Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is a kudikidappukaran in a land having an area of 21 cents belonging to respondents 2 to 4 as tenants in common. These respondents filed an application before the first respondent, the Land Tribunal, Pattanakad under S.77 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for shifting the kudikidappu of the petitioner to an alternate site, which belonged to the second respondent. The application stated that the applicants required the land for building a residential house for the second respondent and also for constructing shop rooms for the purpose of their business. The application was opposed by the petitioner on the ground that the requirement mentioned in the application was not bona fide, and that the alternate site offered for the shifting was not suitable. A Commission was issued to visit the alternate site and report about its suitability. He submitted a report stating that it was suitable. The Commissioner was examined and the report was proved. The second respondent examined himself in support of his case. The petitioner got himself examined; and he also examined another witness on his side. The first respondent after considering the evidence and the contentions advanced by the parties before him passed an order Ext. P4 dated 11-4-1974 allowing the application This Original Petition has been filed to quash the above order. 2. Three grounds have been urged before me by the petitioner's counsel (i) The Land Tribunal's finding that the requirement of the landholders was bona fide was vitiated under law, since he did not consider the existence of other suitable lands in arriving at that finding. (ii) The Tribunal's finding that the alternate site offered by the landholders for shifting the kudikidappu was bad under law, since he failed to consider the petitioner's evidence on that point. (iii) The application itself was not maintainable, since the land offered by the landholders as alternate site for the shifting did not belong to all of them jointly, but only to one of them. I shall consider these grounds seriatim. 3. There is no case that the requirement of the landholders that one of them wanted a land to build a house for his separate residence is not bona fide. The deposition of the second respondent before the Land Tribunal is Ext. I shall consider these grounds seriatim. 3. There is no case that the requirement of the landholders that one of them wanted a land to build a house for his separate residence is not bona fide. The deposition of the second respondent before the Land Tribunal is Ext. P-5, in which he has stated that himself and his wife and children are staying with his parents along with his two brothers and their wives and children, that there was no sufficient convenience for all of them to live together in the same house, and that he required a separate building for his residence with family. There is also no case that the land in which the petitioner is having his kudikidappu is not suitable for constructing a building for the said purpose. The only contention is that the landholders have other lands which are more suitable for the said purpose, and that the requirement for having the land in which the petitioner's kudikidappu is situate was not, therefore bona fide. It was also contended that the land holder must establish that he required the very particular land in which the kudikidappu is situate in order to entitle him to get the kudikidappukaran shifted therefrom. In other words, if he has other suitable lands, be is not entitled to disturb the -kudikidappukaran. 4. Reliance was placed in support of the above contention on certain observations contained in the judgment of my learned brother Poti, J. in Varkey Thomas v. The Land Tribunal, Pampakuda (1974 K. L. T. 759). I am concerned with the true interpretation of S.75(2) of the Act; and I shall, therefore, read that section before I refer to the relevant observations contained in the above judgment. 75. Kudikidappukaran to have fixity. I am concerned with the true interpretation of S.75(2) of the Act; and I shall, therefore, read that section before I refer to the relevant observations contained in the above judgment. 75. Kudikidappukaran to have fixity. (1) xxxxx (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the person in possession of the land on which there is a homestead or but (hereinafter in this sub-section referred to as the landholder) in the occupation of a kudikidappukaran may, if he bona fide requires the land (a) for building purposes for himself or any member of his family including major sons and daughters; or (b) for purposes in connection with a town planning scheme approved by the competent authority; or (c) for any industrial purpose, require the kudikidappukaran, to shift to a new site belonging to him, subject the following conditions, namely: (i) the landholder shall pay to the kudikidappukaran the price of the homestead, if any erected by the kudikidappukaran; (ii) the new site shall be fit for erecting a homestead and shall be within a distance of one mile from the existing kudikidappu; (iii) the extent of the new site shall be the extent of the existing kudikidappu-subject to a minimum of three cents if within the limits of a city or a major municipality, five cents if within the limits of any other municipality and ten cents if in any Panchayat area or township. (iv) The landholder shall transfer ownership and possession of the new site to the kudikidappukaran and shall pay to him the reasonable cost of shifting the kudikidappu to the new site. Where the above conditions are complied with, the kudikidappukaran shall be bound to shift to the new site." S. 75(1) gives a limited protection to kudikidappukaran from eviction. It states that a kudikidappukaran shall not be liable for eviction except on the grounds mentioned thereunder. Even that limited protection is subject to the right of the landholder to shift the kudikidappukaran under S.75 (2). S.80A confers on a kudikidappukaran the right to purchase the kudikidappu occupied by him. That right is notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, including apparently the provisions contained in the Act itself. But it has to be noticed that the very foundation of that right is the existence of the kudikidappu. S.80A confers on a kudikidappukaran the right to purchase the kudikidappu occupied by him. That right is notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, including apparently the provisions contained in the Act itself. But it has to be noticed that the very foundation of that right is the existence of the kudikidappu. If the kudikidappukaran is liable to be evicted on any of the grounds mentioned in S.75 (1), or if the kudikidappu is liable to be shifted for any of the purposes mentioned in S.75 (2), the question of purchasing the kudikidappu does not arise. What is indicated above is the character of the rights conferred on a kudikidappukaran under the Act. They are very valuable rights, but not absolute in character. On the other hand, they are liable to be affected under the contingencies mentioned in the other provisions of the Act. The right of fixity for occupation, and the right to purchase the kudikidappu would not even exist under certain circumstances mentioned in sub-sections (1) and (2) of S.75. 5. Now I shall come to S.75 (2) itself. There can be no dispute that a landholder would not be entitled to relief under the above provision, unless he satisfies the Tribunal that his requirement of the land in which the kudikidappu is situate, is bona fide. Whether it is so or not is a question of fact, which the Tribunal has to decide. It is equally indisputable that the facts that the land in which the kudikidappu is situate is not suitable for any one or more of the three purposes mentioned in the section and for which the shifting is required, and that the landholder has more suitable lands for the said purposes, are relevant for determining whether the requirement is bona fide or not. But it has to be borne in mind that it is the requirement of the landholder, and his bona fides of that requirement which alone are relevant. But it has to be borne in mind that it is the requirement of the landholder, and his bona fides of that requirement which alone are relevant. Suppose a landholder has three pieces of lands including the one wherein the kudikidappu sought to be shifted is situate, and all these three lands are suitable to construct a residential house for which purpose he seeks to shift the kudikidappukaran, it is not either for the Tribunal or the kudikidappukaran to tell the landholder not to disturb the kudikidappukaran and that he may better construct the house in any one of the other two lands. The kudikidappukaran has no right to dictate to the landholder that he should choose for such a purpose a land other than the one in which the kudikidappu is situate. Similarly the Land Tribunal is also not entitled to decline an order for shifting on the ground that the landholder can build the house in any one of the other lands. The landholder may choose the particular land in which the kudikidappu is situate for numerous reasons of his own. He cannot say that he would not disclose them. It is for the Tribunal to decide whether the requirement is bona fide or not. Therefore, the Tribunal is entitled to know why he wants that particular land; and then the Tribunal is to decide whether the reasons stated by the landholder is genuine, or they are only some pretext to shift the kudikidappukaran. If the reasons are genuine, or in other words, if the requirement is bona fide, the Tribunal is bound to pass an order for shifting, subject to the other conditions in the section being satisfied. The Tribunal may honestly think that the other lands, which the landholder has, are more suitable for building a bouse for his residence, or that the construction of a house in any of those lands may provide far more facilities for the landholder in many respects. But the Tribunal's views on these matters are irrelevant. It is the requirement of the landholder that has to be considered; and the point for decision is only whether his requirement is bona fide or not. The Tribunal should not bring into consideration his own ideas in deciding that question. But the Tribunal's views on these matters are irrelevant. It is the requirement of the landholder that has to be considered; and the point for decision is only whether his requirement is bona fide or not. The Tribunal should not bring into consideration his own ideas in deciding that question. The landholder is entitled to have the particular land in which a kudikidappu is situate for any of the purposes, mentioned in S.75 (2) and get the kudikidappukaran shifted from that land for that purpose, provided his requirement is bona fide. According to me, this is the true scope of the above provision. 6. The contention before Poti, J. in the decision relied on by the petitioner's counsel was that the choice of the land for any of the purposes mentioned in S.75 (2) must be left to the sweet will and pleasure of the landholder, and that the Tribunal has no voice in the matter. The learned judge has rightly rejected that contention in an emphatic language. There are some observations in that judgment which may to some extent support the petitioner's contention that a landholder must establish the need to have the very land in which the kudikidappu is situate for getting the kudikidappukaran shifted therefrom; and that a landholder would not be entitled to get a kudikidappukaran shifted, if he has got any other suitable land for the purpose for which the shifting is sought. In support of those observations, the learned judge has referred to the use of the words "the land" in S.75 (2) of the Act; and it is said that these words indicate that the landholder must establish that he requires that particular land for any one or more of the purposes mentioned in the said provision. With great respect I am unable to follow that reasoning to its full extent. The land mentioned in S.75 (2) is the particular land in which a kudikidappu is situate and wherefrom the kudikidappukaran is sought to be shifted. The question of shifting arises only when the landholder requires the very particular land for any one or more of the purposes mentioned in the said section. The word "requires" has a totally different content from the word "needs". Eradi J. has dealt with this aspect in Janaki v. Land Tribunal 1973 KLT. 923. The question of shifting arises only when the landholder requires the very particular land for any one or more of the purposes mentioned in the said section. The word "requires" has a totally different content from the word "needs". Eradi J. has dealt with this aspect in Janaki v. Land Tribunal 1973 KLT. 923. The learned judge stated "If the applicant proves before the Tribunal that he has a genuine and honest intention to utilise the land for one or other of the purposes mentioned in Clauses (a) to (c), and there is nothing to show that" the said plea put forward by the applicant is not bona fide and true, the Tribunal will not be justified in denying to him the relief of shifting so long as the applicant complies with the other provisions regarding the offering of a suitable alternate site belonging to himself and also the payment of the value of the homestead and the shifting charges to the kudikidappukaran." I respectfully agree with the above statement, which in my opinion indicates the correct legal position. There is no warranty in the language of of S.75 (2) to hold that a land holder cannot require the land in which a kudikidappu is situate for the purposes mentioned in the said section, if he has got other suitable lands which would serve the said purpose. The only qualification is that the said requirement must be bona fide. Whether it is so or not is a question of fact, which the Tribunal has to decide on a proper consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. 7. There is one sentence in the above decision of Eradi, J. which reads: "If the requirement does in fact exist, the owner of the land has the freedom to decide whether he would put up the building in the site where the kudikidappu stands or whether he would rather not disturb the kudikidappukaran." The above statement was sought to be made use of in support of an argument that if the requirement of the landholder was genuine, he had the right to say that he wanted the particular land in which the kudikidappu is situate. In other words in such a case there was no question of an enquiry whether his requirement to have that particular land was bona fide or not. In other words in such a case there was no question of an enquiry whether his requirement to have that particular land was bona fide or not. Reading the above sentence in the context in which it appears, it would not lend support to such an argument. The learned judge himself has clarified the position in his judgment in 1974 K. L. T. 741; and that is in agreement with my understanding of the true scope of S.75(2) of the Act. I cannot, therefore, accept the petitioner's contention that the landholders would be entitled to an order for shifting the petitioner's kudikidappu, if they have got other suitable lands for the purposes for which the shifting is sought for by them. I repeat, lest I may be misunderstood, that what is relevant is whether the purpose alleged for the requirement is real or genuine, and if so, whether the requirement to have the particular land occupied by the kudikidappukaran is bona fide. In deciding whether it is so or not, the suitability of that land for the said purpose as well as the existence of other equally or more suitable lands for that purpose are relevant facts. These are matters to be considered by the Tribunal. The existence of other equally or more suitable lands need not necessarily establish that the requirement to have the particular land occupied by the kudikidappukaran is not bona fide. The desire of the landholder to have a particular land and his ideas and conceptions about its suitability must receive a predominant consideration. 8. The petitioner's contention on the first ground cannot also be sustained on the facts of the case. His case regarding other suitable lands was that respondents 2 to 4 have a land just to the west of the kudikidappu and their father have more -than 10 acres of land, and that a building for the residence of the second respondent can be constructed in any one of those lands more conveniently than the land occupied by the kudikidappu. The second respondent, in his deposition, Ext. P-5, before the Tribunal stated that he had no other suitable land for constructing a house. No material was produced before the Tribunal to show that respondents 2 to 4 have any other suitable lands for the said purpose. The second respondent, in his deposition, Ext. P-5, before the Tribunal stated that he had no other suitable land for constructing a house. No material was produced before the Tribunal to show that respondents 2 to 4 have any other suitable lands for the said purpose. Some averment in that respect has been made in this Original Petition; but it has been denied by respondents 2 to 4. There was, therefore, no material before the Tribunal to show that respondents 2 to 4 have other suitable lands in which the second respondent can conveniently construct a residential building. 9. I shall now consider the second ground. There is no substance in the petitioner's contention that the Tribunal's finding that the alternate site offered for the shifting is suitable, cannot be sustained. An advocate was appointed as Commissioner to inspect the land; and he submitted a report that the land was suitable. He was also examined to prove that fact. Besides, the second respondent has also deposed on oath that the land was suitable. The Tribunal has chosen to accept the above evidence in preference to the petitioner's evidence to the contrary. That finding is not open to attack, since it is fully supported by evidence. 10. The third ground urged by the petitioner's counsel raises an interesting point. In Umbath and another v. The Land Tribunal, Anthikad & Others (O.P. No. 5531 of 1972) Eradi, J. in his judgment dated 3111974, held that an application under S.77 of the Act was not maintainable, unless the alternate site offered for the shifting of the kudikidappu belonged to the landholder himself. That was a case, where the land offered for the shifting belonged to the landholder's brother and two brothers made a joint application stating that the landholder bona fide required the land occupied by the kudikidappukaran for constructing a residential building for the landholder. The learned judge held that, unless the alternate site offered belonged to the landholder himself, it would not satisfy the requirement of S.75 (2) of the Act. A somewhat allied question arose before Nambiyar, J. in Damodaran v. Raghavan & Others 1973 KLT. 655. In that case, the question was whether a joint ownership of the alternate site offered for the shifting would be sufficient. A somewhat allied question arose before Nambiyar, J. in Damodaran v. Raghavan & Others 1973 KLT. 655. In that case, the question was whether a joint ownership of the alternate site offered for the shifting would be sufficient. The learned judge left that question open; but he stated that there was little doubt that the new site must belong to the landholder himself. 11. With great respect, I doubt very much the correctness of the view taken by the learned judges on the above question. In construing a statutory provision, it is paramount to take into consideration the legislative object of that provision. When I look at S.75 (2) of the Act on that basis, it appears to me that one of the conditions for shifting a kudikidappukaran is that the landholder shall transfer ownership and possession of the new site to the kudikidappukaran. For that matter, it is of no consequence whether the land offered to be transferred belongs to the landholder himself or to any other person. If the person to whom the alternate site belongs offers to transfer it on behalf of the landholder to the kudikidappukaran, I think that it would satisfy the requirement of the section. When a person is required to do a thing or satisfy a condition, he can do it or satisfy the condition by himself or through his agent, unless it is expressly required to be done otherwise. Where the landholder along with another person makes a joint application for the shifting of a kudikidappukaran, offering to transfer to the kudikidappukaran the requisite extent of suitable land belonging to that other person, it is, in effect and for all practical purposes, a case of the landholder satisfying the requirement of the section through his agent. If it is imperative that the landholder himself must transfer the ownership and possession of the new site to the kudikidappukaran, all that is necessary is that the owner of the alternate site must first execute a sale deed in favour of the landholder, who should then execute the sale deed in favour of the kudikidappukaran. Such a construction of the section would be too technical. Considering the legislative object of the provision, I am unable to find any sense in construing the section in that fashion. 12. Such a construction of the section would be too technical. Considering the legislative object of the provision, I am unable to find any sense in construing the section in that fashion. 12. However, the view taken by my learned brothers on the above question does not help the petitioner before me. Here, the land wherefrom the kudikidappukaran is sought to be shifted belongs to respondents 2 to 4 as tenants in common. It has not been rightly argued before me that such a kudikidappukaran cannot be shifted, if the land occupied by him is bona fide required by any one of them for one or more of the purposes mentioned in S.75 (2). So long as the land has not been divided among them, each one of them is a landholder along with the rest of them. And the alternate site offered for the shifting belongs to the landholder, for whose purpose the shifting is required. Therefore, this would satisfy the requirements of the section literally also. 13. In the result, this Original Petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Dismissed.