A. K. SEN, J. ( 1 ) IN this Rule the petitioner company is disputing the final order dated May 4, 1971 passed in a proceeding which in substance is a proceeding for review of an earlier order for retention obviously made under section 6 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is the successor-in-interest of the Midnapore Zemindary Company Ltd. which company was admittedly an intermediary holding extensive properties prior to the enforcement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. It is not in dispute that practically the entire estate of the company vested on the enforcement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. On April 10, 1956 admittedly this company wanted to retain certain lands on the basis that it is entitled to do so under the provisions of section 6. In this return the company wanted to retain certain lands in the category of homestead under section (6) (1) (a), certain other lands as appertaining to building and structures under section 6 (1) (b), certain lands as non-agricultural land under Section (6) (1) (c), certain lands in the category of agricultural land in khas possession under Section 6 (1) (d) and certain tank-fisheries and orchards under Sections 6 (1) (e) and 6 (1) (f ). There is no dispute that on the return so filed the lands in the category of homestead lands, non-agricultural lands and agricultural lands were within the ceiling. But as no ceiling is provided by the statute in respect of the lands coming under Sections 6 (1) (b) 6 (1) (e) and 6 (1) (f), the company wanted to retain certain areas in such categories which were somewhat extensive in character. There can be no dispute if those lands belong to those categories there being no schedule, company was entitled to retain as such. ( 3 ) NOW the company having filed its return in the year 1956 was allowed to retain the lands thus opted for retention. Since such retention the company had not only transferred various plots out of the plot so allowed to be retained but some areas had been acquire by the government under the provisions of different Land Acquisition Acts. Since such retention the company had not only transferred various plots out of the plot so allowed to be retained but some areas had been acquire by the government under the provisions of different Land Acquisition Acts. Though there is some controversy between the petitioner and the respondents on the present pleadings as to the extent of lands transferred by the petitioner company after retention, the respondents have not been able to deny the position that some of the lands allowed to be retained were subsequently acquired by the Government as retained land of the Company and some again were transferred by private sale. ( 4 ) SUCH a position was allowed to remain for more than 10 years when on 29. 7. 1967 the impugned proceedings was initiated by the Revenue Officer substantially to review and modify the earlier order of retention. I prefer to set out the initial order as passed by the Revenue Officer on the aforesaid date to indicate the nature of the proceedings as there has been some controversy about it. The order reads as follows: -WHEREAS it appears that the intermediary, M/s. Midnapur Zemindary Co. Ltd. held lands beyond the prescribed ceiling on the date of vesting; And whereas the said intermediary appears to have lands in this district and in the districts of Murshidabad, Nadia and Purulia; And whereas the said intermediary appears to have submitted ?b? option statement in Settlement Officer, Midnapore, which was received thereon on 10. 4. 56; And whereas it appears that the intermediary has been allowed to retain lands much above the prescribed ceilings under different categories and without any proceeding U/s. 6 (1) of the E. A. Act; It is therefore necessary to adjust the ceilings of lands under different categories as prescribed under the law. Therefore issue Notice to the intermediary asking it to appear on 19. 8. 67 at 11 A. M. at Settlement Charge Office, Keranitola, Midnapore to exercise its choice for adjustment of ceilings as per provisions laid down in the E. A. Act. ( 5 ) ON the order as aforesaid a notice was served on the petitioner company on August 1, 1967 proposing that as the company has been allowed to retain more than what the company is entitled to retain it is necessary that a correction should be made in that respect. ( 5 ) ON the order as aforesaid a notice was served on the petitioner company on August 1, 1967 proposing that as the company has been allowed to retain more than what the company is entitled to retain it is necessary that a correction should be made in that respect. Therefore, by the impugned notice the petitioner was called upon to appear and submit what out of the lands opted for retention the petitioner could surrender. But for a wide and general allegation that the petitioner had been wrongly allowed to retain more than what the petitioner is entitled to do no particulars of any such error was pointed out or specified either in the initial order or in the notice that was served on the company. The company appeared through its employee and asked for particulars and clarification in respect of the errors for which the modification was sought for. It was not furnished. But on the other hand, the Revenue Officer insisted that the company must furnish plot wise details of the lands which the company opted to retain in the year 1956. Though it is not clear from the order sheet as to whether the company did furnish such details or not but it is claimed by the petitioner that such details were also furnished. For the first time in this final order it was said that what was erroneous in the earlier order was that the company was allowed to retain certain lands which were either not recorded in the name of the company or the classification whereof was not in accordance with the record of rights. Even in this final order it has not been clarified what are the plots which the company wanted to retain though not recorded in the name of the company and what are the plots in respect of which classification was erroneously made out in the option exercised by the company in the year 1956. Proceeding on the basis aforesaid the Revenue Officer adjusted the earlier order by directing vesting, as pointed out herein before of most of the plots which earlier the company was allowed to retain. Proceeding on the basis aforesaid the Revenue Officer adjusted the earlier order by directing vesting, as pointed out herein before of most of the plots which earlier the company was allowed to retain. It has now been pointed out in this application that instead of the company being in error in respect of the classification it was the Revenue Officer who was in such error because many of the plots in the different khatians some of which have been disclosed as annexure 'c' though recorded in the record of rights as buildings, and structures which the company was entitled to retain as such, they were vested. Feeling aggrieved by such an order the petitioner company have moved this Court and obtained the above Rule - ( 6 ) IN contesting this Rule the respondents have filed an affidavit-in-opposition. In this affidavit-in-opposition it has not been disputed that the petitioner company was earlier allowed to retain certain lands which by this process of adjustment are now being vested in the year 1967. As pointed out earlier it is also not disputed that what was allowed to be retained earlier had not only been the subject matter of acquisition by the Government but has been the subject matter of private sale by the Company. The material allegations made in this application based on particulars to the effect that the Revenue Officer himself went wrong investing many of the buildings and structures by proceeding on an irregular classification in respect of those plots in the proceeding though one of the grounds suggested by the Revenue Officer was the error in classification by the petitioner in the option has not been specifically denied though a vague statement of denial is not acceptable to this Court. ( 7 ) ON the pleadings as aforesaid Mr. Mitter appearing on behalf of the petitioner company has raised three points. In the first place, Mr. Mitter has contended that the Revenue Officer had no jurisdiction to review an earlier order passed by a predecessor-in-office. The second point raised by Mr. ( 7 ) ON the pleadings as aforesaid Mr. Mitter appearing on behalf of the petitioner company has raised three points. In the first place, Mr. Mitter has contended that the Revenue Officer had no jurisdiction to review an earlier order passed by a predecessor-in-office. The second point raised by Mr. Mitter is to the effect that even if the Revenue Officer had the jurisdiction he had not exercised the jurisdiction lawfully in the present case when in initiating the proceeding for review by way of readjustment, the Revenue Officer failed to furnish the details of the grounds and particulars of the errors on which he proceeded to readjust the earlier order of retention. Thirdly, it has been contended by Mr. Mitter that in any event, the impugned order is erroneous on the face of the record when the Revenue Officer had proceeded to vest lands which are not liable to vest on the classification as they stand in the Record of Rights and on the option exercised by the petitioner company. Incidentally, Mr. Mitter has pointed out that this process of readjustment or review nearly 15 years after the original order of retention would lead to serious inequities when a lot of innocent purchasers from the petitioner subsequent to the company being allowed to retain the lands so transferred will be put to serious jeopardy as an order of vesting today would take away the title which was conveyed to them by the company reasonably believing that the company was lawfully entitled and allowed to retain those plots. ( 8 ) MR. Mukherjee appearing on behalf of the respondents has first contended in answer that the impugned proceeding is not a proceeding under Section6 of the Act. According to Mr. Mukherjee what the company was allowed to retain previously was by an erroneous process without any proceeding under Section 6 and therefore, not only was the Revenue Officer competent to correct the error but further the order can be sustained as substantially an order under Section 6 and not an order of review. On the second point raised by Mr. Mukherjee he has contended alternatively that if the impugned order be not treated as substantially an order under Section 6 but an order of review on the ground of previous errors such previous errors have been amply made out in the final order itself. On the second point raised by Mr. Mukherjee he has contended alternatively that if the impugned order be not treated as substantially an order under Section 6 but an order of review on the ground of previous errors such previous errors have been amply made out in the final order itself. In answer to the last point raised by Mr. Mitter, Mr. Mukherjee has contended that in the Writ petition the petitioner has failed to furnish the particulars where the Revenue Officer had gone wrong in respect of the classification. ( 9 ) GIVING anxious consideration to the respective contentions I am of the opinion that as the present application is bound to succeed on the second and third point raised by Mr. Mitter, it is not necessary for me in this writ petition to go into the wider question raised by Mr. Mitter in the first point pressed before me. I am unable to agree with Mr. Mukherjee that there was no previous order under Section 6 allowing the company to retain or that the impugned proceeding now before this court can be said to be a proceeding not for modification or review of the earlier order but an independent proceeding under Section 6. That it is a proceeding for modification of the earlier order is patent on the order set out by me hereinbefore. The Revenue Officer himself has acknowledged that the petitioner company had earlier filed its option in B form and was allowed to retain. Obviously when the company was allowed to retain it was so done by an order. Such an order cannot but be an order under Section 6 because that is the provision under which an intermediary can claim retention. It is no doubt true that the Revenue Officer has observed that there was no previous proceeding under Section 6 and thereby what he meant was that there was no formal proceeding by way of notice on the intermediary on his option, a hearing and a reasoned adjudication on such hearing. It is obvious that when the company filed its return under the provisions of the statute, the then Revenue Officer found nothing exceptionable in the return. He accepted the return and allowed the company to retain. It is obvious that when the company filed its return under the provisions of the statute, the then Revenue Officer found nothing exceptionable in the return. He accepted the return and allowed the company to retain. This is my opinion, cannot but be an order under Section 6 and that is the order which was sought to be modified on review, when the Revenue Officer initiated the proceeding for readjustment of the ceilings of the lands under the different categories prescribed by the law. Therefore, it being a proceeding for review or modification of the earlier order it was incumbent on the Revenue Officer to find out what were the errors or what were the inaccuracies or revisions needed in respect of the previous order. Not only it was obligatory for the Revenue Officer to find those out but to incorporate those things in the notice so that the petitioner would know the grounds on which the Revenue Officer wanted to review the earlier order. Obviously, it was never done notwithstanding a specific prayer made by the company through its employees in this respect. Now, when we proceed to consider the final order we find for the first time that the Revenue Officer furnishes two grounds pointed out herein before. Even here the Revenue Officer has failed to furnish the necessary particulars also pointed out hereinbefore. Of the two grounds, so far as the first is concerned, in my opinion, it was not really necessary to revise the records if certain lands never belonged to the company. A mere erroneous order under section 6 allowing the company to retain would not have conferred any title on the company in respect of these lands. So it was wholly inconsequential whether such an error if at all was allowed to subsist or not, so far as the second grounds is concerned, it cannot but be disputed now that it was more the Revenue Officer who was in error in respect of the classification than the petitioner. The Revenue Officer has not specified what are the classifications and in respect of which of the plots that the petitioner went wrong in its option filed in the year 1956. On the other hand, it has rightly been pointed out by Mr. The Revenue Officer has not specified what are the classifications and in respect of which of the plots that the petitioner went wrong in its option filed in the year 1956. On the other hand, it has rightly been pointed out by Mr. Mitter on the materials now before this Court that many a plot recorded in the finally published record of rights as buildings and structures though opted for retention was directed to vest contrary to the option and contrary to the records. Mr. Mukherjee is not right in his submission that the petitioner has not clearly specified the particulars in this respect. In paragraph 9 of the writ petition it has specifically been said that a reference to some of the Khatians including Khatians made annexure 'c' to the writ petition would show that the classification as relied on and as specified by the petitioner was correct and was in accordance with the finally published record of rights whereas the order of the Revenue Officer was contrary to such records when he directed vesting of those buildings and structures notwithstanding the petitioners' option to retain them and notwithstanding the petitioner's right to retain under Section 6 (1) (b ). In the premises as aforesaid, I accept the second and third points raised by Mr. Mitter and held that the proceeding as initiated was not in accordance with law and the final order as passed is also erroneous on the face of the record. In this view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and I direct accordingly. ( 10 ) LET a Writ of Certiorari issue incorporating the above direction. The Rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.