JUDGMENT 1. THIS Rule involves a question of jurisdiction. An application was made before the learned District Judge, Alipore, by a mother for being appointed the guardian of her minor daughter. The father, the petitioner before us, was the respondent in the original court. It was contended before the learned District judge, as it is being contended before us, that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. 2. THE facts of the case are not substantially in dispute. The petitioner as also the respondent were originally residents of Assam. In 1956 they got married and soon thereafter, migrated to Calcutta. In May 1963 the minor was born within the jurisdiction of the District Court of Alipore. It appears that in March 1966 the parties set up their matrimonial home at premises No. 15/1 Hindustan Road, within the same jurisdiction. The minor was living with her parents until March 1972 when she was sent to St. Helen's convent, Kurseong, for her education. She spent her holidays at home with her parents. There is no dispute that until the time she left for Kurseong, she was residing at 15/1 Hindustan Road. In fact, she attended South Point school, a school in the vicinity of Hindustan Road which she left in 1972 far st. Helen's Convent. At that time the relation between the petitioner and the respondent was undergoing considerable strain. It is the mother's case that the minor had to be sent to kurseong because the atmosphere a home had become too oppressive for her. Sometime in February 1974 the respondent left the Hindustan Road premises temporarily and went to stay with her sister at 15c Swinhoe Street, not far from her home, within the jurisdiction of the Alipore Court. A that time the minor was on her holiday and was living with her parents. The respondent took her to her sister's home. Soon thereafter, they returned home and the minor left for Kurseong when her school reopened. On February 19, 1974 the respondent made an application in the count of the District Judge at Alipore for being appointed guardian of the minor. Relation between the parties further deteriorated with the result that the respondent left the matrimonial home on 16th April, 1974. Soon thereafter, they returned home and the minor left for Kurseong when her school reopened. On February 19, 1974 the respondent made an application in the count of the District Judge at Alipore for being appointed guardian of the minor. Relation between the parties further deteriorated with the result that the respondent left the matrimonial home on 16th April, 1974. Thereafter, the respondent discovered that the petitioner had brought the minor from kurseong without her knowledge, tock her to Gauhati where the petitioner's parents lived and had her admitted into St. Mary's Convent Gauhati thereupon, on 10th May, 1974 the respondent made an application before the learned District Judge for ah order for production of the minor. By an order made on the same date the learned District Judge directed the petitioner to produce the minor in court on 20th May, 1974. 3. THE petitioner states that he was not served with any notice of the application made on the 19th February, 1974 or of the application for production of the minor. His case is that he came to know of these proceedings from the landlord's son who resided in the same premises. Thereupon, he made two applications on 20th May, 1974, one for fixing a date for filing objection to the main petition find the other for an order that the case be heard on the point of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue. The learned District Judge directed hearing on May 21, 1974 on the question of jurisdiction only. The case was heard on the appointed date and the preliminary issue was disposed of by an order holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear the application. Against that order, the petitioner who was the respondent before the original court has come up on revision before us. 4. THE relevant provisions in the guardians and Wards Act relating to jurisdiction to entertain applications with respect to the guardianship of the person of a minor, may be set out : "sec. 9 (1) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. The question therefore arises where did the minor ordinarily reside on the date of the application. 9 (1) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. The question therefore arises where did the minor ordinarily reside on the date of the application. " The word 'reside' has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary to mean "to dwell permanently or for a considerable time, to have one's settled or usual abode, to live in or at a particular place." 5. THE definition was accepted by the House of Lords in Levene v. Inland Revenue Commissioner 1928 A. C. 217 where the meaning of 'resident' and 'ordinarily resident' for the purposes of income Tax Act, 1918 came up for consideration. In his speech, Viscount Cave L.C. said : "in most cases there is no difficulty in determining where a man has his settled or usual abode, and if that is ascertained, he is not the less resident there because from time to time he leaves it for the purposes of business or pleasure." 6. HE gave the example of a master mariner who had his home at Glasgow where his wife and family lived, and to which he returned during the intervals between his sea voyages. He was held to reside there although he actually spent the greater part of the year at sea. The Lord Chancellor further observed : "a man may reside in more than one place. Just as a man may have two homes-one in London and the other in the country-so he may have a home abroad and a home in the united Kingdom, and in that case he is held to reside in both places and to be chargeable with tax in this country. " 7. IN Barlow v. Smith (1892) 9 tlr 57, in construing 'residence' for qualifying as a voter, Lord Coleridge c. J. spoke of a man's residence as being where he lives and has his home. In Fox v. Stirk (CA) (1970) 3 W. L. R. 147 Widgery LJ. said: "although I recognise that the word is in some ways ambiguous I think it nevertheless follows that a man cannot be said to reside in a particular place unless in the ordinary sense of the word one can say that for the time being he is making his home in that place. . said: "although I recognise that the word is in some ways ambiguous I think it nevertheless follows that a man cannot be said to reside in a particular place unless in the ordinary sense of the word one can say that for the time being he is making his home in that place. . . . . . It is imperative to remember in this context that "residence" implies a degree of permanence. In the words of the Oxford English Dictionary, it is concerned with something which will go on for a considerable time. Consequently a person is not entitled to claim to be a resident at a given town merely because he pays a short, temporary visit some assumption of permanence, some degree of continuity, some expectation of continuity, is a vital factor which turns simple expectation into residence. " 8. ON the meaning of the words "ordinarily residing at" which occur in section (9) (i) of the Guardian and wards Act with which we are concerned in this case, it seems to us that the qualifying word "ordinarily" does not add anything to the concept of 'residence', if 'residence' is understood in its dictionary meaning and as explained by English Courts. In Levene v. Inland Revenue Commissioners Viscount Cave said : "the expression 'ordinary residence' is found in the Income Tax Act of 1806 and occurs again and again in the later Income tax Acts, where it is contrasted with usual or occasional or temporary residence and I think that it connotes residence in a place with some degree of continuity and apart from accidental or temporary absences. So understood the expression differs little in meaning from the word 'residence' as used in the Acts, and I find it difficult to imagine a case in which a man while not resident here is yet ordinarily resident here. " In his speech Lord Warrington of Clyffe also observed : "i do not attempt to give any definition of the word 'resident'. In my opinion, it has no technical or special meaning. " In his speech Lord Warrington of Clyffe also observed : "i do not attempt to give any definition of the word 'resident'. In my opinion, it has no technical or special meaning. In particular it is in my opinion impossible to restrict its connotation to its duration" He pointed that a member of the House of Lords may well be said to be ordinarily resident in London during the Parliamentary Session and in the country during the recess and added "if it has any definite meaning I should say it means according to the way in which a man's life is ordered." 9. IN Hopkins v. Hopkins (1950) 2 all England Law Reports 1035 it was held, relying on the above decision, that on a true construction of the words 'ordinarily resident in Section 1 (1) (a) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1949, the qualifying adverb 'ordinarily' added nothing to the adjective 'resident'. 10. IN Fox v. Stirk and Bristol Electoral Registration Officer, ricketts v. Cambridge City Electoral Registration officer (1970) 3 WLR 147 the question arose whether two undergraduates, members respectively of Bristol and cambridge Universities, were resident in the respective constituencies for the purpose of qualifying as voters on the qualifying date, October 10, 1969. Section 4 (1) of the Representation of the People Act 1949 directed questions of residence on the qualifying date to be determined in accordance with general principles. 11. IN each case, the undergraduates had arrived in the new academic year shortly before October 10 and were living in rooms in authorised halls of residence or in college on that date. During the academic year they as university students were required to occupy their rooms at least for the university terms between 25 and 30 weeks and could and did occupy them during vacation with the permission of the authorities where their course of study required it, though permission might be refused and in Bristol the halls of residence were closed for some six to seven weeks in the year during which period no student could occupy his room. Allowing the appeals from orders of county court Judges by which they held that the undergraduates were not residing in Bristol or Cambridge in the respective cases and therefore did not qualify for registration, the Court of Appeal held that the undergraduates were entitled to be included on the register, for not only were they resident in the particular constituencies on the qualifying date, but there was also that sufficient degree of permanence or expectation of continuity attaching to their residence in their halls and colleges to turn simple occupation into residence the Court held that the word 'residence' has no technical or special meaning but in its ordinary sense implies a degree of permanence. 12. IN his judgment Lord Denning mr followed Viscount Cave L. C. in levene v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, in his acceptance of the definition of the word 'reside' in the Oxford English Dictionary and said: "the first principle is that a man can have two residences. He can have a flat in London and a house in the country. He is resident in both. The second principle is that temporary presence at an address does not make a man resident there. A guest who comes for the weekend is not resident. A short-stay visitor is not resident. The third principle is that temporary absence does not deprive a person of his residence. If he happens to be away for a holiday or away for the weekend in hospital, he does not lose his residence on that account." Applying these principles, I do not think these students are disqualified simply because their parental home is in England. They may be resident at their homes but they may also be resident in Bristol or Cambridge. People who have houses or flats in London and houses in the country can be on the register for both because they are resident in both, but they can only vote at one. So also with students, they can be on the register for their homes and for their university towns, but they can only vote in one. 13. I think that a person may properly be said to be a "resident" in a place when his stay there has a considerable degree of permanence. So also with students, they can be on the register for their homes and for their university towns, but they can only vote in one. 13. I think that a person may properly be said to be a "resident" in a place when his stay there has a considerable degree of permanence. So I would apply the simple test, was there on October 10, 1969 a considerable degree of permanence in the stay of these students in Bristol or Cambridge ? I think there was. They live there and sleep there. They were there for at least half the year as a minimum. There was certainly a sufficient degree of permanence to make them resident in bristol or Cambridge as the case may be 14. IT is clear from Sub-Section (1) of Section (9) itself that the place of ordinary residence of the minor may not be his actual place of residence on the date of the application. In Lalita twaif v. Paramatma Prasad AIR 1940 all 329, it was held that where the minor is found actually residing at the time of the application is a fact which does not determine jurisdiction. It must be proved where the minor ordinarily resides as laid down in sub-section (1) of section 9 of the Act. This decision was subsequently relied on by s. R. Das J. in the case of Lovejoy patell, AIR 1944 Cal. 433. In Bholanath v. Sharda Devi, AIR 1954 Pat 489 , the question of ordinary residence of a minor arose in a pointed manner. There the minor lived mostly at Buxar within the jurisdiction of the District court of Sahabad with her mother. The child was stealthily taken away by her father to Benaras where he resided. It was held that the District court of Sahabad had jurisdiction to entertain an application for guardianship. In course of his judgment, sinha, J. observed : "the questions as to the ordinary residence of the minor must be decided on the facts of each particular case and generally, the length of residence at a particular place determines the question. The expression the place where the minor ordinarily resides' means the place where the minor generally resides and would be expected to reside but for special circumstances. The expression the place where the minor ordinarily resides' means the place where the minor generally resides and would be expected to reside but for special circumstances. " The learned Judge also pointed out that the question as to what would be considered the ordinary residence of the minor has to be decided in the peculiar facts of each case. In Jamuna Prosad v. Mst. Panna and others, AIR (1960) All 285, a minor girl who resided with her mother at deoria in U. P. was removed to Sahabad in Bihar by her father with the object of gaining control over her. It was held that it could not be said that the minor ordinarily resided at Sahabad. The learned Judge observed : "the words 'ordinarily resident' have a different meaning from 'residence at the time of the application'. Both may be identical or may be different. That would depend on the facts of each particular case. To interpret the words 'where the minor ordinarily resides' to mean 'where the minor actually resides at the time of the application' may in some cases amount to rendering nugatory all the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act. It may be that persons who have absolutely no right may remove the minor forcibly and keep him at a distant place, when the application is made, where the minor was ordinarily residing, and objection may be taken that the application was not entertainable. The entire circumstances, the intention with which the minor had been removed, the person with whom the minor has been living and other relevant factors have to be taken into consideration. " 15. IN Chandra Kishore and another v. Smt. Hemlata Gupta, reported in air (1955) All. 611, the same principle was expressed in the following words : "the words, 'ordinarily resides' obviously means more than temporary residence, even though such residence is spread over a long period. " 16. IN the case of Chimanlal Ganpat and Another v. Rajaram Maganchand Oswal, A.I.R. 1937 Bom. 158 it was found that the minor and her mother lived with her paternal uncle since her father's death and both were maintained by him in Kolhapur State. She was taken to Poona by her maternal uncle and a marriage was arranged for the minor there. 158 it was found that the minor and her mother lived with her paternal uncle since her father's death and both were maintained by him in Kolhapur State. She was taken to Poona by her maternal uncle and a marriage was arranged for the minor there. The minor had spent the greater part of her life with the respondent in Kolhapur State though at the time when the application was made, she had been living in Poona for only eight months. The husband to whom she was engaged was a resident of Poona. It was held that on the date of the application, she was ordinarily residing in Poona. In the case of in re Lovejoy Patell, A.I.R. 1944 Calcutta 483, the facts were as follows : - From 1938 to February 1942 the minors ordinarily resided and attended schools in the city of Calcutta within the original jurisdiction of the Calcutta high Court. They were sent to Darjeeling for education. They lived there upto November 1942 when on account of the annual vacation they came down to the applicant's place of residence in beadon Street which was also within the original jurisdiction of the Calcutta high Court. There they lived up to january 1943. The applicant applied to the High Court on its original side for her appointment as guardian of the persons of the minors on 8th March, 1943. On the date of the Application the minors were residing at Circus avenue outside that jurisdiction. It was held that the minors ordinarily resided within the original jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. In his judgment Das J. observed : "leaving aside for the moment ail matters of controversy as to the person with whom the minors lived there is no doubt that from 1938 to february 1942 the minors ordinarily resided and attended schools in the town of Calcutta within the jurisdiction of this Court. Then they were sent to Darjeeling for education. They lived there upto november 1942 when on account of the annual vacation they came down to the applicant's place of residence in. Beadon Street which is within the jurisdiction of this court. There they lived admittedly upto January 1943. I need not at this stage, discuss what happened subsequently. Then they were sent to Darjeeling for education. They lived there upto november 1942 when on account of the annual vacation they came down to the applicant's place of residence in. Beadon Street which is within the jurisdiction of this court. There they lived admittedly upto January 1943. I need not at this stage, discuss what happened subsequently. These facts, to my mind, are sufficient to indicate that the minors ordinarily resided within the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court "it is necessary to appreciate that in lovejoy Patell's case the minors were residing outside the original jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court at the date of the application. It has also to be remembered that they were living in a residential school in Darjeeling for a good part of the year. Yet Das J. found that although they were residing for a part of the year in Darjeeling and also living outside jurisdiction at the date of the application, the fact that they had lived all along within the jurisdiction of the High Court and spent their holidays within that jurisdiction, conferred jurisdiction on the high Court to entertain the application. It has however to be borne in mind that the case did not decide that the Darjeeling Court within the jurisdiction of which the minors resided during their School terms had no jurisdiction to hear such an application. A person, it must be borne in mind, may have more than one ordinary place of residence." 17. ANOTHER School case is Sarada nayar v. Vayankara Amma and Ors., A.I.R. 1957 Kerela 158. There the petitioners made an application under section 25 of the Guardians and Wards act for guardianship of her minor daughter Nirmala in the District Court at Trichur. The minor was born in 1949. On account of strained relationship, ultimately leading to complete estrangement, the petitioner left the matrimonial home in 1952 but she was not permitted by her husband Dr. Nayar to take the minor daughter with her. Thereafter the minor resided with her father at Madras where the respondent No. 1, a sister of her father, kept house for him. In 1954 Dr. Nayar became ill. The respondent No. 2, another sister of Dr. Nayar accompanied by her husband, the respondent no. 3, visited Madras to see Dr. Nayar. Nayar to take the minor daughter with her. Thereafter the minor resided with her father at Madras where the respondent No. 1, a sister of her father, kept house for him. In 1954 Dr. Nayar became ill. The respondent No. 2, another sister of Dr. Nayar accompanied by her husband, the respondent no. 3, visited Madras to see Dr. Nayar. When they returned to Trichur, their permanent residence, the minor was sent along with them by her father so that she might stay at Trichur and have her education there. Accordingly, the girl was admitted into a school at Trichur. In the first week of September, 1954 Dr. Nayar came to Trichur on a short visit. There he fell ill, got back to Madras and died there in a hospital. The mother then, asked the respondents for the custody of the daughter but they refused. Thereupon, she filed the application for her custody in the District Court at Trichur. 18. THE respondents Nos. 2 and 3 contended that on the date of the application the minor was not ordinarily residing in Trichur and that she was residing at Bombay under the protection of respondent No. 1. The Court held in the facts and circumstances of the case, that the minor's ordinary place of residence was Trichur and as such the Court had jurisdiction in the matter and gave custody of the minor to the petitioner. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 moved the High Court against the order passed by the District Judge. The high Court found that the respondent no. 1 had deliberately taken away the minor to Bombay soon after the petitioner's application for custody was filed and was purposely keeping out and watching the outcome of the application with the full knowledge that she was a party to the petition. At page 161 of the Report Sankaran J. delivering the judgment of the Court observed : - "the expression 'where the minor ordinarily resides' appears to have been deliberately used to exclude places to which the minor may be removed at or about the time of the filing of the application for the enforcement of the guardianship and custody of the minor. The phrase 'ordinarily resides' indicates ordinary residence even at the time of presentation of the application. The emphasis is undoubtedly on the minor's ordinary place of residence. The phrase 'ordinarily resides' indicates ordinary residence even at the time of presentation of the application. The emphasis is undoubtedly on the minor's ordinary place of residence. Such a place has to be determined by finding out as to where the minor ordinarily was residing and where such residence would have continued but for the recent removal of the minor to a different place. " Later on, in determining the ordinary place of residence of the minor he said : "it is an undisputed fact that Nirmala was staying along with counter-petitioners 1 to 3 in Kannambra House at Trichur from 10-6-1954 onwards until she was taken to Bombay in the second week of October 1954 by the first counter-petitioner. Prior to june, 1954 the child was staying at Dr. Nayar's residence at Madras. It has to be remembered that this was only a temporary residence of Dr. Nayar himself and such residence could have had its duration only so long as he was in service as a Medical Officer under the Madras Government." It has to be appreciated that the minor was sent to Trichur to reside for an indefinite period with her father's sister and her husband. Not only was she residing there but she was also being educated in a School at Trichur. 19. MR. B.C. Dutta, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, strongly relied an the decision of the judicial Committee in Annie Besant v. Narayaniah and Others, 41 I. A. 314. In 1910 Mrs. Besant, the appellant, offered to take charge of the respondent's two minor sons and defray the expenses for their maintenance and education in England. She intended to educate the minors at the university of Oxford. The offer was accepted and by a letter dated March 6, 1970 the respondent appointed the appellant to be guardian of their persons. In February, 1912 the minors left India in the appellant's company for england. In England the appellant made arrangements for a course of tuition for the minors. Shortly before their departure for England the minors lived with the appellant, for a while, within the jurisdiction of the District court of Chingleput in the Madras Presidency. 20. SOON thereafter, the respondent revoked the agreement dated march 6, 1910 and in October, 1912 instituted a suit against the appellant in the District Court of Chingleput claiming custody of the children. 20. SOON thereafter, the respondent revoked the agreement dated march 6, 1910 and in October, 1912 instituted a suit against the appellant in the District Court of Chingleput claiming custody of the children. The suit was subsequently transferred to the high Court. It was not in dispute that at the date of the institution of the suit minors were residing in England and that with the exception of the period between September, 1911 and february, 1912 they had never resided within the jurisdiction of the District court of Chingleput. The High Court passed a decree giving the custody and guardianship of the children to the respondent. On appeal, a Division bench of the High Court held that the court which passed the decree had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. On appeal, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the High Court, which was in effect, exercising the powers of the District court of Chingleput had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Lord Parker of Waddington observed at page 322 of the Report : - "the District Court in which the suit was instituted had no jurisdiction over the infants except such jurisdiction as was conferred by the Guardians and Wards Act 1890. By the 9th section of that act the jurisdiction of the Court is confined to infants ordinarily resident in the district. It is in their lordship's opinion impossible to hold that infants who had months previously left India with a view to being educated in England and going to the University of Oxford were ordinarily resident in the district of Chingleput. " 21. THE residence of the minors in england was more than temporary. At the time of the commencement of the suit, they had settled down in England were pursuing their studies and preparing for an academic course in the university. Their residence in England had therefore a certain degree of continuity, some measure of permanence, not only for the time being but also in their expectation. In those circumstances, it could hardly be disputed that they were ordinarily residing in england. In any event, their residence at Chingleput, for a few months prior to their departure, was only a temporary sojourn. Therefore, it could not be said that Chingleput was their ordinary place of residence. In those circumstances, it could hardly be disputed that they were ordinarily residing in england. In any event, their residence at Chingleput, for a few months prior to their departure, was only a temporary sojourn. Therefore, it could not be said that Chingleput was their ordinary place of residence. The Judicial committee found that at the material time, the minors were ordinarily residing in England and not in Chingleput. It does not however follow from the judgment that if the minors had a home in India where they were residing permanently and an application had been made in the Court of their home district that Court could not have had jurisdiction under Sec. 9 (1) of the act. A man may have a home abroad and a home in the United Kingdom as was expressly recognised by Viscount cave L.C. in Levene v. Inland Revenue commissioners. 22. IN the present case, the minor, whose home was in Calcutta, within the jurisdiction of the Alipore Court, had gone to Kurseong for her education in a residential school. During the holidays, and holidays account for a good part of the academic year, she lived and was expected to live in Calcutta within the jurisdiction of the Alipore Court. Her custody had not been made over to any resident in Kurseong. Her mother remained her guardian on the school register. Her connection with home had not been impaired. Her parents at all material times lived and still live within the jurisdiction of the Alipore court. On the date of the application she was actually residing with her mother within the same jurisdiction. In these circumstances, it must be held that the minor was ordinarily residing within that jurisdiction at the material time. Mr. B. C. Dutta tried to establish that the minor ordinarily resided at Kurseong within the jurisdiction of the District Court of Darjeeling. It seems to me that his arguments were slightly off the rails. The question with which the Court is concerned is not whether the minor ordinarily resided at Kurseong but whether she ordinarily resided within the jurisdiction of the Alipore Court. To hold that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the minor ordinarily resided at Kurseong is not to hold by necessary implication that she did not also ordinarily reside within the jurisdiction of the Alipore Court. 23. To hold that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the minor ordinarily resided at Kurseong is not to hold by necessary implication that she did not also ordinarily reside within the jurisdiction of the Alipore Court. 23. WITH great respect I am constrained to say that some of the Indian decisions on the meaning of the words 'ordinarily residing at' in Section 9 (1)of the Guardians and Wards Act appear to have proceeded on the view that there is a competition between different places of residence where there are more than one. There is no such necessary competition. All that the Court has to determine is whether the minor ordinarily resides within its jurisdiction at the material time, irrespective of the fact whether he also ordinarily resides elsewhere. 24. A question has sometimes arisen before the Courts as to whether the residence of the guardian is to be deemed to be the residence of the minor. It has been consistently held by our High Courts, almost without any exception, that presumption does not play any part in determining the ordinary residence of the minor within the meaning of Section 9 (1)of the guardians and Wards Act. The Courts have repeatedly held that the ordinary residence of a minor is entirely a question of fact. At a very early stage the place of ordinary residence for the purpose of Section 9 (1) was determined as a pure question of fact irrespective of the residence of the minor's guardian. In Robert Ward v. Velchand umedchand I.L.R. 34 Bom. 121 a minor was kept by his brother at the American Mission at Baroda for over two and half years. Thereafter, he was brought to Ahmedabad and lived there for about 28 days. Then again he was taken to Baroda by another person. The High Court held that the minor ordinarily resided within the jurisdiction of the Baroda Court though his natural guardian resided at Ahmedabad. In the case of Lakshman Moreshet v. Gangaram Narayan A.I.R. 1932 bom. Thereafter, he was brought to Ahmedabad and lived there for about 28 days. Then again he was taken to Baroda by another person. The High Court held that the minor ordinarily resided within the jurisdiction of the Baroda Court though his natural guardian resided at Ahmedabad. In the case of Lakshman Moreshet v. Gangaram Narayan A.I.R. 1932 bom. 592 a Division Bench of the bombay High Court observed :- "the only thing which can be said to be at all clear is that residence is a matter of fact and not a matter of presumption." In the facts of that case the learned judges held that it could not be presumed that a minor girl ordinarily resided in Poona merely because her husband was residing there. The girl out of the whole of her life had lived for about four to five months in Poona all the rest of the time she had been residing in the Ratnagiri district. That being so, the learned Judges considered that it must be held that she ordinarily resided in Ratnagiri district. 25. IN the case of Bai Shri Arunkumari v. Jhala Harpalsingh Natwar singh A.I.R. 1954 Saurashtra 152 a division Bench of the Saurashtra High court consisting of Shah C. J. and baxi, J. relied on the case reported in a. I. R, 1932 Bom. 592 and held that there is no presumption that the minor is deemed to reside at the place where his natural guardian resides and the place of residence of the natural guardian is not the determining factor in deciding the question of the Court's jurisdiction, except as one of the circumstances to be considered in determining the ordinary place of residence of the minor. Even if such presumption can be raised, it is a weak presumption liable to be easily rebutted by proof of other circumstances. The question of residence of the minor is thus a question of fact which must be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case. In a recent judgment of the gujrat High Court in Virbala and Ors. v. Shah Harichand Ratanchand A. I. R. 1973 Gujrat 1 the same principle has been reiterated. In paragraph 2 of the judgment the learned Judge said "the question of ordinary residence is a question of fact and not a question of presumption. In a recent judgment of the gujrat High Court in Virbala and Ors. v. Shah Harichand Ratanchand A. I. R. 1973 Gujrat 1 the same principle has been reiterated. In paragraph 2 of the judgment the learned Judge said "the question of ordinary residence is a question of fact and not a question of presumption. The Court has to take into consideration the relevant facts and circumstances and find out what is the place of ordinary residence of the minor. "In the Gujarat case the learned Judge relied on the decision reported in A. I. R. 1932 Bom. 592 and A.I.R. 1937 bom. 158. 26. AS far as I can see, the only case where a contrary view was taken is the case reported in A.I.R. 1951 Nag. 179 Sm. Vimalabai v. Baburao Shamrao kabirsagar. In his judgment Mudholkar J. said, "under the Hindu law the father is the natural guardian of ms children and his children must be deemed to reside where he resides." In that case a Hindu minor had been Living in Amraoti for over a year with her father. She was deemed to reside ordinarily in Amraoti though, before going to Amraoti to live with her father after he found employment there, she lipped the greater part of her life in nagpur, first with her parents and thereafter with her mother. During the period the minor spent with her mother in Nagpur after the departure of her father, she was deemed to be within the charge of her mother on behalf of her father, who was her natural guardian, in the view he took in those circumstances, the leaned judge found that Nagpur could not be said to be her legal residence. In Bal Arunkumari v. Jhala Harpalsingh to which reference has been made Shah C. J pointed out that the Nagpur decision rested on the special facts of the case. The minor had lived with her father for one year before the date of the application. The learned Judge was at pains to point out that in fact Mudholkar J. expressly approved of the decision reported in A.I.R. 1937 Bom. 158. The decision of Mudholkar J. was dissented from by the Gujrat High Court in Virbala v. Shah Harichand. With very great respect I am constrained to say that the decision of Mudholkar J. is not supported by principles or precedents. 158. The decision of Mudholkar J. was dissented from by the Gujrat High Court in Virbala v. Shah Harichand. With very great respect I am constrained to say that the decision of Mudholkar J. is not supported by principles or precedents. It has not been followed by any other High Court as far as I can see. I am, therefore, of opinion that the view taken by Mudholkar J. in A.I.R. 1951 Nag. 179 is not supported by the language of section 9 (1) of the guardians and Wards Act and the ordinary place of residence can and does only mean factually, the ordinary place of residence. On a proper construction of section 9 (1) of the Guardians and wards Act it is clear that the words "where the minor ordinarily resides'' do not mean neither more nor less than they say. In the contemplation of the relevant sub-section the place of ordinary residence of the minor is a pure question of fact. Notions of constructive or legal residence do not enter into the picture. There is no presumption that the residence of the guardian is the residence of the minor although usually that happens to be the case. On a consideration of the statute and decided cases, it is clear that in construing the words 'ordinarily residing at' it in not legitimate to invoke any presumption or the aid of any legal fiction. 27. THE determination of the ordinary residence of the minor depends on a variety of considerations. The ordinary place of residence may not be the same as the actual place of residence but that does not mean that the actual place of residence on the date of the application need not be taken into consideration. The duration, the character, the purpose of the residence, the circumstances in which the minor resides at a particular place, animus revertendi if any, have all to be thought of. The determination has to be made in the peculiar facts of each case having due regard to the entire conspectus. 28. IT appears that on the date of the application the minor was residing within the jurisdiction of the District court of Alipore. It is common case that on that date the matrimonial home of her parents which was also her home was situate at Hindustan Road, Calcutta, within the jurisdiction of that Court. 28. IT appears that on the date of the application the minor was residing within the jurisdiction of the District court of Alipore. It is common case that on that date the matrimonial home of her parents which was also her home was situate at Hindustan Road, Calcutta, within the jurisdiction of that Court. Apart from the time during which she resided at Kurseong for the purpose of education she had been residing mainly at her home. The petitioner made an averment in his petition before the learned District Judge that the respondent left the matrimonial home only on 16th April, 1974. The application was filed on February 19, 1974. For these reasons I am firmly of opinion that on the date of the application the minor ordinarily resided within the jurisdiction of the Court of the District Judge at Alipore. It is not necessary for us to decide, nor do we decide, whether the minor was also ordinarily residing at Kurseong. In that view of the matter, the Rule is discharged, but there will be no order for costs. Needless to say that we have not gone into the merits of the application pending before the learned District judge. Rule discharged.