Judgment :- 1. The petitioner in the Writ Petition and the appellant in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal are one and the same, viz., the employees State Insurance Corporation, Madras. The petitioner filed E.I.O.P. No. 5 of 1966 on the file of the Employees Insurance Court (First Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras) against the first respondent herein under S. 75(2) of the Employess State Insurance Act, 1948, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the recovery of the employers contribution of Rs. 6,470. This claim of the petitioner was allowed by the E.I. Court on 23rd November 1967 and the first respondent was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 6,470. Against this direction of the E.I. Court the first respondent preferred C.M.A. No. 110 of 1968 on the file of this court. During the pendency of this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal the petitioner herein sought to execute the order passed by the E.I. Court which order is enforceable as a decree on the Civil court under S. 78(4) of the Act. It filed E.P. No. 11 of 1968 on the file of the E.I. Court, Madras and that court issued a warrant. Pursuant to that warrant the first respondent herein has paid a sum of Rs. 6,772.60. Thereafter C.M.A. No. 110 of 1968 was allowed by this court on 23rd April 1970 holding that the first respondent herein was not liable to make contribution under the Act. Thereafter, the first respondent herein filed C.M.P. No. 3 of 1971 in E.I.O.P. No. 5 of 1966 on the file of the E.I. Court Madras, for restitution. During the pendency of that petition itself, the petitioner paid to the first respondent herein the amount actually collected from it, viz., Rs. 6,772.60. However, the controversy between the parties related to whether the petitioner was liable to pay interest on this sum from 19th August 1968 till 20th February 1971 by way of restitution. The petitioner contended, that S. 144, C.P.C. under which the petition was filed by the first respondent, was not applicable to the E.I. Court, and therefore under that section, the E.I. court had no jurisdiction to order the payment of interest on the amount in question. The E.I. Court rejected this contention of the petitioner and directed payment of interest to the first respondent herein by way of restitution. The E.I. Court rejected this contention of the petitioner and directed payment of interest to the first respondent herein by way of restitution. It is to quash this order of the E.I. Court, dated 5th April 1971, the writ petition has been filed. It is against the very same order the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has also been filed under S. 82(2) of the Act: 2. The question for consideration is, whether the E.I. Court had no jurisdiction to direct payment of interest by the petitioner to the first respondent under S. 144, C.P.C. It is necessary for the purpose of understanding this controversy to refer to the statutory provisions applicable to the court in question. Ch. VI of the Act deals with the “Adjudication of disputes and claims”. S. 74(1) states: “The State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute an E.I. Court for such local area as may be specified in the notification.” According to sub-S. (2) of that Section: “The court shall consist of such number of Judges as the State Government may think fit”. S. 78 of the Act deals with the powers of the E.I. Court. According to S. 78(): “The E.I. Court shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purposes of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects, administering oath and recording evidence and such court shall be deemed to be a Civil Court, within the meaning of S. 195 and Ch. XXXV of the Crl. P.C., 1898”. Sub-S. (2) of S. 78 states: “The E.I. Court shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Government”. According to sub-S. (3) of S. 78: “All costs incidental to any proceeding before an E.I. Court shall, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf by the State Government, be in the discretion of the court”. S. 78(4) states: “An order of the E.I. Court shall be enforceable as if it were a decree passed in a suit by a Civil Court”. 3. The State Government has made rules in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 96 of the Act. R.42 deals with execution. S. 78(4) states: “An order of the E.I. Court shall be enforceable as if it were a decree passed in a suit by a Civil Court”. 3. The State Government has made rules in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 96 of the Act. R.42 deals with execution. According to R. 42(1): “Any person in whose favour an order has been passed shall, within one year from the date of the order, apply in Form 10 to the court which made the order for its execution”. Sub-R. (2) of R. 42 states: “On such application being made, the court shall send the same together with the necessary record to a civil court of competent jurisdiction, for its execution and such civil court shall have the same power in executing such order as if it had been passed by it.” Thus, it will be seen that the rules themselves do not contemplate an order made by the E.I. Court being executed by that court itself, and it specifically imposes an obligation on the E.I. Court, when an application for execution has been made to it to transfer that application along with the records to a civil court of competent jurisdiction for execution. Once such an application has been made and transferred to the Civil Court, all the provisions applicable to a civil court in relation to the execution of a decree will automatically apply to the execution of this order. Therefore, if the provisions contained in R. 42 have been followed in the present case, there will be no difficulty whatever in holding that S. 144, C.P.C. will apply to that court. Unfortunately, in this case, the E.I. Court, as soon as the application in Form 10 has been filed before it, has not chosen to transfer that application to the civil court of competent jurisdiction, as provided for in R. 42(2), but purported to execute that order itself. Without realising that the order was sought to be executed by a Court which has no jurisdiction, the first respondent has also paid the money. It is under these circumstances alone it has to be considered whether S. 144, C.P.C., will apply to the present case or not. As pointed out already, if the procedure prescribed in R. 42(2) has been followed. It is under these circumstances alone it has to be considered whether S. 144, C.P.C., will apply to the present case or not. As pointed out already, if the procedure prescribed in R. 42(2) has been followed. S. 144, C.P.C., will apply, and in this case, that procedure not having been followed, prima facie, S. 144, C.P.C., will not apply. 4. A Bench of this court in M/s. Dhala Tanning Company and others v. Employees Stated Insurance Corporation 1974 I M.L.J. 71 has held that the E.I. Court is only a statutory body and is not is a court governed by the C.P.C. Consequently, even when the E.I. Court wrongly assumed jurisdiction to execute its order, still S. 144, C.P.C., cannot apply to that Court, because it is not a court, but only, a statutory body. However, Mr. M. Srinivasan the learned Counsel for the first respondent, contended that S. 144, C.P.C. is only a procedural Section and the right to direct restitution is part of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. For this purpose, he relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Jai Barham and Others v. Kadar Nath Marwari and others 44 M.L.J. 735.- 18 L.W. 802. In that case, the Privy Council just pointed out that the duty of the court under S. 144, C.P.C., does not arise merely under the Section it is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved. In my opinion, this statement of the law laid down by the Privy Council will apply to courts having general jurisdiction, but will not apply to a body like the Employees Insurance Court, which is only a statutory body as held by the Bench of this court referred to above. 5. The question whether a Revenue Court functioning under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, had the power to order restoration, came up for consideration before a Bench of this court in Mayilasami Gounder v. Ramamoorthi Chettiar and another 1970 I. M.L. J. 606. There, the tenant against whom an order of eviction was originally passed in execution of which he was evicted and which order of eviction was subsequently reversed, filed an application for restoration of possession. The question that came up for consideration before this court was whether the Revenue Court had such a power. There, the tenant against whom an order of eviction was originally passed in execution of which he was evicted and which order of eviction was subsequently reversed, filed an application for restoration of possession. The question that came up for consideration before this court was whether the Revenue Court had such a power. This court held that Revenue Court bad no such power. While coming to that conclusion, this court held: “Unlike Courts of law which would have inherent powers, although there is no specific enabling statutory provision, the position of statutory bodies entrusted with specified powers is entirely different The powers of such a statutory body are entirely limited and controlled by the statute which confers them, and, it cannot act outside the limits of the statute creating it. On that view, it could have no inherent power. It is another matter if on a construction of as statutory provision an inference therefrom can be made of an ancillary or necessary power to execute the main purpose covered by the statute.” This decision directly applies to the present case, because the E.I. Court is not a court of general jurisdiction, but it is a statutory body entrusted with specified and limited powers, and, therefore, it cannot have any inherent power to order restitution. Under these circumstances, it follows that the impugned order of the E.I. Court cannot be sustained. 6. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed, and the order of the E.I. Court is quashed. There will be no order as to costs in the writ petition. 7. In view of my allowing the writ petition, no orders are necessary in the civil miscellaneous appeal and the same is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.