Judgement JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J. :- The Mysore State Road Transport Corporation, the appellant (hereinafter called the Corporation) operates on the notified route under Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 - Hereinafter referred to as the Act -- between Hiriyur and V. V. Sagar, It objected to the renewal of a permit to the 3rd respondent C. Abdul Rahim for the route Hiriyur to Chitradurga and back vis V. V. Sagar, Hosadurga and Janakal on the ground that the renewal will authorise an overlapping over three miles on the notified route. Both the Regional Transport Authority, Chitradurga and the Regional Trnasport Authority, Bangalore, negatived the objection. It may be mentioned that the ground upon which the appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal against the order of renewal passed by the Regional Transport. Authority was that in some other cases the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal had held that the integrity of a scheme is not imparied if the distance of the overlapping portion is about five miles and if a condition not to pick up or set down passengers on the notified route is attache. On this reasoning the Tribunal thought there were no grounds to interfere with the impugned order. The appellant then filed a writ petition in what is now the Karnataka High Court but it was dismissed by a Division Bench in Limine. This appeal is by special leave against that dismissed order. 2. It appears that the passenger transport services on the routes appearing at Serial Nos. 1 to 22, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 53 of the statement appended to the scheme approved under Section 68-D (2) of the Act, subject to the modification set out in the notification dated June 7, 1960, included "services between any two places therein", and the transport services were to be run and operated by the State Transport undertaking to the complete exclusion of other operators . The notification then sets out the various details of the said approved scheme known as the Bangalore Scheme. The question at issue is whether the scheme prohibits overlaping of the route or routes of private operators on a part or whole of the notified route, if the route or routes overlap as aforesaid, then no permit can be granted to those private operators over the notified routes which prohibit them to operate over those routes. The question at issue is whether the scheme prohibits overlaping of the route or routes of private operators on a part or whole of the notified route, if the route or routes overlap as aforesaid, then no permit can be granted to those private operators over the notified routes which prohibit them to operate over those routes. This proposition was laid down in several decisions of this Court to which reference will be made hereafter. 3. In a recent judgment of this Court by one of us (Beg, J. and Chandrachud, J., concurring with him) in Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal Civil Appeals Nos. 1755-1756 of 1969, D/- 17-5-1974 (SC) this court has taken a contrary view. No doubt this case was one rendered in respect of inter-State routes, while the instant case is one relating to intra-State routes. There, however, seems to be no difference in the principal applicable to both the cases. The principal governing intra-State routes has been extended to inter-State routes vide Abdul Khader saheb v. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, (1973) 2 SCR 925 As the recent decision to which reference has been made seems to take a contrary view to that taken by even larger Benches of this Court, we find it necessary to re-examine the question posed before us. 4. Under Section 68-C of the Act where a State Transport Undertaking is of opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such services in relation to any area or routes or portion thereof should be run and operated by the State Transport Undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise, the State Transport Undertaking may prepare a scheme giving particulars of the nature of the service proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered etc. The scheme so framed has to be published under Section 68-D, objections called for and the scheme as finally approved has to be published under Section 68-F with or without modifications including any prohibitions on the area or route or parts of an area or a route covered by the notified scheme. The scheme so framed has to be published under Section 68-D, objections called for and the scheme as finally approved has to be published under Section 68-F with or without modifications including any prohibitions on the area or route or parts of an area or a route covered by the notified scheme. There is now no doubt that any route or area either wholly or partly can be taken over by a State Undertaking under and scheme published approved and notified under the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Act inserted by Section 62 of Act 100 of 1976. The provisions of this Chapter confer a monopoly on the State in respect of transport services to the partial or complete exclusion of other persons. In Y. J. Kondala Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation. AIR 1961 SC 82 a constitution Bench of this Court held that Chapter IV-A of the Act in specific terms provides a complete and in the circumstances a satisfactory machinery for reasonably regulations the exclusion of all or some of the private operators from the notified area or route. Subbe Rao, J., as he then was, speaking for the Court pointed out that, inSaghir Ahmad v. State of U.P., (1955) 1 SCR 707 the constitutional validity of Section 42 (3) of the Act was questioned. What Saghir Ahmad s case decided was that the public were entitled to use public streets and roads which vest in the State as a matter of right. The State as the trustee on behalf of the public was entitled to impose all such limitations on the character and extent of the user as may be requisite for protecting the rights of the public generally. Within the limits imposed by State Regulations any member of the public can ply motor vehicles on public roads and to that extent he can also carry on business of transporting passengers with the aid of a vehicle. As infringement of the right which was challenged in that case arose before the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, the impugned restriction was held not to be justified as a reasonable restriction imposed in the interests of the general public. As infringement of the right which was challenged in that case arose before the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, the impugned restriction was held not to be justified as a reasonable restriction imposed in the interests of the general public. As a result of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, Article 19 (6) enables the State to carry on any trade or business either by itself or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, to the exclusion, complete or partial of citizens or otherwise. Saghir Ahmad s case would have no application to scheme notified under Chapter IV-A of the Act because what has now to be seen is whether under that scheme private operators are permitted to ply their vehicles on the notified route or routes with or without restrictions or totally prohibited from using those routes. Whether a route is inter-state route or intra-State route the power to exclude is conferred by Chapter IV-A. 5. In Y. J. Kondala Rao s case AIR 1961 SC 82 the question was whether the word "route" in Section 68-C refers to a pre-existing route. It was contended that the words "route or portion thereof in the section clearly indicates that the route is an existing route because a scheme cannot be framed in respect of a portion of the proposed route. This contention was negatived. The Court observed at p. 93 : "We do not see any force in this contention. Under Section 68-C of the Act the scheme may be framed in respect of any area or a route or a portion of any area or a portion of a route. There is no inhernt inconsistency between an "area" and a "route". The proposed route is also an area limited to the route propose. The scheme may as well propose to operate a transport service in respect of a new route from point A to point B and that route would certainly be an area within the meaning of Section 68-C. We, therefore, hold that Section 68-C certainly empowers the State Transport Undertaking to propose a scheme to include new routes." new routes". 6. The scheme may as well propose to operate a transport service in respect of a new route from point A to point B and that route would certainly be an area within the meaning of Section 68-C. We, therefore, hold that Section 68-C certainly empowers the State Transport Undertaking to propose a scheme to include new routes." new routes". 6. In the case of Abdul Gafoor v. State of Mysore, 1962 (1) SCR 909 another Constitution Bench of this Court considered the effect of notifying a scheme and it was stated there that when a scheme had been notified under Chapter IV-A of the Act and an application was made for the grant of a permit on a route notified under the scheme by a private operator the Regional Transport Authority had no option but to refuse the permit to the private operator and to grant the application presented by the State Transport Undertaking for a permit. It has no right to ask for assistance from the public or existing permit-holders of the transport service holders. Neither the public in general nor the permit-holders have any part to play in the matter. The only duty it has to do is to examine the application and to see whether it is in pursuance of an approved scheme and secondly whether is has been made in the manner laid down in Chapter IV-A. If, therefore the scheme prohibits private transport owners to operate on the notified area or route or any portion thereof, the Regional Transport Authority cannot either renew the permit of such private owners or give any fresh permit in respect of a route which overlaps the notified route. The question is whether the scheme read as a whole prohibits the private owners from operating on any of the private routes. 7. In Nilkanth Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (1) SCR 728 the appellants contended that as the notified route formed part of larger route operated by a private operator the two routes must be regarded as different routes, and the private operator could not be prevented from running his omnibuses on that portion of his route, which was a different route, although notified. This Court (Gajendragadkar and Hidayatullah, JJ.) held that the appellant were not entitled to run over those portions of their routes which were notified as part of the scheme. This Court (Gajendragadkar and Hidayatullah, JJ.) held that the appellant were not entitled to run over those portions of their routes which were notified as part of the scheme. Those portions could not be said to be different routes, but must be regarded as portions of the routes of the private operators, from which the private operators stood excluded under Section 68-F (2) (c) (iii) of the Act. It was observed in that case that as the State Transport Undertaking had already been granted permits over the route AB , the private operators i.e. the appellants were not entitled in law to renewal of their permits for routes which embraced also route AB . In such circumstances, the Regional Transport Authority could not, but refuse to renew their permits. It was, therefore, incompetent to renew a permit over a route embracing route AB , reliance seems to have been placed upon a decision of the Privy Council in Kelani Valley Motor Transit Co. Ltd. v. Colombo Ratnapur Omnibus Co. Ltd., 1946 AC 338 That decision is hardly of any relevance to the question at issue here. In that case both the appellant and the respondent were applicants for exclusive road service licence for the route from Colombo to Ratnapura. There was another route from Panadura to Badulla through Colombo and Ratanpura. The decision in that case depended upon the words of the Ordinance "such route or on a route substantially the same as such route". As pointed out by the Privy Council : "It appears that Panadura is some sixteen miles along that coast to Colombo, thence from Colombo to Ratnapura is some fifty miles, and from Ratnapura to Badulla is a further eighty miles. It is obvious, therefore, that the route Panadura to. Badulla is not the same or substantially the same route as the route Colombo to Rantnapura." On the above fact situation Sir John Beaumont giving the opinion of the Board observed : "If "route" has the same meaning as "highway" in the Ordinance this argument must prevail since admittedly an omnibus running on the highway from Panadura to Badulla will pass over the whole of the highway between Colombo and Ratnapura, but in their Lordships opinion it is impossible to say that "route" and "highway" in the two Ordinance are synonymous terms. In both Ordinances.... the two words are used, and certainly not inter-changeably. In both Ordinances.... the two words are used, and certainly not inter-changeably. A "highway" is the physical track along with an omnibus runs, whilst a "route" appears to their Lordships to be an abstract conception of a line of travel between one terminus and another, and to be something distinct from the highway traversed... there may be alternative roads lending from one terminus to another but that does not make the route and highway the same." 8. The question that arises in this case, whether when one party has a monopoly over a route a licence can be granted to any other party over any part of that route, did not arise for consideration there and in considering that question the distinction between "route" and "highway" is not at all relevant. 9. In Nilkanth Prasad s case 1962 Supp (1) SCR 728 the distinction between "route" and "road" was relied upon by the appellants to show that the notified route "AB" was a different route from the routes for which renewal of permits was demanded, even though route "AB" might have been a portion of the "road" traversed by the omnibus of the appellants plying on their "routes". Hidayatullah, J., observed at p. 736 : "The distinction made by the Privy Council is right; but it was made with reference to the words used in the Ordinances thereunder consideration. The question is whether a similar distinction can be made in the context of the Motor Vehicles Act." It seems to have been argued before the Court that the word "route" had been used is contra-distinction with the word "area" was used it was used in the sense of a notional line between two terming running a stated course, and was used in contradistinction to what may be conveyed by the word "area". As we have seen in Kondala Rao s case AIR 1961 SC 82 this arguments was negatived and so the Bench in Nilkanth Prasad s case following that decision negatived it. To our mind the decision in Kelani Valley Motor Transit Co. Ltd. s case 1946 AC 338 lends on assistance to the basic concept of a "route" a line of travel between two points, which can be traversed by different roads as was pointed out in that decision itself. To our mind the decision in Kelani Valley Motor Transit Co. Ltd. s case 1946 AC 338 lends on assistance to the basic concept of a "route" a line of travel between two points, which can be traversed by different roads as was pointed out in that decision itself. A route between Delhi to Bombay can be traversed via Aga, Gwalior, Indore etc or by some other road say via Nagpur, but where the road of the route is specified in a scheme and a private operators are prohibited to travel on that route between the two termini, any overlapping of that route would transgress the provisions of the notified route and the Regional Transport Authority cannot but reject an application for a permit to travers that overlapping. Under the Ordinance which the Privy Council was considering in Kalani Valley Motor Transit Co. Ltd. s case and preference was to be given to an application from (a) a company or partnership comprising the holders of all the licences for the time being in force and (b) a company or partnership comprising the holders of the majority of the licences referred to in (a) above, authorising the use of omnibuses on such routes which established the largest number of permits over the route. It is in that connection that the word "route" was considered. 10. In any case under S. 2 (28-a) inserted by Sections 2 of Act 56 of 1969 the word "route" has been defined as meaning "a line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another." This definition correlates the notional line of travel between two termini with the portion of the highway which has to be traversed on that route. It is, therefore, appartment that where a private transport owner makes an application to operate on a route which overlaps even a portion of the notified route, i.e. where the part of the highway to be used by the private transport owner transverse on a line on the same highway on the notified route then that application has to be considered only in the light of the scheme as notified. If any conditions are placed then those conditions have to be fulfilled and if there is a total prohibition then the application must be rejected. 11. If any conditions are placed then those conditions have to be fulfilled and if there is a total prohibition then the application must be rejected. 11. In C.P.C. Motor Service Mysore v. State of Mysore, (1962) Supp (1) SCR 717 the prohibition was only against the private owners operating on the routes which lay within the District. In those circumstances this Court held that the exclusive operation of the routes within the District meant that on other omnibus belonging to a private operator could run on that sector. The direction, therefore, clearly said that the route left to private operators would be open to them beyond the borders of the District, but they were excluded from the portion of the route which lay within the District. Again Hidayatullah, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court observed at p. 726 : "The scheme of the act in S. 68-F (2) (c) (iii) also shows that the regional Transport Authority in giving effect to the approved scheme, may curtail the area or route covered by the permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified route or notified areas." This makes the route or area stand for the road on which the omnibuses run or portions thereof, and in view of the fact that the scheme reserved all the routes within the Mysore District to the State Transport. Undertaking, even those routes which were inter-District open to the private operators would stand pro tanto cut down to only that portion, which lies outside the Mysore District. The result, therefore, is that no distinction can be made between the notification of a portion of the route of the private operators lying within the Mysore District and the notification of a different route, in which the portion within the Mysore District is also included." This view also has been subsequently taken in Roshanlal Goutam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1965) 1 SCR 841 12. This Court has consistently taken the view that if there is a prohibition to operate on a notified route or routes no licences can be granted to any private operator whose route traversed or overlapped any part or whole of that notified route. This Court has consistently taken the view that if there is a prohibition to operate on a notified route or routes no licences can be granted to any private operator whose route traversed or overlapped any part or whole of that notified route. The inter-section of the notified route may not, in our view, amount to traversing or overlapping the route because the prohibition imposed applies to a whole or a part of the route on the highway on the same line of the route. An interaction cannot be said to be traversing the same line, as it cuts across it. 13. In the recent case Civil Appeals Nos. 1755-1756 D/- 17-5-74 (SC), the view taken was that where two routes - (1) the route plied over by private operators and (2) that route notified do not coincide at the points of termini it may not be enough to exclude the private inter-State owners by any necessary implication, and that if the intention is to exclude such user of operation that intention must be made clear in order to have that effect. Three scheme were considered in that case (1) the Anakal Scheme; (2) the Gulbarga Scheme and (3) the Bangalore Scheme and even though it was admitted that with regard to the Bangalore Scheme the case of the appellant Corporation was better inasmuch as the words used there are the complete exclusive of all other operators excluding the intermediate route", none the less it was observed that the exclusion appears to be only of operators providing services between the termini mentioned there and not merely using overlapping portions of the notified route incidentally, and that if the exclusion of those using overlapping portions of the surface of the highway common to two different routes was also really, intended, they should have been named in the appended statement and the number of their stage carriages should have been given. As no explanation was forthcoming for this omission, the interpretation of the three schemes advanced on behalf of the inter-State operators was considered to be more reasonable. As no explanation was forthcoming for this omission, the interpretation of the three schemes advanced on behalf of the inter-State operators was considered to be more reasonable. The Judgment further observed : "Whatever may said about the correctness of the decision of this Court in Nilkanth Prasad case 1962 Supp (1) SCR 728 in the context of the scheme before this Court for consideration in that case and the provisions of the Act as they stood then, we do not think that the Ratio Decidendi of the case is applicable here. Upon the contents of the scheme before us for interpretation we find that only operators named therein or those who seeks to provide "services" upon the routes mentioned in the scheme, in the sense that they carry passengers travelling from one place to another situated only upon the notified routes, could be totally excluded from using the highways which the notified routes cover. We think that conditions were rightly imposed by the final Transport Appellate Authority on the permits of inter-State operators to bring out what it understood the scheme to mean in each case." 14. With respect we do not doubt the correctness of the decision in Nilkanth Prasad s case 1962 Supp (1) SCR 728 which followed the decisions of different Constitution Benches of this Court. Even if that decision has to be dissented from, it could only be done by a larger Bench of this Court. On the other hand if at all the definition of the word "route" in Section 2 (28-A) lends further support to the principle enunciated in Nilkanth Prasad s case. The scheme before us clearly notified the routes at Serial Nos. 1 to 22, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 53 including service between the two places therein were to be operated by the State Transport Undertaking to the complete exclusion of all other operators. In other words, the State Transport Undertaking has been given exclusive right to run on those routes or any two places between those routes or between any two places on those routes. The routes specified in the statement show routes Nos 11 and 12 between Chitradurga to Hiriyur vis Iymangala and Chitradurga to Hiriyur via Mardihalli. 15. In other words, the State Transport Undertaking has been given exclusive right to run on those routes or any two places between those routes or between any two places on those routes. The routes specified in the statement show routes Nos 11 and 12 between Chitradurga to Hiriyur vis Iymangala and Chitradurga to Hiriyur via Mardihalli. 15. The proceeding before the Regional Transport Authority of March 25, 1968 in respect of the application of M/s. C. Abdul Rahim and Sons for renewal of their permit were considered as additional Item No. 23. C. Abdul Rahim and Sons had been granted permit No. 176/58-59 and that permit was being evidently renewed from time to time on the route Hiriyur to Chitradurga and back via. V. V. Sagar, Hosadurga and Janakal. The last application for renewal which gave rise to the present controversy was evidently made on October 1, 1967 for renewing it for a period of five years. This was published on January 11, 1968 and before the Regional Transport Authority C. Abdul Rahim and Sons asked for renewal of their permit as applied for by them in the interest of the travelling public. But the Mysore State Road Transport Corporation objected on the ground that its services will be affected if the grant is renewed. That objection was overruled and the permit was directed to be renewed for a period of three years from the date of the expiry of the permit. 16. A revision petition was filed by Mysore State Road Transport Corporation before the Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal on the ground that the renewal of the permit was bad as the route proposed for renewal overlapped the notified route Hiriyur to V. V. Sagar over a distance of three miles coming under the Bangalore Scheme. This contention was rejected on the ground that in B. Munivenkataswamy Naidu s case (Civil Appeal No. 3203 of 1966 etc.) the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal had held. "that the integrity of a scheme is not impaired if the distance of the overlapping portion is about five miles and if a condition not to pick up or set down passengers on the notified route is attached." 17. Throughout these proceedings it was nowhere contested that the route granted to M/s. C. Abdul Rahim and Sons does not overlap the notified route. If that was the case, this question would not have arisen. Throughout these proceedings it was nowhere contested that the route granted to M/s. C. Abdul Rahim and Sons does not overlap the notified route. If that was the case, this question would not have arisen. On the other hand because the route granted to C. Abdul Rahim and Sons overlapped three miles over the notified routes and since the Tribunal had held earlier that any overlapping within five miles does not impair the integrity of the scheme, the validity of this view is being agitated before us. The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine, notwithstanding the contention urged in the writ petition by the appellant that both the Full Bench as well as a Division Bench of that Court had held that the nationalised routes are to be operated by the State Transport Undertaking to the complete exclusion of all other operators, if such a scheme excluded private operators from operating on them. 18. A similar question has been dealt with by this Court in the Mysore State Road Transport Corporation s case Civil Appeals Nos. 1755-1756 of 1969, D/- 17-6-1974 (SC) to which we have referred earlier. In that case, the facts have not been stated and we are not in a position to know which of the permits in cases before the Court had expired and which of them were renewed during the pendency of the hearing. If the years in which those appeals were filed are taken as a guide, the permits in all those appeals whether renewed for three years or five years would have expired before the decision was rendered. But that was not the reason given for dismissing those appeals. If this reason is valid, then what was decided in that case would not be the ratio of that case. At any rate, the decision in that case would suffer from the same infirmity which a decision in this case may be considered to suffer. But that is not how the decision in that case proceeded. On the other hand, it was assumed in all those cases that the appellant was contending that the permits granted were illegal because those routes overlapped the nationalised notified routes. The fact that permits had expired did not preclude this Court from expounding the law on the basis that those permits were current. On the other hand, it was assumed in all those cases that the appellant was contending that the permits granted were illegal because those routes overlapped the nationalised notified routes. The fact that permits had expired did not preclude this Court from expounding the law on the basis that those permits were current. Where a permit has been granted against the objection of the State Transport Undertaking and the matter is agitated before this Court, there being no stay, it is difficult to postulate that even after the expiry of those permits, they are not renewed. In these very case, it can be observed that the permit is being renewed in favour of C. Abdul Rahim and Sons after the expiry of each of the periods from 1958 onwards. In any case it is impermissible for us suo motu to look into the interstices of the case or to raise objections on assumptions which may or may not be correct. The respondents non-appearance after due notice cannot preclude this Court from proceeding on admitted facts. At any rate, no objection of any kind which might preclude determination of this question has been put to the appellant s counsel and it would be unfair if we were to deal with them as if it is admitted. In any case, if the permits which have expired have been renewed, which we have no doubt must have been, then we can mould our relief to suit that changed situation. see Mohanlal v. Tribhovan, (1963) 2 SCR 707 . 19. The "Bangalore Scheme" has been the subject-matter of the Mysore State Road Transport Corporation s case Civil Appeals Nos. 1755, 1756 of 1969, D/- 17-5-1974 (SC) as also other cases. Even the special leave petition has set it out. Since the decision which has been challenged proceeds on the basis that Hiriyur to V. V. Sagar routed granted to C. Abdul Rahim & Sons overlaps the notified route Chitradurga to Hiriyur there can be no doubt that no permit or renewal can be granted. This is so even if it overlaps over however short the distance of the route. Whether a particular route granted to a private operator overlaps the notified route or not cannot be ascertained from the notified route. This is so even if it overlaps over however short the distance of the route. Whether a particular route granted to a private operator overlaps the notified route or not cannot be ascertained from the notified route. The notified route may merely state the route to be operated by the State Transport Undertaking and the total or partial prohibition on other operators from operating on that route or a portion thereof. Where, however, other operators are permitted to operate on any portion of that route, it may also provide the terms and conditions under which they can be permitted. Beyond this, from the notified scheme it cannot be ascertained whether any particular permit overlaps the notified route or transgresses any of the condition or prohibitions set out therein. There is no justification for holding that the integrity of the notified scheme is not affected if the overlapping is under five miles or because a condition has been stipulated in the permit that the operators will not pick up or set down any passengers on the overlapped route. 20. On this view we allow the appeal set aside the order of the High Court and direct the Regional Transport Authority to comply with the requirements of the scheme as stated by us in respect of any permit granted or in respect of renewal of any such permit made in favour of the third respondent during the pendency of this appeal. BEG, J. :- 21. The appellant the Mysore State Road Transport Corporation, had filed a Writ Petition-cum-affidavit in the Mysore High Court in 1968. It reads : "I, B. P. Kulkarni, Deputy General Manager, Planning Central Office, Mysore State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore do on solemn affirmation state as follows. I am the Deputy General Manager (Planning) Central Office in the Department of the petitioner and having read the relevant documents of the case state the following which I believe to be true and correct. I am the Deputy General Manager (Planning) Central Office in the Department of the petitioner and having read the relevant documents of the case state the following which I believe to be true and correct. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the first respondent dated 12-7-1968 passed in revision petition No. 41 of 1968 by which the resolution of the second respondent in subject No. 23 dated 25th March, 1968 to renew the permit in favour of the third respondent for a period of three years which in effect permitting of overlapping the notified route of about three miles between Hiryur and V. V. Sagar Cross in Bangalore Scheme is upheld, this writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A certified copy of the judgment of the first respondent is filed marked A and a certified copy of the resolution of the second respondent is filed marked B . The following are some of the grounds of objections amongst others. GROUNDS. 1. The second respondent had no jurisdiction to grant the renewal of the permit which overlaps the notified route of the petitioner to a distance of about three miles and hence the first respondent ought to have quashed the said resolution and allowed the revision petition filed by the petitioner against the said resolution. In refusing to do so, the first respondent has acted ultra vires of his powers and in excess of his jurisdiction. 2. That the case of the H. C. Narayanappa v. State of Mysore and others reported in AIR 1960 SC at page 1072 has no bearing. The SC was concerned, in that case with the contention that in the Anekar Scheme, only the routes are notified and not the area. In this case the renewal overlaps the notified routes of the Bangalore Scheme provides total exclusion of private operators. 3. That the Bangalore Scheme provides for total exclusion of the private operators on the notified routes as decided by this Hon ble Court in W.P. 2579/66 on 6-8-1968. 4. That it is the duty of the respondents 1 and 2 to give effect to the notified scheme under Section 68 F (2) of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act. But by the impugned order the first respondent has acted in violation of the said mandatory provision of law. 5. 4. That it is the duty of the respondents 1 and 2 to give effect to the notified scheme under Section 68 F (2) of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act. But by the impugned order the first respondent has acted in violation of the said mandatory provision of law. 5. I believe that there is no other alternative remedy for the petitioner except to invoke the powers of the Hon ble High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." 22. No copy of the scheme involved was annexed to the petition-cum-affidavit. Some relevant facts may, however, be gleaned from other material on the meager record. A copy of the impugned order (annexure A to the writ petition) of the Mysore State Transport Tribunal indicated that the petitioner had objected to the renewal of permit No. 176/58 for the route Hiriyur of Chitradurga and back vis V. V. Sagar, Hosadurga and Janakal" for a period of 3 years from the date of the expiry of the permit. The short order of the Tribunal rejecting the appeal of the petitioner appellant mentioned. "According to Shri S. Srinivasan, the order of renewal is bad as the route proposed for renewal overlaps the notified route between Hiriyur and V. V. Sagar, a distance of 3 miles coming under Bangalore Scheme." It then stated that the reason for the conclusion reached by the Tribunal, that the overlapping portion of 3 miles does not impair the integrity of the scheme, are to be found in another judgment which was neither placed before the High Court nor before us. Again, a glance at a copy of proceedings before the Regional Transport Authority on record (annexure B ) shows that item No. 23 related to an application for a renewal of permit No. 176/58 for the route. "Hiriyur to Chitradurga and back via V. V. Sagar, Hosadura, and Janakal daily one trip for a period of five years from 1-10-1967 to 30-9-1972." 23. The renewal granted was for 3 years which meant that it had expired on 30-9-1970. No attempt has been made to challenge any subsequent renewal. We do not know when the original permit was given, but number "176/58" indicates that it was probably taken out in 1958. Therefore, any relief we could now grant could only be declaratory in respect of a very old permit whose validity should have been challenged long ago. No attempt has been made to challenge any subsequent renewal. We do not know when the original permit was given, but number "176/58" indicates that it was probably taken out in 1958. Therefore, any relief we could now grant could only be declaratory in respect of a very old permit whose validity should have been challenged long ago. It was, presumably, renewed earlier. There must have been similar objections earlier too on the strength of the provisions of the Bangalore Scheme of the provisions of the Bangalore Scheme which came into force on 7-6-1960. If so, these must have failed. An attack in 1968 upon the validity of such a permit which was probably issued ten years earlier but said to have become invalid, so far as the overlapping portion of the route is concerned, eight years before challenging it by means of a writ petition would he too belated to deserve even consideration. 24. Even the date on which the Bangalore Scheme was notified was not apparent from anything on record. It was not given in any order or other material either in our printed paper book or on the record of the Mysore High Court sent to this Court I have examined. We have, therefore, to be able to proceed further at all to consider this case, to assume, that the purported copy of the scheme giving the date of notification of its approval as 7-6-1960, handed in by learned counsel for the appellant after arguments, is a correct copy of the relevant notification in an official Gazette. We could, of course, take judicial notice of such a notification. 25. As I shall indicate later, the date of the original grant or permit and whether the respondent operator and others like him were plying stage carriages for hire upon a part of a notified route, and, if so, on which particular route, at the time of the notification of the Bangalore Scheme, have considerable importance for the rights of the parties determined by an interpretation of the scheme, in the context of relevant rules, which seems to be not only open but decisive on the language of the scheme quite apart from any other question. Indeed, without necessary averments and findings of fact on these question, it does not seem to me to be possible to deal satisfactorily at all with the case before us. Indeed, without necessary averments and findings of fact on these question, it does not seem to me to be possible to deal satisfactorily at all with the case before us. To add to our difficulties, the respondent operator, the renewal of whose permit was questioned by the appellant, could not appear before the High Court because no notice of the Writ Petition, dismissed in limine, was sent to him, and for some reason (possibly because he is no longer interested in this particular permit after the expiry of the impugned renewal in 1970), the operator has not put in appearance in this Court. The result is that we have not had the benefit of hearing any arguments for the respondents in this appeal before us by a special leave granted, as the order of this Court on the special leave petition shows, only because it had been granted in other similar cases with which this case should have been connected.Those other cases have been heard and decided on 17-5-1974 against the appellant in Civil Appeals Nos. 1755-1756 of 1969, D/- 17-5-1974 (SC). 47. Under Section 27 of the Act an employee shall be paid at the rate equal to the daily average of his full time earning for the day on which he had worked during the moth immediately proceeding his leave exclusive of any overtime earnings and bonus but inclusive of dearness and other allowances. There are two explanations. The first explanation states that the expression "total full time earning" includes cash equivalent to the advantage accruing through the concessional sale to employees of foodgrains and other articles, as the employee is for the time being entitled to, but does not include bonus. The second explanation states that for the purpose of determining the wages payable to a home worker during leave period or for the purpose of payment of maternity benefit to a woman home worker "day" shall mean any period during which such home worker was employed, during a period of twenty four hours commencing at midnight, for making beedi or cigar or both. 48. The word "establishment" is define in Section 2 (h) of the Act to mean any place or premises including the precincts in which or in any part of which any manufacturing process connected with the making of beedis or cigars or both is carried on and it includes an industrial premises. 48. The word "establishment" is define in Section 2 (h) of the Act to mean any place or premises including the precincts in which or in any part of which any manufacturing process connected with the making of beedis or cigars or both is carried on and it includes an industrial premises. Section 2 (i) of the act defines "industrial premises" to mean any place or premises not being a private dwelling house where the industry or manufacturing process of making beedis or cigar is carried on. An employee is defined in Section 2 (F) of the Act to mean any agency in any establishment and include any labourer who is given any materials by an employer or a contractor at home referred to as the home worker and any person employed by an employer or a contractor but working at the premises with the employer or contractor. Therefore, the words `employed in an establishment in Section 26 of the Act are referable to home workers as well. The second explanation to Section 27 of the Act also speaks of determination of wages payable to home worker during leave period. 49. It was said that the words "total full time earnings" occurring in Section 27 of the Act were inapplicable to home workers for these reasons. 50. First a home worker with the assistance of his family members could collect large earnings in a month preceding the month in which he would take leave. This was said to be an unreasonable restriction on an employer in asmuch as a home worker would not 1846 work hard or perhaps at all for a considerable period of time and would work only in the month preceding which he would take leave. It is not possible for a home worker to in cease his earnings because the employer will have control over raw material supplied to home worker as also on the daily turnover. An employer is in a position to prevent malpractices or abuse of taking more materials to make a higher income. It is also reasonable to hold that an employer will not allow an income. 51. It was secondly said that Section 27 of the Act did not prescribe the minimum number of days an employee should work before he was entitled to annual leave wages. It is also reasonable to hold that an employer will not allow an income. 51. It was secondly said that Section 27 of the Act did not prescribe the minimum number of days an employee should work before he was entitled to annual leave wages. Reference was made to Section 79 (1) of the Factories Act 1948 which provides for 240 days of work as minimum for entitlement of annual leave. The provision in Section 26 of the Act is that for every 20 days one days leave is allowed. If any worker does not work hard one will not be entitled to leave as contemplated in the Act. The basis of calculating one days leave for every 20 days of work is also adopted in the case of Government servant. (See Central Civil Service Leave Rules, 1972, Rules 26 and 2 (m)). Instead of being unreasonable it can be said to be an impetus to a servant to put in the maximum of work in order to obtain the maximum amount of leave. The entitlement to leave under Section 27 of the Act is based on the number of days of actual work. it is, therefore, not an unreasonable restriction on the employer. 52. Thirdly it is said that the payment of leave wages at the rate equal to the daily average of his total full time earnings in the case of home workers is unrasonable. Reference is made to Section 22 of the Act which speaks of notice of periods of work in industrial premises. Section 22 of the Act is not applicable to home workers. In the case of home workers it is said that they are free to do work at any time and for any length of time in a day even for 24 hours a day. It is, therefore, said that it will be difficult to calculate the total full time earnings of home workers. 53. The words in Section 27 of the Act are "total full time earnings". One meaning of the words, in the case of home workers will be daily average hours of work done by home worker during the last month before leave provided such average does not exceed the daily period of work as prescribed in a notice under Section 22 of the Act. One meaning of the words, in the case of home workers will be daily average hours of work done by home worker during the last month before leave provided such average does not exceed the daily period of work as prescribed in a notice under Section 22 of the Act. Such a construction would give not only full meaning to the words "full time earnings" but would also place home workers and workers in industrial premises in the name position with regard to their leave wages. It will not cast unreasonable burden on the employer in the form of leave wages disproportionate to the amount of work done by the home workers. 54. Another meaning is that the total full time earnings would be the actual total earnings as far as the workers in industrial premises as well as home workers are concerned. With regard to the second meaning the words "full time" will not have any restriction as to hours of work. The result may be that a home worker may have longer hours of work and larger income compared with the worker in the industrial premises, but such longer hours of work can be controlled by an employer both with regard to giving raw materials and allowing longer hours of work. 55. As a matter of fact it is found that income workers can turn out 700 to 1000 pieces a day. That is the view expressed in the Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India 1931 as also the Labour Investigation Committee Report 1944 and the Report of the Court of Enquiry appointed by the Government of Madras 1947. The minimum wages prescribed by various states for these home workers are between Rs. 2 to 4.30 for rolling 1000 pieces. Therefore, the Financial burden on account of leave wages will not be higher to constitute any unreasonable restriction. 56. The Bombay High Court in the present appeals said that the provisions of Sections 26 and 27 of the Act constitute unreasonable restriction not only with regard to home workers but also with regard to employees in industrial establishment. Therefore, the Financial burden on account of leave wages will not be higher to constitute any unreasonable restriction. 56. The Bombay High Court in the present appeals said that the provisions of Sections 26 and 27 of the Act constitute unreasonable restriction not only with regard to home workers but also with regard to employees in industrial establishment. The reason given is that if employees in indutrial premises do not choose to work for all days for the full hours notified it will be equally impossible to determine 1847 what his full time earnings will be and with his daily average of the fultime earnings for the day on which he worked during the proceeding month will be. The Mysore High Court in the present appeal correctly said that the home workers will get wages for the leave period corresponding to the number of beedis manufactured by him for a particular employer. The hours of work will in that case be immaterial, because if he worked for less numbers of hours he would obtain lesser payment. There will thus be no difficulty in computing wages payable for the annual leave period. The home worker will get leave wages corresponding to his actual earning just as the worker in the industrial premises will get leave wages corresponding to his full time earnings. 57. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the present appeal said that home workers carry on their rolling work at homes which are neither establishment nor industrial premises. The word "establishment" as defined in Section 2 (h) of the Act realtes to home workers as well. It is only industrial premises as defined in Section 2 (i) of the Act which excludes private dewelling houses. 58. The home workers are not required to work for a specified number of hours a day. The fact that Sections 17 to 23 of the Act can have no application to home workers but only to persons employed in industrial premises does not render Section 26 and 27 of the Act inapplicable to home workers. The express language of Sections 26 and 27 of the Act is relatable to home workers. They work in establishments. The daily average of total full time earnings for the days worked during the month immediately preceding the leave is applicable to home workers. The express language of Sections 26 and 27 of the Act is relatable to home workers. They work in establishments. The daily average of total full time earnings for the days worked during the month immediately preceding the leave is applicable to home workers. It is because payment to home workers is made at piece rate, viz., for the number of beedis rolled. The Madras High Court said that Sections 26 and 27 of the Act have imposed unreasonable restrictions on manufacturers in regard to employees in industrial premises. The Madras High Court held that for working 11 days a worker would be entitled to one day as annual leave with wages. The Act does not say so. The Act provides that any fraction of leave for half a day or more will be treated as one days full leave. Therefore, if on a calculation of entire leave at the rate of one day for every 20 days of work, there is any fraction of more than one days leave so calculated or earned it would be treated as one day. It is only where there is fraction of leave earned that for such 11 days work one days leave is to be given. It is not same as providing one days leave for working only 11 days in all cases. The entitlement under the Act to one days leave for every 20 days shows that the period of 20 days is a minimum period prescribed for earning one days leave. 59. The structure of Sections 26 and 27 of the Act is two fold. First so far as workers employed in industrial premises are concerned they are entitled to annual leave with wages provided they work for at least 20 days a year for full hours of work specified in the notice. Therefore, Sections 26 and 27 of the Act will not apply to workers in industrial premises who have not worked for full working hours according to the notice for 20 days a year. Second, Sections 26 and 27 of the Act apply to home workers who work at least 20 days a year and the day within the expression 20 days will mean any period of day because there is no notified hours of work. 60. Second, Sections 26 and 27 of the Act apply to home workers who work at least 20 days a year and the day within the expression 20 days will mean any period of day because there is no notified hours of work. 60. In view of the fact that the two sections are applicable both to workers in industrial premises and home workers the expression "total full time earnings" occurs in Sec. 27 of the Act. Section 17 deals with working hours. Section 22 speaks of notice of periods of work. Section 17 and 22 refer to industrial premises and are therefore not applicable to home workers. The total full time earnings for workers in industrial premises will attract the specified periods of work contemplated in Section 22 of the Act. With regard to a home worker the wages during leave period will be calculated with reference to the daily average of his total full time earnings for the days on which he had worked during the preceding month. In the case of home workers it will be the average of 30 days earning. To illustrate, if the worker has earned different sums on different days during the month the sums will be added for the purpose of arriving at an average. The computation in the case of home 1848 workers will be first with reference to the total earning during the month and full time earning is the average thereof. The second explanation to Section 27 of the Act shows that for the purpose of determining the wages payable to home worker during leave period day shall mean any period during which such home worker, was employed during any period of 24 hours. Therefore, so far as the home worker is concerned day shall mean any period. 61. The manner in which leave wages for workers in industrial premises and home workers are to be calculated may be illustrated with reference to the Beedis and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Mysore Rules, 1969. Section 44 (2) of the Act provides that the State Government may make rules inter alia for the records and registers they shall maintain in establishments in compliance with the provisions of the Act and the rules thereunder. Establishment means both industrial premises and any private house where the home workers carry on their work. Section 44 (2) of the Act provides that the State Government may make rules inter alia for the records and registers they shall maintain in establishments in compliance with the provisions of the Act and the rules thereunder. Establishment means both industrial premises and any private house where the home workers carry on their work. Rule 33 of the Mysore Rules framed under the Act speaks of maintenance of records and registers in Form No.XIII. Form No.XIII has 8 columns as the muster roll of employees in industrial premises. Rule 33 (2) of the Mysore Rules speaks of records for home workers in Form No.XIV. There are four columns showing the date, whether work was done, number of beedis manufactured and the wages received. At the foot of Form XIV it shows the total number of days worked in the month. Therefore, in the case of home workers wages are calculated on the basis of these records, namely the number of days worked and second the amount of wages received. In the case of home workers hours of work are not necessary. In the case of employees in industrial premises columns 8 and 9 show inter alia the group, relay, shift number and period work. With regard to home workers payment is made at the rate of 1000 pieces of beedis. Leave with wages in the case of home workers is on that basis of payment. The log book is a form of guarantee and security for both the employer and the worker in regard to quality of work and relative payment. 62. Reference was made to four earlier decisions of this Court for the purpose of showing that Sections 26 and 27 are inapplicable to home workers. These decisions are Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1958 SCR 1340 ; Birdhichand Sharma v. First Civil Judge, Nagpur (1961) 3 SCR 161 ; Shankar Balaji Waje v. State of Maharashtra, (1962) Suppl. 1 SCR 249 and M/s. Bhikusa Yamasa Kahatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1964) 1 SCR 860 . These four cases were decided with reference to the Factories Act. Section 79 and 80 of the Factories Act were considered there. These two sections are in similar language to Sections 26 and 27 of the Act. The only difference is that unlike. These four cases were decided with reference to the Factories Act. Section 79 and 80 of the Factories Act were considered there. These two sections are in similar language to Sections 26 and 27 of the Act. The only difference is that unlike. Section 79 of the Factories Act, in Section 26 of the Act there is no requirement of working for 240 days a calendar year for entitlement to annual leave and further that in Section 26 of the Act the words used are "employee" in place of the word `worker and the word "establishment" in place of the word "factory" in the Factories Act. 63. In Chintaman Rao case 1958 SCR 1340 (2) (supra) this Court held that the three ingredients and concepts of employment are first there must be an employer, second, there must be an employee and the third, there must be a contract of employment. In Chintaman Rao case, (supra) certain independent contractors known as Sattedars supplied beedis to the Manager of a beedi factory. The Sattedars manufactured the beedis in their own factories or they entrusted the work to third parties. The Inspector of Factories found in the beedi factory certain settedars who came to deliver beedis manufactured by them. The owner of the factory was prosecuted for violation of Sections 62 and 63 of the Factories Act for failure to maintain the register of adult workers. It was held that the Sattedars and their "coolies" (sic) were not workers within the definition of Sec. 2(1) of the Factories Act. The ratio was that the Sattedars were not under the control of the factory management and could manufacture beedis wherever they pleased. Further the `coolies (sic) 1849 were not employed by the management through the Sattedars. 64. In Birdhichand Sharma case, (1961) 3 SCR 161 the appellant employment workmen in factory. The workmen were not at liberty to work at their houses. Payment was made for piece rates according to the amount of work done. The workmen applied for leave for 15 days. The appellant did not pay their wages. The appellant contended that the workmen were not workmen within the meaning of the Factories Act. It was held that the workmen could not be said to be independent contractors but were workmen within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Factories Act. The workmen applied for leave for 15 days. The appellant did not pay their wages. The appellant contended that the workmen were not workmen within the meaning of the Factories Act. It was held that the workmen could not be said to be independent contractors but were workmen within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Factories Act. A distinction was sought to be drawn between workmen and independent contractors. It was held that though the work-men could come and go when they liked, they were piece rate workers within the meaning of the Factories Act. If the worker did not reach factory before midday he would be given no work. He was to work at the factory. He could not work elsewhere. He would be removed if he was absent for 8 days. His attendance was noted. If his work did not come up to the standard the pieces prepared would be rejected. The leave provided under Section 79 of the Factories Act was held to be a matter of right when a worker had put in a minimum number of working days. 65. In Shankar Balaji Waje case, (1962) (1) SCR 249 it was held that the labourers who used to roll beedis in the factory were not workers within the meaning of the Factories Act Birdhichand Sharma case, (1961) 3 SCR 161 was distinguished on the facts. The minority view was that the workers in Shankar Balaji Waje case (supra) were of the same type as Birdhichand Sharma case (supra). In Shankar Balaji Waje case (supra) the majority view was that there was contract of service. The worker was not bound to attend the factory for any fixed hours. He could be absent from the work any day he liked and for ten days without informing the appellant. He had to take permission if he was to be absent for more than 10 days. The worker was not bound to roll beedis at the factory. He could do so at home with the permission of the appellant. There was no actual supervision. Beedis not up to the standard could be rejected. Workers were paid at fixed rates. 66. In Bhikusa Yamasa case, (1964) 1 SCR 860 this Court had to consider whether a notification under Section 85 of the Factories Act giving the beedi rollers benefits provided to workers in the Factories Act was valid. There was no actual supervision. Beedis not up to the standard could be rejected. Workers were paid at fixed rates. 66. In Bhikusa Yamasa case, (1964) 1 SCR 860 this Court had to consider whether a notification under Section 85 of the Factories Act giving the beedi rollers benefits provided to workers in the Factories Act was valid. Beedi rollers were refused benefits by the owners of beedi manufacturing establishment. Therefore, the State Government issued notification under Section 85 of the Factories Act. Section 85 of the Factories act provides that the State Government may declare that all or any of the provisions of the Act shall apply to any place where a manufacturing process is carried on notwithstanding taht the number of persons employed therein is less than the number specified in the definition of factory or where the persons working therein are not employed by the owner but are working with the permission of or under agreement with, such owner. The State Government designated certain places to be deemed factory and the persons working there to be deemed workers. This Court said that extension of the benefits of the Factories Act to premises and workers not falling strictly within the purview of the Factories Act is intended to serve the same purpose. on this reasoning the provisions for the benefit of deemed workers were held to be reasonable within the meaning of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. 67. These four decisions were relied on by counsel for the petitioners and the appellants to show that home workers would not be entitled to leave on the ground that sections 26 and 27 of the Act were unworkable in regard to home workers and constituted unreasonable restrictions. The imposition of liability to afford to home workers benefits like annual leave with wages cannot be said to be unreasonable restriction on the right of the owner to carry on his business. In the fact, the word "employee" includes a home worker. The Word "establishment" applies to a private house. The second explanation to Section 27 of the Act 1850 indicate that a home worker is dealt with by the section. Sections 26 and 27 of the Act are to be read together. In the fact, the word "employee" includes a home worker. The Word "establishment" applies to a private house. The second explanation to Section 27 of the Act 1850 indicate that a home worker is dealt with by the section. Sections 26 and 27 of the Act are to be read together. In Birdhichand Sharma case, (1961) 3 SCR 161 this Court held that if a worker had put in number of working days he would be entitled to leave. This court did not go into the question as to what the meaning of the word "day of work would be to entitle a worker annual leave under Section 79 of the Factories Act in Birdhichand Sharma case (supra). 68. In the present case the act contemplates that home workers are at liberty to work at any time and for any number of hours a day. The Act cannot be said to be not applicable to home workers. The Act has made a distinction between the two types of workers and has made the Act applicable to both the types of workers. Even with regard to workers in industrial premises where period of work is notified it is not obligatory on the part of the employer to allow an employee to work, in the industrial premises for the whole of the notified period of work. The employee can be asked to work for the whole of the notified period of work which will not exceed 9 hours a day or 48 hours a week as provided in Section 17 of the Act. In Shanker Balaji Waje case, 1962 Supp (1) SCR 249 the majority view was that the expression "total full time earnings" means earnings in a day by working full time on that day and full time was to be in accordance with the period given in the notice displayed in the factory for the particular day. On that ground the workers in Shanker Balaji Waje case, (supra) were held not to be entitled to wages for the leave period because such wages could not be calculated when the terms of work were such that they could come and go when they liked and no period of work was mentioned with respect to workers. On that ground the workers in Shanker Balaji Waje case, (supra) were held not to be entitled to wages for the leave period because such wages could not be calculated when the terms of work were such that they could come and go when they liked and no period of work was mentioned with respect to workers. The majority view in Shanker Balaji Waje case (supra) will not apply to Sections 26 and 27 of the Act because the home workers are entitled to wages during the leave period and such wages do not in the case of home workers depend upon the condition whether a particular home worker works for a whole of the notified period of work. The basis of calculation of wages in the case of home workers is the daily average of his total full time earnings for the days on which he had worked during the month immediately preceding his leave. If a home worker does full time work by rolling out 1000 pieces he will get corresponding amount of wages. Both the factory workers in industrial premises and home workers in establishments are similarly place by proper control over or regulation of supply of raw materials to home workers. Just as the total full time earnings of the home worker are calculated by the earnings of each day which are kept under control by supply of measured raw materials to produce the requisite number of beedis which a worker can produce a day within his hours of work in the establishment. So far as home workers are concerned, the payment is made at piece rate and it is noto material in their case about specified hours of work because they will get lesser payment if they will not work for the same number of hours as worker in industrial premises. The provisions of Sction 26 and 27 are applicable to home workers and workers in industrial premises are also capable of being made applicable without any reasonable restrictions on employers. 69. It has been contended that Section 31 of the Act which provides one months notice in lieu of notice of dismissal was an unreasonable restriction. The reason advanced was that the Act has not defined the word "wages" and therefore it is not possible to calculate wages. Section 27 of the Act prescribed the rate for calculating wages during the period of leave. The reason advanced was that the Act has not defined the word "wages" and therefore it is not possible to calculate wages. Section 27 of the Act prescribed the rate for calculating wages during the period of leave. Section 39 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act applies to matters in respect of every industrial premises. Section 2(rr)of the Industrial Disputes Act defines wages. The definition of wages in the Industrial Disputes Act applies to workers in industrial premises contemplated by the Act. Home workers are not included in industrial premises because they work in private dwelling houses which are establishments. The definition of wages in the Industrial Dispute Act will apply to workers who 1851 are paid on monthly basis. Section 28(1) of the Act empowers the State Government to direct that the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 shall apply to employees in establishments to which the Act applies. Section 2 (6) of the Payment of Wages Act defines "wages" to include inter alia any remuneration to which the person employed is entitled to respect of any leave period. Some aid may be had from the definition of wages in the Payment of Wages Act, viz. wages include leave wages. Therefore, the word "wages" in Section 31 of the Act will mean wages which are calculated under Section 27 of the Act. This can be calculated both in the cases of workers in industrial premises and home workers in establishments. Therefore, the provisions contained in Section 31 of the Act cannot be said to be unreasonable restrictions. 70. The Petitioners and the appellants next contended that Rule 37 of the Maharashtra Rule and R.29 of the Mysore Rules framed under Section 44 of the Act imposed unreasonable restrictions on the beedi and cigar manufacturers. Rule 37 of the Maharashtra Rule provides that no employer or contractor shall ordinarily reject as sub-standard or Chhat or otherwise more than 5 per cent of the beedis or cigars or both received from the worker including a home worker. Rule 37 of the Maharashtra Rule provides that no employer or contractor shall ordinarily reject as sub-standard or Chhat or otherwise more than 5 per cent of the beedis or cigars or both received from the worker including a home worker. Rule 37 (2) of the Maharashtra Rules further provides that where any beedi or cigar is rejected as sub-standard or chhat or otherwise on any ground other than the ground of wilful negligence of the worker shall be paid wages for the pieces so rejected at one half of the rates at which wages are payable to him for the beedis or cigars or both which have not been rejected. 71. Rule 29 of the Mysore Rules provides that no employer or contractor shall ordinarily reject as sub-standard or chhat or otherwise more than 2 per cent of the beedis or cigars or both received from the worker including a home worker. It is also provided there that the employer or contractor may effect such rejection upto 5 per cent for reasons to be recovered and communicated in writing to the worker. 72. Rule 29 of the Kerala Rules is identical to Rule 29 of the Mysore Rules except that instead of 2 per cent it provides for 2.5 per cent as a limit for rejection. 73. The Kerala High Court held that Kerala Rule 29 fixes arbitrary percentage and is not in the interest of the general public. The imposition of 5 per cent by the proviso to Rule 29 was said by the Kerala High Court to be arbitrary. It was said that the percentage of rejection might be higher than 5 per cent but the fixed limit of 5 per cent would have this bad consequence. It is that quality of beedis would go down if the workers were assured that more than 5 per cent would not be rejected. 74. The Mysore High Court rejected the contention that Mysore Rule 29 imposes an unreasonable restriction. The reason given by that High Court was as follows. The argument that sub-standard beedis or cigars in excess of 5 per cent cannot be rejected by the employer is unsound. Ordinarily 2 per cent rejection is permitted. Rejection upto 5 per cent is permissible only after recording reasons therefor. The reason given by that High Court was as follows. The argument that sub-standard beedis or cigars in excess of 5 per cent cannot be rejected by the employer is unsound. Ordinarily 2 per cent rejection is permitted. Rejection upto 5 per cent is permissible only after recording reasons therefor. But if the employer finds that the quantity of sub-standard beedis is above 5 per cent, the matter is to be referred to the Inspector. Therefore, Rule 29 does not compel the employer to accept sub-standard beedis when the rejection is above 5 per cent. 75. The Bombay High Court upheld Rule 37 of the Maharashtra Rules which allows rejection of more than 5 per cent. The 5 per cent rejections is said by the Bombay High Court to be an outer limit. It does not mean according to the Bombay High Court that the rejection must be 5 per cent. It is said that the contractors by reason of their experience will find 5 per cent rejection to be reasonable. The experience suggests that the outer limit of 5 per cent is fairly reasonable. It is difficult to imagine that no limit should be fixed. The Bombay High Court further found that even for sub-standard beedis there is a market though at a lesser rate. The Bombay High Court further found that plifering of tobacco was an accepted vice of the industry. In spite of that malady rejection in the industry hardly exceeded 3 per cent. The Bombay High Court found 5 per cent rejection to be reasonable. 1852 76. The maximum limit of 5 per cent for the rejection of beedis, is, therefore, based on experience in the industry and secondly the employer can reject more than 5 per cent by raising a dispute before the appropriate authority. 77. On behalf of the petitioners and the appellants it was said that the word "sub-standard" by itself would offer no guidance for rejection and confer arbitrary power. 77. On behalf of the petitioners and the appellants it was said that the word "sub-standard" by itself would offer no guidance for rejection and confer arbitrary power. Section 39(1) of the Act provides that the provisions of the Industrial disputes Act shall apply to matters arising in respect of every industrial premises and Section 39 (2) (c) of the Act provides that notwithstanding any thing contained in sub-section (1) a dispute between an employer and employee relating to the payment of wages for beedi or cigar both rejected by an employer shall be settled by such authority and in such manner as the State Government may by rules specify in that behalf Section 44 (2) (r) of the Act provides for making of rule with regard to the manner in which worting or rejection of beedi or cigar or both and disposal of rejected beedi or cigar or both shall be carried out. The Mysore Rule 27 provides that any dispute between an employer and employee in relation to rejection by the employer of beedi or cigar or both made by an employee may be referred in writing by the employer or the employee or employees to the Inspector for the area who shall after making such enquiry as he may consider necessary and after giving the parties an opportunity to represent their respective cases, decide the dispute and record the proceedings in form X. Form X relates to record of decision or Order. Various particulars inter alia are substance of the dispute, substance of the evidence taken and findings and statement of the reasons therefor. There is also a right of appeal from the decision of the Inspector to the Chief Inspector. 78. It therefore appears that the Rules about rejection and fixing maximum limit of 5 per cent are reasonable and fair. First experience in the industry as recorded in the Report of Minimum Wages Committee supports such limit of 5 per cent as normal and regular. Second in spite of 5 per cent maximum limit it is permissible to the employer to reject more than 5 per cent. For that a dispute is to be raised before the appropriate authorities set up under the Rules. Second in spite of 5 per cent maximum limit it is permissible to the employer to reject more than 5 per cent. For that a dispute is to be raised before the appropriate authorities set up under the Rules. The State Government under Sec. 44(2)(r) and (s) of the Act is empowered to make Rules in respect of the manner in which sorting or rejection of beedi or cigar or both and disposal of rejected beedi or cigar or both shall be carried out and the fixation of maximum limit of rejection of beedi or cigar or both manufactured by an employee. Section 39 (2) of the Act provides that a dispute between an employee relating inter alia to rejection by the employer of beedi or cigar or both made by an employee and the payment of wages for beedi or cigar rejected by the employer shall be settled by such authority and in such manner as the State Government may be Rules specify in that behalf. Rule 27 of the Mysore Rules as well as Rule 27 of the Kerala Rules provide that a dispute between an employer and employee or employees in relation to rejection by the employer of beedi or cigar or the payment of wages for the beedi or cigar rejected by the employer may be referred in writing by the employer or employee to the Inspector for the area. The Inspector after hearing the parties shall decide the issue. The aggrieved party has the right of Appeal to the Chief Inspector. 79. Under Rule 29 of the Mysore Rules rejection of more than 2 per cent and upto 5 per cent is required to be for reasons in writing. Rule 37 of the Maharashtra Rules provides for rejection upto 5 per cent without any obligation to give reasons. It was said by the petitioners that the Mysore and Kerala Rules fixed the limit for rejection but the Maharashtra Rule did not do so. Both the Rules fixed 5 per cent as the maximum limit for rejection. The Mysore and the Kerala Rules have nothing corresponding to Maharashtra Rule 37 (2) requiring payment at half the rates for beedis rejected as sub-standard, if the same was not due to the wilful negligence of the employee. Both the Rules fixed 5 per cent as the maximum limit for rejection. The Mysore and the Kerala Rules have nothing corresponding to Maharashtra Rule 37 (2) requiring payment at half the rates for beedis rejected as sub-standard, if the same was not due to the wilful negligence of the employee. It was therefore, said that either up to 5 per cent rejection under Maharashtra rule 37 or rejection of more than 5 per cent the employer was under an obligation to make payment at half of the rate 1853 as rejected beedis if such rejection was not due to the wilful negligence of the employee. 80. It has, therefore, to be ascertained as to whether the rules prohibit employer from rejecting more than 5 per cent even if they are found to be sub-standard and secondly whether the requirement to pay wages at one half of the rate for the rejected beedis is a reasonable restriction. The Rules provide for rejection upto 5 per cent. The Rules further used the word `ordinarily in regard to such rejection. In case of rejection of more than 5 per cent R.27 of the Mysore Rules and Rule 37 of the Maharashtra Rules provide for raising of a dispute in regard to such rejection. The dispute contemplated is in relation to rejection of beedis and the payment of wages for the rejected beedis. The words "rejection" and "rejected" indicate that the dispute is raised because of the rejection of beedis. The contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioner that before a dispute is raised no rejection is possible is erroneous. The dispute arises because of rejection. Therefore, Rules 27 and 29 of the Mysore Rules and Rule 27 of the Kerala Rules do not impose any unreasonable restriction on the right of rejection. 81. Maharashtra Rule 37 also permits rejection of more than 5 per cent and raising of dispute. The contention on behalf of the petitioners that the Maharashtra Rule which requires payment at one half of the rate for the rejected beedis on any ground other than the ground of wilful negligence of the worker is an unreasonable restriction is not correct. The Bombay High Court correctly held that the experience in the industry is that there is a market for sub-standard beedis. The Bombay High Court correctly held that the experience in the industry is that there is a market for sub-standard beedis. It is also reasonable to hold that home workers will be interested in seeing that the beedis are not substandard because in the process home workers would be earning less. The Maharashtra Rule in intended to eliminate exploitation of illiterate workers who are mostly women. The Rules with regard to rejection are, therefore, reasonable. It is also open to the employers to raise dispute for rejection above 5 per cent. 82. The Petitioners and the appellant challenged Section 37 (3) of the Act as unworkable. That sub-section provides that the provisions of the Maternity Benefit ACt, 1961 shall apply to every establishment as if such establishment were an establishment to which the said 1961 Act had been applied by notification under S.2(1) of the said 1961 Act. The proviso to Section 37 (3) of the Act states that Maternity Benefit in its application to a home worker shall apply subject to certain modifications. The Madras High Court upheld the contention and said that since a worker in a beedi industry is not required to work regularly for any prescribed period of hours in a day or even day after day for any specified period, from the very nature of the case, provisions of the said 1961 Act are unworkable with regard to such home workers. It may be stated that the reasonableness of Section 37(3) of the Act was not challenged. An agrument which was submitted was that it was difficult to locate home workers. That argument was not pressed in this Court. The provisions of the said 1961 act in Sections 4 and 5 thereof deal with prohibition of employment of, or work by, women, prohibited during certain period and right of payment of maternity benefit. Section 4 of the 1961 Act does not present any difficulty because it speaks of prohibition of work by women in any establishment during six months immediately following the day of her delivery. Further, Section 4 provides that on a request being made by a pregnant woman she will not be required to do work of an arduous nature or work which involves long hours of standing and that period is one month immediately preceding the period of six weeks before the date of her expected delivery. Further, Section 4 provides that on a request being made by a pregnant woman she will not be required to do work of an arduous nature or work which involves long hours of standing and that period is one month immediately preceding the period of six weeks before the date of her expected delivery. Section 5 (2) of the said 1961 Act provides that no woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit unless she has actually worked in any establishment for a period of not less than 160 days in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery. There is no difficulty with regard to working of these sections in regard to maternity benefits to women employed in an establishment. 83. For these reasons, we hold that punishment had legislative competence in making this Act and the 1854 provisions of the Act are valid and do not offend any provisions of the Constitution. 84. The Writ Petitions Nos. 127-132 of 1972 are dismissed. The Judgments of the Madras High Court, Bombay High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court are set aside and Civil Appeals Nos. 2516-23, 2560-69, 2661-64 of 1972, 66-69, 72-75, 1307, 854-56, 857-59, 1203 and 1204 of 1973, 307-311 of 1972 and 173 of 1973 are dismissed. The State of Maharashtra and the Union of India appeals against the judgments of the Bombay High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court being Civil Appeals Nos. 1864-73/1971 and 1972-88/1971 respectively are accepted. The appeals from the Judgments of the Gujarat High Court and Mysore High Courts being Civil Appeals Nos. 585/1971 and 1553, 1614-18, 1769/1971, 1131-33 and 1440 and 1972 respectively are dismissed. The parties will pay and bear their own costts. ALAGIRISWAMI, J.:- 85. I am substantially in agreement with the judgment delivered by my Lord, the Chief Justice, but I think it is necessary to add a few words to clarify certain matters in view of the complications that are likely to arise otherwise. The Act is the result of a compromise between the original intentions of the Government and the modifications they had to make in the propsoed measure as a result of concessions intended to bring the home workers within the scope of the Act. The Act is the result of a compromise between the original intentions of the Government and the modifications they had to make in the propsoed measure as a result of concessions intended to bring the home workers within the scope of the Act. The original intention was not to permit beedi rolling in private homes which will involve thousands of labourers in thousands of farflung homes and the difficulty of applying the provisions of the measure to them. The result is an Act which is likely to give rise to many difficulties in its actual working. It is obvious on a reading of the measure that its purpose is to rope in every possible person who could be brought in as an employer. But the result of the definitions in the Act is that everybody would be a principal employer, employer and contractor and every labour will be contract labour. 86. Take the definition of the word "contractor". In so far as it says that it means "a person who, in relation to a manufacturing process, undertakes to produce a given result by executing the work" it is not objectionable and refers to a contractor ordinarily understood. But when the words "through contract labour" are added it leads to complications. "Contract labour" is defined as "any person engaged or employed in any premises by or through a contractor". Therefore, all labour employed by a contractor is contract labour. If any manufacturer employs any person through a contractor, the labour would be contract labour. Then again "contractor" also means "a person who engages labour for any manufacturing process is a private dwelling house". In such a case even a principal employer who engages labour for any manufacturing process would be a contractor. The further definition of the word "contractor" includes a sub-contractor, agent, munshi, thekedar or sattedar. These are obviously included to cover a class of persons dealt with by this Court in certain decision including Chintaman Raos case, ( 1958 SCR 1340 ) . An "employer" is defined to be, in relation to contract labour, the principal employer. I have already pointed out that contract labour would include labour employed even by the manufacturer himself direct. "Principal employer" is defined as "a person for whom or on whose behalf any contract labour is engaged or employed in an establishment". An "employer" is defined to be, in relation to contract labour, the principal employer. I have already pointed out that contract labour would include labour employed even by the manufacturer himself direct. "Principal employer" is defined as "a person for whom or on whose behalf any contract labour is engaged or employed in an establishment". Therefore, when contract labour is employed for a person he is principal employer. When contract labour is engaged or employed on behalf of a person he is also a principal employer. What distinction could be made between the two is a little difficult to understand. However, in the second part of definition of "employer" in relation to labour other than the contract labour in clause 2 (g) (b) - though in view of what I have said earlier it is difficult to see what that other labour could be - there can be no objection to the person who has the ultimate control over the affairs of any establishment being considered the employer, as also any person to whom the affairs of the establishment are entrusted, whether such other person is called the managing agent, manager, superintendent, or by any other name. But to call a person who has, by reason of his advancing money, 1855 supplying goods or otherwise, a substantial interest in the control of the affairs of any establishment, also an employer is very difficult to justify. It is apparently intended to cover cases where a person runs business benami i.e. in anothers name. There can be no objection to such a provision. But merely because a person lends or advances money or supplies goods he cannot be called an employer. He may have a substantial interest in the control of the affairs of the manufacturing establishment in the sense that the security for the money advanced depends upon the manufacturing establishment being run properly or even in the sense that a person supplying goods might also be interested in the control of the affairs because he may be supplying goods on credit. I think the words. "or who has, by reason of his advancing money, supplying goods or, otherwise, a substantial interest in the control of the affairs of any establishment" should be struck down. 87. The interpretation placed upon the expression "employer" by the learned Attorney General does not really flow from the various definitions in the Act. I think the words. "or who has, by reason of his advancing money, supplying goods or, otherwise, a substantial interest in the control of the affairs of any establishment" should be struck down. 87. The interpretation placed upon the expression "employer" by the learned Attorney General does not really flow from the various definitions in the Act. I think it is not without significance that the learned Attorney General put forward this interpretation because it is only on that basis that the Act would be workable at all. While I realise that courts should give effect to the intentions of the legislature, it can be done only if that is possible without doing violence to the actual language of the status. The various definitions plainly seek to rope in everybody who has anything to do with the manufacture of beedies and while trying to give effect to the penal provisions in the statute considerable difficulties will arise. There will on the one hand be the actual occupier of the industrial premises. There will be on the other hand a person who might have advanced money to him and supplied goods to him and therefore may be substantially interested in its control. The actual occupier himself might be a contractor and in that case he as well as the person on whose behalf beedies are manufactured would be liable? I do not agree with the view taken by the Bombay High Court that the Act exhibits an intention to retain the system of contractors. It only takes notice of the existence of the system of contractors and it appears to me that by making the principal employer responsible in every class it is actually trying to force the principal employer to undertake the work of manufacture himself rather than give it to contractor because in any case he would be ultimately liable financially and otherwise to everyone of the workmen employed. Quite possible if an independent contractor is one of the type envisaged by the Madras High Court in its judgment in 1973-2 Mad LJ 126 that is, of a person buying the materials from the person whom it calls the trade mark holder and then selling the beedies to him, he could be called an independent contractor. But he is actually a manufacturer himself in that case. But he is actually a manufacturer himself in that case. He may be selling the beedies manufactured by him not to one person but to many persons. The conditions in the beedis industry being that the actual person who ultimately sells the beedis to the public employs various means by which he does not take any responsibility for the welfare of the workers employed in the industry, the Act proceeds on the basis that he must be made responsible. I find it difficult to accept the contention of the learned Attorney General that the criterion adopted by the Madras High Court is both wide as well as restrictive. It can be said to be wide or restricted, as one chooses to call it, only if one envisages a situation like the one in Dewan Mohideess case, (1964) 7 SCR 646 . But then if the so called contractor is really a benami for the manufacturer there is no difficulty in holding the manufacturer responsible. 88. The main contentions put forward on behalf of the various appellants are regarding the provisions of Ss. 26, 27, 29, 31 and 37 of the Act and Rule 37 of the Maharashtra rules and the corresponding rules made by the various other States. The very convincing reasons and the criticism made by the various appellants were not met by the argument advanced by the learned Attorney General. It is well established from the Chintaman Raos case (1958) SCR 1856 1340 (supra), Shankar Balajis case (1962 Supp 1 SCR 249) and Bhikusas case, (1964-1 SCR 860) that in this industry even people working in factories belonging to manufacturers come as they like, go as they like, work on some days even for one hour a day, and there are no fixed hours of work. This sort of situation exists mainly due to the fact that the payment is made to the worker on a piece rate, and the work is also carried on as a part time occupation. What applies to them applies with greater force to the home workers. Therefore when Section 26 provides that every employee in an establishment (which will include a dwelling house) shall be allowed in a calendar year leave with wages at the rate of one day for every twney days of work performed by him during the previous calendar year, it leads to real difficulty. Therefore when Section 26 provides that every employee in an establishment (which will include a dwelling house) shall be allowed in a calendar year leave with wages at the rate of one day for every twney days of work performed by him during the previous calendar year, it leads to real difficulty. There may not be much point in the criticism that whereas the Factories Act provides for annual leave only for person who had worked for 240 days in a year this Act provides for one days leave for every 20 days during wich they have worked. It may be possible for the contractor to know on how many days the home worker has worked from the log book maintained by him. But what is the wage which has to be paid to him during the period of leave? That term is not defined in the Act and it is not permissible to refer to other Acts in order to understand the meaning of that term. Even if we take it to be what it means in popular usage it is not possible to say what are the wages in the case of a home worker. A home worker might work for one hour on one day, eight hours on another day and not at all for a number of days. What would be the wages payable to him? I am not canvassing the reasonableness of this provisions but of the difficulty in giving effect to the provision. The same criticism applies to various other provisions contained in that section. Section 27 provides that for the leave allowed to an employee under Section 26 he shall be paid at the rate equal to the daily average of his total full time earnings for the days on which he had worked during the month immediately preceding his leave exclusive of any overtime earnings and bonus but inclusive of dearness and other allowances. The term "Full time earnings" has been interpreted in Shankar Balajis and Bhikusas cases. If it is not applicable to an employee of the types of Pandurang in Shankar Balajis case surely it cannot apply to a home worker. This difficulty is not got over by Explanation II which describes a "day" as any period during which the home worker was employed during a period of twenty-four hours. That does not help in calculating the full time earnings. This difficulty is not got over by Explanation II which describes a "day" as any period during which the home worker was employed during a period of twenty-four hours. That does not help in calculating the full time earnings. Again, what meaning are we to give to the term "full time earnings" when there is no period of work at all and there are no fixed hours of working in the case of a home worker" I am not satisfied with the learned Attorney Generals interpretation of Section 23 that it is not permissible after this Act came into force for any worker of the type of Pandurang in Shankar Balajis case to work under the conditions described in that case. If a person should not be employed in an industrial premises except in accordance with the notice of work displayed in the premises under Section 22, it does not mean that he cannot work for less than the period mentioned in the notice of work. Only if he is employed for a longer time that the mentioned in the notice of work would be occupier of the industrial premises make himself liable to be proceeded against. In any case even if that interpretation is correct that cannot apply to a homeworker. 89. The difficulty of applying the provisions of the Maternity Benefits Act is again apparent. The very purpose of allowing the home workers to work in their homes being that the work of rolling beedis is light work which men and women can do in their homes their spare hours, the provision of the Maternity Benefits Act regarding women not being allowed to do arduous labour for a certain period before delivery and after delivery is not apparent. And how can the provision be applied to women who cannot be said to be, so to say, employed continuously for a certain period before the confinement. 90. Under Section 31 no employer shall dispense with the services of an employee who has been 1857 employed for a period of six months or more, except for a reasonable cause, and without giving such employees at least one months notice or wages in lieu of such notice. 90. Under Section 31 no employer shall dispense with the services of an employee who has been 1857 employed for a period of six months or more, except for a reasonable cause, and without giving such employees at least one months notice or wages in lieu of such notice. It is enough that the employee has been employed for a period of six months if he has been working for one or two days every month during those six months, and in any case how are his wages in lieu of notice to be determined? And who would be the "employer competent to dispense with the services of the employee"? If a contractor dispenses with the services of an employee in contravention of Section 31 and is convicted under Section 33 for the first time, would the `principal employer be liable to imprisonment if there is a second prosecution? These are some of the problems which are likely to arise in actual working of the Act. 91. I must make it clear that my objection is not to any of the provisions on the ground of their unreasonableness or constitutionally. The long abstracts which the learned Attorney General read from the Report of the Royal Commission on Labour, the Rege Committee Report, and the Reports of Dr. B. V. N. Naidu and Mr. M. A. Natarajan depict the miserable conditions in which the workers in the industry work. Nobody can dispute the need for setting right those evils. But good intentions should not result in a legislation which would become ineffective and lead to lot of fruitless litigation over the years. I think it is necessary to utter a word of caution lest the fact that we uphold the validity of the Act as such should be interpreted by various courts and tribunals as sanctioning one interpretation or the other of the various provisions. That would be opening up the pandoras box of litigation. I would therefore hold in agreement with the majority of the High Courts that Sections 26, 27, 31 and 37(3) do not apply to house workers. 92. That would be opening up the pandoras box of litigation. I would therefore hold in agreement with the majority of the High Courts that Sections 26, 27, 31 and 37(3) do not apply to house workers. 92. And finally as regards Rule 37 of the Maharashtra Rules, it was accepted by the appellants as reasonable if it is interpreted as meaning that ordinarily chhat up to five per cent could be rejected, but if more than that is rejected it would be subject to decision by the Inspector. It was said that to make the rejection of chhat in excess of five per cent, to depend upon the decision by the Inspector would make all those beedis useless because they have got to be heated immediately so that the beedies may not be spoilt because of the moisture. I think that interpretation is correct and the other States may amend the Rules so as to bring it in line with the Maharashtra Rule. 93. I have tried to interpret the various provisions of the Act not in order to consider their constitutionality or the reasonableness of the restrictions as reflecting on the constitutionality, but of their interpretation in so far as they are likely to lead to difficulties in actual application of the provisions of the Act. I think it would be good in the interest of all concerned if the Act is amended as early as possible to remove all the lacunae and the difficulties pointed out above. These difficulties have arisen because of an attempt blindly to apply the provisions, which would be quite workable if they are applied to conditions where the Factories Act would be applicable where the labour is regular in its attendance every day as well as over a period, to conditions of work which are vastly different as well as to people who work at home without a conscious attempt to mould them to suit those conditions. The sooner that is done the better for all concerned. Order accordingly. For Citation : AIR 1974 SC 1832 Vikas Info Solutions Pvt. Ltd.