JUDGMENT : S. Acharya, J. - The first party in a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure is the Petitioner in this case. 2. The extent of land at present in dispute is Ac. 22.77 decimals out of which 3 acres of land is claimed by opposite party No. 9 under on agreement to sell, and the other second party members claim possession over separate and distinct parcels of land out of the rest as Kar tenants thereof. The proceeding was initiated in 1968 and the Court by its final order dated 18-4-1969 declared that the first party was in possession of the entire property (Ac. 33.94 decimals) attached in the said proceeding except 3 acres of the same, possession of which was declared in favour of second party No. 9. Against that decision, the first, party preferred Criminal Revision No. 223 of 1969 in this Court in respect of the aforesaid order in favour of second party No. 9 declaring his possession over 3 acres of land. Second party Nos. 1 to 8 also preferred Criminal Revision No. 268 of 1969 against the said final order passed against them on 18-4-1969. Both the above-mentioned two Criminal Revisions were heard together and this Court, for reasons stated therein, remanded the case for fresh disposal of the matter as directed therein. On remand, the learned Magistrate released some lands from attach merit as none of the second party members had any claim over the same and ultimately on 20-9-1971 the learned Magistrate decided the case in favour of the first party declaring his possession over all the rest of the lands which continued under attachment in the case. Thereafter second party Nos. 1 to 5 and 7 to 9 preferred Criminal Revision No. 608 of 1971 in this Court against the aforesaid order? passed on remand on 20-9-1971. Second party No. 6 did not join as a Petitioner in the said revision but he was arrayed as on opposite party. This Court on 2-4-1972 remanded the said case for a fresh consideration of the case in respect of all the second party members except the case of second party No. 9 whose possession was declared by this Court in respect of only 3 acres of the attached land as claimed by him. This Court on 2-4-1972 remanded the said case for a fresh consideration of the case in respect of all the second party members except the case of second party No. 9 whose possession was declared by this Court in respect of only 3 acres of the attached land as claimed by him. Das, J, as he then was, while remanding the said case found, on a consideration of the materials on record, that second party No. 9 was in possession of 3 acres of land; each of the second party members claimed possession over separate and distinct parcels of land out of the attached property but their cases and the affidavits filed in support of their? separate cases had not been dealt with separately and in the correct perspective. On the aforesaid findings Das, J declared the possession of second party No. 9 over 3 acres of land as chimed by him, and remanded the case for fresh consideration of the claims put forward by the other second party members and for disposal of the same according to law and in accordance with the observations made in the said judgment. On remand, the learned Magistrate on a consideration of the materials before him and on a consideration of the distinct cases put forward by, each of the second party members 1 to 9 separately vis-a-vis the claim put forward by the first party declared that each of the second party members was separately in possession of distinct panels of land out of the said 22.77 acres of land as claimed by them. This Criminal Revision has been filed by the first party challenging only the finding of the Court below in favour of second party members 1 to 8 in respect of Ac. 19.77 decimals in all. The finding in favour of opposite party No. 9 in respect of 3 acres of land claimed by him has not been challenged by the Petitioner. 3. Mr. Ray, the learned Counsel for the first party-Petitioner, has urged that in view of the distinct claims put forward by each of the second party members 1 to 8 in respect of separate plots of land, the learned Magistrate committed on illegality in not splitting up the proceeding into separate cases in respect of each distinct claim put forward by each of the second party members 1 to 8. According to Mr. According to Mr. Ray, the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in disposing of this matter involving separate claims put forward by the second party members in one proceeding and by one order, ?and? hence the impugned order is bad in law. Mr. Ray has further urged that consideration of the separate claims of the second party members and disposal of the matter by one order has greatly prejudiced the first party. 4. The above-mentioned points on which the impugned order is challenged by Mr. Ray for the Petitioner have not been taken in the revision petition. The second party members have raised separate claims in respect of specific parcels of land ever since they put up opposition against the claim of the first party and filed affidavits in support of their respective claims, This proceeding, instituted in the year 1968, has by now been decided three times by the concerned Magistrate after hearing both the patties. Revision petitions by now have been filed three times by both and/or one or the other party. At no stage-either in this Court or before the Magistrate the above mentioned points regarding illegality, jurisdiction and/or prejudice, as urged at this stage were ever taken or agitated. 5. I will at first take up the question as to whether the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in dealing with the matter in one proceeding and by disposing of the same by one order and whether on that account the impugned order is bad in law. Mr. Ray, in support of his submission on these points has cited 3 decisions of this Court reported in Mathuri Mallik Vs. Satrughna Giri and Others, and Sudarsan Das and Ors. v. Jagannath Roul 1971 (2) C.W.F. 377. In the case reported in Ratan Majhi and Ors. v. Budu Rondhar 25 (1955) C.L.T. 174 and Ors. each party consisted of 23 persons, and both the parties claimed that each member of the party was individually interested in specific plots and neither party was jointly interested in any of the items of the disputed property. Each member of the first party claimed one distinct bit of the disputed land as his ancestral land, and every member of the, second party put forward similar claims in respect of separate bits of lands. Each member of the first party claimed one distinct bit of the disputed land as his ancestral land, and every member of the, second party put forward similar claims in respect of separate bits of lands. Even on the facts of that case, the Magistrate directed that joint possession of the disputed lands should be delivered to second party Nos. 1 to 14, though-there were more than 14 persons arrayed as members of the second party. It was also found in that case that the order of the learned Magistrate was lacking in definiteness. On the above facts and on the patently erroneous decision arrived at by the Magistrate in that case, Panigrahi, C.J. observed that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to combine such separate and distinct disputes between several persons into one and treat them all as one dispute. On a reading of the said decision I am of the view that Panigrahi, C.J. was Impelled to make the above observation regarding want of jurisdiction because of the obviously incorrect action of the Magistrate in treating such a matter, involving such multifarious disputes and claims between such a large number of persons in each party - each different and distinct from the other as one dispute, and then again disposing of the same by such a patently incorrect order. There is no express law prohibiting consideration and disposal of such disputes in one proceeding and by one order, provided in the order passed separate disputes are dealt with separately on a proper consideration of the materials on record. But as that becomes a difficult and risky proposition and may cause prejudice to one or the other party, it is desirable that where distinct and separate claims are put forward by parties in respect of separate parcels of land, the Court should split up the case into suitable number of proceedings which would enable the parties to present their cases properly and enable the Court to consider each claim and dispute raised by the party in a convenient manner. The dictum for splitting up of such proceedings is only a rule of prudence and is not a rule of law so as to render disposal of such a matter in one proceeding illegal and/or without jurisdiction on that score only, without any other consideration. The dictum for splitting up of such proceedings is only a rule of prudence and is not a rule of law so as to render disposal of such a matter in one proceeding illegal and/or without jurisdiction on that score only, without any other consideration. There is nothing to support such a contention either in the aforesaid decision or in Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. There is nothing in the decision reported in Mathuri Mallik v. Satrughna Giri and four Ors. cited by Mr. Ray, to support the abovementioned contention of Mr. Ray in all fours. The observation in the said decision that the Magistrate should have drawn up separate proceedings in respect of the separate disputes relating to the various parcels of the property was made in the context of the findings of the Hon?ble Judge that dropping of a similar proceeding in the past did not avoid breach of peace and the Sub-divisional Magistrate was compelled to start another proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure; that apprehension of breach of peace had not disappeared; and that the Magistrate improperly dropped the proceeding and evaded the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure by adopting the shortcut method of keeping the property in charge of the receiver until the rights of the parties were decided by a Civil Court, with a view to save himself from the trouble of hearing several proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus the observations for drawing up separate proceedings in respect of die various parcels of the disputed property were made entirely on different contexts and on the peculiar facts of that case, and there is nothing in the said decision to support the point as agitated by Mr. Ray. In the case reported in Sudarsan Das and Ors. v. Jagannath Roul 1971 (2) C.W.F. 377, also cited by Mr. Ray, it is observed that as the Magistrate did not draw up separate proceedings in respect of the three different and distinct claims put forward by the three second party members they could legitimately claim to have suffered prejudice and so the entire proceeding stood vitiated on that account. v. Jagannath Roul 1971 (2) C.W.F. 377, also cited by Mr. Ray, it is observed that as the Magistrate did not draw up separate proceedings in respect of the three different and distinct claims put forward by the three second party members they could legitimately claim to have suffered prejudice and so the entire proceeding stood vitiated on that account. Though the facts of that case and the contentions raised by the parties are not dearly stated in that short decision, it appears from the trend of that decision that the second party members in the very first revision preferred against the Magistrate?s order agitated the question of prejudice on the facts of that case. Moreover, there is nothing in the said decision to show that the distinct case of each of the second party members was separately dealt with in the impugned final order; rather from the tone of the decision it appears that their cases were not dealt with separately. Accordingly I do not attach much of weight to the said decision. 6. It is worthwhile reiterating here that in the case before me the learned Magistrate in the impugned order has separately considered and decided the distinct case and claim of each of the second party members on the materials produced by the parties, and the first party never agitated the above-mentioned questions of illegality, want of jurisdiction or prejudice in course of the long pendency of this proceeding and its chequered career as mentioned earlier in this judgment. So the observations in the above-mentioned decisions cited by Mr. Ray, made on the peculiar facts and circumstances of those cases - distinct and different from the case before me, do not apply to this case in all fours. 7. As against the above-mentioned decisions cited by Mr. Ray, Mr. Sinha, the learned Counsel for the opposite parties, has cited the decisions of this Court reported in Jage Kishan and 22 Ors. v. Benimadhav Supakar and 61 Ors. 31 (1966) C.L.T. 388 and Rabindra Mohapatra v. Bhagirathi Mohapatra and Ors. 1972 (1) C.W.R. 743, In Jaga Kishan?s case Das, J. as he then was, has? distinguished the decision in Ratan Majhi?s case cited by Mr. v. Benimadhav Supakar and 61 Ors. 31 (1966) C.L.T. 388 and Rabindra Mohapatra v. Bhagirathi Mohapatra and Ors. 1972 (1) C.W.R. 743, In Jaga Kishan?s case Das, J. as he then was, has? distinguished the decision in Ratan Majhi?s case cited by Mr. Ray, by observing that in that case each party consisted of 23 members who claimed separate possession in respect of specific plots and neither party was jointly interested in any specific item of the property in dispute after distinguishing Batan Majhi?s easel on facts and relying on various other decisions of different Courts on this question. Das, J accepted with approval the view that it was not illegal or irregular to combine a large number of plots in a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure where the dispute was between a landlord claiming possession over a large number of plots on one side and on the other side different sets of tenants claimed possession over different plots of the said lands. He, however, held that the Court, in disposing of such a matter in one proceeding, should see whether any prejudice thereby is caused to the parties. He definitely held that disposing of such a matter by one proceeding was certainly not without jurisdiction as contended in that case. R.N, Misra, J., in the case reported in Rabindra Mohapatra v. Bhagirathi Mohapatra and Ors. 1972 (1) C.W.R. 743, negatived the contention raised about non maintainability of a combined proceeding in that case in which the first party laid claim to the entire disputed property and the second party laid claim to portions thereof; a case similar to the present case, before me. After referring to Ratan Majhi?s case Misra, J. observed: On a proper analysis the real principle seems to be that only when there? would be mutuality of disputes in regard to portions of the disputed property they would become separate disputes: otherwise there would be a lot of inconvenience particularly for, that party who has a total claim to the entire property, to fight many disputes in regard to the same property over which he has only a single claim. 8. I am in full agreement with the view taken by Das, J and R.N. Misra, J in the above-mentioned two decisions. 9. 8. I am in full agreement with the view taken by Das, J and R.N. Misra, J in the above-mentioned two decisions. 9. In the case before me true it is that the second party members have laid separate claims to distinct parcels of land, but their claims, more or less, are on similar grounds though for separate portions of land claimed by the first party. The lone first party member claims possession over the entire property attached in this case as against all the members of the second party. So the claim on one side was to the whole and on the other to portions. The learned Magistrate in the impugned order has separately considered the case of each individual second party member in respect of the distinct claim put forward by him vis-a-vis the claim of the first patty. The findings in the impugned judgment have not been assailed as illegal or incorrect on merits. On the above facts and the view approved by me as mentioned above I am satisfied that the Magistrate did not act without jurisdiction and/or illegally in disposing of this proceeding by this impugned order. 10. As stated above, the first party at no stage and on no occasion pressed for the splitting up of this case and he never alleged any case of prejudice. After the case was remanded to the Court below on the last occasion some of the members of the second party in that Court wanted to adduce fresh materials in respect of their separate claims, but the first party seriously opposed the above prayer and urged that the case should be decided on the materials already on record. The case of prejudice was raised by the counsel of the first party for the first time only at the last hearing of this revision. Nothing could also be shown as to in what particular manner the first party was prejudiced by the disposal of the proceeding in the manner stated above. The manner in which the separate "claims of the second party have been considered and disposed of by the impugned order I do not see any cause for a prejudice to the first party on that account. 11. Mr. Ray did not urge any other point to assail the impugned order. 12. There is, therefore, no merit in this revision and it is accordingly dismissed. Revision dismissed. 11. Mr. Ray did not urge any other point to assail the impugned order. 12. There is, therefore, no merit in this revision and it is accordingly dismissed. Revision dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed