Judgment Nagendra Prasad Singh, J. This application in revision is directed against the final order passed in a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the "Code"). By the impugned order, the Magistrate has declared the members of the second party to be in possession of plot nos. 903, 904 and 893 and the members of the third party to be in possession of plot no. 920/145, situated in village Chaur Digar, within Monghyr Muffasil police station of the district of Monghyr. The petitioner was the first party to the said proceeding. 2. The case of the members of the second party is that they have acquired the plots in question under two registered sale deeds, dated the 14th August, 1954, executed by the petitioner, his brother, Bhuneshwar Yadav, and his uncle, Dipal Yadav, and they were in possession of the same. It is the further case of the members of the second party that plot no. 920/145 had been purchased by them in the year 1954, but later it was sold to Sukhdeo Yadav, and ultimately if was purchased by third party Rajendra Sao and since then the members of the third party are in possession of the same. The case of the first party petitioner is that the aforesaid transfer in favour of the members of the second party was without any consideration and with the object of saving the property from Mahajans; that the deeds in question were farzi and that he throughout remained in possession of the lands in question. 3. The parties, in support of their respective cases, filed documents and affidavits. The learned Magistrate, by the impugned order, has decided the proceeding against the petitioner. 4. This case was originally placed before a learned Single Judge of this Court and on a reference it has been placed before the Division Bench for consideration as to whether the final order passed in the proceeding should be set aside by this Court on the ground that the affidavits which have been relied upon by the learned Magistrate had been sworn before Magistrate who were not in seisin of the case and also because the affidavits were not in accordance with the provisions of Order XIX, rule 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has not seriously pressed the point whether the final order passed in the proceeding is vitiated if the learned Magistrate has placed reliance on affidavits sworn before Magistrates who were not in seisin of the case, perhaps, in view of the several Bench decisions of this court where the said point has been considered and decided. A Bench of this Court in Mahesh Thakur v. Lakshman Prasad Thakur took the view that affidavits which are to be filed in a proceeding under section 145 of the Code must be sworn before the Magistrate who is in seisin of the case, and any non-compliance of this rule makes the affidavits inadmissible and defective. The said judgment was considered by another Division Bench of this Court specially from the point of view as to whether that can be a ground for interfering with the final order passed by the Magistrate in proceedings under section 145 of the Code taking into consideration such affidavits, in exercise of the revisional powers of this Court; and in Jaldhari Mahto v. Mosst. Rudia their Lordships, while agreeing with the earlier Bench decision in Mahesh Thakur's case that such affidavits were defective, came to the conclusion, after taking into consideration the provisions of section 537 of the Code, that the final order passed in the proceeding will not be vitiated and such orders cannot be interfered with merely on that account in exercise of the revisional powers of this Court. The view expressed in Jaldhari Mahto's case has been followed by several Bench decisions of this Court. In this connection reference can be made to the case of Afzal Hussain v. Mazhar Ali and others. In the circumstances, I am not inclined to take a different view. As such, there is no merit in this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, strenuously urged that the final order passed in the present case is vitiated because the affidavits on which the learned Magistrate has placed reliance were not sworn in accordance with the provisions of Order XIX, rule 3(1), of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. Order XIX, rule 3 (1), of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus: "3. 7. Order XIX, rule 3 (1), of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus: "3. (1) Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove, except on interlocutory applications, on which statements of his belief may be admitted: provided that the grounds thereof are stated". From a bare reference to the aforesaid Sub rule, it is clear that the requirement of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of affidavits is that the deponent must state as to which of the facts stated in the affidavit are true 'to his personal knowledge and which facts stated therein are based on information derived from some other source. This aspect of the matter has been examined by different High Courts as well as by the Supreme court in several cases while considering the effect of affidavits which are not in conformity with rule 3 (1) of Order XIX, and it has been observed that affidavits which are in contravention of the said provision are defective and liable to be rejected and ignored. In this connection reference may be made to the case of A.K.K. Nambiar Vs. Union of India and another4. In that case, the appellant before the Supreme Court had challenged the order of his suspension before the High Court of Delhi making allegations against the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh. The said petition was supported by an affidavit, which was not properly verified. In that connection it was observed as follows:- "The reasons for verification of affidavits are to enable the Court to find out which facts can be said to be proved on the affidavit evidence of rival parties. Allegations may be true to information received from persons or allegations may be based on records. The importance of verification is to test the genuineness and authenticity of allegations and also to make the deponent responsible for allegations. In essence, verification is required to enable the Court to find out as to whether it will be safe to Act, on such affidavit evidence. In the present case, the affidavits of all the parties suffer from the mischief of lack of proper verification with the result that the affidavits should not be admissible in evidence". In Dipendranath Sarkar Vs. State of Bihar and others similar observation was made by a Full Bench of this Court in connection with a writ application. In the present case, the affidavits of all the parties suffer from the mischief of lack of proper verification with the result that the affidavits should not be admissible in evidence". In Dipendranath Sarkar Vs. State of Bihar and others similar observation was made by a Full Bench of this Court in connection with a writ application. While rejecting the affidavit of a clerk of the school, it was observed as under. – "There is an affidavit of Shri N.P. Sinha, a clerk of the school, but this affidavit cannot be taken into account because Sri N.P. Sinha has no locus standi to file an affidavit. The affidavit of Sri N.P. Sinha is also defective because it does not clearly express as to how much is a statement of the knowledge of the deponent and how much is a statement of his belief, and there is hence violation of O. 19 R. 3 Code of Civil Procedure". A Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Padmabati Dasi v. Rasiklal Dhar, also observed that the provisions of Order XIX, rule 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure must be strictly observed and where' there is a violation of those provisions the affidavit must be ignored. 8. In Barium Chemicals Ltd. and another v. Company Law Board and others it was observed as follows : "No particulars as the alleged discussion with the 2nd respondent, or of the petition which the said two friends were said to have made, such as its contents, its time or to which authority it was made are forthcoming. It is true that in a case of this kind it would be difficult for a petitioner to have personal knowledge in regard to an averment of malafides, but then where such knowledge is wanting he has to disclose his source of information so that the other side gets a fair chance to verify it and make an effective answer. In such a situation, this court had to observe in 1952 SCR 674 : AIR 1952 SC 317 , that as slipshod verifications of affidavits might lead to their rejection, they should be modeled on the lines of O. XIX, R. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code and that where an averment is not based on personal knowledge, the source of information should be clearly deposed". 9. 9. From the aforesaid 'decisions it can be said that Courts have always insisted that affidavits should be verified in terms of Order XIX, rule 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure. But, none of the aforesaid cases arose out of proceedings under section 145 of the Code or any other provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the Code there are several provisions which, under different circumstances cure any mistake committed by the trial court in trial of the case and they place a bar on the power of the appellate or the revisional Court from interfering-with orders passed by the trial court on the ground of defective procedure having been adopted while conducting the proceeding or admitting evidence. Section 537 is one of such provisions. 10. The decision in Jaldhari Mahto's case (supra) that final orders passed in a proceeding under section 145, based on defective affidavits, that is, affidavits sworn before Magistrates other than the Magistrate in seisin of the case, should not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its revisional powers in view of section 537 of the Code will, in my opinion also apply to cases of final orders passed taking into consideration affidavits which are not strictly in terms of Order XIX, rule 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure. A bare reference to the judgment in Jaldhari Mahto's case will show that question for consideration in that case was as to whether the admission in evidence of defective affidavits goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate deciding the proceeding and vitiates the entire proceeding, or it is curable under section 537 of the Code. After a consideration of several decisions of the Supreme Court and the different High Courts in India, it was observed: "In my considered opinion, the admission of defective affidavits by a Magistrate in seisin of the proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not go to the root of his jurisdiction to decide the proceeding. Admission of an affidavit sworn in before a Magistrate, who is not in seisin of the proceeding, is not so violent a departure as to strike at the root of the enquiry and to render it no enquiry at all. Admission of an affidavit sworn in before a Magistrate, who is not in seisin of the proceeding, is not so violent a departure as to strike at the root of the enquiry and to render it no enquiry at all. If a final order is passed in the proceeding and reliance is placed on such defective affidavits, it has to be seen in each case whether prejudice has been caused to the aggrieved party". As I have already indicated above, this Bench decision was considered in several other Bench decisions of this Court and the said view has been consistently followed while hearing revision applications against final orders passed in proceeding under section 145 of the Code. In my judgment in the decision referred to above on Order XIX, rule 3, of the Civil Procedure Code, there was no occasion to consider the effect of section 537 of the Code. As such, on the basis of those judgments, it cannot be held that final orders passed in proceedings under section 145 of the Code must be set aside on this ground alone. Learned counsel for the petitioner was not able to show as to how any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner by admission of such affidavits. Learned counsel for the opposite party has drawn our attention to the fact that the affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioner also were not in accordance with Order XIX rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and suffer from the same defect. As such, on the face of it, there is no question of prejudice having been caused to the petitioner by admission of such affidavits on behalf of the opposite party. Learned Magistrate has considered the affidavits filed on behalf of the opposite party and having taken into consideration those affidavits, along with the other evidence adduced by the parties, has come to the conclusion that the plots in dispute were in possession of the members of the second and third parties, and I do not find any reason to interfere with the said order. 11. In the result, there is no merit in this revision application. It is, accordingly, dismissed. Application dismissed.