Judgment C.P. Sinha, J. This application in revision is on behalf of the State of Bihar through the Range Officer of the Forest Department, Banka. It is directed against the order dated 4.9.1972 of the sub-divisional Magistrate, Banka, under which he has declared the possession of the opposite party (second party in the proceeding) over the disputed land which measures 38.50 acres bearing new plot no. 364, old plot no. 5004 in village Kakwara, Police station Banka. Declaring their possession as such, he has vacated the rule under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) against the second party and made it absolute against the first party. As it appears, the Magistrate received a report from the local police intimating apprehension .of serious breach of the peace between the two sides regarding possession of the disputed land. The first party was said to claim it as its reserved forest duly notified under Forest law. The second party, however, claim their possession over it by means of purchase from its previous owner, who, in turn, was said to have acquired it by purchase from its original settlee. 2. On receipt of the above police report, the Magistrate, in his order dated 7.7.1972, drew up a proceeding under, section 144 of the Code restraining the two sides from going over this land and to show cause, if any, by 15.7.1972 as to why the proceeding under section 144 of the Code should not be made absolute against them. The parties, in due course, filed their show cause. They also produced their papers. After hearing the two sides, learned Magistrate passed the impugned order under which, as already said, he held the second party to be in possession of this disputed land and made the rule absolute against the other side vacating it against them (second party). 3. Learned State counsel appearing for the petitioner has urged that it was highly improper on the part of the Magistrate to have decided the question of possession in the proceeding which was taken out under section 144 of the Code. 3. Learned State counsel appearing for the petitioner has urged that it was highly improper on the part of the Magistrate to have decided the question of possession in the proceeding which was taken out under section 144 of the Code. If the Magistrate thought that it was necessary to do so to prevent the apprehended breach of the peace, he should have converted that proceeding into one under section 145 of the Code and called upon the parties to file their written statements, documents and affidavits so that he could decide the question of possession finally. This he obviously did not do. On the other hand, he wrongly thought of deciding the question of possession in that proceeding under section 144 which was not the proper forum to do so. According to counsel, if the proceeding was under section 145 of the Code the State could have come out with fuller evidence' in its possession to establish the case of its being in physical possession of the land as a Government reserved forest duly notified. In his submission, the Magistrate's action in deciding the question of possession in that absolutely summary proceeding under section 144 which was meant as a speedy remedy to prevent the apprehended breach of the peace has seriously prejudiced them. On behalf of the other side the contention is that if the first party so thought it was always open to them to request the Magistrate to controvert that proceeding into one under section 145 of the Code and give opportunity to the parties to file their written statements, affidavits, etc. Having not taken any such objection at the appropriate time it is now, perhaps, late for the State to seek the assistance of this court in revision to have the impugned order set aside for that reason. Obviously, the State had opportunity at that time, but they did not try to avail of it and waited for a favourable order on merit and when that order has gone against them they have thought of challenging its propriety and legality in this revision. 4. Obviously, the State had opportunity at that time, but they did not try to avail of it and waited for a favourable order on merit and when that order has gone against them they have thought of challenging its propriety and legality in this revision. 4. There can be no dispute with the position in law that for deciding the question of possession between the parties of the dissuted deed, in such circumstances, the appropriate remedy is by a proceeding under section 145 of the Code where the parties get opportunity to file their written statements, setting out their case, as also documents and affidavits in proof thereof. The scope of section 144 of the Code in the matter is, however, not so wide. Under section 144 of the Code when the concerned Magistrate thinks that there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, he may by a written order stating the material facts of the case direct any person to abstain from a certain Act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, if he considers that such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent disturbance of the public tranquility etc. An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or to the public generally when frequently or visiting a particular place. As the provision of this section stands, it does not speak of determination on the point of possession of the materials placed before the Magistrate in favour of one side or the other, to enable the Magistrate to make the rule absolute against one and vacate the same against the other. Obviously, the question of such possession can be taken up and decided under the next section (145) which sets out an elaborate procedure for the same. 5. There can be no dispute with the position that the appropriate time for the first party to have such conversion done was after the parties had put in their show cause which clearly raised a question of actual physical possession of the disputed land between the two sides. If it had been done so, the Magistrate would have, I think, taken that step because on the vary face of it the dispute appropriately fell within the purview of section 145 and not under section 144 of the Code. If it had been done so, the Magistrate would have, I think, taken that step because on the vary face of it the dispute appropriately fell within the purview of section 145 and not under section 144 of the Code. But they did not do so and allowed the matter to proceed under section 144 till the judgment was pronounced against them. The Magistrate could not, however on his part be absolved from this duty on the facts before him. On the facts, as they stood, it was clearly his duty to change the proceeding to be one under section 145 of the Code and follow the procedure laid down with respect to filing of affidavits etc. by the parties as to be able to adjudicate upon the question of possession between the parties finally. This he obviously did not do and continued with the proceeding in the manner initiated and decided ultimately the question of their possession of this land and on that basis made the rule absolute against the unsuccessful party (first party) in that behalf. 6. The question, however, is whether it is necessary for this court to interfere at this last stage with the impugned order which has manifestly spent its force by efflux of time, this being an order under section 144 of the Code, its scheduled life, as enjoined under sub-section (6), is not more than two months from the making thereof, i.e. from 7.7.1972. This order has, therefore, to be taken to be dead after 7.9.1972. Accordingly, no useful purpose is likely to serve in trying to upset it when it is deemed to be dead in the eye of law. It is not the usual practice of this court to interfere with an order which has already spent its force unless there are special reasons requiring such an interference. In this case, as it appeals to me, there are no special reasons calling for interference with this dead order. On behalf of the State, it has been urged that in any future litigation the above finding of possession of the Magistrate in favour of the second party, which he has given on though there was no need for it because he could dispose of the 144 proceeding without any such finding of possession, may enure to their prejudice affecting their right to this land. I do not think there should be any genuine basis for this apprehension in their mind. When this finding has been given in a proceeding, which was not appropriate for the same, and the order has already spent its life, the parties position vis-a-vis this land will be as they are irrespective of this order. Such an apprehension in their mind, in my judgment, is not sufficient to canvass this court to interfere with this order when it is already dead and non-existent in the eye of law. It must however, be observed that if at any future date the authority concerned is furnished with materials showing the existence of the dispute regarding this land likely to result in breach of the peace and being satisfied about the necessity of taking necessary steps to prevent the same, it would be well open to that authority to initiate action under section 145 of the Code in the matter and decide the dispute relating to possession of the properties as provided in law. 7. In view of my above discussions, I am inclined, to think that it is not a fit case in which revisional interference is called for with the impugned order, which, as already observed, has spent its force by efflux of time. Accordingly, this application is dismissed, subject to above observation. Application dismissed.