S. K. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, while employed as Sadar Sub-divisional Officer, Hooghly was served with a charge sheet dated November 9, 1966 by the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Respondent No. 1, with a statement of allegations stating that it appeared he had been guilty of showing undue favour to one Sk. Abdur Rahim of Bhaira in abuse of office power in that (I) (a) during 1964 he manipulated matters so that most of the paddy secured by persuation were made over for milling to Joypur Rice Mill, of which Sk. Abdur Rahim was one the proprietors, in deprivation of about thirty miles in the locality: (b) he issued instructions to Block Development Officer to make over the paddy to the said mill (c) No steps were take to ensure that the paddy rice did not find way to black market. (II) While a criminal case against Joypur Rice Mill was pending in his Court he went to a sight seeing trip to Kashmir with Sk. Abdur Rahim. (III) Special favour was shown to Sk. Abdur Rahim. (III) Special favour was shown to Sk. Abdur Rahim by grant a Food Grain Licence. The petitioner was further informed that S. P. Ghosh W. B. H. J. S. (retd.) was appointed the Enquiry Officer to hold enquiry into the charges and he was required to file his statement of defence and make his representation before the said officer and to show cause why the penalty of dismissal or any penalty under Rule 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules should not be imposed on him. The petitioner filed his written statement wherein all material allegations were denied and, in particular, it was stated that Sk. Abdur Rahim had nothing to do with the null during 1964 and no favour was shown by allotment of paddy to the mill and further no instruction were issued to the Block Development Officers to make over the paddy to the said mill. On March 3, 1967 the petitioner was supplied with a list of documents relied by Government and also a list of witnesses to be examined in the enquiry and he was also informed of the date of hearing. On March 3, 1967 the petitioner was supplied with a list of documents relied by Government and also a list of witnesses to be examined in the enquiry and he was also informed of the date of hearing. The petitioner made a representation on March 21, 1967 stating that if some of the witnesses had made any statement to police he should have been shown such statements. The petitioner also called for some documents and by his further representation dated April 4, 1967 made a grievance that he was never shown any statement of the Chief Inspector Sen Gupta dated July 21, 1966 which was thus evidently antedated. At the enquiry a large number of witness were examined on either side and number of documents were exhibited. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report finding him guilty on all charges and by Order No. 127-GAC (Vig) dated February 1969, the Chief Secretary informed the petitioner that it was found that all charges except No. I (c) were proved against him and the Governor had been pleased, in consultation with the Public Service Commission, ?to decide and order under rule 19 (1) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules that you (i. e. the petitioner) be severely censured and that this be recorded in your Confidential Character Roll. ? immediately thereafter on the said day the following order was passed: ?order no. 128-GAC (Vig) dated Calcutta the 5th February 1969. Whereas, you, Shri Dhirendra Ghosh, a Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector, now employed as Assistant Secretary, Finance Department attained the age of fifty years on the 31st July, 1967. And whereas, the Governor who is the appointing authority in respect of your service under Government has, under clause (i) of the proviso to sub-rule (a) of rule 75 of the West Bengal Service Rules, Part I (hereinafter referred to as the said rules), decided that you shall not continue in such service beyond the 31st August, 1969. Now therefore, in pursuance of Clause (I) of the proviso to sub-rule (a) of Rule 75 of the said rules, the Governor is pleased hereby to give you notice that you, Shri Dhirendra Mohan Ghosh, who attained the age of fifty years on the 31st July, 1967 shall retire from service under Government on and from the 1st September, 1969. By Order of the Governor m. M. Basu, chief Secretary. By Order of the Governor m. M. Basu, chief Secretary. ? ( 2 ) THE petitioner contended that the above order was really an order of removal from service, passed mechanically on the report of the Enquiry Officer without a second enquiry or a second show cause notice. It was further contended that the decision was not honestly formed, and was mala fide, and being a penalty, it was incumbent that the procedure laid down in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution should have been followed. The petitioner also contended that proceeding before the Enquiry Office was vitiated by the failure to observe the principles of natural justice as the statement of three witnesses referred to in his representation was used adversely against him and he had no opportunity of contradiction the same. ( 3 ) ON these allegations and conditions the petitioner moved this Court in Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction for issuance of appropriate writs fore bearing the respondent from giving effect to the said two orders and also for quashing the same. The application however was dismissed by B. C. Mitra, J. on March 26, 1969. An appeal was preferred against this order and the appellate court by its judgment dated July 7, 1970 set aside the said order and issued a rule in terms of the prayer making it returnable before the appropriate bench. ( 4 ) THE rule was opposed by the respondents and an affidavit-in-opposition was filed on behalf of the respondents denying all material allegations and contentions made in the petition. It may be mentioned that the affidavit-in-opposition is not to be found on record though it is stated that it has been duly filed. By separate order of date I have given direction for tracing out the said affidavit to be kept on record and with consent of a parties I have taken in consideration a carbon copy of the same produced by the petitioner. It was stated therein that there was no failure in the observance of the relevant rules or the principle of natural justice before the enquiry officer. It was further stated that it was not necessary to hold an enquiry or to issue show cause notice under Rule 75 (1) (a) of the rules and the ?said enquiry? had nothing to do with retirement. It was further stated that it was not necessary to hold an enquiry or to issue show cause notice under Rule 75 (1) (a) of the rules and the ?said enquiry? had nothing to do with retirement. It was denied that the order was passed mechanically on the report of the Enquiry Officer and it was stated that the order was passed on reviewing the petitioner's case. For all these reason it was submitted that the rule should be discharged. ( 5 ) THE petitioner filed an affidavit-in-reply reiterating that the enquiry was not held in conformity with the relevant rules and procedure and it was incumbent that the provisions under Article 311 (2) should have been followed before passing the impugned order. Further the order was in violation of Notice 4 (VI) to Rule 75 of the West Bengal Service Rules of 1964. ( 6 ) MR. Chakravarti Learned Advocate for the petitioner contended that the copies of statement of some persons incriminating the petitioner were either not on record or not given prior inspection of before the holding of the enquiry though the same were taken into consideration by the enquiry officer to the great prejudice of the petitioner. The enquiry proceeding or the enquiry report are not on record before me but a copy of the report of the enquiry officer was handed over to me by the petitioner during hearing and I have gone through the same. It appears that the enquiry officer relied on the evidence adduced by the parties at the said enquiry and all the witnesses on behalf of the Government were examined in the presence of the petitioner while there is no suggestion or case that the petitioner was not given any opportunity to cross-examine such witnesses. It further appears that the petitioner also had ample and sufficient opportunity to adduce his evidence through his witnesses and document and there is no grievance on this score. There is also no evidence that the statement of the Chief Inspector was antedated as alleged. It has to be remembered that the departmental proceeding cannot be equated to a criminal trial and there is also no evidence or grievance that the petitioner was not given inspection of such statements and documents prior to the commencement of the proceeding or examination of witnesses. It has to be remembered that the departmental proceeding cannot be equated to a criminal trial and there is also no evidence or grievance that the petitioner was not given inspection of such statements and documents prior to the commencement of the proceeding or examination of witnesses. On an over-all consideration, it appears to me that there is no fatal irregularity or defect in the departmental proceeding while the principles of natural justice had been substantially observed by the enquiry officer. The objection of the petitioner on this score is accordingly overruled. ( 7 ) MR. Chakravarti next submitted that the guidelines laid down in the Notes to Rule 75 of the West Bengal Service Rules, 1964 have not been considered and followed in passing the impugned order. Note 4 to Rule 75 provides for consideration of records of the Government servant nine months prior to his attaining the age of fifty five years, so that a provisional judgment may be formed as to whether he should be retired within three months of his attaining age. Further a Government servant may be retired within the said period if he lacks in integrity irrespective of an assessment of his ability of an assessment of his ability of efficiency of work. If he is not so retired within the aforesaid period, the Government servant should be allowed to continue in service upto the age of fifty-eight years without fresh review. Mr. Chakravarti accordingly submitted that the petitioner, since he was not retired within three months of his attaining the age of fifty-five years, should have been allowed to continue in service upto his attainment of fifty-eight years of age under the rules and guidelines thereon. Reliance was placed on the decision in Narayan Sankaran Mooss v. State of Kerala and others A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 175 in which it was held that violation of a mandatory condition invalidates the order. ( 8 ) THE Notes appended to the Rule 75 of the West Bengal Service Rules 1964 have statutory force as the Rules themselves both being framed under Article 309 as we shall presently see. ( 8 ) THE Notes appended to the Rule 75 of the West Bengal Service Rules 1964 have statutory force as the Rules themselves both being framed under Article 309 as we shall presently see. It appears from clause (VI) to Note 4 of Rule 75, there may be cases of retirement of a Government servant without fresh review after the expiry of the said period of three months if such action is justified by any exceptional reasons, as his subsequent work or conduct or state of health which may make earlier retirement clearly desirable. Accordingly it could not be said that in no circumstance there could be retirement of a Government servant beyond three months of his attaining fifty-five years unless assessment of ability or efficiency is made earlier. It is accordingly permissible for the Government to retire a Government servant for any exceptional reasons and such action per se cannot be held to be unconstitutional. Further the exceptional reasons for retirement without further assessment of efficiency or ability in work as mentioned in Note 4 (VI) to Rule 75 are, as the terms thereof indicate, are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. Accordingly, if on February 5, 1969 the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct following departmental proceeding and severely censured no exception could be taken if by order of same date the petitioner was retired from service for misconduct unbecoming a public servant. Further the petitioner's case for retention was duly reviewed by the Government which decided against his further retention in the circumstances. ( 9 ) MR. Chakravarti next contended that prior to the order retiring the petitioner, there was no fresh charge sheet against the petitioner, nor the procedure laid down in Article 311 (2) was followed. He submitted that compulsory retirement couldn't be imposed on the petitioner unless the above procedure is followed as such order is in effect an order of termination of service by way of penalty. As has been pointed out in Union of India v. J. N. Sinha, A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 40, Fundamental Rule 56 (J), which is almost in parimateria with Rule 75 (a) proviso (i), provides that the appropriate authority has the absolute right to retire a Government servant in public interest and, in West Bengal Rules, without assigning any reason. Though the words ?in public interest? Though the words ?in public interest? is not incorporated in the West Bengal rules, in effect it is so as will appear from the Notes appended to the said Rule 75. Because of his compulsory retirement the Government servant, does not lose any of the right acquired by him before retirement which again involve no civil retirement which again involve no evil consequences. This rule is not intended for taking any penal action against the Government servants and embodies one of the facts of pleasure doctrine provided in Article 310. Compulsory retirement under the above rules cannot be equated with and is completely different from dismissal , removal or reduction in rank as contemplated in Article 311 (2 ). Accordingly there is no basis for the contention that even in cases of compulsory retirement under the above rules, the procedure laid down in Article 311 (2) should be followed. ( 10 ) MR. Chakravarti further contended that censure implies a caution for proper conduct of a Government servant in future while in the present case censure followed by immediate retirement is an exercise in futility. Further once the proceeding has come to an end by infliction of punishment on alleged acts unbecoming to a Government servant, no further action by way of punishment can be taken on the same lapses as done in the instant case. As have been re-stated in J. N. Sinha's case, Rule 75 (a) proviso (i) is not intended for taking any penal action, as it is intended to give power to the Government to ?energise its machinery and make it more efficient by compulsorily retiring those who in its opinion should not be there in public interest. ? ( 11 ) THE petitioner also challenged the impugned order as malafide as an indirect mode of penalizing the petitioner and the order, it is also alleged, is arbitrary and without formation of opinion and thus based on collateral grounds. It is contended that the Government has produced no material in support of the impugned order, in respect whereof the onus lay on the Government. In the above-cited J. N. Sinha's case, it was laid down that the Government servant could challenge the order on the ground that the requisite opinion based on the assessment of the efficiency or ability of the such employee has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds. In the above-cited J. N. Sinha's case, it was laid down that the Government servant could challenge the order on the ground that the requisite opinion based on the assessment of the efficiency or ability of the such employee has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds. ( 12 ) UNDOUBTEDLY the Government servant has the right to challenge the order of retirement on the above grounds. But a challenge must not be confined to bare allegations. Though it is not possible for the Government servant to allege specific acts of malafides, he must establish a prima facie case which will indicate to a person of ordinary prudence in the context of attending circumstances and with reference to the history and record of his service that the order compulsorily retiring such officer is unsupportable and unwarranted. In this state of affairs, it will be for the Government to establish that the decision was neither arbitrary nor malafide but based on cogent grounds. ( 13 ) IN I. N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1264 is has been laid down that where there are no words in the order of compulsory retirement which would throw any stigma there should be no enquiry into Government files, to discover whether any remark amounting to stigma could be found in the files, as the order of compulsory retirement alone is for examination. This principle was approved in State of U. P. v. Shyam Lal A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2151. ( 14 ) WE have quoted the impugned order of compulsory retirement and no word amounting to stigma could be found in the said order. On the above authority it will not be open for us to delve into the Government files to make a roving enquiry to find out if there is any stigma in the impugned order. It is now to be seen if there are any materials or prima facie case established in support of the contention that the order was malafide, arbitrary or based on collateral grounds. The only allegations are that the punishing authority acted mechanically on the report of the Enquiry Officer and no show cause notice was issued nor opportunity of being beard was given to the Government servant before the order was passed. In J. N. Sinha's case (supra) it observed?????? The only allegations are that the punishing authority acted mechanically on the report of the Enquiry Officer and no show cause notice was issued nor opportunity of being beard was given to the Government servant before the order was passed. In J. N. Sinha's case (supra) it observed?????? ?there is no denying the fact that in all organizations, there is great deal of dead wood. It is in public interest to chop off the same. Fundamental Rule 56 (j) holds the balance between the rights of the individual Government servant and the interests of the public. While a minimum service is guaranteed to the Government servant, the Government is given power to energise its machinery and make it more efficient by compulsorily retiring those who in its opinion should not be there in public interest. ? ( 15 ) THE absolute power of the Government to retire a Government servant under conditions imposed by the above Rule can no longer be disputed. In the affidavit-in-opposition it has been stated that the retention of the petitioner beyond the age of fifty-five years was duly reviewed by the Government and after being satisfied that he should not be retained in service, the Government passed the impugned order. The sufficiency of grounds or the propriety of the decision taken by the Government cannot be scrutinized unless it is malafide, arbitrary or, based on collateral grounds. We have indicated that the petitioner must also establish a prima facie case which would indicate that the order of compulsory retirement would be incompatible in the attending circumstances. In the present case, there is no such prima facie case as would lead us to think that the order of retirement is unsupportable, incompatible, or unwarranted in the facts of the case. It is not shown here to be so by prima facie case so that no onus is cast upon the Government to support its decision. Accordingly it is not possible to hold that the impugned order was malafide, arbitrary or on collateral grounds. Even on the finding in the disciplinary proceedings it would be quite reasonable to decide that the petitioner's conduct was unbecoming of a Government servant which would justify compulsory retirement on relevant grounds. ( 16 ) THE last contention urged by Mr. Accordingly it is not possible to hold that the impugned order was malafide, arbitrary or on collateral grounds. Even on the finding in the disciplinary proceedings it would be quite reasonable to decide that the petitioner's conduct was unbecoming of a Government servant which would justify compulsory retirement on relevant grounds. ( 16 ) THE last contention urged by Mr. Chakravarti is that Rule 75 (a) of the West Bengal Service Rules 1964 are discriminatory being violative of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution in that there is nothing in the above rule to indicate to the authority the kind of Government servant to whom the impugned provision can be applied. The presumption that the authority will not in accordance with the rule of law can be sustained only if there is a rule of law to guide him. Reliance was placed in the majority decision of Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Kripa Ram v. R. K. Talwar and others, A. I. R. 1970 AII. 296 in which it was held that Fundamental Rule 56 (a) proviso (I), prevailing in that state, which is in similar terms with Rule 75 (a) proviso (1) of the West Bengal Service Rules 1964, violates Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution, as, if a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. The Court was of opinion that there is no pertinent principle laid down in the rule which expressly or by necessary implication will guide its application. ( 17 ) IN the rules we are concerned with, it will appear that to ensure uniformity in the operation of the rules some criteria and procedure for guidance described as Note 4 attached to Rule 75 (a) proviso (i) in the West Bengal Service Rules, 1964 have been laid down. This Note 4 has been framed by the Governor on January 7, 1966 under Article 309 of the Constitution and annexed to West Bengal Service Rules 1966, as Appendix 9, such Notes being published in the Calcutta Gazette on February 10, 1966, Part I pages 210-211, which along with the said service rules form an integral part of the same. This Note 4 has been framed by the Governor on January 7, 1966 under Article 309 of the Constitution and annexed to West Bengal Service Rules 1966, as Appendix 9, such Notes being published in the Calcutta Gazette on February 10, 1966, Part I pages 210-211, which along with the said service rules form an integral part of the same. The Note 4 provides elaborate guidelines for ensuring the application and operation of the rules, preventing any discriminatory application thereof at the unbridled discretion of the appointing authority. Accordingly the decision in the Allahabad case, where the relevant Fundamental Rules have no guideline or criteria as the West Bengal Rules, has no application to the West Bengal Rules we are concerned with which must accordingly be held valid. It may also be mentioned that the validity of the rule of compulsory retirement before age of superannuation in public interest is well settled by judicial decisions ranging from Shyamlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 369 and even earlier the same cannot be reopened. Accordingly the contention of Mr. Chakravarti about the constitutional invalidity of the Rule cannot be accepted. As all contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner fails, this rule is discharged without any order as to costs. All interim orders are vacated. Rule discharged.