 57b takes away the said right and therefore the section is ultra vires. ( 17 ) THE section 44 (4) of the Act after the amendment provides that the entry in the record-of-rights ?shall be presumed to be correct. ? Section 4 of the Evidence Act defines the meaning of the words ?shall presume? as follows: - ?whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved?. It will be clear therefore that in the matter where it is stated, that the Court shall presume a fact it shall regard such fact as proved, unless it is disproved. Left at that, I would have no hesitation to hold that the contrary evidence could be given to disprove the fact and in fact, Mr. Das Gupta contended that the presumption is no proof and that it is an inference only and the presumption is a different concept from proof. ( 18 ) THE omission of the words ?until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect? does not change the basic conception of the words ?shall presume?. These words are only presumption and not proof. The legislature did not use the words ?conclusive proof?. The words ?shall presume? and ?may presume? mean that in respect of the former ? legal presumption. ? In the case reported in (6) A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 61 (State of Madras vs. A Vaidyanatha Iyer), the Supreme Court interpreted thee words as follows at page 65: -?it may here be mentioned that the legislature has chosen to use the words 'shall presume' and not 'may presume', the former a presumption of law and latter of fact, Both these phrases have been defined in the Indian Evidence Act, no doubt for the purpose of that Act, but S. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is in pari materia with the Evidence Act because it deals with a branch of law of evidence e. g. , presumptions, and therefore should have the same meaning. ?shall presume? has been defined in the Evidence Act as follows:?whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved?. ?shall presume? has been defined in the Evidence Act as follows:?whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved?. It is a presumption of law and therefore it is obligatory on the court to raise this presumption in every case brought under s. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act because unlike the case of presumption of fact, presumptions of law constitute a branch of jurisprudence?. ( 19 ) IN the present case the same principle applies in all force. Here also, the presumption deals with a branch of evidence and the evidenciary value of the documentary evidence, that is, of the record of rights and the Court must make a legal presumption as to the entry of the record-of-rights and nothing more and like all legal presumptions as is evident from the basis concept, it is rebuctable in a proper forum. ( 20 ) MR. Sen contended that even if there is an entry in the record-of-rights, it is not necessary to set aside the entry in a suit. In the case reported in (7) 11 C. W. N. it has been held that even if the record-of-rights is erroneous, it is not necessary to challenge the same in order get relief in a suit. I must respectfully agree with that view. ( 21 ) MR. Dutta and Mr. Matilal, Mr. Panda, Mr. Bhunia contended that the present Act is not a law for acquisition of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights. It is a law for correction of the record-of-rights. The vesting has already been completed and this is only regarding the correction of the record-of-rights and has nothing to do with the vesting on acquisition of the estate. ( 22 ) THE expression, ?acquisition? and the expression, ?right?, in relation to an estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue. ( 22 ) THE expression, ?acquisition? and the expression, ?right?, in relation to an estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue. In my opinion, the whole Act and the provisions of the Act are inter-connected to the main purposes, that is, for acquisition of estates, of rights of intermediaries therein and of certain rights of raiyats and under-raiyats and of the rights of certain other persons in land comprised in estates, by the State, and is an integral part of the scheme for an agrarian reforms. ( 23 ) MR. Matilal however argued that the amendment did not come firstly under Art. 31a as the present amendment does not speak of acquisition but is a provision in respect of the recording of the possession on the land and referred to (8) A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 168 (Ramanlal Gulabchand Shah v. The State of Gujrat) in support of his contention. In my opinion, however, the said case has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the said case the Supreme Court was considering Section 61 and 82 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 13 of 1956. Under Section 65 (1) of the Act it has been provided as follows: -? assumption of management of lands which remained uncultivated. (1)if it appears to the State Govt. That for any two consecutive years, any land has remained uncultivated (or the full and efficient use of the land has not been made for the purpose of agriculture, through the default of the holder or any other cause whatsoever not beyond his control) the State Government may, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit, declare that the management of such land shall be assumed. The declaration so made shall be conclusive. ? ( 24 ) THE Supreme Court held that the said Section 65 cannot come under Art. 31a but comes under Art. 31a (1) (b ). It is further held that the protection of Art. 31a (1) (b) can only be invoked if the law can show a real limit for the period of management. If the management is likely to continue for an indefinite period it is not in any sense limited and, therefore, the amended part cannot claim protection, S. 61 notwithstanding. It is further held that the protection of Art. 31a (1) (b) can only be invoked if the law can show a real limit for the period of management. If the management is likely to continue for an indefinite period it is not in any sense limited and, therefore, the amended part cannot claim protection, S. 61 notwithstanding. Once the matter can be gone into the provision of the additional part will have to be examined for reasonableness. It was held that the provision is unreasonable and is not protected under Art. 31a (1) (b ). Art. 31 B and IX Schedule also does not give any protection on the same ground as the same does not come under Art. 31a (1) (b) of the Constitution of India. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the first part of section 65 before amendment gives the power to the State Govt. to take action in respect of any land which are kept uncultivated for 2 years and it cannot be challenged because of the protection of Art. 31a read with the IX Schedule. Action was not taken under the first part of Section 65 before the amendment but in so far as the second part is concerned the question arose whether taking over of the management can be said to be (a) acquisition by the State, or (b) extinguishment of the rights of the holder, or (c) modification of any such rights. On these questions the Supreme Court held that it is impossible to say that this was an acquisition by the State. Such acquisition must transfer the ownership of the property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State. Since S. 65 or the other provision of the Act do not spell out any such thing, there is no acquisition by the State. There is also no extinguishment of the rights of the holder. The rights are merely suspended and he continues to be the owner. There can of course be extinguishment of rights without acquisition by the State but there must be extinguishment, that is complete termination of the rights. The scheme of the Act in S. 61 contemplates return of the land unless sold to others and in those cases in which a sale is not affected it cannot be said that there is an extinguishment of the rights. The scheme of the Act in S. 61 contemplates return of the land unless sold to others and in those cases in which a sale is not affected it cannot be said that there is an extinguishment of the rights. Therefore the Supreme Court held that the provision is merely suspension of the right of management of one's property without modification of the proprietary right was not held sufficient to give protection of Art. 31a (1) (a ). In my opinion, this case has no application. There is no doubt that the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act provides for the acquisition of the estate by the State and the right of intermediaries therein as also certain rights or raiyats and under-raiyats and of the rights of certain other persons in land comprised in the estates. The intermediaries have also been given some rights to get compensation under the Act which is based on the record-of-rights prepared and finally published. The finally published record-of-rights is the very basis for fixing the compensation in respect of the vested land. The finally published record-of-rights provides for the tenant in possession of the land as direct tenant under the State. Finally published record-of-rights also records the assessment of rent and other particulars in the record-of-rights. Before the amendment of this Act, after finally published the record-of-rights, any person aggrieved could have filed a suit in the Civil Court. In the said suit they could have challenged the record-of-rights finally published. Art. 31a, in my opinion, applies in full force in respect of the Amending Act also and inasmuch as, this is a law for acquisition of the estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights of the persons. It will appear, therefore, that the amendment comes under the protection of Art. 31a of the Constitution. ( 25 ) MR. Matilal further contended that the present enactment is a colourable piece of legislation. Mr. Arun Kumar Dutt also argued that the Act is a fraud of the power of the legislative power. Mr. Matilal contended that by the enactment, the legislature sought to legislate on the law of evidence and the Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Matilal referred to (9) A. I. R. S. C. 1017 (P. Vajragelu Mudaliar v. The Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition) on the question of colourable exercise of power. Mr. Matilal contended that by the enactment, the legislature sought to legislate on the law of evidence and the Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Matilal referred to (9) A. I. R. S. C. 1017 (P. Vajragelu Mudaliar v. The Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition) on the question of colourable exercise of power. On behalf of the respondent it has been argued that what the legislature was doing in the present case is not legislating on the Civil Procedure Code or in the Evidence Act but they were trying to refer to the matters enumerated in section 57b (2) (a) (b) and (c) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act to a special tribunal under the statute. It is further by Mr. Das Gupta that the presumption is nothing but a rebuttal presumption. The omission of the words ?until contrary is proved? does not mean that the presumption is final. Mr. Sen Gupta as well as Mr. H. N. Sen on behalf of the State Govt. in C. R. No. 2285-87, 2273 (w) of 1973 contended that the record-of-rights is only in respect of possession and not title. The entry does not create title and it is not necessary to bring a suit to avoid a presumption in the entry or for declaration that the entry is wrong. Mr. Sen relied upon (10) 11 C. W. N. 48 (Ramgulam Singh v. Bishnu Pargesh Narain Singh) and (60) 40 C. W. N. , 22 (Keshab Chandra v. Madan Mohan ). They further argued that the Act is not colourable exercise of legislation. ( 26 ) MR. Bhunia appearing for the petitioners in C. R. No. 2912 (W) of 1973 argued that in the name of the amending of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, the basic feature of the Constitution, namely, the rule of law is being affected. ( 27 ) MR. Matilal relied on (9) AIR 1965 S. C. 1017 (P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. The Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition) at page 1025, paragraph 16, which speaks as follows: - ?when a Court says that a particular legislation is a colourable one, it means that the Legislature has transgressed its legislative power in a covert to indirect manner, it adopts a device to out step the limits of its power. Applying the doctrine to the instant case, the Legislature cannot make a law in derogation of Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution. It can, therefore, only make a law of acquisition or requisition by providing for ?compensation? in the manner prescribed in Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution. If the Legislature, though exfacie purports to provide for compensation or indicates the principles for ascertaining the same, but in effect and substance takes away a property without paying compensation for it, it will be exercising power which it does not possess. If the Legislature makes a law for acquiring a property by providing for an illusory compensation or by indicating the principles for ascertaining the compensation which do not relate to the property acquired or to the value of such property at or within a reasonable proximity of the date of acquisition or the principles are so designed and so arbitrary that they do not provide for compensation at all, one can easily hold that the Legislature made the law in fraud of its powers. Briefly stated the legal position is as follows : If the question pertains to the adequacy of compensation, it is not justiciable; if the compensation fixed or the principles evolved for fixing it disclose that the Legislature made the law in fraud of powers in the sense we have explained, the question is within the jurisdiction of the Court?. ( 28 ) THE Supreme Court was considering in that case, the Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act (23 of 1961 ). The Supreme Court held that Art. 31a (2) has no application as the Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act (23 of 1961) is not confined in the agrarian reforms and/or further held that there is no reasonable classification and therefore the said Act was void. In the present case, in my opinion, no such thing has happened. In the present case the Legislature sought to amend the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act which enactment is protected under the provision of Art. 31a of the Constitution. As I have held that the Act having come within the said provision of Art. 31a stands in the way the petitioners challenged the violation of provision under Art. 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution. As I have held that the Act having come within the said provision of Art. 31a stands in the way the petitioners challenged the violation of provision under Art. 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution. In my opinion, further by exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of the matter coming within the four corners of the statue, the Legislature has not legislated in excess of powers of the Legislature to enact. That power is ancillary to the powers of enacting a law for acquisition of the estates by the State and by that process they are not legislating either on the Civil Procedure Code or in the Evidence Act. Therefore, in my opinion, there is no substance in the submission made by the petitioners regarding the colourable exercise of powers by the State Legislature. As the provision comes within the protection of Art. 31a, the challenge under Art. 14, 19 or 31 cannot be entertained. Mr. Matilal contended that the provision violates the equal protection in respect of the procedural law and as such the provision amounts to unreasonable classification and violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is further argued by Mr. Matilal that no difference has been made or that S. 57b (2) is discriminated on the basis of the pending suit or suits not pending at the instance of the aggrieved party, to raiyats or the intermediaries who were discriminated on the basis of the pending action. Mr. Matilal referred to the Supreme Court's decision reported in (11) AIR 1967 S. C. 691 (Jalan Trading Co. ). That case cannot help Mr. Matilal in view of the fact that the Supreme Court struck down the particular provisions of the Payment of Bonus Act on the ground of violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. as the present Act, in my opinion, comes under the cover of Art. 31a of the Constitution, the challenge under Art. 14 is ruled out. ( 29 ) MR. as the present Act, in my opinion, comes under the cover of Art. 31a of the Constitution, the challenge under Art. 14 is ruled out. ( 29 ) MR. Datta has further contended that the provisions have been made by which the pending suit abates but no alternative forum has been created in which the petitioner can agitate the question and therefore by abating a suit the petitioner's cause was said to be dismissed but no further provision has been made for creating a forum where the suit or issues in the suit could have been tried. Mr. Matilal has also contended that the ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court without providing for an alternative forum amounts to the exercise of judicial power by the Legislature. It is argue that the State Legislature has abated all suits and has made the order, already passed, final. Mr. Bhunia and Mr. Ranjit Kumar Banerjee contended that the statutory forum cannot decide the question of title and record-of-rights and the provisions thereof are only related to possession and has nothing to do with the title. Therefore, it is argued that in cases where the question of title is involved, the suit cannot abate. Mr. Das Gupta on the other hand contended that though the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been taken away, the statute provides for a forum in which the petitioners may agitate their rights under the statute, but the Court will have to determine whether the issues come within the mischief of section 57b (1), (2) and (3) of the Act. It is further contended that the absence of judicial review is not unreasonable as it was a legislative policy and the legislation comes within the competence of List 2, Schedule VII, Item Nos. 35 and 45. It is argued by Mr. Das Gupta that the provision has been made for disposal of the dispute arising out of section 57b (2) of the Act. The petitioners, however, argue the proviso makes it clear that the Revenue Officer deciding the dispute under section 57b cannot reopen any matter which has already been enquired into, investigated, determined or decided by the State Govt. or any authority under any of the provision of the Act. Mr. The petitioners, however, argue the proviso makes it clear that the Revenue Officer deciding the dispute under section 57b cannot reopen any matter which has already been enquired into, investigated, determined or decided by the State Govt. or any authority under any of the provision of the Act. Mr. Das Gupta however contended that the decision already made under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act cannot be reopened but section 57b (2) only relates to any dispute which is a future dispute and which has not been decided by any authority under the Act. ( 30 ) MR. Das Gupta has not read the provision of Section 57b (2) and (3) correctly. On the other hand, the dispute which has already been decided cannot be reopened and future dispute can be decided under the provision of section 57b (2) of the Act. The said section also has provided an appeal against any order passed under section 57b (3) of the Act but the fact remains whether the provision of section 57b (2) by which the pending suits are abated can be said to be valid provision under the statute. The effect of section 57b (2) is that any person having a cause and having filed a suit was non-suited when it has been provided that the suit will abate so far as relates to clauses (a), (b) and (c ). When the statute makes provision for taking away the right of a party to go to a Civil Court for redressing his grievance it will have to provide for alternative remedy for disposal of the dispute pending in the Civil Court. In such provision by which the Civil Court's jurisdiction is barred, alternative forum was given to agitate the question. In the present case this alternative forum has not been given in the matter already decided by the statutory tribunal or authority and on the other hand, the provision has been made by which no Civil Court can entertain any suits or applications concerning any matter coming within the mischief of section 57b (2) (a), (b), (c) and on which the orders have already been passed under the provisions of the Act. It is competent for the Legislature to make such a provision and bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court so that the orders passed by the statutory tribunal competent to decide the matters within the four corners of the statute can not be reopened. The question regarding the exclusion of jurisdiction of a Civil Court has been considered by the Supreme Court in (12) A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 78 (Dhulabhai v. State of M. P. ). The Supreme Court laid down the views expressed by the Supreme Court in different cases as follows: - (1)where the statue gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted inconformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; (2)where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the Scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the Enquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunal so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not; (3)challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before tribunals constituted under the Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the tribunals; (4)when a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the tribunals; (4)when a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of Certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit; (5)where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies. (6)questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry; (7)an exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. ? ( 31 ) IN my opinion, the first principle laid down by the Supreme Court will apply in the facts of the present case. There is no doubt as has been argued by both the parties, that the State sought to bar reopening of the decision in respect of the mater relating to clause (a), (b) and (c) of section 57b (2), the suits which were pending were sought to be abated. Here in this case, it appears to me that the statute initially did not give finally to such decision but the suit was open for the parties for seeking the remedy. When the suit was pending, the present Act came into force. It has been specifically provided that all the pending suits will abate but no provision has been made for hearing of the cause or issues involved in the suits in any other forum. The effect of such decision will be Mr. Matilal contended, that the Legislature was interfering with the judicial process and making some judicial order which is incompetent for the legislature to do or in the other words the Legislature is interfering with the judicial process without making any provision for the cause to be heard. Mr. The effect of such decision will be Mr. Matilal contended, that the Legislature was interfering with the judicial process and making some judicial order which is incompetent for the legislature to do or in the other words the Legislature is interfering with the judicial process without making any provision for the cause to be heard. Mr. Matilal relied on a case reported in (13) A. I. R. 1944 F. C. , 86 (Basanta Chandra v. Emperor ). The Federal Court was considering the provisions of sections 6 and 10 (2) of the Restriction and Detention Ordinance (3 of 1944) which run as follows: -?6 (1)no order made before this commencement of this Ordinance under Rule 26, Defence of India Rules, shall after such commencement be deemed to be invalid or be called in question on the ground merely that the said rule purported to confer powers in excess of the powers that might at the time the said order was made be legally conferred by a rule made under S. 2, Defence of India Ordinance, 1939 (5 of 1939) or under S. 2, Defence of India Act, 1939 (35 of 1939 ). (2)every such order shall on the commencement of this Ordinance be deemed to have been, and shall have effect as if it had been, made under this Ordinance, and as if this Ordinance had been in force at the time the order was made. Provided that S. 7 and S. 9 of this Ordinance shall apply in relation to any order made under cl. (b) of sub-r. (1) of R. 26, Defence of India Rules, as if that order had been made on the date of the commencement of this Ordinance, and S. 8 of this Ordinance shall not apply to any such order. 10 (1)no order made under this Ordinance, and no order having effect by virtue of S. 6 as if it had been made under this Ordinance, shall be called in question in any Court, and no Court shall have power to make any order under S. 491, Criminal P. C. , (5 of 1898) in respect of any order made under or having effect under this Ordinance or in respect of any person the subject of such an order. (2)if at the commencement of this Ordinance there is pending in any Court any proceeding by which the validity of an order having effect by virtue of S. 6 as if it had been made under this Ordinance is called in question, that proceeding is hereby discharged. (3) where an order purports to have been made by any authority in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Ordinance, the Court shall, within the meaning of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) presume that such order was so made by that authority?. At page 90 of the decision the Federal Court was considering the defect of section 10 (2) as follows: - ?it was next contended that S. 6 and 10 of Ordinance 3 were retrospective in their operation and that it was beyond the competence of the Governor - General to enact a retrospective Ordinance. This question is concluded by the decision of this Court in 1944 F. C. R. 1 Whatever may be said as to the provision in cl. (1) of S. 6 about the 'validity' of the order of detention, so much of that section and of cl. (1) of S. 10 as Court is valid according to that decision. Clause (2) of S. 10 of the Ordinance was objected to on a different ground. It was said that this was an arrogation of judicial power by a legislating authority. It was argued that a legislating authority might be competent to enact a law even in such manner as to prejudice the rights of parties to a pending litigation, and a Court might be obliged to dismiss a proceeding as a result of the application of the law as changed. But, goes the argument, all that the legislating authority does in such a case is only to pass a law; and the disposal of the particular case still remains the function of the Court. In the present case, however, cl. (2) of. 10 does not enact a rule of law and leave it to the Court to apply it to the decision of cases pending before it; the section straightway discharges all pending proceedings. This objection was sought to be met, on behalf of the Crown, in two ways. The Advocate-General of India argued that - whatever may be said of the language employed - cl. This objection was sought to be met, on behalf of the Crown, in two ways. The Advocate-General of India argued that - whatever may be said of the language employed - cl. (2) did not go and was not intended to go further than what cl. (1) provided. If that were so, the scope and effect of cl. (2) must depend upon the construction that we place on cl. (1 ). The Advocate-General of Bihar maintained that cl. (2) was valid and within the competence of the Ordinance-making authority to the full extent which its language signified, even if it went further than cl. (1) of that section. With this argument we are unable to agree. The distinction between a 'legislative' act and a 'judicial act, is well known, though in particular instances it might not be easy to say whether an act should be held to fall in one category or in the other. The Legislature is only authorized to enact laws. Some of the pending determination may wholly depend upon questions of fact and not upon any rule of law, as for instance, when it is alleged that an order of detention was not really the act of the authority by whom it purports to have been made or that it was a mala fide order or one made by a person who had not been authorized to make it. A direction that such a proceeding is discharged is clearly a judicial act and not the enactment of a law. This question was discussed at some length in the judgment of this Court in 1944 F. C. R. 61. The nature of the provision then considered was essentially different from cl. (2) of S. 10 of the present Ordinance. As explained in that judgment, the position there was that certain cases had in fact been tried by Tribunals constitute under an earlier Ordinance and decisions had been pronounced by those Tribunals, but the jurisdiction of those Tribunals was negatived by a decision of this Court. The later Ordinance provided that those decisions should be treated as decisions of duly constituted Tribunals. Applying the test laid down in (1926) 38 Com. L. R. 153 this Court held that that did not constitute an exercise of judicial power by the ordinance-making authority. The later Ordinance provided that those decisions should be treated as decisions of duly constituted Tribunals. Applying the test laid down in (1926) 38 Com. L. R. 153 this Court held that that did not constitute an exercise of judicial power by the ordinance-making authority. But here there has been no investigation or decision by any Tribunal which the legislating authority can be deemed to have given effect to. It is a direct disposal of cases by the Legislature itself. ? ( 32 ) IN my opinion, the principle laid down does not apply in the facts of the present case. It has been stated that all pending suits shall abate without making any provisions for a statutory tribunal or any other forum on which this cause pending in the suit to be tried. One such case has been decided by the Supreme Court in (14) 1973, S. C. C. Vol-II, 535 (Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh and ors. ). In the said case the Supreme Court was considering the effect of the provision relating to the abetment under section 5 (2) of U. P. Consolation of Holdings Act, 1954. The Supreme Court upheld the provision relating to abatement. At paragraph 4 of the judgment the Supreme Court held as follows: -?4. RAM Adhar Singh v. Ramroop Singh and Othrs (AIR 1968 S. C. 714) was relied upon by the respondents before under section But, this was a case in which the question considered and decided by this Court was whether a suit for possession of agricultural land, under section 209 of U. P. Zamindari and Land Reforms Act, would abate when section 5 of the Act does not mention suits for possession. It was held there that the language of section 5 of the Act, after its amendment, was wide enough to cover suits for possession involving declaration of rights and interests in land which can be the subject-matter of decisions in consolidation proceedings. The whole object of this provision of the Act was to remove from the jurisdiction of ordinary civil and revenue courts, for the duration of consolidation operations, all disputes which could be decided in the course of consolidation proceedings before special courts governed by special procedure. The whole object of this provision of the Act was to remove from the jurisdiction of ordinary civil and revenue courts, for the duration of consolidation operations, all disputes which could be decided in the course of consolidation proceedings before special courts governed by special procedure. Much adjudications by consolidation authorities were considered more suitable, just, and efficacious for speedy decisions which had to be taken in order to enable consolidation operations to be finalized within a reasonable time. ? ( 33 ) SIMILAR provisions were made in the present Act and alternative remedies were provided in the Act itself and as such the suits were sought to be abated or in other words the suits of the plaintiffs must be abated. This provision, therefore appears to me, is not a judicial act by the legislature. ( 34 ) THE learned Advocates for the petitioners contended that the provisions bar the suits relating to title also. Mr. Das Gupta however disputes the contentions and argues that the suits raising the question of title has not been barred. In my opinion suits is which the questions of title are raised or the proceedings has been initiated without jurisdiction or rules of natural justice have been violated in the proceedings the aggrieved party may still agitate the matter in a Civil Court. The Supreme Court has held in the case reported in (12) A. I. R. 1969 S. C. , 78 (Dhalabhai vs. State of M. P.) that in spite of the bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the challenge to the provision of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before the tribunal. At page 87 the Supreme Court held that ?the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would not be taken away at least where the action of the authorities is wholly outside the law and is not a mere error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Mr. Sastri says that we must interpret the Act in the same way as if section 18a was implicit in it and that section 18a was added to make explicit what was already implied. We cannot agree. The finality that statute conferred upon orders of assessment subjects, however, to appeal and revision, was a finality for the purpose of the Act. Sastri says that we must interpret the Act in the same way as if section 18a was implicit in it and that section 18a was added to make explicit what was already implied. We cannot agree. The finality that statute conferred upon orders of assessment subjects, however, to appeal and revision, was a finality for the purpose of the Act. It did not make valid an action which was not warranted by the Act, as for example, the levy of tax on a commodity which was not taxed at all or was exempt. In the present case, the taxing of sales which did not take place within the State was a matters wholly outside the jurisdiction of the taxing authorities and in respect of such illegal action the jurisdiction of the Civil Court continued to subsist. In our judgment the suits were competent?. ( 35 ) IF in the present case, the alteration in the record-of-rights is made without jurisdiction or in exercise of power or without giving an opportunity of being heard the Civil Court's jurisdiction cannot be ousted, the Civil Court can still entertain the suit. If for instance, the dispute involved, is determination of the question about the right of retention, this has been disposed of and was found that the determination is not a real determination but a self styled one the suit will certainly lie. This view is supported in the case of House of Lords reported in All England Law Reports 1969 (1), 208 (Anisminic Ltd. vs. The Foreign Compensation Commission and another) at page 212 held as follows: - ?the next argument was that, by reason of the provisions of section 4 (4) of the Act of 1950, the Courts are precluded from considering whether the Commission's determination was a nullity, and, therefore, it must be treated as valid whether or not enquiry would disclose that it was a nullity. Section 4 (4) is in these terms: - the determination by the Commission of any application made to them under this Act shall not be called in question in any Court of law?. The Commission maintains that these are plain words only capable of having one meaning. Here is a determination which is apparently valid, there is nothing on the face of the document to cast any doubt on its validity. The Commission maintains that these are plain words only capable of having one meaning. Here is a determination which is apparently valid, there is nothing on the face of the document to cast any doubt on its validity. If it is a nullity, that could only be established by raising some kind of proceedings in court. But that would be calling the determination in question, and that is expressly prohibited by the statute. The appellants maintain that that is not the meaning of the words of this provision. They say that ?determination? means a real determination and does not include an apparent or purported determination which in the eye of the law has no existence or purported determination which in the eye of the law has no existence because it is a nullity. Or, putting it in another way, if one seeks to show that a determination is a nullity, one is not questioning the purported determination - one is maintaining that it does not exist as a determination. It is one thing to question a determination which does exist; it is quite another thing to say that there is nothing to be questioned. Let me illustrate the matter by supposing a simple case. A statute provides that a certain order may be made by a person who holds a specified qualification or appointment, and it contains a provision, similar to S. 4 (4), that such an order made by such a person shall not be called in question in any court of law. A person aggrieved by an order alleges that it is a forgery or that the person who made the order did not hold that qualification or appointment. Does such a provision require the court to treat that order as a valid order? It is a well established principle that a provision ousting the ordinary jurisdiction of the court must be construed strictly-meaning, I think, that, if such a provision is reasonable capable of having two meanings, that meaning shall be taken which preserves the ordinary jurisdiction of the court. ? again the House of Lords at page 237 of the judgment held as follows: -?the above principles may, however, be affected by the existence (as here) of an ouster or no certiorari clause. ? again the House of Lords at page 237 of the judgment held as follows: -?the above principles may, however, be affected by the existence (as here) of an ouster or no certiorari clause. The words of S. 4 (4) of the Foreign Compensation Act 1950, are:the determination by the Commission of any application made to them under this Act shall not be called in question in any court of law?. It has been argued that your Lordships should construe ?determination? as meaning anything which is on its face a determination of the commission including even a purported determination which has no jurisdiction. It would seem that, on such an argument, the Court must accept and could not even enquire whether a purported determination was a forced or inaccurate order which did not represent that which the commission had really decided. Moreover, it would mean that, however far the commission ranged outside their jurisdiction or that which they were required to do or however far they departed from natural justice, their determination could not be questioned. A more reasonable and logical construction is that by ?determination?. Parliament meant a real determination, not a purported determination. On the assumption, however, that either meaning is a possible construction and that, therefore, the word ?determination? is ambiguous, the latter meaning would accord with a long established line of cases which adopted that construction. One must assume that Parliament is 1950 had cognizance of these in adopting the words used in S. 4 (4)?. Again at page 247 of the judgment it was held as follows: -?this shows very clearly that, as and when machinery should be set up enabling the commission to deal with the compensation under future agreements, this should be within fixed and determined limits which the legislature itself would lay down; this Parliament might (under s. 2 (2) (a) define qualified persons and impose conditions, and under s. 2 (2) (b) prescribe matter to be established to the commission's satisfaction. There could be not doubt that if so far as such power was exercised, and such definitions, conditions binding the commission, so that if they departed from them, they would be acting beyond their powers. Moreover, when one compares the terminology of s. 4 (4) - ?the determination by the commission of any application made to them under this Act. . . ? Moreover, when one compares the terminology of s. 4 (4) - ?the determination by the commission of any application made to them under this Act. . . ? with that of s. 3 (b) - ?the determination of. . . claims?? and appreciates that the power to determine claims is to be subject to such limits (as to definitions, conditions or prescribed matters) as might be approved by Parliament, the conclusion must follow that the preclusive clause can no application except to a determination made within the limits, whatever they turn out to be, fixed by Parliament. The respondent's argument that they have only to make a self-styled ?determination? in order to enjoy automatic protection is thus at once seen to be unsustainable. ? ( 36 ) IF, therefore, determination in question coming within 57b (1) (2) is not the real determination but a self-styled one, then, of course, the suit will not bar. The determination must be a real determination and not a self-styled determination by the authorities under the Act. If it is found that the determination is not a real determination under the statute then the civil courts have jurisdiction to entertain the suits. ( 37 ) MR. Das Gupta contended with reference to the statement of the Minister of Land and Land Revenue Department, Government of West Bengal, before the Assembly, that a person has a right under the statute to raise this question on regard to R. O. R. under section 44 (2a) of the Act by making representation to the Revenue Officer concerned and if he is satisfied, he can suo moto revise the finally published record-of-rights. In my opinion, that right has not been given to the person aggrieved by a certain entry, in the record-of-rights and any person aggrieved has no remedy against the certain entry but only has a right to apply to the Revenue Officer concerned who may or may not proceed suo moto under section 44 (2a) of the Act. This is a discretion on the part of the Revenue Officer and not a right of the person aggrieved. This is a discretion on the part of the Revenue Officer and not a right of the person aggrieved. Moreover it is a most important question whether a person, aggrieved by a certain entry, who has only 9 months' limitation to raise the dispute under section 44 (2a) of the Act can go on in the indirect way to take the advantage of 18 years' limitation in a matter in which the Revenue Officer concerned can proceed suo moto. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, the Revenue Minister's address to the Assembly, wherein it has been stated that any aggrieved person has a right to agitate the question in R. O. R. cannot be said to be found on the law as we found it to be. ( 38 ) IT is further argued by Mr. Das Gupta that this Act as referred to in West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act (Second Amendment), means Act 33 of 1973 and not 1953 Act. Therefore section 57b (2) (a), (b) and (c) and proviso to section 57b (3) will apply in respect of the proceeding initiated under 1973 Act and not in respect of the parent Act. Mr. Sen on behalf of the Government again did not adopt the argument of Mr. Das Gupta. So also Mr. Sen Gupta on behalf of the Government did not subscribe to that view. In my opinion, this Act in this case cannot be made to relate to the Act 13 of 1973. On the other hand by the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973, section 57b was inserted in the parent Act. As soon as it was inserted in the parent Act and for the interpretation of the parent Act this Act means 1953 Act and not otherwise. If this Act means 1973 Act, then section 57b (2) (a), (b) and (c) or 57b (3) or proviso for abatement of suits could not have enacted at all because nothing could be pending by which a determination has been made on the date of coming into force of this Act being a determination of dispute under section 57b (2) (a), (b) and (c) could have been pending and furthermore proviso also would have been nugatory but nothing have been determined before the enforcement under the 1973 Act by any authority. ( 39 ) THE reasons given in the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973 are that the suits are pending for a number of years in a Civil Court and as such it was necessary, therefore, that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court should be effectively barred and the pending suits should abate so far as it relates to alteration on any entry in the record-of-rights, power to retain land and matters which are to be or have already been enquired into or determined under the provisions of the Act. In my opinion, it is a common experience of this Court that the cause of delay in disposal was lying in the hands of the State Government. It is common experience also in this Court that years after the case has been filed and pending, no affidavits are filed by the respondent, Government, even after 3 or 4 years. When the case was ready for hearing in this Court the State Government applies for time for filing affidavit. It is also common experience of the Court that the delay sometime of course is due to the State Government's own difficulty regarding the filing of the affidavits and other matters. It is, however, open to the Legislature to bar the jurisdiction of the civil court in order to dispose of the case through the administrative tribunal or statutory tribunal for the quick disposal of the same if they have the opinion that it takes a long time to dispose of the civil cases in a Civil Court. It has been argued by Mr. Sen Gupta on behalf f the respondent that if the provision comes within the mischief of Art. 31a, as I held it does, then the section cannot be ultra vires the Constitution being violative of Art. 14, 19 or 31. It is open to the Legislature to legislate on the subject to legislate retrospectively. The Legislature is competent to take away the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and vest the jurisdiction in an alternative forum constituted under the statute for the purpose of deciding the matters which come within the four corners of the statute creating the tribunal. It will be seen that section 44 provides the procedure for deciding the disputes relating to the preparation of record-of-rights. It will be seen that section 44 provides the procedure for deciding the disputes relating to the preparation of record-of-rights. Section 57b (2) read with section 44 (4) as amended by the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973 give a finality to the decision already made under the statute. Thereafter, before the amendment it was open to the intermediary or any person being aggrieved of the record, to the file suits but that remedy has been taken away by the amendment. Once determination has been made in accordance within the four corners of section 44, the Legislature thought it fit to take away jurisdiction of the Civil Court for reopening the determination in a suit. This, in my opinion, cannot be said to be ultra vires, more so, when the Act provides for an alternative remedy under Section 44 (2a) and 44 (3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. Therefore, the said section must be said to be ultra vires. In the result, I hold that (a) the Act impugned and in particular sections 57b91), (2), (3) and (4) are not ultra vires. It is however open to aggrieved party to file a suit if it is found (b) that the determination of rent or determination of status or incidence of a tenancy relating to the record-of-rights was done in violation of the principle of natural justice or by an authority having no jurisdiction in the matter, (c) that the suits will not barred if it is found that the matters coming under section 57b (2) (a), (b) or (c) were made in violation of the principle of natural justice, or (d) by an authority not empowered or the matters not coming within the mischief of section 57b (2) (a), (b) and (c); (e) suit will not be barred and suit will not abate if the question of title is involved in any suit. Suit will not be barred and suit will not abate if for that matter partition between the co-sharers of intermediary or relating to such matters which are beyond the scope of S. 57b (1), (2) (a), (b) and (c) etc. Furthermore, the suit will not abate automatically and interim orders already passed will not vacate automatically unless the Court comes to a finding that a particular suit comes within the mischief of section 57b (2) of the Act. Furthermore, the suit will not abate automatically and interim orders already passed will not vacate automatically unless the Court comes to a finding that a particular suit comes within the mischief of section 57b (2) of the Act. The administrative order issued by the respondent directing its officers to take possession of the land immediately as the suit had abated is without jurisdiction and must be set aside (C. R. 2287 (w) 2 1973 ). The respondents must make application before the Court and on such application being made the Court will consider the scope of the relief claimed in the suit and if it is found that it comes within the mischief of section 57b (1) and (2) (a), (b) and (c) then and then only the suit may abate. If it is found by the Court, in which the suits are pending that the matter do not come within the mischief of Section 57b or if it found that the principle of natural justice has been violated or that the respondent has acted without jurisdiction or that the determination in dispute was not a real determination but a self-styled then the suit will not be barred and the Civil Court will still have jurisdiction to continue with the suit in spite of section 57b (2) of the Act. ( 40 ) THE petitioners in C. R. No. 287 (W) of 1973, it is stated, are residents of village Kolkol, P. S. Galsi, District Burdwan in the State of West Bengal and their principal source of livelihood is cultivation. It is stated that the petitioners' father, Amulya Ratan Mallia, held agricultural, non-agricultural and homestead lands within the ceiling limits besides tank fisheries and orchards and the respondents on the assumption that he started a big raiyat case being No. 220- (V-V) of Galsi and in response to the notice he submitted returns in Form 'b' showing retention of all the properties held by him. It is alleged that his agricultural lands are 23. 96 acres. The Revenue Officer treated some of his non-agricultural lands as also tank fisheries as agricultural lands and passed orders directing vesting of most of the valuable properties. It is alleged that his agricultural lands are 23. 96 acres. The Revenue Officer treated some of his non-agricultural lands as also tank fisheries as agricultural lands and passed orders directing vesting of most of the valuable properties. The petitioners' father died on 25th Falgoon 1363 B. S. and he could not take, it is alleged, proper steps against the order and after his demise the petitioners as his legal heirs and successors, brought Title Suit No. 69 of 1961 in the 1st Court of Munsif, Burdwan for declaration of title to the said lands and for injunction in respect of the lands mentioned in the schedule to the plaint. It is alleged that the learned Munsif was pleased to grant injunction as prayed for. The petitioners, it is further stated, are possessing the said agricultural lands under their personal cultivation and this year also they have cultivated the same at an enormous cost. On 24th January, 1969 the learned Munsif permitted the petitioners to submit fresh B forms and directed the Revenue Officers to take necessary steps and accordingly the petitioners submitted returns on 26th February, 1972 and the petitioners filed an application for reviewing the said B. R. Case but to no effect. That as no notice under section 80 C. P. C. was given, the petitioners withdraw the said Title Suit No. 89 of 1966 with liberty to file a fresh suit and the petitioners filed Title Suit No. 177 of 1970 in the Munsif's Court at Burdwan and obtained an order of injunction on consent of the parties, viz. State of West Bengal against the respondents. The petitioners while in enjoyment and possession of the said lands, the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973 came into operation and the Junior Land Reforms Officer came and visited the petitioners, village on 25th July, 1973 and gave out that under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 57b the Civil Courts have lost their jurisdiction and the suit brought by the petitioners and the order of injunction obtained therein have abated and as such the authorities will settle the lands mentioned in the schedule to the plaint to other persons as per decision in the said B. R. Case. ( 41 ) IT will appear therefore, that the said suit was pending at the time when the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act 1953 came into operation. But as it was the apprehension in the mind of the petitioners that in view of section 57b (2) the suit may abate and it is alleged that the land Revenue Officer vested petitioners' land and stated that the Civil Court had lost jurisdiction and that the authority will settle the land mentioned in the schedule of the plaint to other persons. I must point out that in all those matters the State Government did not file any affidavit whatsoever and therefore the statements made by the petitioners in their affidavit must be taken to be correct. I have held that section 57b (1) and (2) is not ultra vires but still it is for the court to come to a decision whether the suit comes within the mischief of the provisions of section 57b (2) at all. If it is found that questions of jurisdiction are raised or natural justice is violated or questions of title are raised then the suit will certainly lie and the suit cannot abate. If, however, it is found that the suit comes within the four corners of the statute under section 57b (2) then, of course, suit will abate and consequently the interim order can be vacated. But I make it clear that the suit cannot automatically abate and the interim order cannot automatically vacate unless such order is passed by the Court having jurisdiction in the matter. In the result, the Rules fail and are hereby discharged. There will be no order as to costs. Rule discharged.