JUDGMENT H. N. Seth, J. - This petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order dated 2nd December, 1970, passed by the District Magistrate Nainital, terminating petitioner's services as Overseer in the Town Office at Rudrapur, Nainital. 2. The petitioner Vishnu Kumar Bharadwaj was appointed as Overseer in Rudrapur Town under the order's of the Prescribed Authority cum District Magistrate, Nainital, dated 10:h October, 1966. The appointment letter indicated that his setvices were temporary and were liable to be terminated without notice. Case of the petitioner is that in his capacity as Overseer, he had to inspect constructions set up in the township and to make a report to the Prescribed Authority. In that connection, he mode a report to the Prescribed Authority with regard to certain unauthorised construction made by Dr. D. C. Rastogi who happened to be the family physician of Prescribed Authority, Sri R. C Jain. Dr. Rastogi came to him in connection with the aforesaid report and requested him to regularise the objection raised by him. When the petitioner expressed his inability to oblige Dr, Rastogi, he threatened him with dire consequences. On the basis of a report made by the petitioner, Dr. Rastogi was prosecuted for an offence under Section 9 of U. P. Regulation of Building Operations Act 1958. Dr. Rastogi, being a family physician of Sri R. C. Jain was thick and thin with him. Sri Jain therefore started interfering in the criminal case, initiated by the petitioner, against Dr. Rastogi He also told the petitioner that his services would be terminated as he had made an attempt to harm his friend and family physician. On 5th June, 1970, the petitioner also made a report to the p dice about the threat that had been extended by Dr. Rastogi. He also made similar reports to the police against 3 Jan Sangh Leaders, namely, Ved Prakash, Chaman Lal Arhatiya, and Subhas Chand on 6th July, 1969. Consequently, Dr Rastogi and aforesaid three persons staffed a c onsade against the petitioner. On 15th June, 1970. Dr. Rastogi addressed a false complaint to Sri Mangla Prasad, the acting Officer-in-charge and Prescribed Authority, alleging that the petitioner had accepted bribe from several persons and had also committed other irregularities Thereupon, Sri Jain the Prescribed Authority sent the complaint made by Dr. On 15th June, 1970. Dr. Rastogi addressed a false complaint to Sri Mangla Prasad, the acting Officer-in-charge and Prescribed Authority, alleging that the petitioner had accepted bribe from several persons and had also committed other irregularities Thereupon, Sri Jain the Prescribed Authority sent the complaint made by Dr. Rastogi to the petitioner calling upon him to report and comment upon facts mentioned therein. The petitioner submitted a detailed report refuting the allegations made in Dr. Rastogi's complaint and thereafter went on leave from 22nd September, 1970 to 4th October, 1970. On return from leave he came to know chat Sri Jain, the Prescribed Authority, had conducted an enquiry and had recorded certain statements behind his back. Accordingly, he approached Sri Jain and requested that he should be given full opportunity to defend himself. He also pointed out to Sri Jain that the enquiry made by him behind petitioner's back, was illegal and without jurisdiction. Sri Jain then told the petitioner that all the irregularities would be settled by serving upon him a simple notice of termination of service which would not be justiciable in a court of law. It appears that subsequently on the basis of the report made by Sri Jain, the District Magistrate passed the impugned order dated 2nd December, 1970, terminating petitioner's service by giving him one month's pay in lieu of notice. 3. The grounds taken in writ petition disclose that the petitioner challenges the validity of the impugned order on three grounds :- (1) Order terminating petitioner's services was illegal as it was passed by the District Magistrate and not by the Prescribed Authority who alone was competent to determine petitioner's employment. (2) The order terminating petitioner's employment is vitiated because of mala tides of the Prescribed Authority, and (3) Circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the order determining petitioner's employment has been made by way of punishment. It is vitiated for non-compliance of Article 311 of (he Constitution However, at the time of hearing, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner did not press the first ground mentioned above. 4. According to the petitioner the impugned order was passed at the behest of Sri R. C. Jain who was a friend of Dr. Rastogi, who at the instance of the petitioner was being prosecuted for an offence under Section 9 of the U. P. Regulation of Building Operations Act 1958. 4. According to the petitioner the impugned order was passed at the behest of Sri R. C. Jain who was a friend of Dr. Rastogi, who at the instance of the petitioner was being prosecuted for an offence under Section 9 of the U. P. Regulation of Building Operations Act 1958. The petitioner further alleges that Sri Jain called him and rebuked him for initiating proceedings against Dr. Rastogi and told him that he would be got rid of by serving upon him a notice determining his employment. Sri Jain has refuted these allegations in the counter-affidavit filed by him. He denied that he submitted the report for terminating petitioner's services for the reason that the petitioner had initiated proceedings against Dr. Rastogi. He also denied the allegations based on which the assertion that he was a friend of Dr. Rastogi, had been made. Beside this, the ultimate decision to terminate petitioner's service had been taken by the District Magistrate who is not alleged to have been prejudiced against the petitioner. He also denied that he had any knowledge about the reports alleged to have been made by the petitioner, against three Jan Sangh Leaders mentioned in paragraph 14 and asserted that Dr. Rastogi's case had no connection with the order terminating petitioner's services. He specifically denied that Dr. Rastogi was his family physician. It is thus clear that the allegations of mala fides have been denied in the counter-affidavit. The petitioner did not file any rejoinder to the affidavit of Sri R. C. Jain. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the petitioner has substantiated his allegation that Sri R. C. Jain was prejudiced against him and that the order terminating his service was motivated. 5. Coming now to the last ground of attack, petitioner's case is that although he was appointed as an temporary Overseer and his services could be terminated by giving him one month's notice as required by the rules governing temporary Government servants, but if the authorities wished to terminate his services by way of punishment, they were bound to comply the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution. In this case, a complaint was made against the conduct of the petitioner which was enquired into by the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority also n corded statement of witnesses behind petitioner's back. In this case, a complaint was made against the conduct of the petitioner which was enquired into by the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority also n corded statement of witnesses behind petitioner's back. It is, therefore, obvious that petitioner's services have been terminated as a result of a conclusion arrived at in that enquiry. Accordingly, the impugned order, though couched as a simple order terminating petitioner's service, is infact an order punishing the petitioner and amounts to his removal from services in contravention of Art. 311 of the Constitution. Sri jain does not deny that he received a complaint against the petitioner and that he looked into it and in that connection statements of certain persons were recorded in the absence of the petitioner. Respondents, however, contend that the aforesaid enquiry was merely an informal enquiry made in order to ascertain whether there was any basts for the allegations made against petitioner. It was not a formal enquiry initiated with a view to punish the petitioner. In case it was not desirable to retain petitioner's service the respondents could determine his appointment in accordance with the rules applicable to the temporary Government servant by giving him one month's notice and for that purpose the provision of Art. 311 of the Constitution did not become applicable. 6. In the case of State of Punjab and another v. Sukh Raj Bahadur (A.I.R. 1968 SC p. 1089: 1968 SLR 701 ) after analysing its earlier decisions the Supreme Court formulated the following propositions:- (1) The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. (2) The circumstances proceeding or attendant on the order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial. (3) If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. (4) An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. (4) An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. (5) If there be a full-scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311 i. e. an Enquiry Officer is appointed a charge sheet submitted, explanation called for and considered, any order of termination of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said article." It follows that an order terminating the services of a temporary Government servant in accordance with the service rules and couched in a language which does not cast any stigma, even though motivated by petitioner's misconduct, does not amount to punishment of removal or dismissal as contemplated by Article 311, unless the circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination of service indicate that the same had been passed by way of punishment. An indication of which preceding or attendant circumstance would show that the order terminating the employment of a Government servant has been passed by way of punishment, is to be found in the third and the fifth propositions formulated by the Supreme Court. In other words where a full scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311 i.e. an Enquiry Officer has been appointed, a charge sheet submitted, explanation called for and after considering the same an order terminating the service of a temporary Government servant couched in innocuous language is passed, it would, as circumstances preceding the making of the order, indicate that the order though purporting to be a simple order of termination, is, infact, one which has been made by way of punishment. Similarly, if the consequence of a order of termination of service made in accordance with service rule is to visit the Government servant concerned with evil consequences or to cast stigma or aspersion on his character or integrity as mentioned in proposition No. 3, it would be an attending circumstance indicating that the order had been passed by way of punishment. While formulating aforementioned propositions the Supreme Court took care to point out that if an order terminating the services of a temporary Government servant was proceeded by an enquiry only for ascertaining whether he should be retained in service, which enquiry cannot re described as a full-scale departmental proceeding envisaged by Article 311 of the Constitution, it will not render an innocuous order of termination of service, made in accordance with the rules of service, into one made by way of punishment. This proposition was given full effect to by the Supreme Court, in the case of Ram Gopal Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. page 158 : 1969 SLR 429 ) where it refused to interfere with an order terminating the services of an officer who had been temporarily appointed to the Judicial Service of Madhya Pradesh under Rule 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Government Servants (Temporary and quasi-Permanent Service) Rules, 1960, without casting any stigma on the officer concerned and merely stating that his services were terminated from a specified date, even though, the order of termination was preceded by an informal enquiry into the conduct of the officer with a view to ascertain if he should be retained in service The Supreme Court, in that case, observed thus:- "On the face of it the order did not cast any stigma on the appellant's character or integrity nor did it visit him with any evil consequences. It was not passed by way of punishment and the provisions of Article 311 were not attracted." In the instant case, a complaint relating to petitioner's conduct was made. The Prescribed Authority enquired into the allegations made in the complaint and found that there was some substance in it. He concluded that in the circumstances, it was not desirable to retain the petitioner in service and made a report to the District Magistrate accordingly. It has been clearly stated in the counter affidavit that the aforesaid enquiry was merely an informal, enquiry which had not been initiated with a view to punish the petitioner. Neither any Enquiry Officer was appointed nor was the petitioner required to reply to a charge-sheet. In these circumstances, as held by the Supreme Court, the impugned order, even if it was motivated by the alleged conduct of the petitioner, couched in innocuous words did not attract the provision of Art. 311 of the Constitution. Neither any Enquiry Officer was appointed nor was the petitioner required to reply to a charge-sheet. In these circumstances, as held by the Supreme Court, the impugned order, even if it was motivated by the alleged conduct of the petitioner, couched in innocuous words did not attract the provision of Art. 311 of the Constitution. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U P. v. Sughar Singh repotted in (1974 S.C. cases Vol. 1, p. 218 : 1974 (1) SLR 435 : 1974 S.L.W.R. 36). In that case one Sughar Singh had been appointed to officiate as Platoon Commander in the P.A.C. After a full departmental enquiry, an adverse entry was actually made in his character roll in the year 1966. Subsequently, on the basis of that adverse entry Sughar Singh was directed to be reverted to his substantive post of Head Constable. The order of reversion was challenged on two grounds namely (I) that it violated Article 14 and 15 of the Constitution and (2) that it resulted in reducing the petitioner in rank without complying with the provisions of Art. 31' of the Constitution. The Supreme Court proceeded to consider both the questions and observed as follow : - "The respondent's counsel then challenged the order of reversion on another ground. He pointed out that at least 200 Head Constables who had taken training as cadet Sub-Inspectors of Armed Police at Sitapur after the respondent and who were junior to the respondent have still been allowed to retain their present status as Sub-Inspector arid have not been reverted to their substantive post of Head Constable. Unless this can be justified as a measure of punishment, the reversion of the respondent would amount to discrimination in contravention of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The facts on which this contention is based are found in paragraphs 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The facts on which this contention is based are found in paragraphs 7 and 20 of the petition. The contention itself is to be found in ground No. 3 of the writ petition. The complaint by itself was one which has to be sustained. No possible explanation tor this extreme form of discrimination had been shown to us. The facts on which this contention is based are found in paragraphs 7 and 20 of the petition. The contention itself is to be found in ground No. 3 of the writ petition. The complaint by itself was one which has to be sustained. No possible explanation tor this extreme form of discrimination had been shown to us. I. deed, it appears from the judgment of the third learned Judge who heard the petition in the High Court that in answer to a question put by him, the standing counsel appearing for the State clearly stated that the order of reversion was a result of adverse entry made in the appellant's confidential character roll. If this statement of the learned Standing counsel has to be accepted, it is impossible to resist the suggestion that the respondent's order of reversion was really an order of punishment in disguise in which event the order must be struck down for non-compliance with the requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution. The appellant in fact faces a dilemma. If it was not a case of punishment, it becomes difficult to explain why this discrimination was made against the respondent vis-a-vis at least 200 other officers who were junior to him in the substantive cadre. That would make the order liable to be stuck down as violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. On the other hand, if the order has to be justified with reference, to the adverse entry in the character roll, it becomes not merely a case of double punishment, but also a case of infringement of Article 311 of the Constitution " It appears that in Singh's case that the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the order of reverting him to a lower post was made as a result of an adverse entry which had been made by way of punishment as a result of regular departmental proceedings after following the procedure for inflicting that punishment. If held that the aforesaid circumstance which preceded the making of the order indicated that it had been made by way of punishment and that in fact it resulted in double punishment. If held that the aforesaid circumstance which preceded the making of the order indicated that it had been made by way of punishment and that in fact it resulted in double punishment. As the order of reversion followed regular departmental procedure adopted for punishing a Government servant, the Supreme Court held it be a punishment (in accordance with the proposition formulated in the case of State of Punjab and another v. Sukh Raj Bahadur (supra). Since Sughar Singh had been reverted to a lower post by way of punishment without complying with Article 311 of the Constitution Supreme Court held that the order of reversion was bad. There is no such material in the case before me which may indicate that the order in the termination of petitioner's service had been passed after following a procedure required for punishing a Government servant. In my opinion, decision of Supreme Court in Sughar Singh's case instead of supporting the petition goes against him as it specifically approves its earlier decisions wherein refused to give any weight to the real motive operating in the mind of the authority which passed the orders terminating the services of a temporary servants and upheld the same so long as the action was founded on the right flowing from the service rules. In this connection the following passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in Sughar Singh's case appearing in paragraph 12 of the judgment may be noted with advantage "Confusion has arisen particularly in respect of cases where this Court has had to deal with orders of Government from the aspect of the motive underlying those orders. What is the weight to be given to motive in deciding whether a particular order is penal in character and therefore falling within the mischief of Article 311 of the Constitution or whether it has been passed for departmental considerations and in exigencies of public service ? It is well recognised that very often the motive of a particular order of Government and the language and terms of the order itself are not in harmony. In many cases though Government take action under the specific service rules for the purpose of terminating the service or reducing the rank of an officer, the real motive or in during factor which influences the Government, to take action is different and is connected with some disqualification or inefficiency of the officer. In many cases though Government take action under the specific service rules for the purpose of terminating the service or reducing the rank of an officer, the real motive or in during factor which influences the Government, to take action is different and is connected with some disqualification or inefficiency of the officer. In other words, Government, while pretending to act in terms of the contract of service or service rules, in reality wants to get rid of the officer concerned or to reduce him to a lower rank by way of punishment for his misconduct or inefficiency or disqualification. In such a case the action taken by Government is in an innocuous form but the real intent of it is penal. Such a situation was contemplated by Das, C.J., in Parshottam Lal Dhingra's Case. He observed (p. 862). It is true that the misconduct, negligence inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service, the motive operating in the mind of the Government is, as Changla, C.J., had said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules, then, prima facie the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. Following this enunciation of the principle this Court has in many later cases refused to give any weight to the motive operating in the mind of the authority which passes an order terminating the service of a temporary servant or reducing the servant in rank so long as the particular action taken was "founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules." These observations clearly make out that even though the real intent of the authorities concerned might have been to get rid of a Government servant on account of his conduct yet if the order terminating his services was made in exercise of the right flowing from a contract or the service rules, Article 311 of the Constitution will not be attracted. As pointed out in the subsequent case of State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur (A.I.R. 1968, SC, p. 1089), even though after taking into consideration the circumstances preceding and attendant on the order, it is possible for the court to go behind an innocuous order purporting to have been made in exercise of the power flowing under a service rule and to see whether it has been made by way of punishment but then it would not be possible to brand an innocuous order as a punishment merely because the notice of the authorities concerned was to penalise the Government servant concerned. The aforementioned case, in my opinion, instead of supporting petitioner's case goes a long way to show that merely because the respondent was motivated into taking action against the petitioner because of allegation of misconduct made against him, it does not mean that the provision of Article 311 were got attracted. There are no circumstances, preceding or attending, as explained above which indicate that the action of the respondent in determining petitioner's employment was not founded on the right flowing from the service rules. Other cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner do not run counter to the view expressed above. I, therefore, do not consider it necessary to cite and comment on those cases. 7. Although in the writ petition, it was stated that the post occupied by the petitioner has not been abolished, it does not necessarily follow that termination of his service has resulted in contravention of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution. There is no averment in the writ petition that there was any other temporary Overseer appointed in the town of Rudrapur whose services had been retained so as to deny to the petitioner equality of opportunity of service. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be interfered with on any of the grounds indicated in Sughar Singh's case. In the result, even though, in terminating petitioner's employment, the respondent might have been motivated by the allegations of misconduct made against the petitioner, yet as the order was founded on the right flowing front the service rules, it was not vitiated for the reason that Article 311 of the Constitution had not been complied with. It has also not been shown that the impugned order is bad as it contravenes Art. 14 or 16 of the Constitution. It has also not been shown that the impugned order is bad as it contravenes Art. 14 or 16 of the Constitution. The petitioner's case that the order deserves to be quashed because of the mala fides of Sri Jain has also not been made. 8. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances, 9. I direct the parties to bear their own costs.