H.L. AGRAWAL, J. This is an application in revision by the defendants against an order of the trial court deciding the question of jurisdiction of the court below to entertain the suit as a preliminary issue on their objection. 2. In order to appreciate the question raised, I shall state the relevant facts. Petitioner no.1 is a factory as defined in section 2 (12) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). One Jagmohan, an employee in the said factory, was an insured person under the Act. Unfortunately on the 7th April, 1967, the said Jagmohan met with a fatal accident in the Vanaspati section of the factory, in consequence whereof he died; and, as such, according to the first schedule of the Act, his dependants have been held to be entitled to get a benefit of Rs, 12,600/- according to the provisions of the Act, and the regulations framed thereunder. A chart showing the details of the claim has been annexed to the plaint as schedule 1. 3. According to the case of the plaintiff opposite party, after investigation it has been established that the said accident causing the death of Jagmohan was due to the breach of the requirements of section 36 (2) of the Factories Act, 1948 on account of an explosion that took place in the factory premises for the contravention of the said requirements under the Factories Act, and, accordingly, the death was as a result of employment- injury sustained as an employee under the Act, in question, and, therefore, the present suit has been instituted for recovery of the amount payable to the dependants of the said Jagmohan from the defendants as, according to the plaintiff's case, the defendants are liable to pay the same in accordance with the provisions of the first schedule of the Act, as specified in sub-clause 3 (1) and (11) of clause 5-A of section 2 of the said Act. 4. Earlier to the filing of the present suit, the plaintiff had filed a claim before the Presiding Officer, Employees Insurance Court, at Arrah. It was registered as E.S.I. Case No. 1 of 1968. 4. Earlier to the filing of the present suit, the plaintiff had filed a claim before the Presiding Officer, Employees Insurance Court, at Arrah. It was registered as E.S.I. Case No. 1 of 1968. It is said that when the insurance case was filed before: Insurance Court on the 16th April, 1968, the plaintiff was not aware that the provisions of the Employees State Insurance (Amendment) Act, 1966 (Act No.44 of 1966) had already come into operation on the 28th January, 1968. At this stage, it is necessary to refer to some of the relevant provisions of the Act, before the amendment which are very much relevant in order to appreciate and decide the question falling for my consideration which have been deleted by the aforesaid amending Act. By the said amending Act, a comprehensive amendment has been made in the parent Act, omitting, inter alia, original sections 66 and 67 and also clause (c) of sub- section (2) of section 75 of the original Act. Section 66 empowered the plaintiff to recover certain damages from the defendants, that is, where any injury was sustained by an insured person as an employee under the Act, by reason of the negligence of the employer to observe any of the safety rules laid down by or under any agreement applicable to a factory or establishment the Corporation was entitled notwithstanding the fact that employer has paid the weekly contributions due under this Act, in respect of such insured person to be reimbursed by the employer or the principal who is liable to pay the compensation under section 12 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is not disputed that in view of the finding in course of the investigation, the Corporation was entitled to maintain a claim to recover the damages from the defendants. 5. Section 75 prescribes the matters which are to be decided by the Employees Insurance Court, and, inter alia, in clause (c) of subsection (2) it provided that claim under section 66 or 67 made by the Corporation against the employer or other person liable there under shall be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court". By sub-section (3) of section 75, a specific bar has been imposed on the Civil Court to decide or deal with any question or dispute referred to in the various clauses of the different sub-sections of section 75 of the Act. 6. By sub-section (3) of section 75, a specific bar has been imposed on the Civil Court to decide or deal with any question or dispute referred to in the various clauses of the different sub-sections of section 75 of the Act. 6. From the provisions referred to above, it is manifest that the nature of the claim of the plaintiff was expressly prescribed under section 66 of the Act, which was then exclusively triable by an Employees' Insurance Court and was likewise specifically excluded to be dealt with or decided by a Civil Court in its original civil jurisdiction. In this regard, it will be also necessary to refer to clauses (g) and (f) of sub-sections (1) and (2) respectively of section 75 which reads as follows : "75. (1) If any question or dispute arises as to (g) any other matter which is in dispute between a principal employer and the Corporation, or between a principal employer and an immediate employer, or between a person and the Corporation or' between an employee and a principal or immediate employees, in respect of any contribution or benefit or other dues payable or recoverable under this Act, such question or dispute subject to the provisions of sub-section (2-A) or any other matter required to be or which may be decided by the Employees Insurance Court under this Act, shall be decided by the Employees Insurance Court in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section 1-A following claims shall be decided by the Employees, Insurance Court, namely: x x x (f) any claim for the recovery of any benefit admissible under this Act," By the said amending Act, of 1966, when the provision of section 66 and also some of the clauses connected with section 75 (1) and (2) namely, clause (c), referred to above, were, admitted and the plaintiff came to learn of this amendment, it filed an application before the Insurance Court that it had been advised to withdraw the case with a view to file the same in appropriate court in view of the aforesaid amendment made in the original Act, and that this was not known to it earlier. On the filling of the said petition, the Insurance Court by its order dated the 1st August, 1969, after hearing both the parties, came to the conclusion that there were sufficient grounds for allowing the present plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of the claim in an appropriate court and, accordingly, granted permission to withdraw the application with liberty to institute application in respect of the subject-matter of the suit. 7. On withdrawal of the said claim case from the Insurance Court, the plaintiff has instituted the present suit in the court below on the 2nd February, 1970 in its original civil jurisdiction. The defendants, this time again, raised an objection that the suit was not maintainable in the Civil Court in view of the aforesaid provisions of section 75 of the Act. The learned subordinate Judge, however, decided the question against the defendants, and therefore, they have come to this Court. 8. According to the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge, on account of the amendment of the Act, by the amending Act, of 1966, the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff are not within the purview of the said Act, and so the plaintiff cannot go to the Insurance Court and the bar imposed on the Civil Court under section 75 (3) of the Act, would not apply to the present suit. On this view of the law on the question, he did not accede to the objection raised by the defendants and decided the issue in favour of the plaintiff. 9. In support of this application, Mr. J.C. Sinha, learned Counsel appearing for the defendants-petitioners, relying upon the aforesaid two clauses (g) and (f), already quoted, contended that the expressions "any other matter which is in dispute between a principal employer and the Corporation" occurring in clause (g) and "any claim for the recovery of any benefit admissible under "this Act" in the latter clause (f), would still apply to the nature of the present claim of the plaintiff and the bar of sub-section (3) would have its full force. It is difficult to accept this contention of the learned Counsel. Earlier to the amending Act, of 1966, the nature of the plaintiff's claim was statutory and was made exclusively triable by the Insurance Court. It is difficult to accept this contention of the learned Counsel. Earlier to the amending Act, of 1966, the nature of the plaintiff's claim was statutory and was made exclusively triable by the Insurance Court. The right to recover damages from the employer in case of an accident of an employee taking place on account of its negligence by deleting the specific section from the Act, was made to stand on its own independent footing, and the statutory recognition of this right withdrawn. The expression, therefore, "any other matter that is in dispute," is intended to cover residuary matters which may be in dispute and cannot certainly refer to any specific claim, namely, the right of the Corporation to recover damages from an employer in the circumstances enumerated under the old section 66 before its deletion. Learned Counsel had to concede that had section 66 been still there on the statute book, the expression "any other matter" certainly would have excluded the nature of I the present claim of the plaintiff. In my opinion, therefore, by a mere deletion of the provision of section 66 from the parent Act, the scope of the expression "any other matter" cannot be enlarged and relied as an omnibus to embrace in its fold the claim of the Corporation on account of re-imbursement from the employer. Once this is clear, the deletion of clause (c) from sub-section (2) of section 75 must be held to have been very advisedly made, and, thereby it was intended by the Legislature that if the Corporation, namely, the plaintiff institutes a proceeding of the nature of that was available to it under the old section 66, the same will not be excluded from the original jurisdiction of the Civil Court, and the Civil Court will be competent to entertain such a suit under its general civil jurisdiction conferred on it under section 9 the Code of Civil Procedure. It is well settled that unless a suit is expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, it is definitely maintainable under the Civil Court on account of its wide and general power under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. In support of this proposition, I may refer to a case of the Supreme Court in Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and others. 10. In support of this proposition, I may refer to a case of the Supreme Court in Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and others. 10. For all the foregoing reasons, in any opinion, there is no merit in this application and the decision of the trial court on the question raised before it was perfectly correct. I would, therefore, dismiss the application, but would make no order as to costs. Application dismissed.