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1974 DIGILAW 209 (PAT)

(Smt) Hrideshwari Devi @ Hrideshwari Kumar v. Shri Priyabrat Kumar

1974-11-07

MADAN MOHAN PRASAD, S.K.CHOUDHURI

body1974
Judgment Madan Mohan Prasad J. This is an appeal by the plaintiff - appellants against an order refusing to appoint a receiver in a suit for partition. 2. According to the plaintiffs, they and the defendants are the descendents of one Gaju Kumar who had two sons, Chanchal Kumar and Bajit Lal Kumar. Chanchal had a son Medni whose widow is plaintiff no. 1 and their daughters are plaintiffs 2 to 4. Chanchal had another son Tilakdhari whose sons and daughters are defendants 1 to 5. On the other hand Bajit Lal Kumar's widow was one Bujhawati whose sons and daughters are defendants 6 to 9. It is said that Medni had separated in mess and residence as well as status from the other members of the family long before 1956 and the widow of Bajit and his sons and daughters were also messing and residing separately. The joint family of the descendants of Gaju Kumar had considerable properties. After Medni's death the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 5 have been cultivating separately portions of joint family land and have been appropriating the usufruct and the remaining properties in joint management. The widow of Bajit and defendant no. 6 were allotted a portion of the joint family property for their maintenance. There was, however, no partition by metes and bounds and the plaintiffs and defendant first party are in joint possession as tenants in common since the life time of Medni Kumar, defendant no. 1 being the senior most member of the family has been managing the properties, but for some time past he has been mismanaging the same and in collusion with others transferred portions of the joint properties and was doing other acts of bad faith. Hence the suit. 3. An application under Order 40 Rule 1 and section 94 of the Code of Civil procedure was filed with the allegation that defendant no. Hence the suit. 3. An application under Order 40 Rule 1 and section 94 of the Code of Civil procedure was filed with the allegation that defendant no. 1 was transferring the joint properties and appropriating the consideration himself, that he was getting the name of the defendants first party recorded in the recent survey in respect of larger share than they were entitled to, thereby reducing the plaintiff's share, that he was trying to create wrong entries in the survey records, that he was doing other acts of bad faith, for instance, appropriating a larger share of the income, that he was trying to dispossess the plaintiffs from the lands which were in their cultivating possession for the sake of convenience, that he was not giving accounts to the plaintiffs and was misappropriating the property, that the property is in danger of being wasted, that he was trying to change the physical features of the lands, that he was mismanaging the properties and doing these acts because of the stringed feeling between them and the plaintiffs. 4. The defendant no. 1 filed a petition showing cause against the appointment of receiver where in it is stated that some of the lands in suit are in possess son of third parties who have been recorded in the survey, that Medni had separated in 1943 from Tilak dhari's sons and by an amicable partition, Medni having no son had taken 1/4 share in the properties and given 3/4 share to defendants 1 to 3 and since then the parties have been in possession accordingly. It is said that in the revisional survey the parties have been recorded accordingly. It is denied that there was any family settlement and parties were allowed to be in cultivating possession of the lands for the sake of convenience. It is also said that Bajit Lal had separated from Chanchal in 1912, that, the family had a very small area of ancestral lands and Tilakdbari had, out of his separate funds, acquired some property which had been maliciously included in the suit properties. Allegations regarding misappropriation, mismanagement etc. has been denied. 5. The defendants second party, the sons and daughters of Bljit-also filed a show cause petition. According to them, Chanchal Kumar died in 1942 in a state of jointness with Bajit Lal Kumar who died in 1946. Allegations regarding misappropriation, mismanagement etc. has been denied. 5. The defendants second party, the sons and daughters of Bljit-also filed a show cause petition. According to them, Chanchal Kumar died in 1942 in a state of jointness with Bajit Lal Kumar who died in 1946. It said that in the year 1952 due to differences in the family, a family arrangement was arrived at and different properties were allotted to different parties and a memorandum was prepared accordingly, a copy of which has been produced. It is denied that there was any partition by metes and bounds as alleged by defendants first party. These defendants claim eight annas share in the properties. The allegations made by the plaintiffs regarding various illegal acts and transfer of the joint family properties by defendants 1 to 3 are supported by these defendants. 6. By a second petition filed on the 16th of September 1972, the plaintiffs made some further allegations. It was said that the defendant no. 1 had got looted about 250 maunds of paddy crop and about 150 maunds of maize crop in village Dobha, that he was threatening to loot the paddy crops in village Sayeedpur and that he was selling away the bullocks and other agricultural implements. A third petition was filed on the 25th of September, 1972 in which it was stated that the defendant no. 1 had started getting the paddy crop in village Sayeedpur looted. A fourth petition was filled on the 15th of November, 1972 where in allegation of looting the crops were again reiterated. Ultimately a fifth petition was filed on the 8th of March, 1973 in which the details of the properties sold away by defendant no. 1 were given and it was said that these facts had been collected after making subsequent enquiries. 7. A rejoinder was filed by defendant no.1 denying the allegations made in the second and third petitions aforesaid. It was said that there was no paddy in any of the plots in village Dobha and Sayeedpur. By another petition filed on the 4th of December, 1972, defendants 1 to 3 filed several sale deeds, contending that they would show that the plaintiffs had included lands belonging to third parties and separate acquisitions by Tilakdhari. 8. Several affidavits were filed in this Court by the parties. By another petition filed on the 4th of December, 1972, defendants 1 to 3 filed several sale deeds, contending that they would show that the plaintiffs had included lands belonging to third parties and separate acquisitions by Tilakdhari. 8. Several affidavits were filed in this Court by the parties. The appellants filed a supplementary affidavit on the 20th July, 1974 reiterating the case of a family settlement in 1952. The said deed has been produced in this court. It has also given a list of the plots allotted to Medni for cultivation for the sake of convenience. It also includes a list of different plots alleged to have been sold by defendant no. 1. A second supplementary affidavit was in answer to an affidavit copy of which has been served on the plaintiffs but which was not filed in this Court. A third supplementary affidavit was filed by the appellants which was a reply to the reply filed on behalf of the defendants first set to the affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants. The defendants had by the aforesaid reply, denied the existence of any memorandum of family arrangement and said that "many loosed blank sheets of paper were signed by late Medni Prasad Kumar, Sri Priyabrat Kumar, and Budhdeo Kumar for preparation of 'Tiraj' intended to be filed before Agricultural Income Tax Department and they had been entrusted to Shri Upendra Kavi who had been entrusted with the work and was preparing the said returns. It was alleged to be a case of forgery. It was also said that the said family arrangement filed by the appellants in this Court could not be admitted in evidence in view of Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These allegations were denied by the third supplementary affidavit filed in this court. 9. The question is whether in the circumstances of this case it would be just and convenient to appoint any receiver of the properties in suit. 10. These allegations were denied by the third supplementary affidavit filed in this court. 9. The question is whether in the circumstances of this case it would be just and convenient to appoint any receiver of the properties in suit. 10. On behalf of the appellants it has been contended firstly that the plaintiffs have made out a good case for consideration by the trial court inasmuch as it would appear that the family was joint at one point of time, that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had a s hare in the properties a foresaid that the plaintiffs are in possession of Some of the lands allotted to them by a family settlement for the sake of convenience, that there is nothing to show that there was any partition by metes and bounds secondly that the relationship between the parties is strained and the defendants first set are trying to keep the plaintiffs out of possession; thirdly that the defendants first set are transferring the lands in suit to different persons and appropriating their sale proceeds. It is thus said to be a good case for appointment of a receiver. 11. On behalf of the defendants first set it has been contended that specific allegations regarding wastage and mismanagement have not been mentioned, that the said defendants are dealing with their separate properties in such manner as they like, that if a receiver were to be appointed they would be ousted from possession, that the plaintiffs have not made out a prima facie case of joint possession and the prayer for appointment of a receiver has been rightly rejected. 12. It will appear from what has been stated above that according to the plaintiffs the family properties were joint until 1952 when there was a family arrangement and different lands had been allotted to different parties for the sake of convenience. On the other hand the case of defendants is that there was a complete partition in the year 1943. This will be an issue for decision in the suit itself. The question at the present moment is whether the plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of title and possession to the properties in suit. It must be pointed out in this connection that it is admitted that the family was joint and that there was a nucleus of Joint property. The question at the present moment is whether the plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of title and possession to the properties in suit. It must be pointed out in this connection that it is admitted that the family was joint and that there was a nucleus of Joint property. Nothing has been produced by the defendants first set so far to show that there had been any complete partition in the year 1943. There is only an allegation to that effect on the other hand; the plaintiffs have produced a deed which they call one of family arrangement. To this objection has been taken on behalf of the defendants that it could not be admitted in evidence until it came within the purview of Order 41 Rule 27. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs then urged that it is not necessary for him to rely on this document because the other part of the document containing a list of plots of lands allotted to defendant second party had been produced in the trial court itself and the genuineness thereof was never challenged in the court below, the challenge having been made in this court only in respect of that part of the document which has been produced by the plaintiff-appellants in this Court. It is, therefore, unnecessary to go into the question as to whether the present appellants could rely on the documents produced by them in this court the documents produced by the defendants second party, however show a list of properties allotted to Bujhawati Kuer widow of Bajit Lal Kumar. This document is said to be "Gosawara Batwara". It is signed by Mossomat Bujhawati herself, Shyam Tara widow of Anandi Kumar son of Bajit, by Priyabrat Kumar for himself and as guardian of his minor brother Mohan Kumar, by Medni Kumar and by Budh Deo Kumar. It will appear there from that Medni and the sons of Tilakdhari of the branch of Chanchal Kumar and the widow and daughter-in-law of Bajit Lal Kumar all had joined hands in executing this document. It is nobody case that there was a partition by metes and bounds in the year 1952. 13. The second point which deserves notice in this connection is that the possession of the plaintiffs over some of the lands which were joint family properties is admitted by the defendants first set. It is nobody case that there was a partition by metes and bounds in the year 1952. 13. The second point which deserves notice in this connection is that the possession of the plaintiffs over some of the lands which were joint family properties is admitted by the defendants first set. They have in fact in their counter-affidavit filed in a stay matter, admitted that out of about 1000 bighas of land in suit the defendants first set are in possession of about 114 acres of land in Bhagalpur district and 205 acres in the district of Purnea and the plaintiffs have in their possession lands in the district of Purnea which are about 67 acres besides the lands in the district of Bhagalpur as stated in their supplementary affidavit. According to the defendants, the plaintiffs had omitted to mention some lands in their possession which have been stated in Annexure C to this counter affidavit (about 12 acres of land) and it is also said that some lands which have actually been allotted to these defendants have been shown as allotted to the plaintiffs, a list of which is given in annexure B to this affidavit and is roughly about 33 acres. There is thus a clear admission that the plaintiffs, except for these 33 acres of land mentioned in the list given by them and some mere not mentioned by them, have in their possession lands as mentioned in their supplementary affidavit. And these lands are admitted to have been the joint property of the family. According to the defendants first set this was the result of a complete partition where as according to the plaintiffs and defendants second set it was the result of family arrangement. 14. A document upon which reliance has been placed by the plaintiff-appellants is the list of documents filed by the defendants first set to which reference has been made earlier. They had produced in the trial court two original sale deeds dated the 3rd of July, 1952 executed by Medni Kumar, husband of plaintiff No. 1 and defendants first party in favour of Ram Narain Yadav. It is also stated in the petition of the defendant first set that these documents would show that some of the suit lands have been sold by these kebalas executed jointly. It is also stated in the petition of the defendant first set that these documents would show that some of the suit lands have been sold by these kebalas executed jointly. It has been urgued on behalf of the appellants that there would not have been joint execution. Another document executed on the 13th June, 1970, by plaintiff no. 1, her husband Medni and defendants first party and others, is a deed of sale in favour of one Rajendra Mandal. It is stated therein that the executants were in need of funds for cultivation etc. and other necessary works and they had therefore, sold the lands in question. It is said that if the parties had divided their lands by metes and bounds there would not have been a joint sale deed with the statements aforesaid. 15. There are a few more documents produced by tile appellants. Two of them are notices issued by the Income Tax Department to the plaintiff no. 1 in respect of the estate of her husband Medni Kumar. It is stated therein that there had been a mistake in calculation of estate duty on the basis of individual and the rate should have been calculated on the basis of an interest in Hindu undivided family. This mistake was, therefore, rectified and duty was assessed on the basis of the estate of Medni Kumar being an intrest in the Hindu undivided family. Besides there are certain orders passed in mutation cases. One is an order in Mutation Case no. (7) of 1970-71, dated the 23rd of June, 1972. It appears from the order that the son of defendant no.1 did not produce any document of partition before the Officer concerned, and the case of partition was not accepted and it was ordered that plaintiff no. 1 be substituted in the place of Medni Kumar. Another document is an order in Mutation case no. 48 (7) of 1970-71. In this case also the name of plaintiff no. 1 was ordered to be substituted in place of Medni Kumar. In this very case the Karamchari had reported that plaintiff no. 1 be substituted in place of Medni Kumar in respect of the properties recorded in his name and plaintiff no. 1 along with defendants 1 to 3 be substituted in respect of the properties standing in the name of Chanchal Kumar. In this very case the Karamchari had reported that plaintiff no. 1 be substituted in place of Medni Kumar in respect of the properties recorded in his name and plaintiff no. 1 along with defendants 1 to 3 be substituted in respect of the properties standing in the name of Chanchal Kumar. The schedule prepared accordingly by the Anchal Adhikari has also been produced. 16. In view of what has been stated above it is obvious that the plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of their title and possession. 17. Now we come to the allegations on the basis of which a claim for appointment of a receiver has been made. The first is that the defendants first party are transferring lands which were joint. There is no specific denial of this allegation by the defendants first party. They have made an ambiguous statement that some of the properties belong to third parties. It is not said that these third parties had not acquired the lands from these defendants. It is also said again in an ambiguous way that Tilakdbari had made separate acquisitions. Thus they are being justified on the ground that they were not joint family properties. 18. With regard to the allegation of getting the names of defendants first party recorded in the survey in respect of a larger share than they are entitled to according to the plaintiffs case the appellants have produced extract from the survey records which show that defendant first party alone were recorded in respect of these lands of village Sayeedpur. The answer of the defendant first party is that they have been recorded according to their shares allotted to them at the partition. 19. Apart from these documents the appellants have also produced a number of documents to show a very strained relationship between the parties. I have already referred to the allegations of looting of Crop and effort at dispossession of plaintiffs as mentioned in several petitions. In this connection it may be mentioned that a report under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was made on the 26th of October, 1972 by the police recommending action against both parties as there was a dispute over the lands. In this connection it may be mentioned that a report under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was made on the 26th of October, 1972 by the police recommending action against both parties as there was a dispute over the lands. Another similar report had been made earlier on the 25th of April, 1971 in respect of a dispute over the lands and in the survey proceedings in respect of them and because there was a likelihood of serious breach of peace at the hands of the defendants first party. A petition filed before the police on the 24th of October, 1972, a Sanha lodged on the same date and a petition sent to the D.I.G., C.I.D, on the 22nd May 1972 have also been produced. There can be little doubt in view of the aforesaid documents that the feelings between the plaintiffs and defendants first party are highly strained. 20. Even at the cost of repetition it must be stated once again that the first party defendants had not produced any evidence to counteract the assertions of the plaintiffs on the basis of the documents afore said. 21. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the decisions in the case of Ramjiram and another Vs. Saligram Bhubaneshrwar Prasad Narain Sinha Vs. Rajeshwar Prasad Narain Sinha and others and Ram Khelawan v. Sudama Devi. In the case of Ramjiram and another Vs. Saligram (supra) it has been held that in a suit for partition if the defendant was keeping the plaintiff out of possession to which he was admittedly entitled, a receiver could be appointed. In the case of Bhubaneshwer Prasad Narain Sinha Vs. Rajeshwar Prasad Narain Sinha and others (supra) it was held that where the relationship between the parties have been so embittered that they do not trust each other and the conduct of the defendant gives sufficient justification to the plaintiffs to urge that be has no confidence in the honesty and integrity of the defendant, the court while not putting the defendant out of possession of the properties will appoint some other person as joint receiver with the defendant in order to safeguard the interest of other members. In the case of Ram Khelawan Vs. Sudama Devi (Supra) the defendant himself was appointed the receiver and his objection to the order appointing a receiver was on that ground held to be unjustified. In the case of Ram Khelawan Vs. Sudama Devi (Supra) the defendant himself was appointed the receiver and his objection to the order appointing a receiver was on that ground held to be unjustified. 22. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on a number of decisions in the case of Balbir Anand and others Vs. Ram Jawaya Kapoor and other for the proposition that while passing an order in respect of appointment of a receiver the court should in view that the rights of the parties are not jeopardised and the ends of justice not defeated; in the case of Chandidat Jha Vs. Padmanand Singh Bahadur and others for the proposition that the plaintiff must make out a good prima facie title for the purpose of obtaining an order for appointment of a receiver in the case of Gulamjan Khan and others v. Zainubunnissa Begum for the proposition that a court may be doing wrong to the defendant if he is in enjoyment of the property and is ousted there from by the appointment of a receiver; in the case of Rasi Devi Vs. Bikal Maharana and others in support of the proposition that the appointment of a receiver is one of the harshest remedies which the law provides and is allowable only in extreme cases and in circumstances where the interest of the person seeking the appointment of a receiver is exposed to main fest peril and hence in a partition suit a receiver should not be appointed unless the plaintiff can show prime facie that he has a strong case and good title to the property; in the case of Tara Singh v. Surajder Singh and others for the proposition that were there is no evidence to show that anything jeopardising the plaintiff's interest had happened or that there was mismanagement and concealment and wastage, no receiver could be appointed; in the case of Bokaro & Ramgur Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar for the proposition that the court will appoint a receiver if it is satisfied on two matters, namely, that the plaintiff's title is prima facie good title and that the property is in danger of being wasted or dissipated or being so dealt with as to get irretrievably out of reach of the plaintiff; in the case of Sitaram Kundanlal and others, Vs. Pannalal Kundanlal and others for the same proposition that in a case of partition a receiver can not be appointed unless the plaintiff proves that he has a good chance of succeeding in establishing the case made out in the plaint and that the property in possession of the opposite party is in danger of being wasted; and in the case of T. Krishnaswamy Chetty V.C. Thangavelu Chetty and others for the proposition that an order appointing a receiver will not be made where it has the effect of depriving the defendant of de facto possession. 23. There is no dispute with any of the propositions of law stated in the aforesaid cases. An analysis of the case laws on the point clearly brings out the duty of the court to be very cautious in allowing an application for appointment of a receiver in a case where the defendant is in actual possession of the property. In such a case it has to require special reasons to be proved for interfering with such possession. At the same time the court has to bear in mind that this is a remedy which may be the only remedy open to a plaintiff for the maintenance and preservation of the property in suit. It is true that a court will require a plaintiff to show a very strong case of title and his right to possession as also that the property is in danger of being wasted. 24. Having given the case my most anxious consideration I have come to the conclusion that in the circumstances of the present case the plaintiff has made out a good case of title and also a case of interference by the defendants with the property in their possession for the purpose of cultivation as also of transfers of the suit properties by the defendants 1st set alone. In the circumstances mentioned above, it is difficult at this stage to accept the defendants' case that there had been a complete partition and that they could transfer the properties and appropriate the sale proceeds. It is difficult also to accept at this stage that the plaintiffs have no title to the properties in the possession of the defendants. In the circumstances mentioned above, it is difficult at this stage to accept the defendants' case that there had been a complete partition and that they could transfer the properties and appropriate the sale proceeds. It is difficult also to accept at this stage that the plaintiffs have no title to the properties in the possession of the defendants. It is important to bear in mind in this connection that the defendants say that some of the properties alleged to have been in possession of the plaintiffs for the purpose of cultivation also had really fallen to their share on the partition. The interference with these properties claimed by both parties is thus bound to continue if the properties are left in the condition they are at present. The transfers of such properties as are in possession of the defendants and which are claimed to be joint properties are likely to continue and thus the properties would change hands and give rise to multiplicity of suits. Considering all the circumstances of this case I am of the view that it is a fit case where an order for appointment of a receiver should be made. I would not, however, like to disturb the status quo in respect of possession by appointing a third person as a receiver of the properties in suit. The best course, it seems to me, to adopt in the present case is to appoint the plaintiffs, the defendant’s first party and the defendant’s second party to be receivers of the properties in the possession of each of them. I would order accordingly. This appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order passed by the court below is set aside. In the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. 25. Before parting with this case I cannot help observing that the learned Subordinate Judge has given the case a most perfunctory consideration as is apparent from the cryptic order so far as the consideration of the cases of the parties is concerned. The learned Subordinate Judge would have done well to carefully consider and weigh not only the cases of the parties but also the documents which were produced before him, to which no consideration has been given at all. 26. The learned Subordinate Judge would have done well to carefully consider and weigh not only the cases of the parties but also the documents which were produced before him, to which no consideration has been given at all. 26. The court below will, however, make a note of the fact that the findings aforesaid are merely for the purpose of deciding the question of appointing a receiver and will not be in any way considered binding on him when he is called upon to decide the maintainability of the suit or other matters. I have expressed the opinion for the limited purpose of deciding the present question. Appeal allowed.