JUDGMENT A.K. De, J: Respondent filed Title Suit Nos. 252 of 1970 on 12.9.70 for appellant's eviction from the suit premises a shop room, stating that he was his monthly bharatia at a rent of Rs. 6/- payable according to Bengali Calendar month, that he had validly terminated his tenancy by service of a combined• notice of suit and notice to quit, that he reasonably required it for his own use by opening a business in cycle and rickshaw parts to be looked after by himself and his un-employed son. 2. The defendant contested the suit pleading res-juaicata in bar disputing service and. validity of the combined notice of ejectment and denying plaintiff's reasonable requirement of the room as stated by him. 3. The learned Munsif has decreed the suit holding against the defendant on all the points. His appeal to the district judge has also failed. District Judge has upheld learned Munsif's finding as to plaintiff's requirement of the suit room for business. Defendant tenant has filed this appeal. 4. Mr. Mrityunjay Palit, learned Advocate appearing for the defendant, submitted that the court below should have held that the plaintiff's case of reasonable requirement of the suit shop room for business was not open for decision in the suit because of the bar of res-judicata as the same case had been disallowed in a previous suit. Plaintiff previously started title suit No. 272 of 1966 against the tenant for his eviction from this suit shop room, and, stated, for disentitling the defendant to protection from eviction, that he wanted it for use as residence of his family members and for use, alternatively or additionally, to start a business. The defendant contested the suit firstly, on the ground that the notice to terminate was bad in law and secondly, that plaintiff's case of requirement was not real. Both the trial court and the first appellate court dismissed that suit holding that the notice to quit was bad not containing description of the suit premises and that plaintiff's case of requirement for residence or business was not real (vide judgment Exhibits A & A1). The question is whether the findings on the question of requirement in T.S. No. 272 of 1966 raised a bar of resjudicata in this suit. For several reasons, the plea cannot succeed. The question is whether the findings on the question of requirement in T.S. No. 272 of 1966 raised a bar of resjudicata in this suit. For several reasons, the plea cannot succeed. When the suit was dismissed On the ground of notice being bad, the other findings as to requirement were quite unnecessarily made and hence are pot resjudicata. The question of requirement could only arise for consideration if it were held that the tennacy had been determined and not before that. This view has been taken in 48 CWN 421, AIR (1942) Cal. 513 ,AIR 1925 Cal 996 and AIR 1971 Orissan 21 B. I need not state the facts of each of those cases as the principle is well settled. 5. Again, in that suit plaintiff's initial case of requirement was for residence. He introduced the requirement for business by amendment of plaint. The initial case was rejected on evidence. The alternative case was not really decided on merits. The first appellate court's findings in Exhibit 4 (1) judgment are "The a negation is absolutely vague and it has not been stated what business the plaintiff wanted to start nor has he adduced any evidence that he has means to start a business." The case was that the plaintiff himself would start it but the evidence given was that his son would do that. There was no case of a business for the sons in that suit. In this suit, that is the case. No plea of resjudicata can rest on that. No issue of resjudicata was raised in this suit. No argument on that was made in the appeal also. No ground has been taken in this Second Appeal. 6. Mr. Palit next argued that the conclusion about plaintiff's reasonable requirement is not supported on the evidence on record and is a wrong one. In reply Mr. S. P. Roychowdhury, respondent's learned Advocate, argued that the said decision, being one of fact, is not challengable in the second appeal and that it, if challengable, is well based an evidence,. I see force in both these submissions of Mr. Roychowdhury. 7. Plaintiff is a person retired from his employment and is free for any job, though old. He has 3 sons, one of whom, Provas was unemployed on the date of suit, and was on defendants' own affidavit, filed in this court on 1.8.74, unemployed till May, 1974. I see force in both these submissions of Mr. Roychowdhury. 7. Plaintiff is a person retired from his employment and is free for any job, though old. He has 3 sons, one of whom, Provas was unemployed on the date of suit, and was on defendants' own affidavit, filed in this court on 1.8.74, unemployed till May, 1974. The suit room is ideal for a business, as it has a door on G. T. Road and is long in use as such by this defendant. It is part of plaintiff's house where he resides, with his family. It is a necessity also, as is evident from the fact that he is stating that from 1966, when none of his sons finished his education. It is of no relevance as to who is meant or intended to look after the proposed business in the room. Either the plaintiff or one of his sons, if available, will do so. The urgency or compulsion of the situation is such that Pravas ultimately has taken a job because of the delay in plaintiff's getting possession of the room for the business. Provas was trying to secure an employment by registering himself in the employment exchange after passing out in 1966 or 1968. Failing to get it even in 1970, his father very naturally has wanted to start a business to establish him. These pieces of evidence very satisfactorily prove that plaintiff reasonably requires the room for his use to start the business. 8. Mr. Palit, however, argued that Plaintiff's case was not bonafide, as such not reasonable, became his case has been different at different times form the time of first suit in 1966 and that his case of requirement was held as not reasonable in the previous suit. In the previous suit he stated he required it to start the business himself. At the hearing of that suit he stated he required it for his son Sunil, then a student. In the notice of the present suit Ext. 1, he stated he requires it for his two sons, Sunil and Provas. He gave evidence in the suit that he requires it for his son, Pro vas and himself. What runs through all these is that he requires it to start a business; who will ors going to run it, when started, is of no consequence, is determining the requirement. He gave evidence in the suit that he requires it for his son, Pro vas and himself. What runs through all these is that he requires it to start a business; who will ors going to run it, when started, is of no consequence, is determining the requirement. As already pointed out there is no finding in the previous suit except that the said case was, vague and subsequently introduced. Requirement is a continuing process, even if it rests on same ground. When requirement is for "residence" it may not be held as reasonable in one year but may be reasonable the following year for increase in the number of family members or some members growing order to need more space. So in the case for use for business, it may not be found made out in one year but may be held proved a later year. Family commitments adding, business potentialities increasing, particular type of business flourishing in the area, any member qualifying himself for it after the first year, there may be a second or later case of requirement for that purpose. It all depends on proof of facts in each case. It is not correct to contend that once a case of requirement is rejected there cannot be another case on a selfsame ground on a new set of circumstances and situation. I reject Mr. Palit's contention. A change of circumstances may occur from day to day. So the principle of resjudicata does not apply (See Burman v. Woods (1948) LK.B. 111). Mr. Palit's next submission is that the plaintiff is in possession of "reasonably suitable" accommodation for his requirement elsewhere and he cannot, therefore, be granted any decree under clause (ff) of section 13 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. This has been held against the defendant in the suit, both courts concurrently concluding that the adjoining room has no door on G.T. Road, that it is a part of the inner apartments of the plaintiff's residence, as found on local inspection by the lawyer commissioner in his report Ext. 4 (a)which has not been challenged as incorrect. That room has no access except through a passage, which leads to plaintiff's residential portion. To open it to customers, i.e. a public passage, will interfere with its use as a private passage. 4 (a)which has not been challenged as incorrect. That room has no access except through a passage, which leads to plaintiff's residential portion. To open it to customers, i.e. a public passage, will interfere with its use as a private passage. There is evidence of a neighbour, besides of the plaintiff, that his children use it as a study room, and that it is also used as baithakhare for visitors to sit and be entertained. This contention also 'fails, 9. Mr. Palit next raised a plea that the defendant, a goldsmith, will, Jose his business and necessarily his income if he is evicted and that his hardship will be greater than that of the plaintiff, a richmen who will augment his income from the proposed business. As held in (84 CLJ 157 at page 165), the Court need not advise as to how the plaintiff may satisfy his requirements (see also 59 CWN 395 and 85 CLJ 74). The section as it stands, now, excludes from consideration question of hardship and of comparative advantage and disadvantage of the parties. I am unable to give effect to this contention. 10. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, for the respondent, relies on the decision in the case of Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant N. Patel, 1974 (1) SCC 661 , where it has been held that the finding that the landlord reasonably and bonafide required a suit premises for own use and occupation is clearly one of fact. There is a number of cases 'of this court taking' the same view on the question. To cite a few, they are A.I.R. 1947 Cal. 351, I.L.R. (1967) 2 Cal. 47 & A.I.R., 1967 Cal. 255. There is also a decision of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1966 Madhya Pradesh 207. Mr. Palit in reply referred to A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 585 and 77 CWN 921. The case in 77 CWN 921 rests on the decision in AIR 1973 S.C. 585 . The decision in AIR 1973 S.C. 585 is not on ali fours with the case before me. In that case, the two courts below held initially, considering section 14(1) proviso CI.(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, that the claim cannot be considered to be bonafide as eviction had been asked for within 11 months of the letting. The decision in AIR 1973 S.C. 585 is not on ali fours with the case before me. In that case, the two courts below held initially, considering section 14(1) proviso CI.(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, that the claim cannot be considered to be bonafide as eviction had been asked for within 11 months of the letting. Both parties asked for a remand for determining another question of fact, which was not decided by the two courts below, as to whether the premises available with the landlord can be considered to be "reasonably suitable accommodation" which is a necessary One to bring the case under the proviso (c) of section 14 (1). When that additional finding of fact was received, and which the two tribunals did not consider when making the findings initially, the High Court reversed that of the tribunals below relying on that finding subsequently made on those facts It was held that the decision made by the two Tribunals as to "bonafide requirement" was a finding on mixed question of law and fact. 11. In that case the Supreme Court observed "The High Court rejected the contention of the appellant that it has no jurisdiction to consider the correctness of the findings recorded by the two subordinate authorities especially when the relevant matters to be taken into account for deciding such a question have not been borne in mind by those authorities". 12. The Supreme Court in that case did not go into the question as to what is a substantial question of law for the purpose of section 39 (2) of the Delhi Act. It was further observed in the decision "From the above observation it is clear that an inference drawn by the subordinate authorities that the requirement of the respondent was not bonafide could not be recorded as conclusive. The High Court in proper cases, has ample jurisdiction to interfere with that finding and record its own conclusion on the basis of the material on record." 13. Their Lordships referred to the decision of that court in Bhagwandass v. S. Rajdev Singh, AIR 1970 SC 986 , and held that decision in AIR 1970 was on a relevant consideration of the materials on record and that no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, arose for consideration. Their Lordships referred to the decision of that court in Bhagwandass v. S. Rajdev Singh, AIR 1970 SC 986 , and held that decision in AIR 1970 was on a relevant consideration of the materials on record and that no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, arose for consideration. These decisions in AIR 1973 SC 585 and in 77 CWN are of no aid to the appellants as contended by Mr. Palit. The decisions in both sets of cases referred to by both the parties are that a finding on the reasonable requirement of the premises by a landlord can be challenged in a second appeal if there is no consideration of any materials necessary to decide that question. It can only be gone into in a second appeal where ultimate conclusion has been made without considering all proved facts. It is not possible in a Second Appeal to make a fresh assessment of the evidence on a question of fact to see if another conclusion is possible or may have been reached. In the instant case, it has not been shown that any of the fact held proved was not considered or that the conclusion was not on the question before the court. I, therefore uphold the contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury, that the decision of the two courts below as to reasonable requirement of the suit premises for own occupation of the• plaintiff cannot be interfered with in the second appeal. 14. In view of the above conclusion, I dismiss the appeal with costs. The application, filed by the appellant on 1.8.74 has been considered in the judgment and is also disposed of in terms of this judgment 15. Mr. Palit finally prayed for some time for the defendant to vacate the premises. On his prayer. I gave the defendant three months time. The defendant shall vacate the suit premises within three months from this date and in default, he shall be removed therefrom in execution.