Per R. Mookerjee—These are three separate identical references in each of which the same question of law referred to this Larger Bench for decision is: "Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case one single Revision petition was competent or whether five separate revision petitions ought to have been filed." 2. The point in issue in all these matters is that while the assessing authority passed separate assessment orders for separate years wherefore separate appeals were filed before the appellate authority, he disposed of the separate appeal by a single common appellate order. Thereafter the aggrieved dealers filed a single revision against the aforesaid order from which the question arose whether such a single revision was permissible or whether separate revisions should be filed relating to each assessment order disposed of by the common appellate order. The learned S.B. and D.B. making the above references have referred to a number of decided cases cited by the contesting parties. 3. Shri B.K. Khetan pointed out the difference between the provisions of sections 14(1) and 14(2) Rajasthan Sales Tax Act. In the latter dealing with revisions filed by dealers the record of proceedings in which the impugned order was passed has to be considered. Thus even if one revision had been filed, all the orders passed in the proceeding should we looked into by the revisional Court. He referred to rule 39(1) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Rules which provides that an application for revision under sec 14(2) shall be in Form S. T. 9. He contended that item 5 in the said form referring to the period of assessment may be more or less than a year and that item 6 provides for the certified copy of the order or orders sought to be revised to be attached. He maintained that item 6 is connected with sec. 14(2) whereby more than one order can be examined by the Court in one proceeding to avoid multiplicity of litigation. Referring to sec. 14(2) of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 he maintained that the word order includes its plural whereby a single revision against a number of orders would be permissible. 14(2) whereby more than one order can be examined by the Court in one proceeding to avoid multiplicity of litigation. Referring to sec. 14(2) of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 he maintained that the word order includes its plural whereby a single revision against a number of orders would be permissible. He relied on 1963 XIV STC 918 and 1973 WLN (Part I) 132 He argued that when similar proceedings are consolidated, it is all the more necessary to consider one revision in relation to the same party when a single appellate order has been passed. 4. Shri Khetan next pointed out that a D. B. in 1968 RRD 323 held that a single revision petition lies against one appellate order but a D. B. in revision No 517/ 67 Tikam Chand Goel vs. State decided on 16.5.68 and a S.B in 1971 RRD 21 and 1972 RRD 100 held otherwise which was unjustified. He argued that as the law does not expressly provide for more revisions than one to be filed, the Court should not hold otherwise as it will also impose financial liabilities for which reliance was placed on 1953 IV STC 114. 5. Shri R. M. Batwara supporting Shri B. K. Khetan further relied on AIR 1953 SC 4 19. He pointed out that under rule 36 the appellate authority had to issue a copy of his order for each of the appeals disposed by him though a common order may have been passed disposing of all the appeals. Referring to AIR 1954 Raj 58 he argued that two appeals arising from the same suit and disposed of by one judgment in which two decrees were prepared and the second appeal was filed from one decree only, failure to file a copy of the other decree was not a sufficient ground for barring the hearing of the appeal on the ground of res judicata. He also relied on AIR 1954 Traveancore Cochin 28 which held that when there were separate appeals from one decree and separate decrees were drawn up in these appeals then the final decree will be all the decrees taken together and one second appeal from the separate appellate decrees was maintainable. He also relied on AIR 1954 Traveancore Cochin 28 which held that when there were separate appeals from one decree and separate decrees were drawn up in these appeals then the final decree will be all the decrees taken together and one second appeal from the separate appellate decrees was maintainable. These cases relate to Sec. 11 and O. XLI R.1 C.P.C. Reference was also made to O. II, R. 3 CPC by which the plaintiff may unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant or defendants jointly. Citing 1967 RLW 401 he contended that where two constructions of a fiscal enactment are possible the construction most favourable to the subject should be adopted and enforced rather than the one which imposes a greater burden on him. This case deals with O. VII, R. 11 CPC considered in connection with the Court Fees Act. Citing AIR 1953 Cal. 733 learned counsel argued that any benefit accruing to the State by sec. 14(2) R.S.T. Act should be eschewed as a construction which permits one to take advantage of ones wrong or to impair ones obligation under a current statute should be discarded. This matter related to the interpretation of statutes considered in conned ion with the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act. 6. Shri N.S. Chordia supporting Shri B.K. Khetan and Shri R.M. Batwara asserted that the appellate authority had a right to consolidate proceedings which he had done and had passed a single order disposing of different assessment orders whereby one revision could be filed against a common appellate order. Citing 1955 RLW 355 he referred to the binding nature of proceedings whereby the D. B. ruling in 1968 RRD 323 was binding on other subsequent D.Bs. 7. Citing 1953 ITR 412 Shri R.C. Ghiya appearing as an amicus curiae argued that the separate orders of the assessing authority get merged in a single appellate order against which one revision can be filed. 8. Shri P.K. Jain, amicus curiae contended that when separate appeals are filed and a common order is passed by the appellate Authority disposing of such appeals, then the dealer should get as many copies thereof as the appeals filed by him. 9. The learned Government Advocate argued that a reading of sec. 8. Shri P.K. Jain, amicus curiae contended that when separate appeals are filed and a common order is passed by the appellate Authority disposing of such appeals, then the dealer should get as many copies thereof as the appeals filed by him. 9. The learned Government Advocate argued that a reading of sec. 1462) RST Act shows that separate revision should be preferred against separate orders He pointed out that an order is not defined in the Sales Tax Act but according to Sec. 2(14) CPC it means the formal expression of any decision of a Civil court which is not a decree Referring to Form ST-9 he stated that item 4 therein means the date of the order sought to be revised i.e. it means a particular order and item 5 refers to the period (and not periods) of assessment and according to Sec. 2(b) Rajasthan Sale Tax Act the assessment year means a year commencing on the 1st day of April. Sec. 10 (l) (a) shows that assessment and determination of tax due shall be determined after the returns for the year have become due. Sec. 13 which provides for appeals objecting to an assessment etc. shows that a separate appeal must be made for each assessment year. He further stated that item 7 of Form S. T. 9 shows that the disputed turnover or tax due thereon is related to only one year whereby separate revisions have to be filed for each assessment Relying on 1971 XXVII STC 473 he pointed out that each assessment period is distinct whereby a fresh assessment must be made for each such period. 10. It has been strenuously argued by learned Counsel on behalf of the dealers and it has also been mentioned in the referring judgments, that in 1968 RRD 323 a learned D.B. held that a single revision against a common appellate order was competent while in revision No 517/67 Tikam Chand Goel vs. State it was held by another learned D.B. on 16-5 68 that separate revision petitions were necessary in such cases and that the learned Member Shri B.C. Mukerjee was a party to both the said contradictory decisions. It was further argued before the referring Member or Members as before us that the Supreme Court in AIR 1960 SC 936 held that when a Division Bench disagrees with the view of a previous Division Bench of the High Court the question should be referred to a Larger Bench. It is interesting to note however that there is no real contradiction at all between the decisions of the two aforesaid learned D.Bs. of this Board mentioned above. In 1968 R R.D. 323 it has been unequivocally stated that one revision is clearly envisaged against one order but in that case on revision was considered to be proper against one single appellate order even though it had disposed of two assessment orders because the appellate authority had considered the assessment period of two years as if the two years formed one period and he took the case to be one and dealt with it as such. These two D.B. judgments have been fully examined by a learned S.B. in 1971 RRD 21, the relevant portion whereof is reproduced below: — I have gone through the two DB rulings. In the D.B. which passed the order dated 16.5.68, one of the learned Members was Shri B.C. Mukerjee who had also participated in the earlier Division Bench which passed the order dated 20.11.67 (i.e. the judgment reported in 1968 RRD 323). In the decision dated 16-5-68 the earlier decision dated 20.11.67 was duly considered and distinguished with the following observations: "We have perused the decision taken by another D.B. of this Board on 20th November 1967, in case No. 182 Revision Petition Sales Tax/65/Aj mer-M/s Pannalal Kankaria & Sons vs. State of Rajasthan. A similar preliminary objection was raised in that case which was over ruled. But the facts of that case were different. In that case although the assessment period was 1957-58 and 1958-59, the learned Deputy Commissioner treated both the periods as one, with one consolidated return, which was then split up into two. The assessment period in that case and the turnover for the 2 year was treated by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) as one. There was only one order and no second, though an identical order was passed and placed on record of the second case Thus the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) treated both the cases as one and dealt with them as such. There was only one order and no second, though an identical order was passed and placed on record of the second case Thus the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) treated both the cases as one and dealt with them as such. In the present case the appellate authority has clearly indicated that there are three different appeals but as the grounds of appeals are identical, they will be disponed of by a single order The assessment is also shown separately for each year and a separate though identical impugned order has been placed on each file In view of this, the ruling of the former DB is not applicable to this case." 11. In view of the above it is clear that as there was no conflict or difference of opinion between the two aforesaid DB decisions which were easily reconcilable, there is actually no disputed question of law for being resolved by this Larger Bench. However as various other ancillary points have also been raised before us in this connection it would be useful if this Larger Bench considers them also. 1963 XIV STC 918 was cited to show that the Supreme Court held that where a single petition is presented to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of various assessment orders all together, there is only one proceeding and when an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court from the judgment of the High Court in such a petition, there cannot be more appeals than one and the appellant is liable only to pay one set of court fees and other charges as in a single appeal. This case was also fully considered in 1971 RRD 21 as follows: Although the second ruling dated 10.4.70, cited by learned counsel for the dealer, is by a single learned Member it has to be considered as it refers to a Supreme Court judgment. The Supreme Court judgment is reproduced below in full:— "This is an appeal against the order of the Deputy Registrar directing the present case to be registered as nine appeals and requiring the appellant to pay nine sets of court-fees. The Deputy Registrar had relied on two cases of this Court namely, Lajwanti Sials case and Kishanchand Chellarams case. We do not think that these precedents cover the present case. The Deputy Registrar had relied on two cases of this Court namely, Lajwanti Sials case and Kishanchand Chellarams case. We do not think that these precedents cover the present case. "In Lajwantis case, there were a number of applications under Sec. 66 (2) of the Income Tax Act for reference of the same question. There were in fact a number of separate references but they were dealt with by one judgment from which the appeal to this Court arose. That was really a case of five appeals for the common judgment must be taken to have been delivered in each of the dif-ferent reference cases. "Kishanchand Chellarams case is also not helpful because there four applications by four different assessees had been made for reference of three identical questions arising in each assessment case under Sec. 66 (1) of the Income Tax Act. Though it appears that there was one order of reference to the High Court and the High Court treated the case as a single case of reference, it could be said that there were in fact a number of references. "The present case however originated out of one petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of various assessment orders, obviously here, there was only one proceeding. It could not be said that there were as many proceedings as there were assessment orders, for the petitioner had by a single petition challenged them all together. When an appeal is taken to this Court from the judgment of the High Court in such a petition, it is impossible to contend that there are more appeals than one. Therefore, the appellant before us is liable only to pay one set of court-fees and other charges as in a single appeal. Action may be taken accordingly by the office, if necessary, by refunding the excess charges made." As will be seen, the ratio decidendi in the Supreme Court case was that there was one petition before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and it was from the High Court judgment on this single petition that the matter went up to the Supreme Court. Unlike that case, in the present case there was not one appeal but three appeals before the Appellate Authority against whose decision the revision application has been filed. The circumstances are thus clearly different. Unlike that case, in the present case there was not one appeal but three appeals before the Appellate Authority against whose decision the revision application has been filed. The circumstances are thus clearly different. The present circumstances would appear to be more like those in Lajwanti Sials case referred to in para 2 of the Supreme Court judgment. 12. In the instant three cases also there were not one but many appeals before the appellate authority against whose decisions a single revision application had been filed in each case. 13. AIR 1953 SC 4 19 & AIR 1954 Raj. 58 cited before us were also cited before the learned D.B. in 1968 RRD 323. In those cases it was held that it in one original suit two appeals were preferred to the lower appellate Court which dismissed the plaintiffs suit the plaintiff need not file two second appeals as one second appeal would be sufficient. It was held by the said learned D.B. that in the cited cases the original suit was one while in the matter before it the original assessment orders were different and related to different years and so the causes of action were different. We agree with this decision and would also point out that the cited cases related to civil matters under the Civil Procedure Code which would not normally apply to Sales Tax cases AIR 1954 Travancore Cochin 28 is similar to the cases discussed above. 1973 WLN (Part 1) 132 was cited to show that the whole object behind consolidation of suits made under the inherent powers of the Court under Sec. 151 CPC is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to prevent delay etc. It is however important to note that the said decision further provides that by consolidation it cannot be inferred that the Court after consolidation ceases to have jurisdiction to dispose of the consolidated suits separately. It was also observed that though it is true that ordinarily a Court after consolidation should dispose of consolidated suits by one judgment & decrees it does not mean that if separate judgments and decrees are passed they are illegal and void or ineffective. Apart from the fact that this again is a ruling in relation to civil suits under the CPC, it must be recognised that the Dy. Apart from the fact that this again is a ruling in relation to civil suits under the CPC, it must be recognised that the Dy. Commissioner (Appeals) did not consolidate any appeals but had employed a convenient mode of disposing together by a common order a number of separate appeals having some common features relating to same parties. These separate appeals were preferred against separate assessment orders. It may be noted that under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act separate assessment orders must be passed for separate years and only in certain cases a biennial assessment could be made by a single order as provided in the proviso to Sec. 10(a). There is no provisions for consolidation of proceedings under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act as there is under the CPC. Therefore the analogy of joinder of causes of action in the same civil suit by a plaintiff against a defendant or joint defendants as provided under Order II, Rule 3(1) C. P. C. as argued by Shri R. M. Batwara cannot obviously apply to assessments, appeals or revisions under the RST Act. 1967 RLW 401 is hardly relevant herein as it holds that in a case of conflict between the procedural provision like that contained in O. VII, R 11 CPC dealing with the rejection of a plaint and a provision in a fiscal enactment like the Court Fees Act, it is the provision in the latter Act which must prevail over that of the former. Further, if two constructions of a fiscal enactment are possible the construction more favourable to the subject should be adopted and enforced, rather than the one which imposes a greater burden on him. It is obvious, in view of what has been hereinbefore stated and discussed in paragraph 11, that in the instant matters two constructions are rot possible. Similarly with reference to AIR 1953 Cal. 733 it would) be quite incorrect to contend that in the instant cases the Dy. It is obvious, in view of what has been hereinbefore stated and discussed in paragraph 11, that in the instant matters two constructions are rot possible. Similarly with reference to AIR 1953 Cal. 733 it would) be quite incorrect to contend that in the instant cases the Dy. Commissioner (Appeals) by passing a common order by which he disposed of separate appeals had taken any advantage of his so-called own wrong because as pointed out above he had merely employed a convenient and time worn manner of disposing separate appeals by a common order and he has committed no wrong whatsoever thereby 1953 ITR XXIII 412 relied upon by Shri R.G. Ghiya held that when an appeal is provided from a decision of a Tribunal and the appeal Court after hearing the appeal passes an order the order of the original court ceases to exist and is merged in the order of the appeal court, and although the latter may merely confirm the order of the trial Court, the order that stands and is operative is not the order of the trial Court but the order of the appeal Court. This judgment was passed in a reference under the Income Tax Act-It will be evident however that the above rule does not help the dealers because the orders of the appellate authority herein though common disposed of separate assessment orders which means in fact that there were as many appellate orders as there were separate assessments. As was held by the S.C. in Lajwanti Sials case the common judgment must be taken to have been delivered in each of the different cases. From an examination of the common appellate orders of the Dy Commissioner (Appeals) in the instant cases it will be observed that in each such common order the various assessment orders have been separately mentioned or considered and decided. 14. Relying on 1953 IV STC 114 Shri B.K. Khetan argued that this Court may not hold that more than one revision should be filed when the law does not ex-pressly provide for it because such a decision will impose financial liabilities on the parties. The case cited by him however does not support his plea. 14. Relying on 1953 IV STC 114 Shri B.K. Khetan argued that this Court may not hold that more than one revision should be filed when the law does not ex-pressly provide for it because such a decision will impose financial liabilities on the parties. The case cited by him however does not support his plea. In 1953 IV STC 114 the position was that under the proviso to Sec. 22(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, as it stood prior to its amendment by the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act 1949, an aggrieved assessee was entitled to appeal provided he paid such amount of tax as he might admit to be due from him Under the proviso to Section 22(1) as amended, the appeal had to be accompanied by satisfactory proof of payment of the tax in respect of which appeal had been preferred. The assessment proceedings of the assessee company was initiated prior to the amendment of the section but the order of assessment was made after the amendment. The assessee contended that as the amendment had not been made retrospective its right of appeal under the original Section 22(1) remained unaffected and that as it did not admit anything to be due, it was not liable to deposit any sum along with its appeal to the Sales Tax Commissioner. The Commissioner rejected the appeal on the ground that it had not been accompanied by any proof of payment of the tax assessed as required under the amended proviso The Board of Revenue and the High Court declined to direct the Commissioner to admit the appeal. In these circumstances the Supreme Court held in that case that the imposition of the restriction by the amendment of the section could not affect the assesss right of appeal from a decision in proceedings which commenced prior to such amendment and which right of appeal was free from such restriction under the section as it stood at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. Consequently the assessees appeal should not have been rejected on the ground that it was not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the assessed tax. As the assessee did not admit that any amount was due by it, it was entitled to file its appeal without any sum of money. Consequently the assessees appeal should not have been rejected on the ground that it was not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the assessed tax. As the assessee did not admit that any amount was due by it, it was entitled to file its appeal without any sum of money. It will be evident at once that the ratio decidendi in the cited case has nothing to do with the issue before us which is simply whether one or more revisions should be filed in the circumstances set out above. Rule 64(1)(b) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Rule indicates the value of the Court fee stamps which have to be affixed to an application for revision under sec. 14(2). That is to say, depending on the number of such applications which have to be filed the total value of the Court fee stamps to be purchased would vary accordingly. Therefore if it is legally necessary to file more than one revision, there is no question of imposing any additional liabilities as liability in such cases is already fixed by law. The Supreme Court has dealt with an entirely different aspect of the law as indicated above. 15. It has been mentioned in the referring judgments that the impact of Rule 39 and Form ST. 9 had not been examined in the case law cited therein. Shri B.K. Khetan has also referred to this aspect and its inter-connection with sec. 14(2) in his arguments. But in 1968 RRD 323 after considering sec. 14(2), Rule 39 and Form ST-9 as it then stood, (the new form ST-9 came into force from 9-1-70) the learned D.B. has found that one revision is clearly envisaged against one order. In Tikam Chand Goels case decided on 16-5-68 the learned D. B. has categorically held that sec 14(2) & Rule 39 clearly indicate that a separate revision for each case is envisaged in the Rules. The present form ST 9 being a later phenomenon could not be considered in the above judgments which will be done now. In Tikam Chand Goels case decided on 16-5-68 the learned D. B. has categorically held that sec 14(2) & Rule 39 clearly indicate that a separate revision for each case is envisaged in the Rules. The present form ST 9 being a later phenomenon could not be considered in the above judgments which will be done now. Section 14(2) RST Act provides as follows: — "The Board of Revenue may on application for revision of an order not being an order passed under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 11] by a dealer under this Act made within six months of the date of the order, call for the record of the proceedings in which the order complained against was passed and after examining the record, subject to the provisions of this Act, pass such orders not prejudicial to the assessee, as it thinks fit". Rule 39(1) provides that an application lor revision for revision under sec. 14(2) shall be in Form ST-9 and item 6 of the latter provides for a certified copy of the order(s) sought to be revised to be attached. When a dealer applies under sec. 14(2) for the revision of an order within the prescribed time, the Board may call for and examine the record of the proceedings in which the order complained against was passed and pass such orders not prejudicial to the assessee as it thinks fit. Thus the revision is made against one order. In the present context the order was an appellate one passed under sec. 13. As discussed above the appellate order may be a common order but as it had in fact separately disposed of more than one assessment order, in revision the record in revision the record of the proceedings in which the order complained against was passed would not be the records of all the assessment proceedings taken together, dealt with by the common appellate order but would only be the record of each separate and different assessment proceedings to which the common appellate order is particularly related. Thus a revision would be related to a particular and individual assessment order disposed of by the common appellate order which therefore means that there must be as many revisions as there were assessment orders which may have been disposed of by the said common appellate order. Thus a revision would be related to a particular and individual assessment order disposed of by the common appellate order which therefore means that there must be as many revisions as there were assessment orders which may have been disposed of by the said common appellate order. Rule 39 merely states that the revision application will be in a particular form. We now come to item 6 of ST-9. It was sought to be argued that the word used therein viz. order(s) should mean that any number of separate assessment orders relating to the same party disposed by a common appellate order could be sought to be revised together by one revision application. But in view of the clear provisions of sec 14(2) RST Act it cannot be accepted that the mere addition of the letter (s) to the word order provided in a particular form viz. ST-9 would completely change the meaning of the substantive section or govern it. Nor can it be accepted, as has been argued by Shri B.K. Khetan, that Sec. 14(2) of the Rajasthan General Glauses Act 1955 by which, unless a different intention appears, words in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa, will qualify the word order used in sec. 14(2) Rajasthan Sales Tax Act because a plain reading of the latter sub-section would indicate the different intention envisaged in the exception provided in the former. 16. Another point mentioned in the referring judgments, as also argued by Shri R.M. Batwara and Shri P.K. Jain, was that it has not been examined so as to what would be the effect if only one order is communicated u/R. 36 by the appellate authority even though he had disposed of a number appeals having a common question of law and facts by a single common order. Rule 36 provides that a copy of every order of the appellate authority disposing of an appeal shall be sent to the appellant and to the assessing authority concerned either by personal delivery or by post. Rule 36 provides that a copy of every order of the appellate authority disposing of an appeal shall be sent to the appellant and to the assessing authority concerned either by personal delivery or by post. It logically follows from what has been discussed above that when the appellate authority disposes of a number of separate appeals by one common order then in view of rule 36 the number of copies of his order to be sent by him to each of the two contending parties should be equal to the number of separate appeals deposed of by him as aforesaid. If this had not been done apparently because there was no definitive legal pronouncement on this point so far requiring such action to be taken under rule 36, it would not certainly justify the filing of one revision against a common appellate order disposing of separate appeals relating to separate assessments. Because it should be borne in mind that Rule 36 merely provides for the communication of appellate orders and does not lay down how revisions are to be filed by dealers. The relevant provision for this is contained in sec. 14(2) Rajasthan Sales Tax Act. Rule 36 does not say that the number of revisions to be filed would depend on the number of appellate orders communicated by the appellate authority. 17. The three separate references referred to us are identical, the issue being whether one single revision petition was competent or whether more than one revision ought to have been filed. The actual number of such petitions would not be actually five in each of the three cases as contemplated in the references. Thus as a result of the above discussions our answer to the question referred to us is as follows: That in the fact & circumstances of the cases referred to us one single revision petition was not competent and in each of the above cases the number of revision petitions which ought to have been filed would be the same as the number of appeals filed against the separate assessment orders disposed of by the learned appellate authority by his common appellate order. As a procedural corollary to the above, we also hold that when an appellate authority disposes of a number of appeals by a common order, the number of copies of his said order to be sent by him to the dealer and the assessing authority concerned in accordance with rule 36 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Rules 1955 should be equal of the number of appeals disposed of by him by his said common order. 18. A copy of this judgment shall be placed in each of the above mentioned case files.