JUDGMENT Yashoda Nandan, J. - This is a defendants appeal arising out of a claim under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. Appellant No. 1 was the owner of a Motor Truck No. U. P. Q. 718 while Mohammad Jawad Hussain appellant No. 2 was the driver of the said truck at the relevant time. They were impleaded in the suit as defendant Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. Plaintiff-respondent No. 1 is the widowed mother and plaintiff-respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are minor children of the deceased Phuleshwar. 2. The plaintiffs instituted the suit giving rise to the instant appeal alleging that on 19th May, 1965 on account of the negligent and reckless driving of Truck No. U. P. Q. 718 by appellant No. 2 on P. W. D. Road Kasiya, district Deoria, Phuleshwar met with an accident by the said truck and received fatal injuries and died instantaneously. According to the plaintiffs, Phuleshwar, who was a skilled carpenter, was proceeding on the road on a bicycle when the truck driven by appellant No. 2 came from behind, dashed against his bicycle and caused his death. It was alleged that at the time of the accident, Phuleshwar was earning about Rs. 300/- per month. The plaintiffs claimed that they had suffered heavy loss of pecuniary benefits which would have accrued to them if Phuleshwar, who was a healthy man aged about 35 years, had not met with the accident and consequent death. The plaintiffs, who are the heirs and dependents of late Phuleshwar, initially claimed an amount of Rs. 90,300/- as damages. By a subsequent amendment they reduced their claim to a sum of Rs. 35,000/-. The appellants resisted this claim. It was alleged that the plaintiffs had no cause of action for bringing the suit. It was claimed that the truck was proceeding from Kasiya to Padrauna and Phuleshwar was also proceeding in the same direction on his bicycle. According to the plea raised in defence the truck was being driven at a reasonable speed of 12 miles per hour and there was sufficient light on account of the head-lights. It was pleaded that when appellant No. 2, who was at the relevant time driving the truck approached Phuleshwar, he blew the electric horn and started proceeding with reduced speed. It was pleaded that when appellant No. 2, who was at the relevant time driving the truck approached Phuleshwar, he blew the electric horn and started proceeding with reduced speed. When the front wheel of the truck had bye-passed the bicycle on which Phuleshwar was moving, he suddenly swerved towards the truck and the truck driver did not notice how Phuleshwar came beneath the near left wheel of the truck and got crushed. The truck was stopped and when the driver after alighting therefrom went to the spot where Phuleshwar was lying on the road, he found him dead. Thus in substance the defence was that Phuleshwar's death was caused by his own negligence and careless cycling. The plaintiff's claim that Phuleshwar was a skilled carpenter was denied and it was asserted that he was a poor agriculturist who was learning carpentry and had no income in fact from that trade. According to the appellant, the plaintiffs were not dependent on Phuleshwar for their livelihood. It was pleaded that Phuleshwar was not of sound state of health and could not have survived for more than a few years. The suit, according to the defence plea, was barred by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and it was bad for non-joinder of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the insurer) as a party with which the Truck involved in the accident was insured in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 94 of the Motor Vehicles Act (thereinafter referred to as the Act). The compensation claimed was said to be excessive in any case. On the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed the following issues:- 1 (a) Whether Phuleshwar died in accident dated 19-5-1965 caused by negligent driving of the Truck No. U. P. Q.-718 by defendant No. 2 only? (b) Whether Phuleshwar died in the aforesaid accident due to his own contributory negligence ? 2(a) Whether the plaintiffs are dependents of Phuleshwar deceased ? (b) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to damages arising out of Phuleshwar's death ? If so to what amount of damages they are entitled ? 3(a) Whether the defendant No. 1 is liable for the aforesaid damages ? Its extent ? (b) Whether the defendant No. 2 is liable for the aforesaid damages ? Its extent ? 4. Whether the suit is barred by Motor Vehicles Act ? 5. If so to what amount of damages they are entitled ? 3(a) Whether the defendant No. 1 is liable for the aforesaid damages ? Its extent ? (b) Whether the defendant No. 2 is liable for the aforesaid damages ? Its extent ? 4. Whether the suit is barred by Motor Vehicles Act ? 5. Whether the suit is liable to fail for non joinder of New India Assurance Company Ltd. ? 6. Plaintiffs relief ? Issue No. 1 (a) was decided by the trial court in the affirmative and 1 (b) in the negative while deciding issue No. 2(a) the trial court held that the plaintiffs were defendants of Phuleshwar deceased and were entitled to an amount of Rs. 18,250/- as compensation on account of his death due to the accident. Issue Nos. 3(a) and 3(b) were both decided in favour of the plaintiffs. The suit was held not to be barred by any provision of the Motor Vehicles Act and it was further held that it was not bad on account of nonjoinder of New India Assurance Company Ltd. In consequence of the findings recorded the plaintiffs suit for recovery of Rs. 18,250/- was decreed with proportionate costs by the learned Civil Judge, Deoria. He further ordered that the plaintiffs will be entitled to future and pendent elite interest at the retal amount. Aggrieved by the decretal amount. Aggrieved by the decree of the court below, defendants have appealed to this Court. 3. The first submission made by the learned counsel, appearing for the appellants, was that because of the statutory requirements of Sec. 94, the Motor Truck which had become involved with the accident resulting in the death of Phuleshwar was insured against third party risk. The appellants had clearly brought it to the notice of the court that the Truck was insured with the insurer whose name was disclosed in the written statement. It was submitted that by reason of Sec. 96(2) the appellants were indemnified by the insurer in respect of any claim for compensation which might be decreed against them on account of any accident by the Truck, but on account of failure of the court to issue notice to the insurer, the insurer could not be held liable for the decretal amount. This had resulted, it was submitted, in serious prejudice to the appellants. This had resulted, it was submitted, in serious prejudice to the appellants. It was urged that it was the duty of the court to have issued notice to the insurer as contemplated by Sec. 96(2) of the Act and the failure of the court below to have done so justified the decree being set aside and the suit being remanded with directions to the court to give notice to the insurer and to proceed with the trial of the suit thereafter. The contention to my mind, is devoid of merit. Neither the Civil Procedure Code nor Sec. 96 of the Act nor any provision of the Indian Fatal Accidents Act make it incumbent for the plaintiffs in a suit of the nature with which I am concerned to implead the insurer as a party to the suit. The plaintiffs had chosen to make a claim for compensation only against the owner and driver of the truck. They asked for a decree only against the two appellants. Since they sought no relief against the insurer, no provision or principle of law could compel them to implead the insurer as a party to the suit. Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 96 provides that no sum under Sec. 96(1) shall be payable by an insurer in respect of any judgment unless, before or after the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment is given, the insurer had notice through the court concerned of the bringing of the proceedings or in respect of any judgment so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal. Sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 96 further entitles the insurer to be impleaded as a party if it receives notice of the proceedings and to defend the action on the grounds mentioned in the various clauses of that provision. Sec. 96 (2) is a provision for the benefit of the insured the claimant and the insurer. If the claimant desires to enforce his decree against the insurer, it is for him to move the court for a notice to the insurer. On the other hand, if the insured is anxious to be indemnified in respect of any decree that may be passed against him, he must take steps for getting notice issued to the insurer. The court itself is under no duty to issue notice to the insurer. On the other hand, if the insured is anxious to be indemnified in respect of any decree that may be passed against him, he must take steps for getting notice issued to the insurer. The court itself is under no duty to issue notice to the insurer. In support of his contention that it is the duty of the court irrespective of any move in that behalf by the plaintiff or the defendant in a run down action to issue notice to the insurer, learned counsel placed reliance on certain observations made by Chhagla, C. J. with whom Bhagwati, J. concurred in Sarup Singh Mangat Singh v. Nilkanth Bhaskar, A.I.R. 1953 Bom. 109. The particular passage on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel, runs as follows : "Sec. 96 was recently enacted and it casts a sort of vicarious liability upon an Insurance Co., and although the statute makes it obligatory upon the plaintiff to serve a notice through the Court upon the Insurance Co., if he wants to hold the Insurance Co. liable as if it were a judgment-debtor under the decree which he might obtain, the statute does not confer any right upon the Insurance Co. to defend the action on the same points in issue which the defendant would be entitled to defend." These observations, to my mind, are of no assistance to the learned counsel for the appellants for the contention raised by him. In fact the observations quoted above merely show that if the plaintiffs desire to make an Insurance Company liable as if it were a judgment-debtor, then alone it is their duty to see to it that a notice is served on the insurer through the court in accordance with Sec. 96(2) of the Act. If the plaintiff, however, is satisfied by obtaining a decree against the owner and driver of the Truck, he cannot be required to implead the insurer as a party to the proceedings or to move the court for a notice being issued to the insurer. This is so because there is no privity of contract between the claimant and the insurer and he consequently cannot be compelled to implead the insurer as a party. The law merely gives him a right to get notice served on the insurer through the court but does not entitle him to implead the defendant as a party to the suit. The law merely gives him a right to get notice served on the insurer through the court but does not entitle him to implead the defendant as a party to the suit. 4. Further reliance was placed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants in support of his submission on the following passage in the judgment of Patel and Thakkar, JJ. in Abdulkadar Ebrahim Sura v. Kashinath Moreshwar Chandani, A.I.R. 1968 Bombay 267. "We cannot part with this case without making a few observations regarding joining the Insurance Company as a party. Sec. 96 of the Act provides in clear terms that in an application for damages under the Motor Vehicles Act, the Insurance Company need not be made party to the claim. Under sub-Sec. (2) it is the duty of the Court to issue a notice of the proceeding to the Insurance Company and or such notice being issued to it, the insurer is entitled to be made a party and defend the action only on the ground that the policy stood cancelled on grounds stated in sub-section. It is only on the limited grounds that the insurer is entitled to contest the proceedings. The office of the Motor Vehicles Tribunal was, therefore, wrong in insisting upon the applicants that they make the Insurance Company party to the proceedings. The learned Judge was equally wrong in permitting the Insurance Company to take part in the proceedings which had no relation to any of the defences which it could have taken under Sec. 96(2)." No doubt the above quoted passage does contain observations to the effect that it is the duty of the court to issue notice of the proceeding to the Insurance Company but these observations were clearly made in respect of proceedings before a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under Sec. 110 of the Act and not to a civil suit instituted in the regular court. This is evident from the observations contained in the passage extracted from the judgment which clearly states that the office of the Motor Vehicles Tribunal was wrong in insisting that the applicants should implead the Insurance Company as a party to the proceeding Paragraph 20 of the judgment as reported, also leaves no room for doubt that the observations relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants were made with reference to proceedings before a Claims Tribunal constituted under the Act and not to a civil suit. No doubt in the opening sentence of the judgment Patel, J. with whom Thakkar, J. concurred, has stated that the appeals before the bench arose out of proceedings under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, but it appears from paragraphs 20 and 21 of the judgment as reported that the appeals before the court were under Sec. 110-D of the Act and not under Sec. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure arising out of a suit before the civil court. As far as Claims Tribunals constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act are concerned, there may be ample justification for holding that they are under a duty to issue notice to the insurer but I have no hesitation in holding that no such duty can be cast upon the civil courts entertaining a claim under the provisions of Indian Fatal Accidents Act. As far as the claims Tribunals are concerned, Sec. 110-B casts a duty upon them to specify in the award the amount which shall be paid by the insurer. The Claims Tribunal evidently cannot specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer without giving the insurer an opportunity of being heard. Fundamental principle of natural justice consequently would cast a duty on the Claims Tribunals to issue notice to the insurer and to offer it an opportunity of disputing a claim before they can be held liable for any amount specified in the award. No such duty as is cast on Claims Tribunals exists as far as the civil courts entertaining a suit under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act are concerned. 5. Lastly Sri B. C. Dey, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, sought support for the submission made by him on a decision by K. L. Pandev and A. P. Sen, JJ. in Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Jabalpur v. Jahiram, A.I.R. 1969 M.P. 89. 5. Lastly Sri B. C. Dey, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, sought support for the submission made by him on a decision by K. L. Pandev and A. P. Sen, JJ. in Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Jabalpur v. Jahiram, A.I.R. 1969 M.P. 89. This decision again, to my mind, is of no help to the appellants because it again related to proceedings before a Claims Tribunal. Material facts giving rise to the decision before the Madhya Pradesh High Court were that a vehicle belonging to the appellant corporation met with an accident which resulted in serious injuries and disablement of the claimant. At the relevant time the motor vehicle belonging to the appellant before the High Court was insured with the Indian Assurance Company against third party risk. It appears that in the application presented under Sec. 110-A(1) of the Act the claimant did not implead the insurer but in spite of it an award granting compensation against the appellant corporation was given by the Claims Tribunal concerned. Before the High Court, it was urged that the application as framed and presented before the Claims Tribunal suffered from serious infirmity in as far as in it the insurer was not impleaded. The High Court accepted the contention and remitted the proceedings for retrial after allowing the claimant an opportunity to implead the insurer and serving on them a notice in order that they may appear and contest the claim to the limited extent provided under Sec. 96(2) of the Act. In support of the view that it was incumbent on the claimant to implead the insurer in his application under Sec. 110-A (1), the learned Judges who decided the appeal specifically mentioned that it was the requirement of Sec. 110-A (2) that every application under Sec. 110-A(l) shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed. Reference is also made to the form of the application prescribed by Rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Claims Tribunal Rules, 1939 which enjoins that the insurer should be impleaded as opposite party No. 3. The view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court was expressed with reference to an application under Sec. 110-A (1) before a Claims Tribunal and has no application to a suit in a civil court under the Fatal Accident Act. The view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court was expressed with reference to an application under Sec. 110-A (1) before a Claims Tribunal and has no application to a suit in a civil court under the Fatal Accident Act. In the view taken by me, the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants with regard to the defective procedure followed by the trial court fails. 6. It was next contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that on the evidence produced the court below was not justified in holding that the truck owned by appellant No. 1 and driven by appellant No. 2 at the time of the accident, was the truck involved and that it was being driven in a rash or negligent fashion. I have gone through the evidence on a record and have heard the learned counsel in support of the appeal. In my opinion, the court below was perfectly justified in coming to the conclusions it did. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Pheku Misir (P. W. 3) was examined to prove that the truck was being driven by appellant No. 2 in rash and negligent fashion. In his cross-examination nothing was brought out to make me suspect that he is not an absolutely independent and truthful witness. He belongs to a village different to that of the deceased and apart from the fact that he had once employed him to repair a cart, there appears to have been no particular intimacy between the deceased and him which could have impelled him to give a false statement against the appellants. Apart from that, his statement gives clear indication that he is an impartial witness who has made no attempt to go out of the way to support the plaintiffs case. He frankly stated that at the time of the accident he was some paces ahead of the deceased who was coming on a bicycle. Not only that, he candidly stated that he did not notice the intial impact between the bicycle driven by the deceased and the motor truck of the appellant, since he was at that time, according to his testimony, sitting by the road side urinating. Not only that, he candidly stated that he did not notice the intial impact between the bicycle driven by the deceased and the motor truck of the appellant, since he was at that time, according to his testimony, sitting by the road side urinating. He disclosed that his attention was drawn towards the motor truck only when he heard Ram Narain, who was accompanying the deceased on a different bicycle, raising an alarm to the effect that Phuleshwar had been crushed by the Truck. In his examination-in-chief he revealed that when he looked in the direction of the truck he noticed that Phuleshwar was entangled in the front wheel of the motor truck. In cross-examination he reiterated that the deceased was in between the front wheels of the truck involved in the accident. According to his assertion at the time when the accident occurred, the motor truck was being driven without lights. He further stated that when the accident occurred, the truck was being driven at considerable speed. Naturally enough he could not give the exact speed. The only witness examined on behalf of the appellants was appellant No. 2, the driver of the truck. He is obviously a highly interested witness whose careless handling of the truck occasioned the claim for a heavy amount being made against his employer. I cannot see any reason why the testimony of Pheku Misir, who, in my opinion, is an honest and independent witness should not be preferred to that of Mohd. Jawad Hussain. The quantum of damages assessed by the court below was not challenged by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, who argued the appeal. 7. There is no merit in this appeal. It is hereby dismissed. Since no one appeared on behalf of the respondents, there shall be no order as to costs. The interim order of this court dated 1st February, 1967 is recalled.