Judgment :- 1. The first respondent obtained a decree for sale of mortgaged properties against a firm whose partners were the appellant and respondents 2 and 3. The suit in which the decree was obtained was on the basis of a registered mortgage deed executed by this firm in favour of the first respondent on 2-12-68 for Rs. 86000/-. The preliminary decree was passed in the suit on 2nd March, 1970 and the final decree on 19th June, 1970. It appears that on 23rd May, 1970, that is after the preliminary decree but before the final decree the firm had been dissolved by a registered deed. 2. When the decree holder-first respondent moved for realisation of the decree amount by sale of the properties, the three partners of the firm concerned who are brothers and who had been impleaded in the proceedings as partners representing the firm claimed to be agriculturists and prayed for benefits under the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act Act 11 of 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which had come into force on 14th July, 1970. It might be stated here that in the definition of the term 'agriculturist' as given in the Act a firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, or a company as defined in the Companies Act, 1956, or a corporation formed in pursuance of an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or of any special Indian Law are specifically excluded. However, what each of the partners of the judgment-debtor firm contended was that as the firm had been dissolved, they could in their individual capacity claim benefits of the Act as they are agriculturists and what the decree holder was seeking is execution against the separate individual property of each of them. Therefore, their contention was that the court could give benefit under the Act to these persons in their individual capacity. The executing court overruled these contentions. The third respondent took up the matter in appeal to this court in A. S.623/71 which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this court on 4-1-72. In that appeal though the present appellant and the other brothers had been impleaded they had not been served with notice of the appeal. The executing court overruled these contentions. The third respondent took up the matter in appeal to this court in A. S.623/71 which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this court on 4-1-72. In that appeal though the present appellant and the other brothers had been impleaded they had not been served with notice of the appeal. In disposing of the appeal this court observed: "Respondents 2 and 3 (the other brothers) were not served with the appeal; and the first respondent has submitted that the question to be decided by this court will not affect them and the decision need bind only the appellant. Since the counsel has made a submission like that, we have dispensed with service on respondents 2 and 3 and have considered the appeal." 3. Mr. Balasubramaniyan, learned counsel for the appellant strongly contended before us that decree being against a firm, that will not preclude the individual partners from claiming reliefs under the Act when execution is sought not against property of the firm but against the separate property of the erstwhile partner. According to him, the firm having been dissolved before coming into force of the Act, the decree debt is not one payable by the firm as such but by the individual partners. In any view, according to him, as the decree debt is payable by a partner apart from the firm, if the partner is an agriculturist he would be entitled to relief under the Act if his person or property is proceeded against. In the mortgage deed on which the suit was filed, it was urged by Mr. Balasubramanyan that though what was secured was a firm debt, the mortgaged properties belonged to the partners in their individual capacity. They did not form part of firm asset. 4. As stated earlier 'agriculturist' as defined in the Act does not include a firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. There is a specific statutory exclusion. It is not denied that the firm concerned was registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. 'Debt' under the Act means any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured due from or incurred by an agriculturist on or before the commencement of the Act, whether payable under a contract, or under a decree or order of any court or otherwise. 'Debt' under the Act means any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured due from or incurred by an agriculturist on or before the commencement of the Act, whether payable under a contract, or under a decree or order of any court or otherwise. In the instant case as pointed out in the judgment of this court, in the 3rd respondent's appeal, the mortgage deed was executed by the firm and preliminary and final decree were also obtained against the firm. Though the properties might have belonged to the brothers individually they were mortgaged as assets belonging to the firm. 5. Now a partnership is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually 'partners' and collectively a 'firm' and the name under which their business is carried on is called 'the firm name'. The members of a partnership do not form a collective whole, distinct from the individuals composing it; nor are they collectively endowed with any capacity of acquiring rights or incurring obligations. The rights and liabilities of a partnership are the rights and liabilities of the partners and are enforceable by and against them individually. A partnership is not a corporation or a legal entity as such though under the Indian Partnership Act there is some recognition of a firm possessing a sort of personality distinct from the persons constituting it (see AIR. 1948 P.C.100). In law the firm name is a compendious method of describing the parties who are j associated for the purpose of carrying on the business of the partnership. The firm cannot be equated to a company which has got a separate juristic entity distinct from the share-holders see AIR. 1955 S.C. 74 (Bacha F. Guzdar, Bombay v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay). Therefore, if under the Act a firm is specifically excluded to come within the definition of the term 'agriculturist' and therefore debt due from a firm is not a debt within the meaning of the Act, to allow a partner to claim benefit under the Act in respect of a debt due from a firm would be to defeat the legislative intention as such. As stated earlier it is settled law that a firm is not a legal entity but only consists of the individual partners for the time being. The essential characteristic of a firm is that each partner is a representative of the other partners. Each of the partners is an agent and a principal. He is an agent in so far as he can bind the other partners by his acts within the scope of the partnership business and he is a principal to the extent that he is bound by the acts of the other partners. The liabilities of the firm can be enforced against each of the partners personally (see Thellakula Jalayya v. Namanna Venkiteswara Rao AIR. 1957 A.P. 658). In AIR. 1963 S.C.1007 it was said that the firm is not a legal person and it is the partners of the firm who are the employees under the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, in respect of liabilities of the firm, they being not debts under the Act, individual partners though they may be agriculturists are not entitled to claim relief under the Act. 6. As regards the contention raised by the appellant that before the final decree, the firm was dissolved on 31st May, 1970 and that the debtors were the three partners individually and not the firm, we need only state that debts of the firm do not cease to be so even after dissolution of the firm. That is why after dissolution the following provision is made under S.47: "After the dissolution of a firm the authority of each partner to bind the firm, and the other mutual rights and obligations of the partners, continue notwithstanding the dissolution, so far as may be necessary to wind up the affairs of the firm and to complete transactions begun but unfinished at the time of the dissolution, but not otherwise: Provided that the firm is in no case bound by the acts of a partner who has been adjudicated insolvent; but this proviso does not affect the liability of any persons who has after the adjudication represented himself or knowingly permitted himself to be represented as a partner of the insolvent". S. 45 of the Partnership Act may also be noted: "(1) Notwithstanding the dissolution of a firm, the partners continue to be liable as such to third parties for any act done by any of them which would have been an act of the firm if done before the dissolution until public notice is given of the dissolution: Provided that the estate of a partner who dies, or who is adjudicated an insolvent, or of a partner who, not having been known to the person dealing with the firm to be a partner, retires from the firm, is not liable under this section.for acts done after the date on which he ceased to be a partner. (2) Notices under sub-s. (1) may be given by any partner." 7. We may also point out what was said by the Division Bench of this court in the earlier appeal filed by the third respondent: The main question we have to decide in the appeal is whether the appellant is entitled to relief under Act 11 of 1970-whether he is an agriculturist entitled to benefits of the Act. What is claimed is that on 31st May 1970 the partnership was dissolved and thereafter, the debtors were the three partners individually and not the firm, so that the individual partners are entitled to relief as agriculturists under the Act. The deed of dissolution bears the date 31st May, 1970, and the appellant has admitted as pw 1 that there was no public notification as contemplated by S.45(1) of the Partnership Act. There is also no evidence as to when the registrar of firms was intimated about the dissolution of the partnership; in fact, there is no evidence even to show that the registrar of firms was intimated at all. It is even possible to contend that the deed of dissolution is an antedated document which came into existence after the final decree was passed, because, if the dissolution of the partnership was earlier than 19th June, 1970 when the final decree was passed one would have expected that the appellant would have taken objection that no final decree should be passed against the firm since the firm was not in existence then. Suspiciously enough, on 19th June. Suspiciously enough, on 19th June. 1970 when the final decree was passed, no such objection appears to have been taken: and that fact with the dearth of evidence that the registrar of firms was intimated and the admitted fact that there was no public notification under S.45(1) of the Partnership Act may drive us even to the conclusion that the deed of dissolution might be a fraudulent document created later." 8. Therefore, we hold that there are no merits in the appeal and it is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.