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1974 DIGILAW 200 (PAT)

Ram Sudistha Jha v. Nageshwar Jha

1974-10-07

HARI LAL AGRAWAL

body1974
Judgment H.L. Agrawal, J. This application in revision is directed against the order of the court of appeal below whereby it has refused to order the substitution of the petitioner in the suit in place of the Original plaintiff. 2. The original plaintiff of the title suit in question, sold away his entire interest in the suit lands in favour of the petitioner by a registered deed of conveyance dated 22.11.1969. It is said that in the aforesaid deed, it was stipulated that the petitioner shall continue and prosecute the present title suit. On 10.12.69, the petitioner filed an application in the trial court under the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') for his substitution on the aforesaid ground along with a registration receipt in question in support of his place. The learned Munsif, however, taking an erroneous view that the registration receipt did not indicate the property conveyed under the document in question refused to grant the prayer of substitution nor did he think it desirable to grant any adjournment to the petitioner to enable him to substantiate his case or to produce the registered sale deed after obtaining the same from the Registration office. The original plaintiff had not taken any steps in view of the arrangement with the petitioner and in the next breath the learned Munsif dismissed the suit itself for default purporting to exercise his power under Rule 8 Order 9 of the Code. 3. The petitioner filed a miscellaneous appeal against the order of refusal to substitute him and the learned subordinate Judge who decided the appeal, although took a view that the prayer of the petitioner was wrongly rejected, refused to allow the appeal and grant the prayer under the impression that since the suit itself was dismissed for default and was not pending, there could be no substitution of the plaintiff. 4. In my opinion, both the courts below committed gross errors of jurisdiction in this case. Under Rule 10 of Order 22 of the Code, a person upon whom the interest of the properties in suit devolved by way of assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit is entitled to continue the said suit with the leave of the court. The right of the petitioner therefore was statutory. Under Rule 10 of Order 22 of the Code, a person upon whom the interest of the properties in suit devolved by way of assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit is entitled to continue the said suit with the leave of the court. The right of the petitioner therefore was statutory. He also filed the application without any unreasonable delay. If the Munsif felt any doubt in the circumstances, he should have granted him a reasonable opportunity to produce the sale deed in question, but it was most unreasonable for him to have dismissed the suit forthwith. 5. Be that as it may, any order passed under Rule 10 of Order 22 of the Code has been made appeal able under order 43 of the Code. The petitioner, therefore, had got a right of appeal and the learned Subordinate Judge having felt himself satisfied that the order refusing to allow the prayer of the petitioner to be impleaded in place of the sole plaintiff was improper, he should have allowed the appeal. He clearly misdirected himself in refusing to allow the appeal, under an apparent misapprehension that the suit had come to an end and was not any more pending in which the petitioner should be substituted. The order of dismissal of the suit was' mere consequential, on the refusal of the Munsif to allow 'the application of the petitioner for his substitution in place of the plaintiff. If once that application would have been allowed or could be allowed, as the learned Subordinate Judge felt where the original sale deed was also produced, the order of dismissal of the suit for default would automatically stand set aside as in that event, there would have been no absence of the plaintiff, a situation which entitled the Munsif to dismiss the suit under Rule 8 of order 9 of the Code. 6. On behalf of the opposite party Mr. Devakant Chaudhary seriously contended that the order of dismissal of the suit, which was a separable order, having become final and the petitioner having not challenged the said order by a separate proceeding, the appeal of the petitioner was rightly dismissed by the court of appeal below and this court should not allow this application. Devakant Chaudhary seriously contended that the order of dismissal of the suit, which was a separable order, having become final and the petitioner having not challenged the said order by a separate proceeding, the appeal of the petitioner was rightly dismissed by the court of appeal below and this court should not allow this application. There is no force in this contention for the reasons already discussed above, namely, that once it is held that the trial court was wrong in refusing the prayer of the petitioner on his application filed before him under order 22 Rule 10 of the Code, the order of dismissal of the suit was a mere consequential order on his failure to exercise the jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner and was dependent upon the same. If the previous order which was a condition precedent for passing of the second part of the order is set aside, I have got no doubt in my mind that the subsequent part of the order resulting in the dismissal of the suit automatically stands set aside. 7. Mr. Devakant Choudhary also raised an objection that on the death of the sole plaintiff in the court of appeal below, his son Subans Singh was left out and therefore, this application in absence of the said son is incompetent. There is no force in this contention either. For when an application for substitution was made on behalf of the petitioner in the court of appeal below, no such objection was taken that was the proper stage within the meaning of Rule 5 of Order 22 of the Code for taking such an objection and if the substitution has been allowed in place of the original plaintiff, in presence of the parties, it is too late now for Mr. Devakant Choudhary to contend in this court regarding the in competency of the present application. That apart, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, on account of the substitution of the other heirs of the original plaintiff the interest of the plaintiff, if any, will be deemed to be properly represented as there is no apparent conflict between the interest of the substituted heirs of the plaintiff and the left out heir. That apart, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, on account of the substitution of the other heirs of the original plaintiff the interest of the plaintiff, if any, will be deemed to be properly represented as there is no apparent conflict between the interest of the substituted heirs of the plaintiff and the left out heir. However the sale plaintiff having parted with his entire interest in the suit lands with specific stipulation that it will be the purchaser, namely, the petitioner who alone will be responsible to prosecute the suit, the said Subans Singh has got no manner of concern with this litigation any more and his absence has no bearing on the question falling for consideration before me. 8. For the foregoing reasons, I allow this application and direct the trial court to substitute the petitioner in place of the plaintiff and proceed to dispose of the suit in accordance with law. In the circumstances, however I shall make no order as to costs. Application allowed.