Judgement Kanahaiya Lal Oswal and others filed a suit against the Government of India (Union Territory of Tripura) and the District Magistrate and Collector, Tripura, (Food Section), Agartala, for recovery of Rs. 7,364.38 on the footing of a contract dated 19th April, 1960, entered into between the parties. Before filing the suit the plaintiffs had served notices under Section 80, Civil Procedure Code, on the Chief Secretary and the Collector of the State of Tripura. The suit was resisted by the defendants, inter alia on the ground that notice under Section 80 of the Code had not been served on defendant No.1 through proper person. This defence prevailed in the trial Court which rejected the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11, of the Code. The plaintiffs having felt aggrieved have come up in appeal to this Court. 2. The plaintiffs Counsel as well as the Government Advocate frankly conceded at the Bar that they had not been able to lay hand on any reported decision of the Supreme Court or of any High Court for or against the proposition which requires determination in the present appeal. As such the matter shall have to be decided on the basis of the interpretation of relevant provisions of the law. 3. It is not in dispute that the contract in question was in relation to the affairs of the Union Territory of Tripura. Section 55 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, bears on the subject of "contracts and suits" and reads as under:- "For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that- (a) all contracts in connection with the administration of a Union territory are contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union; (b) all suits and proceedings in connection with the administration of a Union territory shall be instituted by or against the Government of India. 4. Since the present suit was filed after this Act of 1963 had come into operation the plaintiffs had very rightly cited the Government of India (Union Territory of Tripura) as main defendant in the suit. The opening words of Section 55 indicate that the section was incorporated in the Act with a view to removal of certain doubts. 4. Since the present suit was filed after this Act of 1963 had come into operation the plaintiffs had very rightly cited the Government of India (Union Territory of Tripura) as main defendant in the suit. The opening words of Section 55 indicate that the section was incorporated in the Act with a view to removal of certain doubts. Though the parties counsel were unable to point out what those doubts were which necessitated the adoption of this section, but two decisions of the Supreme Court, one given in 1954 and the other in 1962, probably accounted for certain doubts which the Government wanted to set at rest. The argument raised before the Supreme Court in the first case Satya Dev v. Padam Dev, AIR 1954 SC 587 , was that the executive action of the Central Government is vested in the President, that the President is also the executive head of Part C States, (which are now called Union Territories), and that as such the contracts entered into with part C States are, in law contracts entered into with the Central Government. The Supreme Court described this argument as fallacious and observed that the President who is the executive head of the part C States is not functioning while acting in that capacity as the executive head of the Central Government but as the head of the State under powers specifically vested in him under Article 239 of the Constitution, that the authority conferred under Article 239 to administer part C States has not the effect of converting those States into the Central Government, that under Article 239, the President occupies in regard to part C States a position analogous to that of a Governor in Part A States and of a Raj Pramukh in Part B States, and that though the Part C States are centrally administered under the provisions of Article 239, they do not cease to be States and become merged with the Central Government. In the second case reported in AIR 1962 SC 145 , State of Vindhya Pradesh v. Moula Bux, it was ruled by the Supreme Court that Section 79 (a) of the Code, which says that in a suit by or against the Central Government the proper plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, is the Union of India, does not apply to a Part C State and that only the definition in Clause (b) of the Section applies to Part C States. On the footing of this premise the Supreme Court held further that it was the Vindhya Pradesh State which was the proper authority to be sued inasmuch as the contract in question was entered into between that State and the plaintiffs, the Central Government being not in the picture in any manner. These two decisions of the Supreme Court recognised the individual and distinct entity of a Part C State and in addition held that C State itself could sue or be sued in its own name. Since the Parliament had the necessary Constitutional authority to pass the Act of 1963, it appears to have clarified the position in Section 55 thereof by stating that though all contracts in connection with the administration of the Union territory are contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union yet all suits and proceedings in connection with the administration of a Union territory shall be instituted by or against the Government of India. The effect of Section 55 is that the suits and proceedings in connection with the administration of a Union territory shall be instituted by or against the Government of India and not by or against the Union territory itself with effect from the date the Act of 1963 came into force. 5. To appreciate the basis of trial Courts ultimate finding and which basis was reiterated by the Government Advocate in this Court, it is necessary to read Sections 79 and 80 of the Code. 5. To appreciate the basis of trial Courts ultimate finding and which basis was reiterated by the Government Advocate in this Court, it is necessary to read Sections 79 and 80 of the Code. Section 79 reads as under:- "In a suit by or against the Government, the authority to be named as plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, shall be- (a) in the case of a suit by or against the Central Government, the Union of India, and (b) in the case of a suit by or against a State Government the State." The relevant part of Section 80 provides that no suit shall be instituted against the Government until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office of- "(a) in the case of a suit against the Central Government except where it relates to a railway, a Secretary to that Government; (b) in the case of a suit against the Central Government where it relates to a railway, the General Manager of that railway; (bb) in the case of a suit against the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Chief Secretary of that Government or any other officer authorised by that Government in this behalf; and (c) in the case of a suit against any other State Government a Secretary to that Government or the Collector of the District." 6. The trial Court held that since in terms of Section 55 of the 1963 Act the suit in connection with the administration of Union territory has to be instituted against the Government of India and since according to Sections 79 and 80 of the Code a notice has to be served on a Secretary of the Government when suit is filed against the Central Government, the notice served by the plaintiffs of the present case on the Chief Secretary or the Collector of the Union territory of Tripura does not satisfy the requirements of law. In other words, the trial Court appears to have equated the Government of India with the Central Government. It was not disputed at the bar that the expression "Government of India" is not defined in any of the statutes, nor the expression "Union of India". The only expressions defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897, are "Government" or "the Government", "Central Government" and the "State Government". It was not disputed at the bar that the expression "Government of India" is not defined in any of the statutes, nor the expression "Union of India". The only expressions defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897, are "Government" or "the Government", "Central Government" and the "State Government". According to Section 3 (23) the Government shall include both the Central Government and any State Government. This is undobutedly an inclusive definition and so it can be legitimately concluded that the Government of India is also a Government. However, the precise question for decision is whether the expression Government of India used in Section 55 of the 1963 Act is synonymous with the Central Government as was canvassed by the learned Government Advocate and as was assumed by the trial Court. The Central Government is defined in Section 3 (8) of the General Clauses Act to mean the President and also to include in relation to the administration of a Union territory, the Administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution. However, this definition clause cannot lead us to the conclusion that Central Government and Government of India mean one and the same legal entity. If there were no difference between the two expressions, the Central Government and the Government of India, it passes comprehension why should the Parliament have used the latter expression in S. 55 of the 1963 Act instead of the well known and defined expression "Central Government". What might have influenced the Parliament in the choice of expression "Government of India" rather (than) "Central Government" or "Union of India" (may) be the fact that if suit of a private person were decreed then execution could not be taken against the assets of Central Government, or the Union of India because factually the decree in such a case would be against the Union territory which as held by the Supreme Court, is a distinct entity. Anyway, even if we assume that there is no difference between the two expressions, "Central Government" and "the Government of India", then too it is not possible to agree with the trial Court or with the Government Advocate that Section 80 of the Code would apply to a suit filed against the Government of India. Anyway, even if we assume that there is no difference between the two expressions, "Central Government" and "the Government of India", then too it is not possible to agree with the trial Court or with the Government Advocate that Section 80 of the Code would apply to a suit filed against the Government of India. It is for the reason that Section 80 in terms applies to suits against the Central Government or against the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir or any other State Government. None of the clauses of Section 80 talks of suits against the Government of India. It follows that the present suit does not fall within the reach of Section 80 vis-a-vis the first defendant which is Government of India. 7. The distinction between a State and its Government is well known and so has to be kept in view while deciding the matter at anvil. Section 79 of the Code covers the subject of the authorities which are to be named in a suit filed by or against the Central Government or the State Government. Section 80, on the other hand, is not a procedural provision, and unlike Section 79 it falls in the category of a substantive provision. It interdicts inter alia institution of suits unless compliance is made with its provisions when the suits arise out of causes of action against certain Governments. The Supreme Court declared in AIR 1969 SC 674 , Raghunath Das v. Union of India, that Section 80 must be strictly complied with but, it was added, strict construction does not mean that it should be construed in a pedantic manner or in a manner divorced from common sense. Obviously, Section 80 stands in the way of a person exercising his natural right of filing a suit against certain named Governments or the public officers. Though the constitutionality of its provisions has not been challenged but evidently unless a particular suit falls clearly within its sweep it would not be hit by its provisions. Obviously, Section 80 stands in the way of a person exercising his natural right of filing a suit against certain named Governments or the public officers. Though the constitutionality of its provisions has not been challenged but evidently unless a particular suit falls clearly within its sweep it would not be hit by its provisions. Beyond dispute, the cause of action that gave rise to the present suit is in connection with the administration of the Union territory of Tripura, and since according to the Supreme Court decision in the cases of Satya Deb, AIR 1954 SC 587 (supra) and State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1962 SC 145 (supra) the State of Union Territory is a distinct legal entity, and since according to Section 3 (58) of General Clauses Act "State" includes a Union territory, the present suit would fall under clause (c) of Section 80. According to the clause in the case of a suit against State Government other than the State Government of Jammu and Kashmir notice has to be given to some Secretary of the State Government or the Collector of the district concerned. The learned Government Advocate admitted that the plaintiffs of our suit had served Section 80 notice both on the Chief Secretary as well as the Collector of Tripura. Therefore, it is not possible to subscribe the view of the trial Court that this suit had been filed without compliance with the provisions of Section 80. It is correct that the Government of India has been cited as one of the defendants in the suit but that had to be done according to the command of Section 55 of 1963 Act. Nevertheless it is not possible to ignore the fact that the suit arises out of a cause of action against the Government of Union territory of Tripura. It can be said at the cost of repetition that the fields of operation of Sections 79 and 80 of the Code are distinct; Section 79 is purely procedural in nature and is concerned with prescribing the names of authorities as plaintiff or defendant when the suit is by or against the Central Government or a State Government, while Section 80 is substantive in nature and ordains that before a suit can be filed against the Government notice shall have to be served on the specified officers of the Government concerned. It will be noticed that the authority to be named as defendant in a suit, according to Section 79, is either the Union of India or the State while determining factor for Section 80 is against which Government, as distinct from State, cause of action had arisen. Section 55 of 1963 Act corresponds with Section 79 of the Code read with Section 4 of the Code, and so it does not supplant or supplement Section 80 of the Code. 8. To sum up, the applicability of Section 80 is not attracted to the suit in hand qua the defendant No. 1. Government of India, because in terms that section does not apply to a suit against such a Government, and, secondly, the cause of action having arisen out of the affairs relating to the administration of the Union territory of Tripura the notice was to be served in law only on the Secretary of that Government or the Collector of the district concerned and that had been done because admittedly notices had been served both on the Chief Secretary as well as the Collector of the Union territory. In view of these conclusions the order of the trial Court rejecting the plaint cannot be sustained. I, therefore, on allowing this appeal quash that order and remand the suit to that Court for fresh decision on all the issues including issues Nos. 1 and 4. on the assumption that Section 80 of the Code does not stand in the way of the present suit. Since the matter was highly technical and not free from doubt as also res integra. I leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. The costs incurred by the parties in the trial Court shall abide the ultimate event. Appeal allowed.