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1974 DIGILAW 2 (KAR)

RAJAGOPALA v. P. REVANNA

1974-01-09

K.J.SHETTY

body1974
( 1 ) THIS is a revision petitition under S. 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 ('the Act'), questioning the correctness and validity of an order of eviction made aginst the tenant. Revanna was a landlord. He filed an application for eviction of his. tenant, under S. 21 (1) (a) and (h) of the Act. But, he died during the pendency of the proceedings. His legal representatives were brought on record and they continued the proceedings. They are the respondents before me. ( 2 ) IN the application for eviction, Revanna had stated thus :"the petition schedule shop is reasonably and bona fide required by the petitioner for the purpose of his business. The premises in which the petitioner was formerly running his business had to be vacated as the said shop was required by its landlord for his business. The petitioner was therefore, obliged to request the respondent to vacate the schedule shop and deliver the same to the petitioner. The respondent who was promising to vacate the same in the beginning, later refused to do so. The petitioner therefore caused a legal notice to be issued to the respondent duly terminating his tenancy and informing him of the above facts. " ( 3 ) REVENNA died before the evidence commenced in the proceedings. His son who was impleaded as one of the legal representatives gave evidenct. He stated that the shop is required by him to continue his father's business and there is no other premises available to him. Believing that evidence, learned munsift held that the landlord has proved that the shop is reasonably and bona fide required by him for his personal. occupation and if the possession is not given, it would cause him greater hardship. Those findings were affirmed by the District Judge in the appeal prefeirred by the tenant. ( 4 ) THE contention urged before the appellate Judge was, that the legal representatives of Revanna had no right to continue the action for eviction on a plea which was different from that put forward by Revanna. It was urged that the requirement of Revanna that the premises were bona fide needed for his occupation was personal to him and on his death, his legal representatives cannot continue the proceedings on the ground that the premises are required for their bona, fide use and occupation. It was urged that the requirement of Revanna that the premises were bona fide needed for his occupation was personal to him and on his death, his legal representatives cannot continue the proceedings on the ground that the premises are required for their bona, fide use and occupation. ( 5 ) THE learned Judge rejected that contention; while dismissing the appeal. He hag held that the provisions of S. 21 (1) (h) are comprehensive enough and, the requirement contemplated therein is not merely the need of the landlord personally but also his wife or children or other dependents. v the same contention has been pressed before me on behalf of the tenant. Under S. 21 (1) (h) of the Act, the, landlord can ask for possession of any premises on the ground that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required for his personal occupation or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust, that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust. Revanna, in his application for eviction has stated that " the petition schedule shop in reasonably and bona fide required by him for the purpose of his business". He has never stated that the premises were required for his sons or for continuing his family business. His need was therefore, purely personal to him. ( 6 ) UNDER Rule 3 of Order 22 (CPC) where a sole plaintiff or sole, surviving plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit or the proceeding. The legal representative of a deceased plaintiff can only prosecute the cause of action as originally framed. Sub-clause (ii) of Rule 4 of Order 22 CPC is more specific on this question. It provides that when a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, his legal representatives who are brought on record may make any defence, appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant. In other words, the heirs and the legal representatives could urge all contentions which the deceased could have urged except only those which were personal to the deceased. In other words, the heirs and the legal representatives could urge all contentions which the deceased could have urged except only those which were personal to the deceased. ( 7 ) IN my judgment, the position cannot be different for the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff, when a plea of the deceased plaintiff was personal to him. A person who is brought on record under Rule 3 can raise only such pleas appropriate to his character as legal representative. Likewise, the defendant can raise no defence against the legal repre sentative, other than what he could have raised against the deceased plaintiff himself. Such being the case was it open to the legal representatives of Revanna to raise a plea that the shop is required by them for their business and for their occupation, when no such plea was raised by Revanna in his application for eviction. Under S. 21 (1) (h) Revanna could have brought an action for eviction of the tenant on the ground that the premises were bona. fide needed not only to him personally but also for the need of his sons or other dependants. He did not take up the cause of his sons qr other relations. He pleaded that the premises were required for him for continuing his business. It was his personal requirement and on his death, his legal representatives cannot take up that plea and much less they could contend that the premises are bona fide required by them. The tenant had no opportunity to put forward his defence against the bona fide requirements of the legal representatives of Revanna the evidence adduced in the case by the heirs of Revanna, that the premises were needed by them, was therefore, contrary to the pleadings in the case and cannot therefore be looked into. ( 8 ) THE learned Judge, in my view, was in error in upholding the eviction order. In the result, the petition is allowed, the order of eviction passed by the Court below is set aside and the application for eviction stands dismissed. No costs in the circumstances. --- *** --- .