Judgment :- 1. In this batch of petitions challenge is made to demands by various Panchayats for tax assessed under S.66A of the Kerala Panchayats Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). It is agreed that in all these cases demands were made without service of any order of assessment prior thereto It is also agreed that capital value of land which has to be determined for the purpose of S.66A of the Act had not been determined in these cases with reference to material put to the petitioners and after giving an opportunity to the petitioners to substantiate their cases in regard to such capital value Possibly in these petitions this court may be able to grant relief on this ground itself But we may mention here that m most of these petitions there is an attack the constitutional validity of S.66A of the Act and also to the Kerala Panchayats (Levy and Collection of Land Cess) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). 2. The Kerala Panchayats Act, 1960 had, by S.66 (2), provided for a levy of cess on all lands in the Panchayat area, other than exempted lands at the rate of two paise per annum for every five cents of land or part thereof. This provision was repealed and a new S.66A was introduced providing for the levy of land cess on every land in a panchayat area, other than exempted lands at the rate of one sixteenth per centum of the capital value of the land. The cess so levied was payable by the owner of the land. This was subsequently amended folder indicate that the levy was of an annual nature. S.66A was deemed to have come into force in the Travancore-Cochin area on 5th August, 1951 and in the Malabar area on 1st April 1958. This section reads: "66A Land Cess. The cess so levied was payable by the owner of the land. This was subsequently amended folder indicate that the levy was of an annual nature. S.66A was deemed to have come into force in the Travancore-Cochin area on 5th August, 1951 and in the Malabar area on 1st April 1958. This section reads: "66A Land Cess. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall be levied annually on every land in a Panchayat area, other than any land or class of lands which the Government may, in public interest, exempt by notification in the Gazette, a land cess at the rate of one sixteenth per centum of the capital value of the land and cess so levied shall be payable by the owner of the land: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall be deemed as authorising the levy of land cess in any Panchayat area in respect of any particular period during which such cess was not being levied in that Panchayat area prior to the 1st day of January, 1962. (2) The Government may make rules providing for the manner of ascertaining the capital value of the lands for the purpose of sub-section (1)." It may be noticed that it was left to the rule making authority to prescribe the manner of ascertaining capital value of lands for the purpose of levy of the cess. This was purported to be done by the Rules. The rules were framed by the Government of Kerala in exercise of the powers under S.66A (2) which provided for rule making in regard to the manner of ascertaining the capital value of the lands and under S.129 of the Act which enabled the Government to make rules generally to carry out the purposes of the Act. 3. A brief reference may be made to the scheme of the rules. R.2 defines certain terms including the term "Assessment Officer". That term meant such officer as was appointed by the Government for determining the cess payable in respect of any land under S.66A of the Act. R.3 and 4 are the pertinent rules which provided for assessment and the manner of determining capital value for such assessment. It may be profitable to extract these rules here: "3. That term meant such officer as was appointed by the Government for determining the cess payable in respect of any land under S.66A of the Act. R.3 and 4 are the pertinent rules which provided for assessment and the manner of determining capital value for such assessment. It may be profitable to extract these rules here: "3. Assessment Officer to determine cess: The assessment Officer shall, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and the rules issued thereunder and the orders issued by the Government from time to time, determine the cess payable in respect of every land in the Panchayat area, other than any land exempted under S.66A of the Act. 4. Manner of determining the capital value of land: (1) For the purpose of levy of cess under S.66A of the Act, the capital value of any land shall be its market value, that is to say the price which it would reasonably fetch, if sold in the open market, having regard to its situation, present condition and value as a prospective site for building houses or for the location of mills, factories or other industries and commercial concerns. (2) In determining such market value, regard may be had to the following factors, namely: (a) the price paid for the land or for any portion thereof in the year current or in the three years immediately preceding, after making due allowance for the lapse of time and any difference in respect of the situation of the land or of the amenities in the neighbourhood, since the sale; (b) the price paid for similar lands in the vicinity in the year current or in the three years immediately preceding, after making due allowance as aforesaid; and (c) the rate of capital value adopted by the Revenue Department in the year current and in the three years immediately preceding in respect of similar lands in the locality, in connection with the acquisition of land for public purposes or in connection with the assignment or sale of lands at the disposal of the Government under Land Assignment Rules or for any other purpose." R. 5 provided that the cess as determined under R.4 was to be paid annually by the owner of the assessed land within sixty days of the commencement of the year. The cess due in respect of any land was to be demanded and collected by the Executive authority of the Panchayat and that was to be in accordance with the provisions of certain rules in the Kerala Panchayats (Taxation and Appeal) Rules, 1963. This is the provision in R.6. An appeal against the order of assessment is provided for and that appeal lay to the Panchayat and there was a further appeal to the appellate authority who was to be an officer authorised by the Government to entertain such appeal. The appeal must be presented within 30 days from the date of the order appealed against. This is the content of R.7. A further revision was provided for in R.8 and that revision lay to such authority as was authorised by the Government to entertain revision petitions. R.9 indicated that the annual levy was to depend upon the assessment to be made periodically. Such period, unless the Government otherwise directed, was to be once in five years. The expenditure on the assessment officers and staff was to be recovered from the Panchayat as provided in R.10. R.11 may be extracted here: 11. Government's power to issue directions: Subject to the provisions of the Act and these rules, it shall be competent for the Government to issue such general or special orders to the Assessment Officers as they may deem necessary regarding the procedure and criteria to be followed in determining the cess in respect of the lands under these rules." This rule enabled the Government to issue general or special orders to the Assessment Officers as they deem necessary regarding the procedure and criteria to be followed in determining the cess in respect of the lands under these rules. 4. The main attack to S.66A or the Act is that it is arbitrary and violative of Art.14 and 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution of India. It is said that the provision suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of power for it is said, essential legislative power has been abdicated by the legislature in favour of the rule making authority since it has been left to such authority to act as it liked in material matters without even indicating the guidelines. There is also a challenge to the section on the ground of want of legislative competency. There is also a challenge to the section on the ground of want of legislative competency. It is said that the tax is essentially one on the capital value of the land and not on the land itself and if it be so it cannot be justified with reference to Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. On the other hand, it would properly fall within Entry 86 of List I of the Seventh Schedule and if so it would be legislation competent for the Parliament to make. The State legislature would have then acted without competence in incorporating. S.66A into the Act. As to the rules the attack is that it confers arbitrary powers upon an Assessment Officer as well as the Executive authority enabling them to exercise their powers as they please. It is said that there is no provision in the rules to call for returns, to consider such returns, to compel the assessing authority to give an opportunity in case the returns are not found to be acceptable, to enable the owner to adduce evidence in regard to capital value in the event such value is in dispute and finally it does not contain any provision compelling the Assessment Officer to pass an order objectively stating his reasons and communicating the same to the person affected by such order Therefore it is said that the power of enforcing the levy by a demand is capable of exercise in any manner the authorities please and that would be sufficient to vitiate the rules which enable such exercise. 5. That the power to impose tax on the capital value of the assets inclusive of agricultural land of individuals and companies is in the Parliament cannot be in controversy. Even in regard to agricultural lands the tax on the capital value could be imposed by the Parliament as held by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon (AIR. 1972 S. C. 1061). The tax on capital value of the assets when such assets consist also of agricultural land may fall within Entry 97 of List 1 since it must be considered as a residuary power vested in the Parliament. 1972 S. C. 1061). The tax on capital value of the assets when such assets consist also of agricultural land may fall within Entry 97 of List 1 since it must be considered as a residuary power vested in the Parliament. It has been indicated that unlike in the case of several Entries where what is excepted is List I falls within List II, what is excepted in Entry 86 of List I is not provided for in List II, and therefore it must necessarily fall within the residuary Entry, Entry 97 of List I. Hence irrespective of whether the land is agricultural or otherwise, if the tax happens to be one on capital value it has to be held that the State legislature is incompetent to enact such a law. It has got power only to enact a law imposing tax on lands and buildings. The question therefore, in a case where such controversy arises, is whether the tax in really one on the land or whether it is upon the capital value of the land. The distinction between these two concepts has been well brought out in the decision of the Supreme Court in Asst Commr Madras v. B. & C. Co. (AIR. 1970 S.C.169), so much so we do not think it is necessary to go further than to quote the following passage from the said decision: "The first question to be considered in these appeals is whether the Madras Legislature was competent to enact the legislation under Entry 49 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution which reads: "Taxes on lands and buildings." It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned Act fell under Schedule VII, List I, Entry 86 that is "Taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land, of individuals and companies' taxes on the capital of companies." The argument of Mr. V. K. T. Chad may be summarised as follows: The impugned Act was, both in form and substance, taxation of capital and was hence beyond the competence of the State Legislature. To tax on the basis of capital or principal value of assets was permissible to Parliament under List I, Entries 86 and 87 and to State under Entry 48 of List II. To tax on the basis of capital or principal value of assets was permissible to Parliament under List I, Entries 86 and 87 and to State under Entry 48 of List II. Taxation of capital was the appropriate method provided for effecting the directive principle under Art.39 of the Constitution, namely, to prevent concentration of wealth. Art.366 (9) contains a definition of 'estate duty' with reference to the principal value. Entry 86 of List I (Taxes on capital value of assets exclusive of agricultural land) and Entry 88 (Duties in respect of succession to such property) form a group of entries the scheme of which is to carry out the directive principle of Art.39 (c). The Constitution indicated that capital value or principal value shall be the basis of taxation under these entries and, therefore, the method of taxation of capital or principal value was prohibited even to Parliament in respect of other taxes and to the State except in respect of Estate Duty on agricultural land. Such in effect is the argument of Mr. V. K. T. Chari. But in our opinion there is no warrant for the assumption that entries 86, 88 of List I and Entry 48 of List II form a special group embodying any particular scheme. The directive principle embodied in Art.39 (c) applies both to Parliament and to the State Legislature and it is difficult to conceive "how entries 86 to 88 of List I would exclude any power of the State Legislature to implement the same principle. The legislative entries must be given a large and liberal interpretation, the reason being that the allocation of the subjects to the lists is not by way of scientific or logical definition but by way of a mere simplex enumeration of broad categories. We see no reason, therefore, for holding that the Entries 86 and 87 of List I preclude the State Legislature from taxing capital value of lands and buildings under Entry 49 of List II. In our opinion there is no conflict between Entry 86 of List I and Entry 49 of List II. The basis of taxation under the two entries is quite distinct. As regards Entry 86 of List I the basis of the taxation is the capital value of the asset. It is not a tax directly on the capital value of assets of individuals and companies on the valuation date. The basis of taxation under the two entries is quite distinct. As regards Entry 86 of List I the basis of the taxation is the capital value of the asset. It is not a tax directly on the capital value of assets of individuals and companies on the valuation date. The tax is not imposed on the components of the assets of the assessee. The tax under Entry 86 proceeds on the principle of aggregation and is imposed on totality of the value of all the assets. It is imposed on the total assets which the assessee owns and in determining the net wealth not only the encumbrances specifically charged against any item of asset, but the general liability of the assessee to pay his debts and to discharge his lawful obligations have to be taken into account. In certain exceptional cases, where a person owes no debts and is under no enforceable obligation to discharge any liability out of his assets it may be possible to break up the tax which is leviable on the total assets into components and attribute a component to lands and buildings owned by an assessee. In such a case the component out of the total tax attributable to lands and buildings may in the matter of computation bear similarity to a tax on lands and buildings levied on the capital or annual value under Entry 49, List II. But in a normal case a tax on capital value of assets bears no definable relation to lands and buildings which may or may not form a component of the total assets of the assessee. But Entry 49 of List II, contemplates a levy of tax on lands and buildings or both as units. It is not concerned with the division of interest or ownership in the units of lands or buildings which are brought to tax. Tax on lands and buildings is directly imposed on lands and buildings, and bears a definite relation to it. Tax on the capital value of assets bears non definable relation to lands and buildings which may form a component of the total assets of the assessee. By legislation in exercise of power under Entry 86, List I tax is contemplated to be levied on the value of the assets. Tax on the capital value of assets bears non definable relation to lands and buildings which may form a component of the total assets of the assessee. By legislation in exercise of power under Entry 86, List I tax is contemplated to be levied on the value of the assets. For the purpose of levying tax under Entry 49, List II the State Legislature may adopt for determining the incidence of tax the annual or the capital value of the lands and buildings. But the adoption of the annual or capital value of lands and buildings for determining tax liability will not make the fields of legislation under the two entries overlapping. The two taxes are entirely different in their basic concept and fall on different subject-matters". The Supreme Court again said in the decision in Shri. P. C. Mills v. Broach Municipality (AIR. 1970 S.C. 192) thus: "The incidence of the tax is not on lands and buildings as units of taxation but on the net assets of which lands and buildings are only some of the components. This is not the case under entry 49 (List II) where the tax can be laid directly on lands and buildings as units of taxation. Therefore, a lax on lands and buildings is fully within the competence of the legislature and it is open to it to authorise the municipality to levy the same tax indicating the mode of levy. This the legislature has done by indicating the different modes which may be adopted in making the levy, one such mode being a percentage of the capital value." Our attention has been drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon (AIR. 1972 S. C. 1061), by Sri. Varghese Kalliath, counsel for the petitioner in O. P. 4419 of 1972. We do not think that anything different was said by the Supreme Court in that decision. In fact that decision, as we understand it, adopts the same line of reasoning as in the decisions adverted to. 6. It appears to be beyond the pale of controversy that tax on land may be imposed by adopting the method of determining the tax on the basis of the capital value of the land. In fact that decision, as we understand it, adopts the same line of reasoning as in the decisions adverted to. 6. It appears to be beyond the pale of controversy that tax on land may be imposed by adopting the method of determining the tax on the basis of the capital value of the land. Merely because such capital value is taken as the basis for determining the quantum of tax leviable it does not become a tax on such capital value. Necessarily some mode or other has to be prescribed for taxing land. To tax on the basis of the market value of the land may be a proper basis and if capital value is adopted as the basis it will not render what would otherwise be a tax on land, a tax on such capital value. We therefore do not see any merit in the contention that the Section is bad for want of legislative power in the State Legislature. 7. The contention as to excessive delegation also must fail. The essential legislative power has not been delegated by the legislature. The provision is one intended to authorise the Panchayats to levy cess on land falling within its area and the Act indicates that such cess is to be levied annually. It indicates that the Government may, in public interest, exempt any land or class of lands from the scope of the levy. It fixes the quantum of levy at one sixteenth percentam of the capital value of the land. It further provides that it shall be the owner of the land who is liable to pay the cess. Therefore the legislative policy is clearly enunciated in the section. Capital value is a term of definite concept. For the purpose of determining value of land under the Land Acquisition Acts provisions are made therein as to what all matters are to be taken into consideration. In determining capital value for the purpose of S.66A what matters are to be taken into account is left to be provided by the Rules. If the Rules are so framed as to bring in extraneous and irrelevant material to determine the capital value, so as to make the capital value by applying such rules not really what that term means, possibly, the rule may be open to attack. If the Rules are so framed as to bring in extraneous and irrelevant material to determine the capital value, so as to make the capital value by applying such rules not really what that term means, possibly, the rule may be open to attack. The rule making power is conferred upon a delegate essentially to meet situations which the legislature cannot contemplate in detail when it passes the statute. Details have necessarily to be left to the delegate, the legislature indicating the limits of the authority within which the delegated power is to be exercised, indicating the policy and laying down the guidelines for the exercise of its power. So long as there is a clear definition of the nature and incidents of the levy and also the quantum of the levy, delegation intended to work out other details cannot be said to be excessive. We may in this context refer to the following passage in the decision of the Supreme Court in Vasanthi Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State of Bombay (AIR. 1961 S.C. 4). Justice Gajendragadkar said in that case thus: "It is now well-established by the decisions of this Court that the power of delegation is a constituent element of the legislative power as a whole, and that in modern times when the Legislatures enact laws to meet the challenge of the complex socio-economic problems, they often find it convenient and necessary to delegate subsidiary or ancillary powers to delegates of their choice for carrying out the policy laid down by their Acts. The extent to which such delegation is permissible is also now well-settled. The Legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case. It must lay down the legislative policy and principle, and must afford guidance for carrying out the said policy before it delegates its subsidiary powers in that behalf. As has been observed by Mahajan, C. J., in Harishankar Bagla v. The Stats of Madhya Pradesh "the Legislature cannot delegate its function of laying down legislative policy in respect of a measure and its formulation as a rule of conduct. As has been observed by Mahajan, C. J., in Harishankar Bagla v. The Stats of Madhya Pradesh "the Legislature cannot delegate its function of laying down legislative policy in respect of a measure and its formulation as a rule of conduct. The Legislature must declare the policy of the law and the legal principles which are to control any given cases, and must provide a standard to guide the officials or the body in power to execute the law." In dealing with the challenge to the vires of any statute on the ground of excessive delegation it is, therefore, necessary to enquire whether the impugned delegation involves the delegation of an essential legislative function or power and whether the Legislature has enunciated its policy and principle and given guidance to the delegate or not. As the decision in Bagla's case shows, in applying this test this Court has taken into account the statements in the preamble to the Act, and if the said statements afford a satisfactory basis for holding that the legislative policy and principle has been enunciated with sufficient accuracy and clarity the preamble itself has been held to satisfy the requirements of the relevant tests. In every case it would be necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Act in relation to the delegation made and the question as to whether the delegation is intra vires or not will have to be decided by the application of the relevant tests." We do not think that applying the tests indicated by the Supreme Court there is any scope for contending that the delegation is excessive. 8. Reference has been made by counsel Sri. T. L. Viswanatha Iyer to the decision of the Supreme Court in K. T. M. Nair v. State of Kerala (AIR. 1961 S. C. 552). Particular reference is made to Para.9 of the judgment. It is true that the passage would indicate that the taxing statute must define a machinery for the levy, assessment and collection of the tax imposed. But we do not think we should read this passage to mean that all this should be provided for in the Act itself and not in the rules. Reference in that case was to delegation to the Executive and not to the rule making authority. But we do not think we should read this passage to mean that all this should be provided for in the Act itself and not in the rules. Reference in that case was to delegation to the Executive and not to the rule making authority. Such delegation to the Executive may be open to the objection that it confers an arbitrary power on the Executive. But that is not the situation with which we are concerned in this case. 9. We see no reason also to uphold the challenge that the provision in S.66A is discriminatory. In fact what was argued before us was that the delegation is excessive and therefore bad. Counsel did not contend before us that the provision in S.66A infringes the right to hold property without unreasonable restrictions guaranteed under Art.19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. Therefore though the ground is raised in some of the petitions, we are not going into it. 10. We think the Government has given some room for the petitioners to contend against the validity of the rules. That is because, though on a close reading of the rule it is possible to find the requirement of a decision by way of assessment by the Assessment Officer which is to be in force until the next revision, there is no procedure prescribed in the rules as to how the Assessment Officer is to act. A taxing statute is open to the attack that it violates Art.14 or 19 (1)(f) of the Constitution as any other piece of legislation is and therefore care must be taken to ensure a fair procedure to determine the tax liability of the person who is called upon to meet the demand. That necessarily means that provision must be made either in the Act or in the rules for adequate safeguards enabling the parties who are sought to be assessed to place their points of view, to adduce evidence in case their side of the case is not accepted and to pass an order indicating the objective approach to the materials placed before the assessing authority. Though R.3 may indicate that the Assessment Officer should determine the tax payable by the owner of the land and that may mean that he is to pass an order of assessment and though R.4 defines the matters which are relevant for the purpose of ascertaining the capital value, the absence of specific provisions enabling returns to be called for, evidence to be adduced in case the returns are not to be accepted as correct or complete, to be heard in the matter and the absence of the requirement of communicating an intelligible order passed by the Assessment Officer are certainly lacune in the rules which have necessarily given rise to these petitions. It is not contended before us that these are not requirements which need be complied with or that these, even if required to be complied with, are empty formalities. On the other hand, learned Advocate General who appeared before us agreed that though the rules as such do not provide for these in specific terms, these have to be read into the rules as necessary requirements and it would be possible to sustain the rules only by reading them in that manner. It goes without saying that the authorities whose actions are challenged before us have not understood these provisions in that spirit. There is not one case before us in all these petitions where this procedure has been adopted. The determination of the capital value in everyone of these cases has been without reference to any material that the petitioners might have been able to produce in support of their case as to such capital value. There has been no case where an opportunity which can be said to be reasonable has been afforded to any of the petitioners. It is not shown or even contended before us that the case is otherwise in anyone of these petitions. Therefore irrespective of the question of validity of these rules, we have to quash the demands in all these cases. We have to hold that in none of these cases the Executive Authorities of the Panchayats are competent to collect taxes pursuant to the demands made. Therefore irrespective of the question of validity of these rules, we have to quash the demands in all these cases. We have to hold that in none of these cases the Executive Authorities of the Panchayats are competent to collect taxes pursuant to the demands made. Since that would be sufficient to grant relief to the petitioners in these cases and further since the learned Advocate General assured us that the Government would immediately take up the question of amending or reframing the rules so as to meet the situation, we do not think it necessary to exercise ourselves in the matter of striking down the rules. We record the assurance by the learned Advocate General and we hope that the matter will be attended to with considerable despatch without giving room for another set of petitions to this Court complaining about the rules or acting taken pursuant to the rules which may be open to similar attack. Though this may be sufficient to dispose of all these cases we may refer to contentions which are peculiar to some of the cases. 11. O.P.Nos.1396 of 1974, 2310 of 1973, 995 of 1974, 996 of 1974, 2450 of 1974 and 2451 of 1974 are cases wherein the petitioners are lessees of the Government. The petitioners claim to be lessees and not owners, some of them under the Government and some of them under others. In O. P. 996 of 1974 only a small area, namely 40 acres is freehold and the rest is held by the petitioner as lessee. The Act imposes an obligation to pay the cess under S.66A on the owner of the land. The petitioners in these cases contend that they are not owners and therefore they shall not be called upon to pay tax. An attempt has been made by the State in its counter-affidavit to define the term'owner'. Definition by the deponent of the counter-affidavit cannot be a substitute for legislative definition. The term 'owner' may possibly, in certain contexts, extend to persons other than those in whom absolute right vests. That is so is to be shown by reference to the context, circumstances and the nature of the enactment. It is not possible to read the term 'owner' in the provision in S.66A as referring to the person in occupation of the land. 'It cannot be so for more reasons than one. That is so is to be shown by reference to the context, circumstances and the nature of the enactment. It is not possible to read the term 'owner' in the provision in S.66A as referring to the person in occupation of the land. 'It cannot be so for more reasons than one. Even assuming that such contention is possible that will lead to anomalous results, for, there will be two owners of the land, the owner of the freehold and the tenant as qualified owner. There cannot be a levy of cess against and an obligation to pay by both. Apart from this the term owner is used in contra distinction to the term'occupier', for, we find in S.68 of the Kerala Panchayats Act which deals with building tax the reference to 'occupier' of the building as well as to the 'owner'. We are particularly referring to sub-section (5) of S.68 of the Act. It would appear that in the rules and notifications framed to implement S.66A Government itself has understood the terms in this manner. In R.4A which was incorporated by an amendment in the Rules reference is made to 'owner or occupier' which would indicate that the Government understands the occupier as different from the owner. In Notification G. O. M. S.67/70/LAD dated 7th November, 1970 exempting certain classes of lands from the levy of land cess, one class is (1) (2) (3) Lands not put to any use and from which no rent is realised by the owners." The term 'owner' as a person realising the rent would indicate that in respect of tenanted land Government understood the owner as a person receiving the rent and not the lessee. In statutes where under persons other than owners were sought to be made liable for the levy of tax care has been taken to define the term 'owner' properly and in the absence of such a definition in the Kerala Panchayats Act, S.66A enables the petitioners to successfully contend that they are not liable to pay tax. Possibly the Government might not have intended this result, for, it would be anomalous to call upon impecunious owners these days to pay tax on the lands in the possession of their tenants. Possibly that question may not arise at all after 1 11970. Possibly the Government might not have intended this result, for, it would be anomalous to call upon impecunious owners these days to pay tax on the lands in the possession of their tenants. Possibly that question may not arise at all after 1 11970. Whatever that be, if the legislature did not intend to exclude the lessees from the operation of the provisions of S.66A of the Act, that is a matter for consideration by the legislature by appropriate amendment of the Statute. As the matter now stands, we will have to hold that the lessees are not liable to pay tax. 12. It is not necessary to go into individual cases to consider whether the assessing authority or the appellate authority have acted arbitrarily. It is sufficient to state that in all these cases the petitioners succeed by reason of the demands against them being found to be unsustainable. The petitioners are allowed as above. No costs. 13. In cases where demands have not been made, it goes without saying that what we have said will certainly be borne in mind by all those concerned in making and applying the rules. Before we part with the case, we have to notice that in 3 of the petitions, O. P. Nos. 3227, 3505 and 3507 of 1974 the petitioners are not persons who have been taxed or persons who are likely to be taxed. It is certain Karshakasangams or Association of persons that have come up as petitioners. Anyhow now that we have found that in the case of those against whom demands have been made they are entitled to relief, it is not necessary to go into these petitions. Those petitions are dismissed but no costs.