( 1 ) THE respondents-plaintiffs filed a suit in the trial court for possession of the plaint schedule properties, mesne profits and damages. The trial court decreed the suit for eviction and awarded mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 60 per day and disallowed the claim for damages. The defendant appealed and the plaintiffs filed cross-objections regarding the disallowed part of the claim. The lower appellate court confirmed the decree for eviction and enhanced the rate of mesne profits to Rs. 75 per day and also awarded damages of Rs. 5000 with interest thereon at six per cent per annum from the date of suit. The Defendant has come up in second appeal. ( 2 ) THE suit schedule properties consist of buildings standing on two sy. Nos. 10/1 and 10/2, the total extent of which is 46 cents located in the heart of Mangalore. It is near the Hampankatta bus-stand, Government arts and Science College and Government Officers and Banks. The properties belong to Sri P. A. Pandit, an officer in the Indian Air Force. They are administered by his mother and Power of Attorney Holder Smt, Pandit ramabai. There is a big building with 33 rooms wherein a Lodging and! boarding Hotel as well as a Rustaurant under the name of ' Jaya Cafe' are run by the defendant from 1948 onwards. There are also shop premises facing the road on the ground floor of the building. Originally, there were three residential houses and out-houses bearing the name "parameswara vilas". Under a registered lease deed, Ext. D. 1, dated 11-6-1946, the property was leased fur a period of 15 years by Mrs. Rama Bai, the Power of attorney Holder, in favour of the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 120 per month. One of the conditions of the lease was that the defendant should put up a building worth not less than Rs. 20,000 within two years and to give vacant pessession of the leased property after the expiry of the lease without claiming any compensation for the improvements made by him. The defendant erected a new building and started his hotel business The period stipulated under Ext. D. 1 expired on 10-6-1961. By another registered lcase deed Ext. 20,000 within two years and to give vacant pessession of the leased property after the expiry of the lease without claiming any compensation for the improvements made by him. The defendant erected a new building and started his hotel business The period stipulated under Ext. D. 1 expired on 10-6-1961. By another registered lcase deed Ext. D-2, dated 9-2-1961, a fresh agreement of lease was entered into between Smt. Ramabai Pandit and the defendant under which the defendant was allowed to continue in possession of the premises for another period of nine years expiring on 11-6-1970. Smt. Ramabai terminated the tenancy of the defendant by a registered notice Ext. P-5, dated 1-6-1970, as she did not want to renew the lease in favour of the defendant. The defendant refused to vacate the premises arid issued a reply notice, ext. P-3, dated 10-4-1970. Thereafter on 23-4-1970, Smt. Ramabai Pandit executed a registered lease deed, Ext. P-1, in favour of the present plaintiffs for a period of ten years from 12-6-1970 on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,800. Under the terms of Ext. P1, she transferred her rights to evict the defendant and his sub-tenants. The plaintiffs instituted the suit against the defendant thereafter. ( 3 ) THE defendant pleaded that he cannot be evicted by virtue of the protection given under the Mysore Rent Control Act and that the plaintiffs have not derived any right, title or interest in the suit premises under ext. P1, since according to him, it offends the provisions of the Mysore rent Control Act and is void. He also denied his liability to pay damages and mesne profits. ( 4 ) THE trial Court held that the suit premises is a non-residential building and therefore exempt from the application of Part V of the Mysore rent Control Act under S. 31 of that Act. It held that Smt. Ramabai was competent to execute Ext. P1, that Ext. P1 is not illegal and that the defendant is liable to be evicted. In view of the fact that the rent fixed under ext. P1 is Rs. 1,800 p. m. , it considered that Rs,60 per day would be the reasonable amount of mesne profits and since in its opinion the quantum of damages sustained by the lessor had not been proved, it rejected the claim for damages. In view of the fact that the rent fixed under ext. P1 is Rs. 1,800 p. m. , it considered that Rs,60 per day would be the reasonable amount of mesne profits and since in its opinion the quantum of damages sustained by the lessor had not been proved, it rejected the claim for damages. The lower appellate Court agreed with the finding of the trial Court that the suit premises constituted a non-residential building and therefore exempt under S. 31 from the application of the provisions of Part V of the Mysore Rent Control Act. It held that Ext. P1 is not void under S. 23 of the Contract Act. It enhanced the mesna profits to Rs. 75 per day and also awarded damages of Rs. 5,000. ( 5 ) THE first contention urged by Mr. Sundaraswamy appearing for the appellant is that the Power of Attorney, Ext. P2, did not authorise Mrs, ramabai to execute the lease deed Ext. P1 in favour of the plaintiffs since on the date of Ext. P1, namely, 23-4-1970 the period of the lease granted in favour of the defendant under Ext. D2 had not expired, and it was due to expire only on 11-6-1970 Ext. P1 purports to grant the lease from 12-6-1970 in favour of the plaintiffs. According to him, the power of attorney, ext. P2 authorised Mrs. Pandit only to grant leases in possession and did not authorise her to grant a lease in reversion like Ext. P1. He has relied on certain passages in Woodfall's 'landlord and Tenant', 27th Edn, Vol. 1. At page 264, it has been stated that all leases which are not to take effect in possession immediately, but from a future day, are considered as reversionary leases, within the meaning of powers to grant leases in possession and not in reversion, and that a reversionary lease is one granted for a term which is to commence from or after the expiration or other determination of a previous lease. At page 53, in para 118, it has been stated as follows:" In all well-drawn powers of leasing it should be expressly declared whether a lease in reversion may be granted, or whether the leaso is to be made tp take effect in possession, and not in reversion, or by way of future interest. At page 53, in para 118, it has been stated as follows:" In all well-drawn powers of leasing it should be expressly declared whether a lease in reversion may be granted, or whether the leaso is to be made tp take effect in possession, and not in reversion, or by way of future interest. A general power to make leases, without saying more, authorises only leases in possession,"he also relied on the passage in Bowstead on Agency, 13th Edn, at page 65 under Art. 24 to the Effect that "powers of attorney must be strictly construed and are interpreted as giving only such authority as they confer expressly or by necessary implication". In Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edn, Vol. 1, at page 161 it has been stated as follows :" The instrument conferring authority by deed is termed a power of attorney, a document which is construed strictly by the Courts, according to well recognised rules. Regard is first had to the recitals, which, showing the general object, control the general terms in the operative part of the deed. General words are construed as having reference only to the special powers, but include incidental powers necessary for carrying cut the authority. "tn llalsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn, Vol. 30, at page 223, it has been staed as follows :" A power to grant leases in pssession is not well exercised by a lease in reversion. For this purpose, 'possession' includes recerpt of rent, though a concurrent lease that is, a lease commencing in praesenti but taking effect only after the determination of a subsisting leasa is not a lease in possession. Further, a power to lease which specifies no time for commencement normally authorises only a Isiase commencing forthwith, though it may be possible to construe the power as expressly or by implication authorising a lease to commence in future. " ( 6 ) IN the written statement it has been denied that the Power of attorney had the power to grant the lease under Ext P1 or the authority tp delegate to the plaintiffs the power, if she had, to evict tenants, or institute or file suits. The 7th issue is "whether Mrs. Ramabai was competent to execute the document, Ext. P1?" Hence, there is no specific plea or issue relating to the question urged by the appellant now. The 7th issue is "whether Mrs. Ramabai was competent to execute the document, Ext. P1?" Hence, there is no specific plea or issue relating to the question urged by the appellant now. This question was not urged in the lower appellate Court either in the grounds of appeal or during arguments. It is not also taken in the appeal grounds before this court. The trial Court held that the Power of Attorney Holder had the authority to grant the lease in favour of the plaintiffs under Ext. P1. Hence, this question must be deemed to have been waived by the defendant in the lower appeellate Court. On merits also, this contention has to fail. ( 7 ) S. 105 and S. 5 of the Transfer of Property Act also do not recognise the distinction between the two kinds of leases-lease in possession and lease in reversion. Moreover, in Woodfall's 'law of Landlord and Tomant' at page 50, the principles applicable to the construction of leasing powers have been seated as follows ;" 107. Construction of leasing powers:. . . . . The rules of costruction have been variously stated by different Judges, some of whom have laid down thai leasing powers are to be construed liberally and equitably in favour of the donee, while others have said that limited rowrs are to be consstrued strictly for the tenant for life and liberally for the remainderman, observing conditions in favour of the next taker not literally only, but substantiatty. It would appear however that the true rule is that powers must be construed according to the intention of the parties, and that such intention must be construed impartially without leaning to either side. A power is to be so construed that the estate itself, which is subjected to the power, will not be destroyed by the exercise of it. It is the duty of the, Court to support a power, if possible, and to give effect to its execution, if it is not exercised from improper motives. If a power does not specify what term may be granted, the intention of the settlor may be gathered from the terms of the instrument. "it is therefore relevant to consider the terms of the instrument to determine the intention of the owner. The Power of Attorney, Ext. P2, was executed on 6-4-1946. The owner, Mr. If a power does not specify what term may be granted, the intention of the settlor may be gathered from the terms of the instrument. "it is therefore relevant to consider the terms of the instrument to determine the intention of the owner. The Power of Attorney, Ext. P2, was executed on 6-4-1946. The owner, Mr. P. A. Pandit, appears to be an officer in the Indian Air Force. He is described in Ext. P2 as an Engineer. It is stated that he is about to go out of Mangalore on a permanent employment and being unable to return every now and then to Mangalore, appointed his mother Mrs. Ramabai Pandit as his General Power of Attorney Holder to administer all his moveable and immoveable properties in Mangalore and outside. It empowers her to manage and administer all his properties in her discretion, to lease them out either for short term or long term leases, or even to sell them out-right for the best available price as she deems best and invest the available realisations to her best advantage at her choice. It also authorises her to collect the rents of his properties from the several tenants, to give them on lease to good tenants of her choice and to take steps for recovery of rents from the tenants and otherwise manage all his properties. He has also empowered her to deal with all his properties moveable and immoveable at her choice and in her discretion as she may deem fit. She has further been authorised to specifically delegate all these or any of the powers granted to her to any other person or persons whom she thinks fit and proper for such time as she deems best. It is further stated in Ext. P2 that he confirms and ratifies all that his mother does in furtherance of those objects stated therein and all acts done by her as acts done by himself personally. It is thus seen that the intention of Mr. Pandit was to authorise his mother to manage and administer all his properties as she thought best and to grant leases. Even the power to sell his properties for the prices she considers best has been given to her. It is thus seen that the intention of Mr. Pandit was to authorise his mother to manage and administer all his properties as she thought best and to grant leases. Even the power to sell his properties for the prices she considers best has been given to her. Hence it must be deemed that the intention of the settler was to authorise the Power of attorney Holder to grant leases both in possession as well as in reversion. It is significant that the lease granted to the defendant under Ext. D2 is also a lease in reversion. The defendant himself having obtained such a lease from Mrs. Pandit is estopped from questioning the authority of Mrs. Pandit to grant a lease in reversion in favour of the plaintiffs under Ext. P1. Hence, for all these reasons, this contention has to be rejected. ( 8 ) IT is next contended on behalf of the appellant that Ext. P2 did not authorise the Power of Attorney Holder to lease the new building put up by the defendant. The decision in Dr. K. A. Dhairyaean v. J. R. Thalour, AIR. 1958 SC. 789. is relied on. In that case, under the terms of the lease, the lessee had to construct within six months from the date of lease a double storied building to the satisfaction of the lessor's Engineers. On the termination of the lease either at the end of 21 years or earlier the lessee had to surrender the demised premises with its fixtures and appurtenancies to the lessor without any compensation for the same. Shortly before the lease expired, the lessor gave notice to the lessee to deliver possession of the demised premises and the building on the expiry of the lease. It was held that the period of lease having expired and the lessee having been given notice to quit, he was to vacate the premises unless protected by the provisions of Act 57 of 1947. It was held that the lessee would be a tenant of the land under that Act and that he could not be evicted so long as he complied with the provisions of that Act. The plaint confined the reliefs claimed by the lessors only to the building constructed on the land. It was held that the lessee would be a tenant of the land under that Act and that he could not be evicted so long as he complied with the provisions of that Act. The plaint confined the reliefs claimed by the lessors only to the building constructed on the land. In the lease deed there was no clause positively stating that tho building to be erected on the demised land would be in the ownership of the lessors and that the building would be deemed to have been leased! to the lessees along with the demised land The various clauses of the lease were held to be consistent with the ownership of the building being with the lessees in which lessors had no right while the lease subsisted. In that case, Act 57 of 1947 was held to give to the person who continues to remain in possession of the land, although the period of the lease had come to an end, the stalus of a statutory tenant, and that he could not be evicted save as provided by the Act. It was therefore held that the lessors could not claim to be the owners of the property during the subsistence of the lease. On behalf of the lessor in that case, reliance was placed on the decision in bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Ltd v. D. C. Patel, AIR. 1953 SC. 16. But that decision was distinguished on the ground that in that case one of the clauses of the lease expressly stated that immediately after the completion of the building within the time specified, the lessors of the land would grant to the lessees a lease of the land with the building thereon for a term of 999 years from the date of the auction at a yearly rent. That clause was interpreted to mean that a lease would be granted not only of the land but also of the buidling on it for a term of 999 years from the date of the auction. Since there was no such clause in the case before them, the decision in bhatia Co-op Housing Society's case (2) was held not applicable. In the present case, under Ext. D1, the defendant was bound to put up a new construction of the value of not less than Rs. Since there was no such clause in the case before them, the decision in bhatia Co-op Housing Society's case (2) was held not applicable. In the present case, under Ext. D1, the defendant was bound to put up a new construction of the value of not less than Rs. 20,000 and the defendant had to hand over all the properties with the improvements, additions and the new constructions to the lessor on the expiry of the period of lease and the defendant was not entitled to claim any compensation in respect of the new constructions erected by him or to take away the materials in them. The defendant erected the new building in the year 1948. He entered into a new lease agreement under Ext. D2 under which the lease was granted for a further period of five years from 11-6-1961. Under one of the terms of ext. D2, the defendant has acknowledged that all superstructures, fixtures, appurtenances and trees grown " as they now exist on the premises " are of the right of the lessor The lease is in respect of the properties mentioned in the schedule of Ext. D2. Items 1, 3 and 5 of that schedule constitute the new building put up by the defendant under the terms of Ext. D1. In Ext. P3. the reply notice issued on behalf of the defendant to Mrs. Pandit on 10-4-1970, it has been stated that on the expiry of the period of the lease under Ext. D2, all the buildings constructed by the defendant in the leasehold property passed on to the landlord and that the landlord became the owner of the same. It is further stated that the rent of Rs. 600 fixed under ext. D2, the subsequent lease deed, was for the land and all the buildings that stood on the property. In Bhatia Co-op Housing Society 's case (2) it has been held that under S. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, where one of the terms of the lease provided that the lessor would grant a further lease of property along with the building put up fay the lessee under the terms of the first lease, the lessor became the owner of the new build on the expiry of the period of the first lease. That decision applies to the facts of the present case. That decision applies to the facts of the present case. Hence, the lessor became the owner of the new building put up by the defendant under the terms of Ext. D1 and Ext. D2. The defendant has also acknowledged the ownership of the lessor in respect of the said new building both in Ext. D2 as well as Ext. P3. The relationship of landlord and tenant has been established in respect of the new building under Ext. D2. The defendant is therefore estopped from questioning the ownership of the lessor in respect of the new building. The lease in favour of the plaintiffs, Ext. P1, is subsquent to Ext. P3. The defendant, therefore, cannot question the authority of Mrs. Pandit to grant a lease in respect of the new building also to the plaintiffs. ( 9 ) IT is next contended by Mr. Sundaraswamy, that Mrs. Pandit herself had no right to sue for eviction and that therefore she could not transfer any such right to the plaintiffs under Ext. P1. His contentoin is that the power of Attorney, Ext. P2, authorised Mrs. Pandit to sue for eviction only in case there was default in the payment of rent, but not otherwise. Under Ext. P1, Mrs. Pandit has specifically transferred all her rights as lessor and has empowered the plaintiffs to institute such legal proceedings as is necessary for evicting the defendant or his sub-tenants. In Bhagat ram v. Keshab Deo, AIR. 1965 Assam 55. it was held that under S. 109 of the T. P. Act, there was no bar to the lessor to grant a second lease in favour of a third person during the subsistence of the first lease and that after the creation of such a lease, the reversionary right of the lessor was transferred to the new lessee and that the new lessee stepped into the shoes of the lessor-landlord for the purpose of evicting the original lessees. It was held that apart from the specific provision in the second lease itself that the transferee can take necessary steps for eviction of the original lessees, he was entitled to enforce the right of the transferor under S. 109 of the T. P. Act, to enter into possession of the property by evicting the original lessees. The power to lease given to Mrs. Pandit under Ext. The power to lease given to Mrs. Pandit under Ext. P2 includes the power to terminate the lease and sue for eviction. At page 75 of Bowstead on Agency, is the following statement:" A is the manager of an estate. He has implied authority to contratrt for the usual and customary leases, and to give and receive notices to quit to and from the tenants and to enter into agreements with tenants authorising them to change the mode of cultivation, and providing for the basis on which compensation for improvements shall be payable on the determination of the tenancy,"at page 72 of the same book, it is stated, under Art. 28, that every agent has implied authority to do whatever is necessary for, or ordinarily incidental to, the effective execution of his express authority in the usual way. Hence, this contention of the appellant also must be rejected. ( 10 ) BOTH the lower Courts have held on Issue No. 1 that the suit premises is exempt under S. 31 of the Act from the application of Part V of the Act, since it is a non-residential building, the monthly rent of which exceeds Rs. 500. It is the contention of Mr. Sundaraswamy that his finding is not sustainable. Ext. D1 states that the property leased is the entire compound measuring about 45 cents with all the existing three residential houses buildings and out-houses, two bath rooms, sheds, one well, two cow sheds etc. But it is also stated therein that any sub-tease of any part of the premises to any tenant or tenants without in any way diminishing the liabilities of the lessee and retaining the use and object of a substantial part of the lease-hold for ' lessee's own business' shall not be deemed to be a violation of the terms of the leass. Ext. D2 also refers to the extent of the property being 45 cents containing three residential houses, outhouses etc. , as having been taken under the lease deed Ext. D1. ( 11 ) UNDER S. 3 (a) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Act, the definition 'building' excludes a room or other accommodation in a hotel or a lodging house. , as having been taken under the lease deed Ext. D1. ( 11 ) UNDER S. 3 (a) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Act, the definition 'building' excludes a room or other accommodation in a hotel or a lodging house. Under Cl (1) of that section, " the owner of a lodging house " has been defined to include any person who receives or is entitled to receive, any monetary consideration from any person on account of board, lodging or other service. Part VI of the act deals with Hotels and Lodging Houses. Sec. 32 deals with fixation of fair rates to be charged for board, lodging or other service and the number of lodgers. Section 35 provides that no charges in excess of the fair rate shall be recoverable. Section 36 relates to restriction on ejectment of lodgers. S. 37 provides for recovery of possession by the manager of a hotel or owner of a lodging house from a lodger. S. 39 provides for penalties enforced on the Manager of a hotel or owner of a lodging house. S. 40 provides for enquiries by the competent authority. S. 41 provides for appeals against the order passed by the competent authority. S. 42 provides for deposit in Court of charges payable by the lodger in certain cases. ( 12 ) IN Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR. 1968 J and K. 59. the premises were let out for running a hotel. It was held that the Statements of Objects and reasons in a statute is not admissible in aid of construction of any provision of a statute where the words of the statute are quite clear and unambiguous and they can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which actuated the sponsors of any bill to introduce it in the legislature or to appreciate the urgency of the evil which was sought to be remedied. The follofwing statement as to the interpretation of statutes in Jugalkishore v. Raw Cotton Co Ltd, AIR, 1965 SC. 376. was referred to. " The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is, by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. The follofwing statement as to the interpretation of statutes in Jugalkishore v. Raw Cotton Co Ltd, AIR, 1965 SC. 376. was referred to. " The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is, by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. "therefore, it was held that the words used in the statute should be interpreted as they appaar without recourse to the Statement of Objects and reasons. Under S. 2 (3) of the Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent control Act, 'house,' was defined as follows :" 'house' means a building or part of building suitable for occupation and residence and includes- (a) garden, ground and out-houses (if any) appurtenant to such building or part of a building; (b) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use, in such building or part of a building. "it was hold that the building used for commercial purposes such as that of a hotel is a 'house' within the meaning of S. 2 (3) of that Act. But it is to be noticed that in our Act, the definition of 'building' excludes a room or other accommodation in a hotel or a lodging house. In Waller and Son, ltd v. Thomas, (1921) 1 KB. 541. it was held that a public house which contains dwelling house accommodation constitutes and falls within the general provisions of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920 and that it does not constitute business premises within Section 13. The decision of the Court of Appeal. in Epsom Grand Stand Assn v. Clarke, 35 TLR. 525, was followed. But Mccardie J. made the following observations which are pertinent :" That is a definite decision of the Court of Appeal, but I confess to feeling that juristic criticism may be properly applied to it: I feel with the deepest respect that the true test is to ascertain the dominant purpose and principal user of the premises. One might well have thought that the dominant purpose and object of a public house was 10 carry on the business of a lic. One might well have thought that the dominant purpose and object of a public house was 10 carry on the business of a lic. nsed victualler and that the provision of accommodation for the occupants was a mere adjunct of the business, One might have said that premises do not cease to be ' business premises' becauss dwelling accommodation necessary for the purpose of the business is attached. However the court of Appeal have taken a different view and we must loyally follow it. In my opinion Mr. Wootten is right in saying that the Act of 1920 recognizes the Epsom decision and treats it as an integral part of the scheme of the Act; for S. 12, sub-sec (2) (ii), provides that the application of the Act shall not be excluded" by reason only that part of the premises is used as a shop or office or for business trade or professional purposes". Reading the Epsom decision in conjunction with those words I cannot avoid the conclusion that this-house must be treaed as a dwelling house within the general provisions of the Act rather than as business premises under S. 13 with the special modifications therein provided. . . . . . . "in his opinion, the dominant purpose and object of a public house is to carry on the business of a licensed victualler and that the mere fact that accommodation was provided for the occupants would only constitute an adjunct of the business and that the premises could not cease to be a business premises. In that case, part of the buildinng was used for business purposes. In Dakshina Murthy v. Thulja Bai, AIR. 1952 Mad. 413. the building was used for several years for the residence of the owner. Then it was let to a tenant who was carrying on business in chappals and thereafter to the defendant for his business in hides and skins. Structurally, the building appeared to have been meant for residence rather than for carrying on business. The locality in which the building was situate was predominantly a business locality. Under S. 2 (1) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) act, 1946, 'building' was defined to mean " any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes ". There was no, definition of 'residential building'. Under S. 2 (1) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) act, 1946, 'building' was defined to mean " any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes ". There was no, definition of 'residential building'. Under S. 11 (1) of that Act, it was provided that no residential building shall be converted into a non-residential building except with the permission in writing of the Controller. It was held that the main considerations for the purpose of determining whether a building is residential or non-residential were as follows :" (1) Where there is an instrument of tenancy specifically and explicitly declaring the purpose of the letting as residential or non-residential, no duficulty generally arises; (2) Where there is no such instrument of tenancy the question will have to be considered on the basis of direct evidence 'aliunde' concerning the purpose of the letting, which may ba adduced in a case; (3) If no such evidence is too forthcoming, the Court can only look at the evidence concerning the user of the premises by the tenant down to the date of the application for eviction as acquiesced in by the landlord, for such user and such acquiescence afford a safe basis for an inference of agreement between the parties as to the purpose of the letting; (4) Where there is such evidence of user, but there is no evidence of such acquiescence, the structural design, the antecedent user of the building by the landlord ss known to the tenant and other surrounding circumstances, if any, will also have to enter into the determination of the question whether the building is or is not residential; (5) Difficulty may sometimes still remain, i. e. , evidently after applying the tests above indicated if the building is found let for both kinds of purposes, residential and non-residential, no distinction being made between one part as let for one purpose and the other for the other purpose. In such a case it seems to us, that what has to be determined as a question of fact is what was the real, main and substantial purpose of the letting? In such a case it seems to us, that what has to be determined as a question of fact is what was the real, main and substantial purpose of the letting? "it was also observed that what is at the inception a residential building may well become a non-residential one, by force of the terms of a letting, and that any conversion, after the letting, of a residential building into a non-residential building may well take place within and only within the limits which the statute prescribes. It was also observed that it is not possible to conclude that if prior to letting a building happens to have been of one character it must forever keep that character irrespective of what the effect of the letting or of the acts of the parties subsequent to the letting may be. Their Lordships also referred to the observations of Mccard e, J in Waller and Sons v. Thomas set out above and observed that there is no reason why the test of dominant purpose and principal user propounded by that learned Judge should not be regarded as applicable to cases arising under the Madras Act. It was therefore held that the purpose of letting being non-residential in that case, the mere structural fitness of the building for a residence at the time of letting does not prevent the building from being considered as a non-residential building. ( 13 ) IN the written statement, the defendant pleaded that the residential houses which formed the subject-matter of Ext. D1 retain the character of residential houses, that one of the houses is occupied by the defendant as his residence and the second house is occupied by his Manager for his residence. It is also alleged that the new building put up by him was being used as lodgings and do not thereby become non-residential buildings. * * * according to the Report of the Commissioner, all 1he buildings were used for non-residential purposes. The eastern side building consisted of four rooms and a spacious varandah. It was kept vacant and the doors were kept open and nobody was there at the time of his visit. It was contended that in the present case the purpose of letting is not mentioned in either ext. D1 or Ext. D2 and that the user by the tenant is therefore material. It was kept vacant and the doors were kept open and nobody was there at the time of his visit. It was contended that in the present case the purpose of letting is not mentioned in either ext. D1 or Ext. D2 and that the user by the tenant is therefore material. It is also admitted that no permission has been given by the Controller to convert the suit premises into a non-residential one just as in the Madras decision. It is contended by Mr. Sundaraswamy, that the dominant purpose of letting was that the new building constructed by the tenant should be used as a hotel and rastaurant and that the old houses which were in existence on the date of Ext. D1 continue to be used for lodging even at the time of the suit. ( 14 ) MR. SUNDARASWAMY, relied on the decision in Sanjiva Shet v, lavinana Kamath, 1961 Myslj. 561. In that case, a house and three shops situated in the same compound were let to the tenant. The landlord asked for occupation of the residential building. It was held that the lease must be construed as the lease of two buildings, one residential and other non-residential, and that the landlord was entitled to the occupation of the residential building, namely, the house. In that context it was observed that the Madras Buildings lease and Rent Control Act (25 of 1949) is an 'exhaustive and complete Code on the subject of leases of buildings and if under that law the landlord is entitled to recover possession of the residential building, it would not be open to the tenant to resist the landlord's claim on the ground that it infringes some other principles or statutory provision. ( 15 ) MR. SUNDARASWAMY's contention is that the premises continues to be residenial in character irrespective of the user to which it is put, since there is no permission to convert the residential building under Ext. D1 into a non-residential building. ( 16 ) ON behalf of the appellants, reliance was placed on the decision in Gumpena Ramachandra Rao v. Kotturu Ramakrishna Rao, 1969 All. Ind. Rent Con. Jr. 504. which was a case under the AP Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act (15 of 1960 ). D1 into a non-residential building. ( 16 ) ON behalf of the appellants, reliance was placed on the decision in Gumpena Ramachandra Rao v. Kotturu Ramakrishna Rao, 1969 All. Ind. Rent Con. Jr. 504. which was a case under the AP Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act (15 of 1960 ). The purpose of the lease was stated in the lease deed to be for running a business or for lodging hotel by the lessee. The tenants were not living in the premises but were letting out the rooms only for the lodgers. The premises was used only as a lodging house. There was no definition In the Act of a residential or a non-residential building. There was no restaurant or a boarding section in the building. The rooms in the building were rented out to those who required lodging. The expression "for the purpose of running a business" was held to be not relevant sincr there was also the other purpose indicate in the lease deed, namely, "for running a lodging hotel". The building was constructed for the purpose of residence. It was held that it is the nature of the building and the dominant user of the building that could determine whether it is a residential or a non-residential one. There was no hotel although it was styled as lodging hotel or as boarding section in the premises. The tenants divided the building into several rooms and Tented them out charging daily rent for their use and occupation by the lodgers. It was held that the premises was a residential building. But in the present case, the new building put up by the defendant in the year 1958 was not constructed for the purpose of residence, but was constructed for the purpose of letting out part of the ground floor as shops for business purposes and for the purpose of accommodating the lodgers in the first floor. It is also in evidence that the defendant used the suit premises for running a boarding hotel as well as restaurant. Hence, the above decision does not apply to the facts of the present case. ( 17 ) IT is urged by Mr. It is also in evidence that the defendant used the suit premises for running a boarding hotel as well as restaurant. Hence, the above decision does not apply to the facts of the present case. ( 17 ) IT is urged by Mr. Krishna Rao appearing for the Respondent- plaintiff, that the finding of both the lower Courts is that the suit premises is a non-residential building exempted under S. 31 of the Act and that this being a finding of fact, is not liable to interference in second appeal. CM a cons deration of the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court held that considering the structural design, location, the main purpose for which it is used and other circumstances, the suit property is a non-residential building from the inception of the lease in favour of the defendant. Ext. D6 is the agreement between the defendant and one of his tenants entered into on 14-7-69 under which the defendant borrowed monies from his tenant in which it is recited that urgent funds are needed for the smooth and efficient running of his business and the defendant described himself as the lessee of the 'laxmi Nivas' buildings of 'jaya Cafe'. The recital in that document also shows that the defendant was residing at 'balmttia' end not in the suit premises. In Ext. D1 also there is a recital that the defendant intends to use the prsmises for his own business. The lower appellate Court has held that the indention of the parties at the time of execution of Ext. D1 was that the suit premises should be used for running a hotel. It has also held that even otherwise, when Ext. D2 cams into existence there was already a hotel and the purpose for which it was let out at that time was only to continue the hotel business in the suit premises. It also held that the suit premises were let for a non-residential purpose and therefore exempt under S. 31 of the Act. Under Sec. 3 (g) of the Act, 'hotel' or 'lodging house' are defined to mean a building or a part of a building where lodging with or without board or other service is by way of business provided for a monetary consideration. Under Sec. 3 (g) of the Act, 'hotel' or 'lodging house' are defined to mean a building or a part of a building where lodging with or without board or other service is by way of business provided for a monetary consideration. Under the Expln to sub- bee (4) of S. 14, the term 'residential building' includes a building let out for the purpose of a public hospital, an educational institution, a public library, reading room or orphanage, but it does not mention a hotel of lodging house. The definition of 'building' under S. 3 (a) excludes a room or other accommodation in a hotel or lodging house. ( 18 ) IN Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 23 at page 743, it has been stated as follows, with respect to what constitutes a 'dwelling house':"the expression la dwelling' means premises which are suitable for all the major activities of residential life, particularly sleeping, cooking and feeing, and which are actually being used for those purposes. Where the premises are merely used for the purpose of affording additional accommodation for guests of a hotel owned by the tenant, the rooms so used do not constitute a dwelling. In every case the question is not whether the premises are capable of being used as a separate dwelling but whether the premises are in fact let as such. Thus, where a tenancy provides that the premimses shall be used for business purposes the tenant cannot bring himself within the protection of the kent Restrictions Act by utilising the premises as a residence in breach of the terms of the lease. "in Curl v. Angelo, (1948) 2 AIIER. 109. the landlord claimed possession of two rooms let to the tenant for use as extra bedroom accommodation far the hotel which the tenant conducted on adjoining premises. The rooms were usually occupied by guests, but also on occasions by members of the tenant's family or staff. It was held that the rooms were not let as a 'separate dwelling' within the meaning of S. 12 (2) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920. The observations in Wright v. Howell, (1947) 20 LTJ. 299. The rooms were usually occupied by guests, but also on occasions by members of the tenant's family or staff. It was held that the rooms were not let as a 'separate dwelling' within the meaning of S. 12 (2) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920. The observations in Wright v. Howell, (1947) 20 LTJ. 299. to the effect that the word 'dwelling' included all the major activities of life, particularly sleeping, cqoking and feeding, were approved and it was held that where the tenant carries on one only of his many home activities, while he carries en others in a 'different tenement altogether, the premises cannot be considered to be a dwellng house within the meaning of the above said Act. ( 19 ) IN Tompkins v. Rogers, (1921) 2 KB. 94. the premises were used for the purpose of providing Boarding and Lodging for paying guests. It was held to be premises used for business purposes. In Dakshinamoorthy v. Thulia bai, AIR. 1952 Mad. 413 FB. it has been held that it is the dominant purpose and the principal user for which the premises are put that should be criterion in deciding whether it is a residential or non-residential building. In D. N. Nazarath v. Dr, U. V. Krishna, 1964 Myslj. Supp. 311. it has been observed as follows :". . . A building which may be a residential building at one point of time may lose that character and become a non-residential building at a subsequent point of time. Likewise, a non-residential building may shed its attribute and become a residential building subsequently. Generally speaking, to determine the question whether a building is a residential or a non-residential building, the factors to be taken into consideration are the purpose of the tenancy, the user of the premises at the relevant points of time, the most important of which is the date of the application for eviction, the acquiescence of such user by the landlord and other surrounding circumstances. While each case must depend upon its own facts and circumstances, the real, main and substantial purpose of the lease would generally constitute an unfailing test although it is clear that no test by the employment of a 'neat' combination of words can be formulated for the decision of that question in very case in which it may arise___"it was observed that the building though at the inception was a residential building may at a subsequent stage become partly residential and partly non-residential. In that case, one part of the building which was along with the rest of the building residential in character, was used subsequently for carrying on the business of the firm. It was held that the part of the building so used by the firm can no longer claim the attributes of a residential building. Under S. 11 of the Madras Act no landlord can, without the permission of the Controller convert a residential building into a non-residential building. It was held that the embargo created by s. 11 is only to the conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building without the permission of the Controller and that the section does not arrest the conversion which may take place, in contravention of the law, of a residential building into a non-residential building by what the landlord or the tenant himself may elect to do, although the landlord who makes such conversion may render himself liable to punishment for disobedience of statutory provisions. ( 20 ) FROM the evidence it is clear that the premises taken on lease under Ext. D1 were three residential houses. The object with which the tenant took the lease was with a view to put up a new building for the purposes of running a Boarding and Lodging house as well as a Restaurant. By the time the lease under Ext. D2 was entered into, the new building had been constructed by the tenant and he had been running the Restaurant and the Hotel from the year 1948 itself. On the ground-floor of the new building, there were shops, the rest of the new building was used for the purpose of lodgers which consisted mainly of rooms, bath rooms, latrines etc. , for the purpose of the lodging and boarding house. On the ground-floor of the new building, there were shops, the rest of the new building was used for the purpose of lodgers which consisted mainly of rooms, bath rooms, latrines etc. , for the purpose of the lodging and boarding house. The only portion of the leased premises which was used for some period as residence was a portion of the buildng on the eastern side. Part of that building was used as Restaurant and dining hall for the purpose of the hotel. It is not the defendant who used that portion as residence for himself, but it WPS the Manager of the hotel, during the period of his service as such, who was residing in that portion. The other members of the staff of the hotel also used to sleep in a portion of that building. But for this portion of one of the buildings leased, the qther buildings including the new building were used either for the purpose of the hotel and restaurant or for the purposes of the business run by the sub-tenants. Though it is not mentioned in Ext. D1 that the premises were let for running a hotel or businesss, the real and substantial purpose of letting was certainly for running a hotel. The residence of the Manager in a portion of one of the buildings should be considered to be only incidental to the main purpose of running a hotel. The dominant purpose even at the time of Ext. D1 was to make use of the premises for a boarding and lodging house and the hotel end restaurant under the name and style Maya Cafe' was being run from 1948 upto the date of suit. The three sub-tenants were using parts of the premises for a drug house, a bangles shop and the shop for selling watches. The locality in which the premises was situate is a business locality suitable for running a hotel. By the time Ext. D2, the second lease deed, came into existence there was already a hotel business run by the defendant and he wanted to continue the hotel business. The portion of the new building containing the rooms used for lodging purposes must be considered to be an adjunct to the business of boarding run by the defendant. By the time Ext. D2, the second lease deed, came into existence there was already a hotel business run by the defendant and he wanted to continue the hotel business. The portion of the new building containing the rooms used for lodging purposes must be considered to be an adjunct to the business of boarding run by the defendant. Hence, there is no reason to differ from the finding of the lower appellate Court that the suit premises constitute a non-residential building. It is therefore exempt under S. 31 from the application of the provisions of Part V Off the Act. ( 21 ) IT is next contended by Mr. Sundaraswamy, that the lease deed ext. P1 is void under S. 23 of the Contract Act as it offends S. 4 and other provisions of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961. On behalf of the appellant, reliance is placed on the preamble to the Act. It says that the Act is intended to provide for tho control of rents and evictions, for the leasing of buildings, to control rates of hotels and lodging houses and besides other matters. Cl (1) of S. 4 of the Act provides that every landlord shall, within fifteen days after the building becomss vacant by his ceasing to occupy it or by the termination of a tenancy or by the eviction of the tenant or by the release of the building from requisition, or otherwise, give intimation to the Controller. Cl (2) states that except as provided in this Part, no person shall let, occupy or otherwise use any building which becomes vacant without the landlord giving intimation under sub-sec (1) and for a period of fifteen days from the date on which the intimation is received by the controller or within a period of one week after the termination of the proceedings under S. 8, if any, whichever is later. Cl (1) of S. 10a provides that if any person has, in contravention of sub-sec (2) of S. 4, occupied a building the Controller may call upon such person to show cause why he should not be evicted therefrom. Cl (3) of S. 4 provides that any landlord who contravenes the provisions of sub-sees (1) or (2) shall, on conviction, be punished with fine which may extend to Rs. one thousand. Cl (3) of S. 4 provides that any landlord who contravenes the provisions of sub-sees (1) or (2) shall, on conviction, be punished with fine which may extend to Rs. one thousand. Sub-sec (1) of S. 5 provides that the Controller may direct that any vacant building, whether intimation of its vacancy has been given or not, may be given on lease to such public authority or other person as he may think fit. Explanation to that sub-section states that a building may be directed to be leased under this section notwithstanding that it is subject to an agreement of lease or has been let or occupied in contravention of sub- sec (2) of S. 4. Part III of the Act relates to fixation of fair rent. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that Ext. P1 provides for an increasa of rent to Rs. 1,800 p. m. and therefore tends to defeat Part III of the Act. It is for these reasons, it is contended, that Ext. P1, is void under S. 23 of the Contract Act. ( 22 ) IN Saleh Abraham v. Manekji Cowasji, AIR. 1924 Cal. 67. the standard rent had been fixed at Rs. 85 p. m. The landlord leased the premises to the plaintiff at Rs. 100 a month and the plaintiff brought the suit to recover possession. S. 11 (1) of the Calcutta Rent Act provided that no order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises shall be made so long as the tenant pays rent allowable by the Act and performs the conditions of the tenancy. It was held that the object of the lease was of such a nature that it would. defeat the provisions of the Rent Adt, and consequently, tho object was unlawful. The lease was held to be unlawful since it provided for payment of rent in excess of that allowed by the Rent Act. It was contended that the consideration for the agreement was not unlawful on the date of the lease since the Controller had not then determined the standard rent. It was held that the lease if not unlawful in its inception became unlawful and void when the Controller fixed the standard rent at rs. 85 a month. It was contended that the consideration for the agreement was not unlawful on the date of the lease since the Controller had not then determined the standard rent. It was held that the lease if not unlawful in its inception became unlawful and void when the Controller fixed the standard rent at rs. 85 a month. In that case, the standard rent had been fixed, but the fair rent has not been fixed under the Act in respect of the suit premises in the present case. The statute in that case also gave protection from eviction in respect of the premises. But it is not so in the present case. ( 23 ) IN Devji Keshavji and Co v. Dahibai, AIR. 1971 Bom. 285. it was held that the word 'landlord' under Ss. 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House rates Control Act (Act 57/1947), means the person in whom the reversion is vested and not merely one who has a right to the possession of the premises as a tenant. It was observed that the Rent Act is intended for the public good, preventing evictions excapt under limited circumstances defined in the Act and must be so, construed as not to enable the landlord to evade the Act. Under S. 12 of that Act, the landlord is not entitled to evict tke tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay the rents and observes the other conditions of the tenancy. This right of the tenant is subject to S. 13 which enables the landlord to evict the tenant under certain limited circumstances. While construing the words off S. 12, it was held that in the case of derivative title from the landlord, a tenant of the landlord would not be a landlord for all purposes in relation to a sitting tenant who is a different tenant of the landlord, at least as long as the Rent Act continues. It was also observed that even this definition is subject to the context. The decisions based on S. 109 of tho T. P. Act were distinguished on the ground that the case must be governed by the special Act. The decision in Bhogilal v, Subramanya Iyer, AIR. 1954 Mad. 514. was dissented from by the learned single Judge. It was also observed that even this definition is subject to the context. The decisions based on S. 109 of tho T. P. Act were distinguished on the ground that the case must be governed by the special Act. The decision in Bhogilal v, Subramanya Iyer, AIR. 1954 Mad. 514. was dissented from by the learned single Judge. It is to be noticed that in that case, the tenant was protected from eviction under the Bombay Act. But in the present case, the premises are exempted from the provisions of Part V of the Act, relating to eviction, under S. 31. These decisions have no application to the present case, even if it is to be assumed that they lay down the correct law otherwise. ( 24 ) IN Sharada Bai v. State, AIR. 1969 Mys. 162= (1968) 2 Myslj. 384 FB. it has been observed that the object of the Act, as stated in its preambles is to provide for the control of the leasing of buildings, and that the right of owners of buildings to occupy or let their buildings is restricted by the provisions of the Act contained in part II, and that the object of control of the leasing of the buildings, is sought to be achieved by the Controller making a selection of the tenant in respect of a vacant building to be let or re-let and the landlord being directed to lease the same to the tenant selected by the Controller. The tenant selected by the Controller is deemed to ba the tenant of the landlord with effect from the date on which the possession of the building is delivered. It has further been held that the Act by S. 4 (1) imposes a statutory obligaion on every landlord to give intimation of vacancy within fifteen days after the building becomes vacant, and that it forbids every landlord from letting or occupying a building which has become vacant without giving intimation of vacancy, and that the said restriction on the landlord is intended to achieve the object of the Act. In G. G. in Council v. Indar Mani, AIR. 1950 EP. 298. In G. G. in Council v. Indar Mani, AIR. 1950 EP. 298. it has been held that under S. 105 of the T. P. Act the essential feature of a lease is that it is a transfer of a right to enjoy immoveable property for a certain time in consideration of a price paid or promised, that the separation of the right of possession from ownership is the fundamental conception of a lease and that if the parties agree that the lessee is to have no right of possession, the transaction would not be a lease. It is therefore contended that since Ext. P1 purports to transfer the right to possession also, it is a lease which is hit by S. 4 of the Act, in Sheikh Gulfan v. Sanat Kumar, AIR. 1965 SC. 1839. it has been observed as follows :"----Normally, the words used in a statute have to be construed in their ordinary meaning, but in many cases, judicial approach finds that the simple device oi adopting the ordinary meaning of words does not meet the ends of a fair and a reasonable construction. Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of words may not necessarily assist a proper construction of the statutory provision in which the words occur. Often enough, in interpreting a statutory provision, it becomes necessary to have regard to the subject-matter of the statute and the object which it is intended to achieve. That is why in deciding the true scope and effect of the relevant words in any statutory provision, the context in which the words occur, the object of the statute in which the provision is included, and the policy underlying the statute assume relevance and become material. As Halsbury has observed, the words " should be construed in the light of their context rather then what may be either their strict etymological sense or their popular meaning apart from that context". "ralying on this passage in the judgment, it is contended by the appellant that the choice of a tenant is controlled by the Act and it is not open to the landlord to enter into an agreement creating rights of tenancy like the present one. His contention is that such a contract is prohibited by the object and spirit of the Act. In S. V. Mothiji v. S. M. Ebrahim Sait, 1964 Myslj. His contention is that such a contract is prohibited by the object and spirit of the Act. In S. V. Mothiji v. S. M. Ebrahim Sait, 1964 Myslj. Supp, 362 it has been held that an agreement to enhance rent contrary to the provisions of the House Rent Control Order comes under S. 23 of the Contract act and that the landlord cannot claim enhanced rent on the basis of such an agreement. It was further held that the tenant would be entitled to refund of the excess amount paid by him. In that case, the agreement was held to be contrary to law and therefore void. The House Rent control Order forbids enhancement of the rent and the agreement for enhancing rpnt was contrary to Rule 11 of the House Rent Control Order 1942. The decision turned on the terms of the statutory provision in that case. In A Moses Pillai v. M. K. Govindan, AIR, 1940 Mad. 346. the language of Cl 7 (a) of the madras House Rent Control Order, 1941 was considered. That provision allowed aft increase of rent only where some additional improvements or alterations had been carried out at the landlord's expense since the rent was fixed. It was held that the intention of the legislature in enacting that provision was to interfere with the rights created by contorts entered into before or after the order and that on the grounds of high policy it would prohibit any increase of rent save in the only case provided for by the clause. ( 25 ) IN Raval and Co v. Ramachandran, AIR. 1967 Mad. 57 FB. a Full Bench of the Madras high Court has held that the Madras Rent Control Act, considering the legislative intendment or the plain significance of the structure of the lenactment, shows that the provisions of the Act were intended to interfere with both contractual and statutory tenancies, but affording special protection to tenants against eviction and balancing this by certain corresponding obligations imposed on tenants. It was also held that the absence of a non-abstanle clause docs not affect the interpretation of the Act with regard to the inroads it makes upon the previous property law of landlord and tenants of buildings and that it enables both landlords and tenants to seek the benefit of the fixation of fair rent. It was also held that the absence of a non-abstanle clause docs not affect the interpretation of the Act with regard to the inroads it makes upon the previous property law of landlord and tenants of buildings and that it enables both landlords and tenants to seek the benefit of the fixation of fair rent. It has also been held that the act is a complete Code for the Tribunals exercising jurisdiction under the act for the execution of the orders, providing for appeal and revision and that it is necessary for defermination of contractual tenancy by notice under the T. P. Act as condition precedent for the landlord to obtain eviction on the grounds specified in S. 10 of the Act. It has also been held that for the purpose of interpretation of the statute not merely the preamble but the entire complex of the provisions must be taken into consideration. The contention that the fixation of fair rent can be only for the benefit of the tenants and not the landlords was rejected. This decision was confirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court in Raval and Co v. K. G. Ramachandran, AIR 1974 SC. 818 . The Supreme Court, by a majority, held that the provisions of the madras Act are intended to take effect notwithstanding any contract even during the subsistence of the contract, and that under the Act fair rent is payable during the contract period as well as after the expiry of the contract period. ( 26 ) SRI T. Krishna Rao, learned Counsel for the respondents, has contended that Ext. P1 does not contravene any of the provisions of the Act and is therefore not void under S. 23 of the Contract Act. He has pointed out that the preamble to the Act does not provide for the manner in which the Lesscs are created under S 2 (2) of the Act. Parts II and III of the Act ere not appplicable to a building constructed after the 1st of August 1957 for a period of five years from the date of construction of such building. Pert II relates ot the lease of buildings and contains Ss. 4 to 13 of the Act. Part. III relates to rent including fixation of fair rent. Pert II relates ot the lease of buildings and contains Ss. 4 to 13 of the Act. Part. III relates to rent including fixation of fair rent. It is urged by him that Sec. 109 of the T P. Act is not abrogated and that the Act does not provide for all kinds of leases. He has also relied on S. 4 (2), as amended by act 14 of 1969, under which it is opan to the landlord to lease the building to a person of his choice if there is no order passed by the Controller within 15 davs from the date of receipt of intimation of vacancy by him, or after the expiry of one week after the termination of the proceedings under s 3, whichever is later. Under these circumstances, leases will be outside the purview of Part II of the Act except the provision relating to allotment of the promises by the Controller. He has relied on the decision in Sreenivasa Setty v. HR and AC, (1964) 2myslj, 436. (26) wherein it has been held that where the allottee dors not occupy the house allotted to him under S. 4 of the Act by the Contriver after the vacancy arises, there was no fresh vacancy and that the owner of the building is entitled to occupy after the period mentioned in sub-sec (2) of S. 4. The decision In Sharada Bai v. State also recognises that the Act imposes no restriction on the right of the landlord to occupy his building after the proceedings under Sec. 8 of the Act come to an end except where the Controller has directed the building to be leaped to a tenant selected by him. It was also held that when the Controller makes an order under S. 8 of the Act stating that it is not necessary or expedient to direct the building to be leased, the Controller does not make any allotment in favour of the landlord as in the cases arising under s. 6 of the Act and that the statutory obligation to keep the building vacant before sub-sec (2) of S. 4 comes to an end within one week after the ter mination of the proceedings under S. 8. Hence, it is urged that the Act over-rides the provisions of the T. P. Act only to the extent provided in the Act and that it does not abrogate the provisions of the T. P. Act relaying to leases in entirety. Expln. to S. 5 of the Act recognises the right of the landlord to enter into an agreement of lease to preserve the right of the Controller to over-ride such an agreement, and does not state that such an agreement is void. Under S. 14, both the landlord as well as the tenant can apply for fixation of fair rent in spite of there being an agreement between the parties. Under sub-sec (8) of S. 14 the earliest date from which the fair rent fixed by the Controller can apply is the date of the application. S. 16 provides for increase in fair rent where some additional improvements or structural alterations have been carried out at the landlord's expense. Under sub-sec (1) of S. 10, when the Controller allots a building to a public authority or other person the rate of rent has to be specified in the order and the other terms of tenancy may be those agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant. Under sub-sec (4) of S. 8, it is open to the Controller while allotting the building to specify the rent, but such rent shall not be less than the amounts mentioned in the four sub-clauses. The second proviso states that if such rent specified in the order is not the fair rent, it is open to the tenant or the landlord to apply for fixation of fair rent. Hence, it is clear that if neither of the parties apply for fixation of fair rent, the rent specified by the Controller in such an order will prevail. In sub-sec (9) of S. 14 it is provided that no tenant shall be liable to pay any amount in excess of fair rent notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary unless such an amount is a lawful increase of fair rent within the provisions of the Act. But under sub-sec (10) of 9. In sub-sec (9) of S. 14 it is provided that no tenant shall be liable to pay any amount in excess of fair rent notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary unless such an amount is a lawful increase of fair rent within the provisions of the Act. But under sub-sec (10) of 9. 14, it is provided that " subject to the provisions of sub-sec (9), any agreement for the payment of rent in excess of the fair rent is null and void and shall be construed as if it were an agreement for payment of the fair rent. Hence, if no fair rent is fixed for the building, it is open to the lessee to agree to pay higher rent and such an agreement will not be contrary to the provisions of the Act; but if fair rent is fixed, any agreement to pay rent in excess of fair rent will be void in respect of the excess rent, but valid to the extent of the fair rent. Sub-sec (2) of Sec. 18 provides that where the fair rent of a building is not fixed, there can be no stipulation for payment of any premium or pugree or any consideration whatsoever in cash or kind, in addition to the agreed rent, and that any sum or consideration paid in excess of the agreed rent shall be refunded by the landlord. Sub-sec (3) of s. 18 provides that any stipulation in contravention of sub-sec (2) shall b,s null and void. Hence, in cases where fair rent is not fixed, the tenant is liable to pay the agreed rent even if it is higher than the fair rent that can be, but has not been, fixed for the building under the provisions of the act. It is only the payment of any sum in excess of the original agreed rent that is rendered null and void under sub-sec (3 ). Hence, the lessea will be liable to pay such agreed rent till fan rent is fixed or till the date of the application for fixation of fair rent. But if no application for fixation of fair rent is filed, the tenant is liable to pay the agreed rent. ( 27 ) IN Jemima Bai v. Narayana Murthy, AIR. 1959 AP. 108. there was no fair rent fixed under the Madras Buildings (Leasa and Rent Control) Act of 1949. But if no application for fixation of fair rent is filed, the tenant is liable to pay the agreed rent. ( 27 ) IN Jemima Bai v. Narayana Murthy, AIR. 1959 AP. 108. there was no fair rent fixed under the Madras Buildings (Leasa and Rent Control) Act of 1949. Under S. 5 (1) of that Act, it was provided that when fair rent of a building has been fixed under the Act, no further increase in such fair rent shall be permissible except in cases of additional improvement or alteration carried out at the landlord's expense The question for decision was whether the agreement between the landlord and the tenant for an enhanced rent WPS valid It was held that the agreement entered into between the landlord and the tenant was not in contravention of the provisions of the Act and it was observed as follows r" A contract must be enforceable unless such contract is prohibited by law or vitiated by other circumstances. This apart, it may also be noted that where a statute seeks to control contractual obligations, such a statute must always be strictly construed. Courts will not be astute to construe an Act as to avoid a contract, or a contract so as to bring it within the prohibition of a statute. Vide Craies Stalute Law P. 236. "in T Seencppa v. J. Mohanlal, (1968) 1 Myslj. 307. S 18 (2) of the Act came up for consideration In a croceeding under the Mysore Rent Control Act, a compromise was arrived at between the landlord and the tenant under which the tenant agreed to pay a higher rent in lieu of the old rent. It was held that what is provided by sub-sec (2) of S. 18 is that even in a case where the fair rent of a building has not been determined, the landlord shall not receive from the tenant, or stipulate for the payment by him, of any sum as premium or pugree or any other consideration in addition to the agreed rent, but that it does not forbid the indirect benefits, and that what is prohibited is the payment of any sum in excess of the agreed rent. It was held that under the terms of the compromise, the tenant did not agree to pav any sum in excess of the agreed rent. It was held that under the terms of the compromise, the tenant did not agree to pav any sum in excess of the agreed rent. It was held that although the old agreed rent wrs Rs. 30 there was a noraiio and a new contract was substituted for the old, and that there is nothing in sub-sec (2) of S. 18 of the Act which forbids the formation of a new contract in that way. It was further held that the new contract incorporates the terms of a new lease which came into being by a fresh agreement between the parties and that thn new contract is not forbidden by sub-sec (2) of Section 18 and it waa enforced. ( 28 ) IN Bipathumma v. Miriam Bibi, (1966) 1 Myslj. 162. it has been held that S. 21 of 'he Act is a self-contained Code in so far os the topic of eviction is concerned, and that any provision in any law which impinges on the topic of evitction alcne is removed by the non-ovstale clause and not any provision of any law dealing with any other topic. It has also been held that the non-obstsnte clause in S 21 does not repeal any other provision of the ord nary law or supersede any specific provisions of law. It was therefore held that before the landlord could initiate proceedings under S 21 of the act, it is necessary that the lease should have been terminated either by notice or by other mode appropriate to the nature of the lease. The definition of landlord' under S 3 (h) of the Act is stated to mean any person who is for the time being receiving, or entitled to receive, rent in respect of any premises. as also a person who would so receive the rent or be entitled tc receive it if the premises were let to a tenant This shows that the trsnsfer of the interest of the landlord in favour of another person is not prohibited. The expression 'entitled to receive rent' signifies a person who is so entitled by virtue of sale, mortgage, or of assignment of tha lessor's interest also. Part II of the Act relating to lease of buildings relates to the situation subsequent to the building becoming vacant. The expression 'entitled to receive rent' signifies a person who is so entitled by virtue of sale, mortgage, or of assignment of tha lessor's interest also. Part II of the Act relating to lease of buildings relates to the situation subsequent to the building becoming vacant. The manner in which a person becomes a landlord is not regulated by the Act, nor is there any prohibition with regard to any manner by which a person becomes a landlord under the Act. But the right of the landlord with regard to the occupation as well as to let a building is restricted by the provisions of the Act. The right under S. 109 of the T. P. Act, therefore is not intended to be curtailed by the Act or any of its provisions. The plaintiff in the present case, therefore, exercises his right to sue for eviction by virtue of S. 109 of the T. P. Act. In Satappa v. Appayya, AIR. 1968 SC. 1358. the suit was filed for specific performance of an agreement to sell land. The question was whether the agreement, if enforced, would rtsult in the violation of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The acquisition of the land under the agreement would result in the plaintiff holding an extent in excess of the ceiling perscribed by the statute. The acquisition of such excess land was rendered invalid under the statute. While considering the question whether she consideration or object of the agreement was unlawful as forbidden by law or would defeat the provisions of any law under Sec. 23 of the contract Act, it was observed as follows :". . . . The Act contains no general restrictions upon such transfers, and unless at the date of the acquisition the transferee holds land in excess of the ceiling the acquisition to the extent of the excess over the ceiling will not be valid. There is nothing in the agreement, nor can it be implied from the circumstances, that it was the object of the parties that the provisions of the Act relating to the ceiling should be transgressed. There is nothing in the agreement, nor can it be implied from the circumstances, that it was the object of the parties that the provisions of the Act relating to the ceiling should be transgressed. The mere possibility that the respondent may not have disposed of his original holding at the date of the acquisition of title pursuant the agreement entered into between him and the appellant will not, in our judgment, render the object of the- agreement such, that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law. The court, it is true , will not, enforce a contract which is expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute, whatever may be the intention of the parties, but there is nothing to indicate that the Legislature has prohibited a contract to transfer land between one agriculturist and another. The inability of the transferee to hold land in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the statute has no effect upon the contract, or the operation of the transfer. The statutory forfeiture incurred in the event of the transferee coming to hold land in excess of the ceiling does not invalidate the transfer between the parties. 9. We hold that a contract for purchase of land entered into with the knowledge that the purchaser may hold land in excess of the ceiling is not void, and the seller cannot resist enforcement thereof on the ground that, if permitted, it will result in transgression of the law. "it was accordinglly held that specific performance of the agreement could be granetd. In Raval and Co v. Ramachandran it has been held that the intention uf the Legislature must bet gathered not merely from the preamble, but also from the entire complex of the provisions. It was held that 15. 10 of the Madras Act is a complete Code for eviction of the tenant on certain grounds, with a special machinery provided for the decision, and that eviction on any of the grounds specified in the Act may be sought to determine the lease by notice under the Transfer of Property Act. ( 29 ) IN Uahoo Dass v. Prem Prakash, AIR. 1964 All. 1 FB. ( 29 ) IN Uahoo Dass v. Prem Prakash, AIR. 1964 All. 1 FB. a Full Bench of that Court considered the question whether a contract of tenancy for the purpose of canying un business governed by the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 entered into by the landlord with a person on payment of rent by the latter in violation of a general or special order issued by the Dist Magistrate concerned under S. 7 (2) of that Act is void under s. 10 lead with Sec. 23 of the Contract Act. Subsequent to the contract entered into by the landlord-respondent with a third party, the appellant represented to the Dist Magistrate that the shop had fallen vacant and cbtall edffrom him an order under S. 7 (2) of that Act calling upon the landlord to let it out to him. Thereupon, the landlord instituted the suit for an injunction. Though the Act contained provisions for punishing a person for letting out, without permission or letting out in contravention of an order of allotment or refusing to let out in spite of an order of allotment and rendering a person liable to be evicted in contravention of an allotment order or without vacancy of an accommodation having been reported, there was no provision whatsoever in the Act rendering a contract of tenancy entered into by a landlord and another person void or even illegal. It was observed as follows ," Under the Contract Act an agreement is a contract if made by the free consent of parties competent to contract for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object and not expressly declared by any provision of the Contract Act to be void. A lease involves two agreements; one by the landlord agreeing to let his accommodation to be used by the tenant in consideration of the latter's paying him money, called rent, and the other by the tenant agreeing to pay to the landlord money, called rent, in consideration of the latter's allowing him to use his accommodation. . Each party agrees to a certain act and each agreement is a consideration for the other. In one case the consideration is payment of rent and in the other cass, allowing the accommodation to be used and neither of the two considerations is unlawful. . Each party agrees to a certain act and each agreement is a consideration for the other. In one case the consideration is payment of rent and in the other cass, allowing the accommodation to be used and neither of the two considerations is unlawful. The object of one agreement is to acquire money and the object of the other agreement is to carry on business and neither of thet two objects is unlawful. S. 23 of the Contract Act defines what considerations and objects are lawful and what not. Every consideation or object is lawful unless it is forbidden by law or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law, or is fraudulent or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another or is in the Court's view opposed to public policy. Neither of the considerations is forbidden by law and neither of the objects is forbidden by law. The law does not forbid payment of money or giving use of an accommodation or acquiring money or carrying on business. It also cannot be said that either the consideration or the object in the case of either of the two agreements is of such a nature that it would defeat the provisions of any law. The U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act contains no provision which would be defeated by permitting either of the two considerations or either of the two objects. It must be noted that there must be something in the nature of the consideration or the object which would defeat the provisions of any law. It is not alleged that either of the considerations or either of the objects is fraudulent or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another or is opposed to public policy. Therefore, both the agreements in the instant case would be contracts unless they are declared by any provision in the Contract Act to be void. Ss. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 are the only provisions which declare agreements to be void and none of those provisions applies in the instant case. I must, therefore, hold that the agreements in the contract of tenancy referredto in the question are contracts. Ss. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 are the only provisions which declare agreements to be void and none of those provisions applies in the instant case. I must, therefore, hold that the agreements in the contract of tenancy referredto in the question are contracts. "it was further held that the Act does not contain any provision prohibiting Jetting out an accommodation by a landlord as that agreement does not cease to be a contract merely because it is forbidden by law; it ceases to be a contract only if its consideration or object is forbidden by law or it itself is declared to be void under S. 24 etc. of the Contract Act. It was held that the contract of tenancy is not void under S. 10 read with S. 23 of the Contract Act. It was further observed that a man is entitled to arrange his affairs in such a manner as to derive benefit without violating any provision of law and that the act of letting out a shop is not opposed to puolic policy. It was further held that S. 23 of the Contract Act requires the provisions of any law to be defeated and not the purpose of any law in order that the contract is rendered void. In Motolal v. Nanhelal, AIR. 1930 PC. 287. the suit was for specific performance of an agreement to sell a share in the village including the cultivating rights in Sir land. S. 59 (1) of the Central provinces Act of 1920 relating to tenancies provided that if thp proprietor desires to transfer such rights, he may apply to the Revenue Officer and when such officer is satisfied with regard to certain conditions, he shall sanction the transfer. The question to be decided was whether a decree for specific performance should not be made because spectfic performance necessitates an application to the Revenue Officer for sanction to the transfer. Their Lordships held that it was not necessary to decide in that case whether the application for sanction of transfer must succeed. The lower appellate Court had decreed the suit for specific performance directing the defendant to apply within one month to the Revenue Officer to sanction the transfer. This decision was referred to with approval in Chandnee widya Vati v. Dr, C. L. Katilal, AIR. 1964 SC. 878. The lower appellate Court had decreed the suit for specific performance directing the defendant to apply within one month to the Revenue Officer to sanction the transfer. This decision was referred to with approval in Chandnee widya Vati v. Dr, C. L. Katilal, AIR. 1964 SC. 878. 29-A. In Chandnee Widya Vati v. Dr C. L. Katilal the suit was for specific performance of a contract of sale in respect of a house property situate in Delhi, belonging to the defendant and built on a lease-hold plot granted by the Government. The plaintiffs entered into a contract of sale in respect of the property. The agreement provided that the vendor shall obtain permission of the Chief Commissioner to the transaction of sale within two months of the agreement. The vendor made an application for peimission but withdrew the same. The High Court held that the agreement was a completed contract of sale subject to the sanction of the Chief commissioner before the sale transaction could be concluded, and that if the Chief Commissioner ultimately refused the sanction to the sale the plaintiff may not be able to enforce the decree for specific performance of the contract. It was no bar for the Court passing a decree for that relief. The Supreme Court held that the decree should in addition direct the defendant to make the necessary application to the Chief Commissioner for sanction within one month and that he shall convey the property to the plaintiffs within one month of receipt of that sanction. It was also held that in the event of the sanction being refused, the plaintiffs were entitled to damages. 29-B. Under S. 8 (4) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, while allotting a building the Controller may specify the rent and such rent shall not bo less than thand fair rent if it has been fixed. If the fair rent has not been fixed for the building, the rent specified shall be not less than the rent last paid for the building. If no such rent was last paid, the Controller shall specify the rent which is not less than the rent determined by him on [the basis of the rental value of the building as entered in the property tax assessment book of the local authority. If no such rent was last paid, the Controller shall specify the rent which is not less than the rent determined by him on [the basis of the rental value of the building as entered in the property tax assessment book of the local authority. If no property tax has been assessed in respect of the building, it shall not be less than the rent determined by the Controller based on the rent prevailing for a similar building in the locality. Under S. 10 (1), the landlord is directed to deliver possession of the building to the authority or person to whom it is allotted by the Controller and such authority or person shall be deemed to be the tenant of the landlord at the rate of rent specified in such order. It provides that the other terms of tenancy shall be such as may be agreed upon between the landlord end the tenant and in the absence of- such an agreement, as may be determined by the Controller. Hence, with regard to other terms, namely, the terms other than the rate of rent and the date of commencement of the tenancy, it is open to the parlies to enter into a valid agreement of lease. Under the terms of Ext. P1 the liability of the landlord to intimate the Controller after the building becomes vacant within the time stipulated under S. 4 of the Act is not taken away and his liability to report the vacancy continues. 29-C. Hence, the mere fact that prior sanction under a statutory provision is necessary for a transfer does not render the contract for -transfer entered into between the parties illegal or unenforceable. Though prior sanction has not been obtained as required by statute, if there was an agreement to lease, such an agreement could be enforced in a Court of law by means of specific performanncs subject to similar terms as stated above. In the present case, it is open to the Controller to recognise the rights of the parties under the agreement Ext. P1 and allot the suit premises to the plaintiffs after the premises become vacant and a report is made thereafter to the Controller. Hence, merely because the contract between the parties is subject to recognition by the Controller , it cannot be said that the contract is illegal and void. ( 30 ) SEC. P1 and allot the suit premises to the plaintiffs after the premises become vacant and a report is made thereafter to the Controller. Hence, merely because the contract between the parties is subject to recognition by the Controller , it cannot be said that the contract is illegal and void. ( 30 ) SEC. 4 of the Act deals with the situation after the building becomes vacant, but the Act does not deal with what precedes the vacancy or what leads to the vacancy. The manner in which a person becomes a landlord is also not dealt with by the Act. Hence, the agreement Ext. P1 cannot be said to defeat the purpose of thand Act and is not also in contravention of any provision of the Act. The contract therefore, is neither void nor invalid. ( 31 ) THE next question relates to mesne profits. In the plaint, the mesne profits is claimed at the rate of Rs. 100 per day from 12-6-70 as well as future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 100 per day from the date of suit till date of possession. The trial Court took into consideration the fact that under Ext. P1 the rent fixed is Rs. 60 per day and accordingly it awarded Rs. 300 as the mesne profi's from 12-6-3070 till date of suit, 18-6-1970 i. e. , for five days. It also held that the plaintiffs are entitled to costs and future mesne profi's at the same rate. The lower appellate Court held that on a modest estimate, the tenant must be earning at least Rs. 100 per day as estima ed by the plaintiffs but since only Rs. 75 was claimed in the cross-abjection it awarded mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 75 par day in place of Rs. 60 per day awarded by the trial Court. It is contended by mr. Sundarpswamy, that as far as future mesne profits is concerned an (enquiry should have been ordered under Or. 20, R. 12 CPC. It was also ccntended that in any case, only fair rent can be made payable by the defendant and in any case not more than at the rate of Rs. 600 per month, being the agreed rent under Ext. D2. ( 32 ) HE rolied on the decision in Sanjeenvi v. Chittibabu, AIR. 1953 Mad. 473. 20, R. 12 CPC. It was also ccntended that in any case, only fair rent can be made payable by the defendant and in any case not more than at the rate of Rs. 600 per month, being the agreed rent under Ext. D2. ( 32 ) HE rolied on the decision in Sanjeenvi v. Chittibabu, AIR. 1953 Mad. 473. The definition of 'tenant' under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Contrcl) act of 1049 includes a person continuing in possession after the terminatirn of the tenancy in his favour. Tt was held that the defendant was not liable to be evicted and was not liable for mesne profits. Under S. 7 (1) of that Act, the tenant was afforded protection from eviction except in accordance with the provisions of that section It is urged that under Section 3 (r) of our act also, the definition of 'tenant' includes a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy. It is to be noticed that the question of mesne profi's did not arise in that case since the Madras Act gave protection to the tenant from eviction even subsequent to the date of termination of the tenancy. In K. K. Verma v. Union of India, AIR. 1954 Bom. 353, it has been held that a tenant whose tenancy has been terminated by a valid notice to quit is a person whose possession is juridicial, that such possession is protected by statute and that he could sue for possesson against his landlord if the landlord disturbs that possession otherwise than in due course of law. But under S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, a trespasser who has been thrown out of possession cannot go to Court since he cannot claim possession under S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. It was therefore held that under the Indian Law, the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law and that in India a landlord can only eject his erstwhile tenant by recourse to law and by obtaining a decree for ejectment. It was therefore held that a tenant, who continues in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, cannot be said to be in unauthorised occupation within the meaning of S 3, (1) (b) of the Government Premises (Eviction) Act (27 of 1950 ). It was therefore held that a tenant, who continues in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, cannot be said to be in unauthorised occupation within the meaning of S 3, (1) (b) of the Government Premises (Eviction) Act (27 of 1950 ). The abovesaid view of the High Court, of Bombay was affirmed in Yeshwvnt singh v. Jagdish Singh, AIR. 1968 SC. 620. It was held in that derision that it was obligatory for the lessor to resort to the Court and obtain an order for possession before he could eject the lessee and that he is not entitled to throw out the lessee by force. It is therefore contended on behalf of the appellant that the defendant is not a trespasser subsequent to the date of terminstion of the tenancy in his favour and is therefore not liable for mesna profits. In Guntur Municipal Council v. Ratepayers' Assn, AIR. 1971 SC. 353. it has been held that under S. 32 (2) of the Madras Dist Municipalities Act (5 of 1920) the test for fixation of annual value of lands and buildings is what rent line premises can ordinarily fetch if let out to a hypothetical tenant, and that the Municipality is therefore bound by the fair or standard rent which would be payable tor a particular premises under the Rent Control Act in force during the year of assessment. It was also held that when the controller has not fixed the fair rent the Municipal authorities will have to arrive at their own figure of fair rent in accordance with the principles laid down in the Rent Control Act. It is therefore contended on behalf of the appellant, that the defendant cannot be made liable to pay anything in excess of the fair rent over what he is liable to pay under the Act and that since the definition of 'tenant' includes a person who continues in possession subsequent to the termination of the tenancy, only the agreed rent can be awarded under S. 18 (2) (a) of the Act and that the maximum liability is only fair rent i. e. , not exceeding Rs. 600 p. m. In Hindustan steel Ltd V. Usha Rum, AIR. 1969 Delhi 59. 600 p. m. In Hindustan steel Ltd V. Usha Rum, AIR. 1969 Delhi 59. it has been held that mesne profits is not what the plaintiff has lost by exclusion but what the defendant might have reasonanly made by his wrongful possession and that what the plaintiff in such a case might have or would have made can only be relevant as evidence of what the defendant might with reasonable diligence have received. It was also observed that in the case of property of which rent is controlled by the R C. Act the plaintiff cannot complain of having suffered any loss by his exclusion beyond the rent for which the property is let out to the tenant holding over except to the extent of a permissible increase of rent under the Rent Control Act itself. Following the decision in Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandranmaul, AIR. 1966 SC. 735. it was held that during the period of exemption of the building from the provisions of the Rent Control Act, there was no restriction on the lessor to charge any rent during the relevant period, but since there was no evidence with regard to what the defendant had received from the sub-tenants or might With reasonable diligence have received from them, it was held that the rent at which the premises had been let by the plaintiff represented the fair compensation for use and occupation during the period the premises was held over by the defendant. This shows that if there was evidence, mesne profits would have been awarded on the basis of what the ex-tenant received or would have received during the relevant period. On behalf of the appellant, reliance was also placed on the decision of the Privy Council in Karmani Industrial Bank v. Satyamranjani, AIR. 1928 PC. 227. It was a decision under the Calcutta Rent Act, 1920. Under s. 14 of that Act, it was provided that if any sum has been paid on account of rent which is by the Act irrecoverable, such sum shall within six months after the date of payment be- recoverable by the tenant by whom it was paid from the landlord who received the payments. Significance was attached to the words ' tenant by whom it was paid' and ' the landlord who received payments' as indicating the change in the relations of the tenancy contemplated by the legislature. Significance was attached to the words ' tenant by whom it was paid' and ' the landlord who received payments' as indicating the change in the relations of the tenancy contemplated by the legislature. It was held that the words 'landlord and tenant' must include an ex-landlord and ex-tenant and tenantl must include a person whose term of contract of tenancy has come to an end. It was held that under S. 14, the intention is to give relief to any person who having been a tenant comes within the period of limitation to assert his claim to receive excessive rent paid whether at the time he claims he is actually a tenant or not. It was also held that the contractual rent paid beyond the period of six months from the date of application was irrecoverable as provided in S. 14. On the basis of this decision it is contended by the appellant that it was open to the appellant to apply for fixation of fair rent under the Act even subsequent to the date of termination of the tenancy and that the fair rent would be applicable for the period during which mesne profits is payable. It is contended that even after the order of eviction is passed by the Controller, or by the Civil Court in cases coming under S. 31, the tenant continues to be statutory tenant and that the provisions relating to fair rent and the other protections under the Act continue to be applicable, to the tenant and that even in cases of buildings exempt under S. 31, the provisions of the Act other than Part V applies to them, and that therefore, the quantum of mesne profits cannot exceed the fair rent that can be fixed under the Act. He has also relied on the decision in Deoki Prasad v. Dulichand, AIR. 1954 Cal. 532. In that case the definition of 'tenant' in the Rent Act, included an ex-tenant in possession whose tenancy has been determined by an ejectment decree. It was held that an application for standardisation of rent made by a tenant does not cease to be main ainable merely because during the pendency of the said proceeding the decree for ejectment has been passed against him. It was held that an application for standardisation of rent made by a tenant does not cease to be main ainable merely because during the pendency of the said proceeding the decree for ejectment has been passed against him. In that case, the decree in the ejectment suit had been set aside and the case was remitted to the lower appellate Court for re-hearing, and the question whether the tenancy had been determined was hold to be sub-judice. Hence the observation that even if the ejectment suit can determine a lease the petitioner would still have continued to be a tenant under the Rent Control Act, 1950, for the purpose of maintaining the application for standardisation of rent and continuing proceedings in that behalf must be considered to be obiter. The decision in Karnani Industi Bank v. Satya Niranjan was followed and was considered as authority for the proposition that even subsequent to the ejectment Decree against him, the tenant in possession would be entitled to maintain an application for standardisation of rent. In Badrilal v. Mun Corpn of Indore, AIR 1949 FCR. 292. it was held that a person who was lawfully in occupation does not become a trespasser even if he does not become a tenant holding over but is a tenant by sufferance. The following passage in Kai Kushroo Bazanjee Capadia v. Bai Jerbai Hirijibhoy Barden, AIR 1973 SC, 508. was cited with approval :" On the determination of a lease, it is the duty of the lessee to deliver up possession of the demised premises to the lessor. If the lessee or a sub-lessee under him continues in possession even after the determination of the lease, the landlord undoubtedly has the right to eject him forthwith; but if he does not, and there is neither assent nor dissent on his part to the continuance of occupation of such per son the latter becomes in the language of English Law a tenant on sufferance who has no lawful title to the land but holds it merely through the laches of the landlord. If now the landlord accepts -rant from such person ox otherrwise expresses assent to the continuance of his possession, a new tenancy conies into existence as is contemplated by S. 116 T. P. Act, and unless there is an agreement to the contrary such tenancy would be regarded as one from year to year or from month to month in accordance with the provisions of S. 116 of the Act. "it was held that in the case of a tenant by sufferance, there is no need for any notice before he could be evicted and that a person who is in lawful occupation of the premises does not become a trespasser and if he does not become a tenant holding over, he would be a tenant by sufferance. It is therefore contended on behalf of the defendant-appellant that he is not liable to pay anything except Rs. 600 p. m. or the fair rent, whichever os lower. ( 33 ) IT Is, however, urged by Mr. T. Krishna Rao appearing for the respondent, that the decision in Karnani Industrial Bank's case (40) does not apply to the present case since under the Act, fair rent could be fixed only from the date of application for fixation of fair rent at best and no right is given to the tenant to recover any exoass amount over and above the fair rent paid prior to such date. He relied on the decision in Anond nivas (P) Ltd v. Anandji, AIR. 1965 SC. 414. That was a case under the Bombay Rents, h and LHRC Act (57 of 1947 ). It was held by the majority that a person remaining in occupation of the premises after" the determination or expiry of period of tenancy is commonly, though in law not accurately, called a statutory tenant, and that such a person is not a tenant at all in the sense that he has no estate or interest in the premisss occupied by him and that he has merely the protection of the statute in so far as he cannot be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases if any, and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. It was also held that on the determination of the lease, unless the tenant acquires the right of a tenant holding over, the terms and conditions of the lease are extinguished and the rights of such a person remaining in possession are governed by the statute alone, namely, the Rent Control Act. It was therefore contended by Mr. Krishna Rao, that the definition of 'tenant' under S. 3 (r) of the Act is Subject to the phrase used in S. 3 unless the context otherwise requires' and that continuation in possession subsequent to the termination of the lease must mean continuation in lawful possession and not in unlawful possession. Since under the provisions of T. P. Act the tenant is obliged to restore possession to the landlord on the expiry of the period of the tenancy or the termination of the tenancy, his continuation in possession is it is urged, unlawful possession and that S. 18 (2) does not apply to the defendant, since he is not a tenant after the period under Ext. D2 is over i. e. after 11-6-1970. ( 34 ) IN Padmanabha Setty v. Papaiah Setty, AIR. 1966 SC. 1824. while considering the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act (30 of 1951) it has been stated as follows :"a tenant who can be evicted under the conditions prescribed in s. 8 (2) of the Act, cannot be said, in our view, to be entitled to the possession of the premiess of which he is a tenant. No doubt her cannot be evicted till one or more of the conditions prescribed by the section are fulfilled, but it is difficult to equate his right to stay in the premises till he is evicted to an entitlement of the possession of the premises. "since Part V of the Act is not applicable in the present case, even the statutory Immunity from eviction is taken away. In M. C. Chokkalingam v. Manickavasagam, (1974) 1 SCWE 195. while considering whether the possession of a tenant after expiry of the lease is lawful it was observed as follows :" The fact that after expiry of the lease, the tenant will be able to continue in possession of the property by resisting a suit for eviction, does not establish a case in law to answer the requirement of law- fail possession of the property within the meaning of Rule 13. Lawful possession cannot be established without the concommitant existence of a lawful relationship between the landlord and the tenant. This relationship cannot be established against the consent of the landlord unless, however, in view of a special law, bis consent becomes irrelevant. Lawful possession is not litigious possession and must have some foundation in a legal right to possess the property which cannot be equated with a temporary right to enforce recovery of the property in case a person is wrongfully or forcibly dispossessed from it this Court in Lalu Yseahwant Singh's case (supra) had not to consider whether juridical possession in that case was also lawful possession. We are clearly of opinion that juridical possession is possession protected by law against wrongiul dispossession but cannot per as always be equated with lawful possession. "and further :" Law in general prescribes and insists upon a specified conduct in human relationship or even otherwise. Within the limits of the law, courts strive to take note of the moral fabric of the law. In the instant case, under the terms of the lease, the property had to be handed over to the lessor. Besides under S. 108 (q)of the T. P. Act, on the determination of the lease, the lessee is bound to put the lessor into possession of the property. Since the landlord has not assented to the lessse's continuance in possession of the property, the lessee will be liable to mesne profits which can again be recovered only in terms of his wrongful possession. "since the defendant in the present case is not entitled to protection from eviction under the Act, his possession must be considered to be wrongful possesion after the expiry of the period of the lease and he is liable to pay mesne profits. ( 35 ) IN Fateh chand v. Balakrishan das, AIR 1963 SC, 1405. it was held that mesna profits as denned in S. 2 (12) of the CPC are profits which the person in wrongful possession of property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits but do not include profits due to improvements made by the person In wrongful possession. The normal measure of mesne profits was therefore told to be the value of the user of land to the person in wrongful possession. The normal measure of mesne profits was therefore told to be the value of the user of land to the person in wrongful possession. It was contended on behalf of the tenent in that case that the 47. premises were governed by the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act, 19 of 3947, and that nothing more than the standard rent assessed on that property may be awarded as damages. It was osberved that it was not necessary to consider in that case whether mesne profits at the rate exceeding the rate of standard rent may be awarded since there was no evidence as to what the standard rent of the house was. The rent of the premises was Rs. 80 p. m. The trial Court ordered mesne prog's at the rate of R. 5. 140 p. m. That rate was confirmed by the Supreme Court since it was not shown to be excessive. Interest was awarded at the rate of six per cent from the date of suit till the date of delivery. In Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul the agreed rent was Rs. 150 p. m. The plaintiff's cjaim for Rs. 450 as the agreed rent was disbelieved by the trial Court. The trial Court directed the defendant to pay Rs. 300 p. m. It was held that once it is held that the plaintiff is entitled to eject the defendant it follows that from the date of decree granting relief of ejectment to plaintiff, the defendant who remains in possession of the property despite the decree must pay damages for use and occupation until it is delivered to the plaintiff, and that a decree for ejectment in such a case must be accompanied by a direction for payment of the future mesne profits or damages. It was held that the amount of Rs. 300p. m. was reasonable being the amount of reasonable rent for the premise in question. A decree was granted directing the defendant to pay the. plaintiff future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 300 p. m. from the date of trial Court's decree until the date of delivery of possession of the properly to the plaintiff. Though the defendant was found to be in possession as a licensee, he was found liable to pay mesne profits. ( 36 ) THE evidence shows that the defendant would get Rs. 300 p. m. from the date of trial Court's decree until the date of delivery of possession of the properly to the plaintiff. Though the defendant was found to be in possession as a licensee, he was found liable to pay mesne profits. ( 36 ) THE evidence shows that the defendant would get Rs. 125 per day if all the 33 rooms were let. The shops fetch a rent of Rs 600 p. m. or Rs. 20 per day. Hence, the income which the defendant would get would be rs. 145 por day. The lower appellate Court was right in adopting the basis for determination of the future mesne profits as the amount which the defendant would get and not what the plaintiff agreed to take under Ext. P1. Since the necessary material for fixation of the rate of mesne profits js available, there is no necessity for directing an enquiry for the purpose of fixation of mesne profits In the circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the amount of Rs. 75 fixed by the lower appellate Court is excessvie, or unreasonable. Hence, this part of the decree has to be confirmed. ( 37 ) IN the lower appellate Court, an application was filed on behalf of the defendant under Or. 41, R. 27 CPC for admission of additional evidence. The prayer was that certain receipts for rent issued by the owner should be admitted as additional evidence,. In the opinion of the lower appellate Court, the evidence on record was sufficient to render a decision in the case and it was unnecessary to admit additional evidence. In that view, it dismissed the application. There is no reason to interfere with that finding of the lower appellate Court. ( 38 ) THE next question is whether the defendant is liable to damages, and if so, whether the amount of Rs. 5,000 awarded by the lower appellate court is justified The trial Court rejected the claim for damages. According to the reports of the Commissioner, the damage to the new building is rs. 5. 649 and to the old buildings is Rs. 1,329, the total damage being of the value of Rs. 6,378. Since the plaintiff claimed only Rs. 5,000 the lower appellate Court awarded Rs,5,000 as damages. Under the terms of Extd2 d/. According to the reports of the Commissioner, the damage to the new building is rs. 5. 649 and to the old buildings is Rs. 1,329, the total damage being of the value of Rs. 6,378. Since the plaintiff claimed only Rs. 5,000 the lower appellate Court awarded Rs,5,000 as damages. Under the terms of Extd2 d/. 9-2-61, the lessee is bound to maintain the premises in good habitable condition and carry out all repairs including customary white-washing and painting, and is re-quired to renew the broken glass panes, fixtures and electric lights etc. , at his own cost as may be necessary or as required by the lessor. But under S. 44 of the Act, it is provided that every landlord shall be required to keep the building in reasonably good repair. . If the landlord neglects to make such repairs, the tenant may make the repairs and deduct the cost of such repairs from the rent or otherwise, recover it from the landlord provided that the amount so deducted or recoverable in any year shall not exceed one twelfth of the rent payable by the tenant for that year. The Act came into force on 31-12-1961. In Moses Pillai v. M. K. Govindan, AIR. 1948 Mad. 346. it has bebn held that under C1. 7 (a) of the Madras house Rent Control Order, 1941, the language showed that the legislature intended to interfere with the rights created by contracts entered into before or after the order and that on grounds of high policy it would prohibit any increase in rent, save as prqvided in that clause. In Raju v. Avatkaram, AIR. 1965 AP. 80. it was observed with reference to the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and eviction) Control Act (15 of 1960), that the statute has been enacted solely for the benefit of the tenants, who having regard to the lack of adquate accommodation were under the mercy of the landlords. It was not open to the tenant to contract himself out of rights conferred on him by the enactment. Hence, S. 44 must be held to have superseded the term in Ext. D2 with regard to the liability of the defendant to keep the premises in reasonable repair. From 31-12-1961 the date on which the Act came into, force, at any rate, the liability to keep the premises in good repair would be that of the landlord. Hence, S. 44 must be held to have superseded the term in Ext. D2 with regard to the liability of the defendant to keep the premises in reasonable repair. From 31-12-1961 the date on which the Act came into, force, at any rate, the liability to keep the premises in good repair would be that of the landlord. But it is contended by Mr. Krishna Rao, that S. 44 of the Act does not take away the past rights, the rights accrued to the landlord prior to the date of the Act coming into force. Butt, assuming that the defendant is liable for the damages caused to the promises prior to the coming into force of the Act there is no evidence as to what part of the damages was caused prior to that date and what part of the damages was caused thereafter. There is also no evidence as to the extent of damages caused by the defendant wantonly. The plaintiff would be entitled to damages under the terms of Ext. D2 only if he is able to show that such damages were caused prior to 31-12-61. Since he has not adduced any evidence in that regard, he is not entitled to claim damages. . This part of the decree of the lower appellate Court awarding damages to the plaintiffs, therefore, has to be set aside. ( 39 ) HENCE, the decree of the lower appellate Court is modified as above said with regard to the award of damages; but otherwise the decree is confirmed. This appeal is therefore dismissed except to the extent above said. In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs in this appeal. --- *** --- .