JUDGMENT R.L. Gulati, J. - The petitioners are the owners of House No. 57/105. Neelwali Gali, Kanpur, a portion of which is in dispute and which shall hereinafter be referred to as the 'accommodation'. Previously the house belonged to the petitioners' grand-mother and they have inherited it on her death. They carry on a joint family business in the firm name of Ram Krish Dass Brijimohan Dass. In this firm was an employee of the name of Purshottam Dass, who as in occupation of the accommodation in dispute. The services of Purshottam Dass were terminated and a suit for his ejectment was filed by the petitioner's grandmother, who was then alive. The suit was decreed and possession of the accommodation was also delivered to her. She also made an application for the release of the accommodation on ground that the same was needed by her grandsons for accommodating the customers and constituents of their business. The application was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by his order dated 18th December, 1970. An application under section 7-F of the Rent Control and Eviction Act was also rejected by the State Government. 2. In the meantime, it appears, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer allotted the accommodation in favour of the second respondent, Shambhu Ratna Kaseri, and at his instance the petitioner were "served with a notice under section 7-A (1) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act on 17th of March, 1971. The petitioners have moved this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejecting the application for release, the order of the State Government rejecting the revision application and the order of allotment made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in favour of the second respondent as also the notice dated 17th March, 1971 issued under section 7-A(1) of the Act. 3. The principal ground of attack is that the approach of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and State Government while dealing with the petitioner's application for release is erroneous in law. 3. The principal ground of attack is that the approach of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and State Government while dealing with the petitioner's application for release is erroneous in law. Another contention is that the allotment order in favour of the second respondent was passed without notice to the petitioners and in contravention of Rule 7 of the rules framed under the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act which require, that where a portion of an accommodation is in the occupation of the landlord, no allotment order shall be made without consulting him. In my opinion this petition succeeds wholly on the first ground and it is not necessary to decide the remaining points. 4. A perusal of the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer shows that he has rejected the application for release on the ground that the family of the petitioners is residing in a bungalow at Nawabganj crossing and it has also a few room, in the house in question which are bring used for business purposes and as such the accommodation already in their possession is sufficient for their need this is what has stated in the ultimate paragraph of his order - "I have carefully gone through the evidence on record and I find that the applicant has already sufficient accommodation at her disposal both for residential and business purposes and be can very well utilise the accommodation at her disposal in the house in question for the purposes of stay of the visitors if she so likes after setting it right. In my opinion the need of the applicant for an additional accommodation is neither genuine nor bona fide and her release application is rejected." The State Government in its order passed under section 7-F has also approached the problem from the same angle and has rejected the application on the ground that the accommodation in possession of the lady and her family members is enough for their need and they do not need any additional accommodation. 5. To may mind the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the State Government have both misdirected themselves in law. A landlord makes an application under Rule 6 of the Rent Control and Eviction Rules for release of an accommodation when the same falls vacant. 5. To may mind the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the State Government have both misdirected themselves in law. A landlord makes an application under Rule 6 of the Rent Control and Eviction Rules for release of an accommodation when the same falls vacant. In order to succeed in such an application all that he has to show is that he needs the accommodation for his personal use and occupation. Since there is no sitting tenant, there is no question of comparing his need with the need of the tenant. Sufficiency of accommodation already in his possession is not material. That is a consideration which arises only if he wants to evict a sitting tenant under section 3 of the Act. Then a question might arise as to whether he needs any more accommodation then he already has and that his need is so pressing that the need of the tenant should be sacrificed. After all, it has to be borne in mind that a landlord being the owner of a house has a inherent right to occupy it. That is a right which accrues to him as the owner of the property. This right has been subject to restrictions by the Rent Control and Eviction Act for purposes of controlling the letting of the property and its rent. When a landlord does not want to let out his property and wants to occupy it himself, the Rent Control authorities are not possessed of a power to force him to let it out to a tenant. This view has been reiterated in a number of cases decided by me. In Madan Mohan Saberwal v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer this principle has been laid down in the following words : "The principle to be followed in cases like the present one has been laid down by this Court in several cases. That principle is that where an accommodation falls vacant and the landlord applies for its release on the ground that he needs it for his personal occupation, all that he has to establish is that he needs the accommodation genuinely for his personal use. Since there is no sitting tenant in such a case, the question of comparing the needs of the landlord and the tenant does not arise". Since there is no sitting tenant in such a case, the question of comparing the needs of the landlord and the tenant does not arise". Thus all that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as also the State Government had to see in the instant case was as to whether the landlord required the accommodation genuinely for his personal occupation or his real intention was to let it out to a tenant of his choice at a higher rent after getting it released. The question as to whether the accommodation already in the occupation of the landlord was sufficient or not was wholly irrelevant. Therefore, the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejecting the petitioners' release application is patently erroneous. For the same reason, the order of the State Government passed under section 7-F also suffers from the same infirmity. Both these orders are quashed. 6. As regards the allotment in favour of the second respondent, that also will have to be quashed, because so long as the petitioners' application for release is not decided in accordance with the law, the accommodation could not be allotted to a tenant. Accordingly that order is also set aside. 7. As the notice issued to the petitioner under section 7-A (1) proceeds on the basis of the allotment order in favour of the second respondent which has been quashed, that notice also falls and is quashed. 8. The petition is accordingly allowed with costs.