JUDGMENT Parimal Kumar Chanda, J. 1. This appeal by the State of West Bengal is directed against the Judgment of the President, Calcutta Improvement Tribunal in Valuation Case No. 88A of 1958(V) dated 6.5.1959. 2. Premises No.238, Maniktala Main Road was acquired under the Calcutta Improvement Trust alignment No. III (Maniktala) by which Maniktala Main Road was proposed to be widened by 30 feet on the Southern side of the road. Premises No. 238 was divided into two lots in the scheme plan the Northern portion is described as Lot A and the Southern portion as Lot B. In Lot A there was an Ice Factory known as Shankar Ice Factory. It may be mentioned here that Lot B was originally part of premises No. 237/1 and separate premises No. 238 was created after Shankar Ice Factory was started. Two awards have been made in respect of Lots A and B. There is no dispute regarding the award made in respect of Lot A. In this appeal we are concerned with the award made in respect of Lot B. Purna Chandra Mullick, Paresh Nath Mallick, Kala Chand Mallick and Gorachand Mallick in whose favour the a ward has been made got Lot B on the basis of partition on 13.8.1954 (Vide the deed of partition, Ext. 7). On receipt of the notice under section 9 they submitted a petition claiming a sum of Rs. 9,20,000/- including statutory allowance as compensation. They also challenged the correctness of the area given in the notices asserting absolute ownership of the acquired property. 3. The L.A. Collector awarded them Rs. 72,474.65 paise. Being dissatisfied with the award the Mallick's filed a petition on 5.9.1957 for reference to the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act in the following terms:- (A) That the area of the land acquired is 2 bighas and 5 kattahs. (B) That the market value of the land ought to have been assessed at the average rate of Rs. 3000/ per kattah. (C) That damages for injurious affection ought to have been awarded at Rs. 4000/- per kattah on account of severance of a strip of land measuring about one kattah and five chat tacks and intervening between the land acquired and the common passage which has become absolutely useless by reason of acquisition of the adjoining land to the west. (C) That damages for injurious affection ought to have been awarded at Rs. 4000/- per kattah on account of severance of a strip of land measuring about one kattah and five chat tacks and intervening between the land acquired and the common passage which has become absolutely useless by reason of acquisition of the adjoining land to the west. (D) That statutory allowance ought to have been awarded at the rate of 15% on the market value of the land. The Mallicks had not accepted the award made under section 11 of the L.A. Act and made the petition dated 5.9.1957 annexure to the letter of reference addressed to the President, Improvement Tribunal. 4. The area of Lot B as stated by the Collector is 2B. 3K. 5Ch. 10 Sq, feet and that was accepted by the referring claimants before the Tribunal. It was urged by the claimants before the Tribunal that the market value ought to have been assessed at an average rate of Rs. 1000/- per kattah. It was next urged that the Collector ought to have awarded damage at the rate of Rs. 4000/- per kattah for the strip of land lying to the east of the eastern boundary the undisputed area of which is 1 K.4 Ch.42 sq. feet which had become absolutely useless on account of acquisition of the adjoining land. This narrow strip of land measuring 121 feet 6 inch in length with a width of 5 feet at one end and 10 feet on the other which is a part of the Premises no. 237/7 belonging to the Mallicks has not been acquired. This strip was of course part of a different Municipal premises, but taken along with Lot B, it was a complete block with a frontage on the common passage. The claimants also demanded statutory allowance at 15 p.c. on the market value of the land. The Tribunal Reid that the front belt unit rate of the premises acquired should be Rs. 2750/- per kattah and the total value at that rate was worked out at Rs. 71,802.50 paise The Tribunal however could not reduce the amount of the Collector's a ward i.e. Rs. 72,424,65. The Tribunal disallowed the claim for statutory allowance. The Tribunal Reid that the front belt unit rate of the premises acquired should be Rs. 2750/- per kattah and the total value at that rate was worked out at Rs. 71,802.50 paise The Tribunal however could not reduce the amount of the Collector's a ward i.e. Rs. 72,424,65. The Tribunal disallowed the claim for statutory allowance. In regard to the strip of land lying to the east of Lot B, the Tribunal held that the referring claimants were entitled to damages for injurious affection on account of the severance of the strip. Having regard to the front belt rate of Lot B, that is Rs. 2750/- per kattah, the Tribunal assessed the damage of this strip of land measuring 1 K.4 Ch.42 sq feet at Rs. 3598/- only. The Tribunal accepted the reference only in part. The Collector's award was enhanced only under clause thirdly of Section 23(1) by Rs. 3598/-. Interest on that amount was to run at 6 p.c. per annum from the date when the collector took possession till the amount was remitted to the Tribunal. 5. On a certificate granted by the Tribunal under Section 77A of the Calcutta, Improvement (appeals) Act 1911, the State of West Bengal has come with this appeal. In the memorandum of appeal the grounds taken are:- (1) That the learned Tribunal erred in law in allowing the claims for injurious affection and severance. (2) That the Tribunal was not justified in allowing compensation under Section 23(1) thirdly as the claimants did not lay any claim before on account of severance and injurious affection before the L.A. Collector. (3) That the Tribunal erred in law in its interpretation of Section 25 of the L.A. Act and in holding that the claimants were entitled to get full value on the view that it has been rendered useless by the acquisition. (4) That in assessing the said damage the Tribunal failed to consider the evidence of the expert, B. Roy, that the strip of land would be one forth its value even if it could not be put to any profitable user and in any view of the matter, the Tribunal should not have awarded more than 3/4 of the full value of the unacquired strip of land as damage. 6. 6. In this appeal we are concerned with the short and only point whether the Tribunal was justified in allowing the damages amounting to Rs. 3598/- for severance and injurious affection. On a consideration of the evidences of B. Roy, the expert examined on behalf of the claimants, and P.C. Mallick, one of the claimants, the Tribunal has found that the strip of land could not be used for letting out for shop purposes and attempt to sell or let out the strip proved abortive. The evidence of B. Roy to which reference has been made in the memorandum of appeal does not improve the position. He has said that the disposition of the strip of land at the material time was that it was a different from the acquired land and it was used as a passage. So the witness thought that there would be no diminution in value as it is still left as passage, and its value would be 1/4 of the full value of the acquired land. It does not appear from his evidence that he had any personal knowledge a bout the user of this strip of land as passage. This strip of land lies in between a common passage and the acquired portion of lot B. B. Roy, has said that even if this strip of land were not used as passage it was a strip of land and remains a strip of land even after acquisition and as such, there will be no diminution of its value. It has been elicited from Sukumar Dey that this strip of land was lying vacant at the material time. There was a great opening on this strip of land. That does not mean that it was used as a common passage by the adjoining owners. There is no satisfactory evidence that it was so used by the adjoining owners. In fact it was suggested to Sukumar Dey on behalf of the State that this strip of land could be let out to small shop keepers. We find from the evidence of Puma Chandra Mallick that the common passage is to the east of this strip of land. It has been further elicited in examination of Purna Chandra Mallick that it is not possible to construct shop houses on it. We find from the evidence of Puma Chandra Mallick that the common passage is to the east of this strip of land. It has been further elicited in examination of Purna Chandra Mallick that it is not possible to construct shop houses on it. It is true that Sukumar Dey has said that along the eastern boundary of lot B there was wall partly of C.I. sheets and partly brick built with a gate. This strip of land might be used by the man of the near by Ice Factory for ingress to and egress from the factory but that does not convert it as a common passage of adjoining owners. At east there is no evidence that the adjoining owners or any other outsider had any limited right of user over this strip of land. 7. The evidence of B. Roy that the strip of land would be 1/4 its full value though it could not be put to any profitable use, does not appear to have any basis and it seems to be grounded mainly on the assumption that it was part of the common passage which in fact it was not. We hold in agreement with the learned Judge of the Tribunal that the strip has been rendered useless by the acquisition Section 23(1) clause thirdly reads as below:- "Thirdly the damage (if any), sustained by the person interested, at the time of Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of severing such land from his other land." 8. In view of this clause injury to other property or other portion of the same property consequent on acquisition is to be compensated. Chairman Serampore Municipality vs. Secretary of State, AIR 1922 Cal. 386, 387, 388. In the case reported in Nathar Hussain Meera Levai Rowther & another vs. Deputy Collector of Usitampati, AIR 1916 Madras 1146, a division Bench has held that an owner of land acquired for public purpose is entitled to be compensated for injuries to other lands. In a case reported in Prasanna Kumar Datta vs. Secretary of State, AIR 1934 Cal. 525, it was observed that compensation might be allowed even on account of loss of privacy due to acquisition of adjoining property. In a case reported in Prasanna Kumar Datta vs. Secretary of State, AIR 1934 Cal. 525, it was observed that compensation might be allowed even on account of loss of privacy due to acquisition of adjoining property. In Balammal's case reported in Balammal & other vs. State of Madras, AIR 1968 SC 1425 , the Supreme Court accepted the contention of the appellants that the owners who had sustained loss by reason of the severance of the land acquired from their other lands were entitled to compensation either under thirdly or fourthly or sixthly of section 23(i) of the Land Acquisition Act but refused to grant any relief observing that there was no evidence to prove that by reason of the acquisition the remaining lands were injuriously affected, nor was there any evidence to show that there was any damage resulting from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the declaration and the time of taking possession of the land. As earlier noticed the strip of land though a part of different premises, taken along with Lot B, was compact block with a frontage on the common passage. The application to the Collector for reference under S. 18 includes a claim for additional compensation on the ground that the acquisition has materially affected the value of property not acquired. The Supreme Court has held in the case reported in State of Bihar & another vs. Kundan Singh & another, AIR 1964 SC 350 , that the claim for additional compensation on the ground that the portion of the property acquired so materially affected the value or utility of his other property not acquired as to justifying claim for additional compensation under section 23 could legitimately from the subject matter of an enquiry in a reference under section 18(1) of the L.A. Act. In the application for reference under section 18, this ground of objection to the award was specifically stated and the collector made the reference making the application as annexure. As observed by the Privy Council in (Rai) Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur vs. Secretary of State, AIR 1930 P.C. 64, the scope of enquiry before the Court in a reference under section 18 is to consider the objections made by the persons interested under section 18. 9. As observed by the Privy Council in (Rai) Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur vs. Secretary of State, AIR 1930 P.C. 64, the scope of enquiry before the Court in a reference under section 18 is to consider the objections made by the persons interested under section 18. 9. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that in pursuance of the notice under section 9 the Mallicks did not claim any compensation on account of severance and as such they could not press their claim on this item before the Tribunal. Reliance has been placed in this connection on the division Bench decisions reported in Secretary of State vs. Tikka Jagtar Singh, AIR 1936 Lahore 733 (735), Orient Bank of India vs. Secretary of State, AIR 1926 Lahore 401, Ramprosad vs. Collector of Aligarh, AIR 1917 All. 52-40 IC 274, Umar Bux vs. Secretary of State, AIR 1918 Lahore 160-46 IC 906, where it has been held that under Section 9 a claimant must give particulars of his claim. If any item is not specified, claimant will not be awarded compensation merely because the amount awarded does not exceed the total claim. Section 9(2) lays down:- "Such notice shall state the particulars of the land so needed, and shall require all persons, interested in the land to appear personally or by agent before the Collector at a time and place therein mentioned (such time not being earlier than 15 days after the publication of the notice), and to state the nature of their respective interests in the land and their objections (if any) to the measurements made under section 8. The Collector may in any case require such statement to be made in writing and signed by the party or his agent." The Mallick put forth their claim by a petition dated 6.5.1957. They claimed a lump sum of Rs. 9,20,000/- including statutory allowance on account of compensation for the acquisition of the premises. The teamed Judge of the Tribunal has observed:- "In connection with this claim the learned Government Advocate raised a point that the claimants did not lay any claim on account of severance or injurious affection before the Collector and therefore this claim laid in this Court was not tenable. I am unable to accept this contention of the learned Government Advocate. The claimants had before the collector claimed a lump sum of Rs. I am unable to accept this contention of the learned Government Advocate. The claimants had before the collector claimed a lump sum of Rs. 9,20,000/- on account of compensation. It is not necessary nor is it possible for all interested persons, to lay claims under separate heads. The amount awarded by the Collector, even taken along with the enhanced sum of Rs. 3598/- will be far below than total amount claimed by the claimants before the collector and therefore no question of any bar under section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act arises. Section 25 lays down:- "25. Rules as to amount of compensation:- (1) When the applicant has made a claim to compensation, pursuant to any notice given under section 9, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not exceed the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11. (2) When the applicant has refused to make such claim or has omitted without sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded by the Court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector. (3) When the applicant has omitted for a sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not be less than, and may exceed, the amount awarded by the Collector." 10. Section 25 is concerned with the maximum and minimum amounts which the Court may award in each of the three cases. In other words, as mentioned therein under section 25 claimants are estopped from getting more from the Judge than what they had claimed before the Collector. Section 25 is plain and contains a statutory injunction to the court not to award compensation in excess of what is claimed in pursuance of a notice under section 9. As we interpret section 9(2) all that is required under this section, is that a person claiming an interest in the land under acquisition should (1) specify the interest he claims, (2) specify the amount he claims for such interest and (3) give particulars of his claims of compensation. Because the claimants did not give any details for determining the compensation, it cannot be said that no claim at all was made pursuant to notice under section 9(2). Because the claimants did not give any details for determining the compensation, it cannot be said that no claim at all was made pursuant to notice under section 9(2). In Chigurupati Subbanna vs. District Labour Officer East Godavari, AIR 1930 Madras 618, Beasley C.J. and Curgenven, J. while considering the scope of sections 9(2) and 25(2) of the Act observed:- "That under section 9(2) of the Act, the claimant is not required necessarily to make his claim in writing so long as he makes a claim for compensation. What the Act does require is that there should be a specific claim, namely, a claim which states in rupees the value the claimant places upon his property." 11. The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State of West Bengal has referred to the cases reported in Babu Ram Prasad vs. Collector of Aligarh & another, 40 IC 274, Umar Bakhsh & another vs. Secretary of State, 46 IC 906, Orient Bank of India Ltd. vs. Secretary of State 94 IC 245 and Balmukund & another vs. Punjab National Bank Ltd., AIR 1936 L. 723, besides relying on sections 9(2) and 25 of the Land Acquisition Act in support of his contention that the learned Judge of the Tribunal was wrong in entertaining the claim of the Mallick based on clause thirdly of Section 23(1) of the L.A. Act. In Umar Bux vs. Secretary of State, AIR 1918 Lahore 160-46 IC 906, it has been observed:- "The appellants also claim damages for severance, but as no claim for compensation on this account was made to Collector (Section 9 of the Act) it cannot be entertained by the Court." 12. In Orient Bank of India Ltd. vs. Secretary of State, AIR 1926 Lahore 401: 94 IC 245, the court held that merely placing an uncertified copy of a sale deed before the collector without claiming specific amount for the land acquired was not a sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 9. In Secretary of State vs. Tikka Jagtar Singh, AIR 1936 Lahore 733, the same court held that under Section 9 of the Act a claimant must give particulars of his claim. And if an item is not specified merely because the amount awarded does not exceed the total amount claimed he will not be awarded compensation on that score. In Secretary of State vs. Tikka Jagtar Singh, AIR 1936 Lahore 733, the same court held that under Section 9 of the Act a claimant must give particulars of his claim. And if an item is not specified merely because the amount awarded does not exceed the total amount claimed he will not be awarded compensation on that score. It was however observed:- "It is unnecessary however to record any definite finding en that point as the appeal of the Secretary of State as regards the compensation awarded for severance must succeed on the short ground that the objector has failed to produce any evidence to show what damage he would suffer on this score." 13. Prior to the decision in the case of Secretary of State vs. Tikka Jagtar Singh, AIR 1936 Lahore 733, it was held in Secretary of State vs. F.E. Dinshaw, AIR 1933 Sind 21, that failure to specify the amount claimed in respect of any particular sub-head of section 23 cannot operate as a bar in awarding compensation in respect of sub-head. Similar view has also been expressed by Andhra Pradesh High Court in the District Welfare Officer Fluru vs. M. Venkatarangaya, AIR 1958 A. 647, S. Nageswara Rao vs. Special Deputy Collector, AIR 1959 AP 52 , Mahant Narayana Dosajee Varu vs. Board of Trustees, the Tiyumlai Tirumati Divastenmas, Tirupati, AIR 1959 AP 64 , State of Hyderabad vs. Md. Dwer Ali, AIR 1963 AP 300 , Revenue Divisional Officer Visianagaram vs. Vommi Appalaswami, AIR 1967 AP 56 , Gangadhar Shastri vs. Deputy Collector of Madras, (1912) 14 IC 270: (1912) Madras LJ 379. In the Lahore and Allahabad cases to which reference, has been made by learned Advocate for the State, the cumulative effect of all the relevant sections which follow section 9, to wit, sections 11, 15, 23, 24 and 26, has not been considered. Under section 11 the Land Acquisition Collector is to dispose of three matters (1) the area of the land included in the award; (2) total compensation to be allowed for the land; (3) the apportionment of the total compensation among all persons interested in that land Prag. Narain vs. Collector of Agra, AIR 1932 PC 102-104. Under section 11 the Land Acquisition Collector is to dispose of three matters (1) the area of the land included in the award; (2) total compensation to be allowed for the land; (3) the apportionment of the total compensation among all persons interested in that land Prag. Narain vs. Collector of Agra, AIR 1932 PC 102-104. Section 15 provides that the collector taking steps prescribed by sections 9, 10 and 11 to determine compensation that ought to be allowed shall be guided by the provisions contained in sections 23 and 24, Vyrecherla Narayana Gajapatiraju vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam, AIR 1939 PC 98. Under these two sections the Judge is to take into consideration certain facts and to exclude others in fixing the total compensation for the land under acquisition whether or not he is requested to take into consideration such facts. In the instant case, collector himself referred the matter regarding compensation as contemplated by clause thirdly in Section 23(1). So this could be taken up by the Tribunal for consideration. In the case reported in K. Subrahmanyamma vs. District Welfare Officer, Eluru, AIR 1966 AP 15 , it has been held by a Division Bench of this court that clauses 3 and 4 of Section 23 provide that in determining compensation, court shall take into consideration damage sustained by person interested by reason of severing such land from his other land and damages sustained by reason of acquisition in injuriously affecting other property. Under section 26 of the Act, the Judge is to specify the award he allows with reference to different such clauses of Section 23 The L.A. Collector is not to act in that manner when he makes the award under section 11. It is sufficient for him to record what he considers to be fair compensation to be allowed for the whole of the land and how it should be apportioned. The reference made by the collector relates to total amount of compensation. So a Judge can award a less or more sum in any item in respect of each head. On a reference to court against award of L.A. Collector the court does not sit in appeal but has to decide the matter afresh. That being the position, the phrase the amount so claimed appearing on Section 25 can reasonably be interpreted as the whole claim made by the claimant. On a reference to court against award of L.A. Collector the court does not sit in appeal but has to decide the matter afresh. That being the position, the phrase the amount so claimed appearing on Section 25 can reasonably be interpreted as the whole claim made by the claimant. In this connection, we may refer to certain observation in Secretary of State vs. F.E. Dinshaw, AIR 1933 Sind 24:- "The reason why Section 9 clause (2) has been worded somewhat widely is obvious. The Land Acquisition Officer is required to determine the compensation to be paid in respect of every interest in the land and to apportion it amongst the different claimants, but every claimant is expected to value his own interest. For instance, a mortgagee is interested in getting his mortgage claim and nothing more. The amount and particulars of his interest which he is required to specify by section 9 is the amount of his claim and the particulars of his mortgage. But in the event of the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer for the plot inclusive of the equity of redemption of the mortgagor, is less that the claim of the mortgage, there is no reason why he should not ask for a reference and have the valuation revised and brought up to the amount claimed by him if he is able to satisfy the Judge that the Land Acquisition Officer had not properly assessed some of the items referred to in section 23. If that be so there is likewise no reason why an owner may not dispute the award of the land acquisition officer on some of the sub-heads rerecorded to in that section merely and solely because he has not claimed specific sums in respect thereof, provided of course he does not ask for more than what he has claimed in respect of any of the other items." 14. Agreeing with the views expressed in the cases reported in Revenue Divisional Officer Visianagaram vs. Vommi Appalaswami, AIR 1967 AP 56 , S. Nageswara Rao vs. Special Deputy Collector, AIR 1959 AP 52 , Secretary of State vs. Malik Amir Mohammad Khan, AIR 1935 L. 653, AIR 1935 Lahore 653 and differing from the decisions in the cases reported in 40 I.C. 274, 46 I.C. 906, 94 I.C. 245 and AIR 1936 Lahore 723, we bold that failure to specify any sub-head of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act before L.A. Officer is no bar to the Judge reviewing the award of the Land Acquisition Officer in respect of such head provided the total amount does not exceed the award claimed before the collector or less than the amount awarded by the collector. Section 25 as earlier noticed is concerned with the maximum and minimum amounts which the court may award in each of the three cases set out in section 25. In the instant case the total amount awarded by the Tribunal does not exceed the amount claimed by the claimants before the L.A. Collector. 15. Regarding the amount of compensation, the Tribunal held that the claimants were entitled to get compensation for the severance at the full rate, i.e. at the rate of Rs. 2,750/- which has been found to be the rate of compensation for the front belt unit of Lot B. In view of the findings that this strip has become entirely useless to the owners, the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and needs no interference. 16. We find no substance in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.