JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - The Appellant has been convicted u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life. 2. The prosecution case may be stated in short. On 2nd of April 1970, at about 6.00 p.m., there was a quarrel between the deceased (Bhikari) and Bharat (d.w. 1). The accused is the son of Bharat. The incident arose out of an information received by Bharat from his wife that the deceased assaulted her as she refused to keep his baby while the wife of the deceased (P.w. 3) wanted to go out to fetch water. On Bharat?s questioning the deceased as to why the deceased assaulted Bharat?s wife, there was mutual abuse which ultimately resulted in a scuffle. The deceased is alleged to have grappled Bharat. Both of them rolled on the ground. P.w. 1 separated them. While they were still abusing each other the accused stabbed the deceased both in the back side and then in the front of his abdomen. The deceased succumbed to the injuries soon after. 3. The accused does not dispute the occurrence, but gives a different version. His case is that the deceased threw Bharat to the ground sat on him and pressed his throat and attempted to throttle him. At this stage, the accused came with a knife and stabbed the deceased in the back who thereafter got up. While the deceased swerved round, the knife held by the accused pierced him in the front and a few minutes after the deceased died. 4. The learned additional Sessions Judge after an analysis of the relevant evidence on record, held that death was homicidal and the accused had no right of private defence. 5. Before us, the finding that death is homicidal is not disputed. The only question for consideration is whether the accused is protected by the right of private defence of person. 6. The learned additional Sessions Judge after an analysis of the relevant evidence on record, held that death was homicidal and the accused had no right of private defence. 5. Before us, the finding that death is homicidal is not disputed. The only question for consideration is whether the accused is protected by the right of private defence of person. 6. Section 100 of the Indian Penal Code lays down that the right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in Section 99, to the voluntary causing of death to the assailant if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions enumerated hereunder: First, such an assault may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault; and secondly, such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault. 7. The prosecution has examined three eye-witnesses (p.ws. 1, 3 and 4). The version of p.w. 1 is that while he had separated Bharat and the deceased, the accused suddenly gave the two blows to the deceased. It hers been suggested by the prosecution through his evidence that at the time the two stabbing wounds were given, there was no reasonable apprehension on the part of the accused that death or grievous hurt would be caused to Bharat. p.w. 1 admitted that excepting him, there were no other eye-witnesses at the place of occurrence. He had made different statements in the committing Court and before the police. In examination-in-chief, he stated: ...While the two after being separated by me were standing and abusing each other the accused who was standing nearby covering his body with a towel rushed to the place from the back side of Bhikari and stabbed on his back by means of a knife.... Before the Investigating Officer, he had, however, stated that while he was separating the deceased from Bharat, the accused Puma came running with a knife and gave two stabs to the deceased. The versions are clearly contradictory. The most important circumstance to determine in this case is whether the accused gave the stabbing wounds while p.w. 1 was in a process of separation or after the separation between the deceased and Bharat had already been effected. The versions are clearly contradictory. The most important circumstance to determine in this case is whether the accused gave the stabbing wounds while p.w. 1 was in a process of separation or after the separation between the deceased and Bharat had already been effected. The substantial variance between the two statements makes it difficult for us to place reliance on the evidence of p.w. 1 that he is a witness of truth. As has already been stated, he admitted that excepting him there was no other eye-witness to the occurrence. By necessary implication this excludes the presence of p.ws. 3 and 4. We have also carefully examined the evidence of p.ws. 3 and 4. They substantially contradicted themselves when a reference is made to their statements before the police and in the committing Court. p.w. 3 previously had made a statement that excepting p.w. 1, there was no other eye-witness to the occurrence. p.w. 3 stated before the police: ...there was exchange of hot words between my husband and father of the accused and scuffle began, both dragged each other and my husband put down the accused?s father on the ground and sat on him.... In the sessions Court, she gave a different story. We are not prepared to accept her as a witness of truth also. On the same reasoning, we do not place much reliance on the evidence of p.w. 4. 8. The accused examined d.ws. 1 and 2. D.w. 1 is Bharat himself. He gives a vivid description as to how the deceased threw him on the ground, sat on his chest and attempted to throttle him, where after he made a groaning sound, which immediately drew the attention of the accused, who rushed to the spot to save him and gave the stab wounds. Doubtless, his statement that the second stab was not deliberately given, but was received by the deceased in course of his turning round towards the accused is not acceptable and does not fit in with the natural course of events. The second stab caused the fatal injury and is not likely to be caused by a mere turning round. The general story given by him has neither been demolished in cross-examination nor by the previous statement taken from him u/s 164, Code of Criminal Procedure. D.w. 2 claims to be another eye-witness and substantially corroborates d.w. 1. The second stab caused the fatal injury and is not likely to be caused by a mere turning round. The general story given by him has neither been demolished in cross-examination nor by the previous statement taken from him u/s 164, Code of Criminal Procedure. D.w. 2 claims to be another eye-witness and substantially corroborates d.w. 1. The injuries on d.w. 1 corroborate his version that the deceased gave him blows with stick. 9. The net effect of the aforesaid analysis is that the prosecution evidence presented through p.ws. 1, 3 and 4 is not acceptable on account of material contradiction in their evidence between what they said in the Sessions Court and earlier. The defence version is acceptable. In essence, it presents the story that the deceased was throttling Bharat when the accused suddenly rushed to the spot and gave two stab wounds with the knife successively. Doubtless, the deceased had no weapon in his hand and after the first blow has given the accused could have desisted himself from giving further blows. But, as has been repeatedly said, the critical moment in which the accused had to act to save the life of his father was such that he cannot be expected to weigh the pros and cons in a golden scale. The serenity and calmness of a Court-hall cannot be resorted to as the test to apply to the accused at that crucial moment. In our view, the accused is entitled to right of private defence of the person of his father. He is not to establish his plea beyond reasonable doubt as is the burden on the prosecution. He is entitled to an acquittal, if his defence may reasonably be true. 10. In the result, the conviction and the sentence passed on the Appellant are set aside and the appeal is allowed. The Appellant is acquitted and he be set at liberty forthwith. P.K. Mohanti, J. 11. I agree. Final Result : Allowed