Judgment :- 1. Both these civil revision petitions arise out of proceedings before the Taluk Land Board under S.85 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called the Act) for surrender of excess lands held by the respective petitioners. The Board had determined the excess land which the petitioners have to surrender, under S.85 (5) (c) of the Act. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners have moved this court under S.103 of the Act. As a common question of law relating to the interpretation of S.82 (4) of the Act arises in the two cases, they were heard together. Though we are disposing of the cases by this common judgment, herein we shall deal with them separately. 2. The petitioner in C. R. P. 1027/74 as the head of the family consisting of himself, his wife and two minor children, filed the statement under S.85 (2) of the Act before the Land Board intimating the particulars in respect of all the lands held by the family. After the necessary enquiries contemplated by the statute, the Taluk Land Board came to the conclusion that the petitioner has to surrender 12.19 acres in Sy. No. 43/5 and 1.01 acres in Sy. No. 46/3 of Anamangad Village of Perintalmanna taluk as excess land above the ceiling area in the family. Consequently a notice was caused to be issued to the petitioner and his wife calling upon them to file objections, if any, against the extent and identity of lands found liable to be surrendered by the petitioner. In response to this notice the petitioner raised the following objections before the Taluk Land Board: (1) The lands referred to in the notice are lands exempted from the provisions of Chapter III of the Act as per S.81, as they are "private forests" as defined in the Act; (2) In 1963, the lands were converted into a rubber plantation and were covered by the exemption from the ceiling provisions in favour of "plantations", provided by S.81 (e) of the Act; (3) One of the petitioner's sons, Damodaran had acquired ownership over 6.17 acres of land by virtue of a partition in the family and over another extent of 1.31 acres of land under a gift in his favour executed by the petitioner: and therefore an extent of 7.48 acres has, in any event, to be excluded from the land to be surrendered. These objections were overruled by the Taluk Land Board for the reasons indicated hereunder: (1) There is no record with the petitioner to show that the land is a 'private forest'. The petitioner himself admitted that the area did not come within the purview of the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act. Therefore, the land does not come within the meaning 'private forest' as defined in the Act. (2) The evidence adduced by the petitioner would indicate that the land was converted into a rubber plantation only in 1968, and not in 1963 as contended by the petitioner. (3) Damodaran, petitioner's son was a minor on 111970 and hence a member of the 'family' on the date. The land held by him is land held by the 'family' and cannot be excluded In fixing the ceiling limit of the family. Before us, Mr. K. P. Radhakrishna Menon, learned counsel for the petitioner took up the following points in challenging the decision of the Taluk Land Board: (1) Even according to the Land Board, the land in question is a rubber plantation since 1968. Therefore, as before 1-1-70, the land having been converted into a rubber plantation, the same is liable to be exempted under S.81 of the Act. (2) The Taluk Land Board should have excluded the land, the ownership of which stands vested in Damodaran (who is now a major) the son of the petitioner, by virtue of the partition in his family and the gift deed in his favour. (3) The Board has not properly kept in view that the definition of 'private forest' in the Act differs from the definition as given in the M.P.P.F. Act in considering the question whether the land was 'private forest'. We will consider these points one by one: Claim for exemption from ceiling area on the ground that the land in question admittedly became a rubber plantation in 1968: 3. Under S.81(e) of the Act, the provisions in Chapter III of the Act which deal with "restriction on ownership and possession of land in excess of ceiling area and disposal of excess lands" shall not apply to "plantations". As 'defined in S.2 (44) of the Act, plantation will certainly include a rubber plantation. Under S.81(e) of the Act, the provisions in Chapter III of the Act which deal with "restriction on ownership and possession of land in excess of ceiling area and disposal of excess lands" shall not apply to "plantations". As 'defined in S.2 (44) of the Act, plantation will certainly include a rubber plantation. But under S.82 (4) as originally enacted, where, after the commencement of the Act, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified therein, the extent of land that may be owned or held by a family or adult unmarried person owning or holding such land at the time of the conversion, shall be determined without taking into account such conversion. Schedule II of the Act then took in dry land, garden, other dry land, Palliyal land, rubber plantation etc. When Act 35 of 1969 which came into force from 1-1-70 amended the Act, S.82 (4) read as follows: "Where after the commencement of this Act, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified therein, the extent of land that may be owned or held by a person owning or holding such land at the time of the conversion shall be determined, without taking into account such conversion". The amended Schedule II did not take in any plantation. The Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 Act 25 of 1971 introduced further amendments into the Act. S.12 of the Amending acj amends S.82 of the Act and reads as follows: "12. Amendment of S.82. In S.82 of the principal Act, for sub-sections (3) and (4), the following sub-sections shall be substituted namely "(3) In calculating the extent of land owned or held by a family or an adult unmarried person the shares of the members of the family or the adult unmarried person, as the case may be, in the lands owned or held (a) by one or more of such members jointly without any person or persons other than a member or members of such family or by such adult unmarried person jointly with any other person or persons; or (b) by a co-operative society or a joint family, shall be taken into account. Explanation: For the purpose of this section, the share of a member of a family or an adult unmarried person in the lands owned or held jointly or by a co-operative society or a joint family shall be deemed to be the extent of land which would be allotted to such member or person had such lands been divided or partitioned as. the case may be, on the date notified under S.83. (4) where after the commencement of this Act, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that schedule or into a plantation, the extent of land liable to be surrendered by a person owning or holding such land shall be determined without taking into consideration such conversion." What is contended for by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that taking the provision in S.82 (4) along with S.81 (e) any conversion of the land into a plantation before 1 1 70 will not make the petitioner liable to surrender any portion of the same as excess land. S.83 of the Act came into force only on 1 170. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, S.82 (4) itself should have effect only from 1170, which is the date from which S.12 (c) of the Amending Act 25 of 1971 gave force and effect to the amended sections. He contended strongly that if the date of commencement of the Act as made mention of in S.82 (4) is taken to mean 14-64, viz., the date on which the original S.82 came into force, it will be giving to the amended S.82 (4) a retrospective operation not intended by the legislature. In this context he canvassed the correctness of the decision of Vadakkel, J., in Ramavarma Raja v. Land Board of Kerala (1973 KLT 918) where it was held (at page 920): "It will be noticed that under S.82 (4) as it stood prior to and after its amendment by Act 35 of 1969, "where any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified therein" such conversion would not be taken into account or consideration in determining the extent (at the time of conversion) of the land of a person who owned or held such land. So long as all kinds of plantations were specified in schedule II, S.82 (4) would be attracted to conversion of lands into plantations. But by Act 35 of 1969 which came into force on 11 70 the original Schedule II was substituted by the present schedule II in which plantations are not specified. It was to remedy this that the present sub-section (4) of S.82 was substituted by Act 25 of 1971 with effect from 1170. The result is that both prior to 1170 as well as after that date "conversion of any class of land specified in schedule II" into a plantation, cannot be taken into account or consideration in determining the extent of the land liable to be surrendered. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that S.82 (4) is not attracted to case where the conversion of land into a plantation was before 111970 is therefore without any force." 4. We have no hesitation in rejecting this contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. We hold that the scope and ambit of the provision in S.82 (4) of the Act has been, if we may. say so with respect, correctly explained by Justice Vadakkel in 1973 KLT 918. S.82 of the Act, no doubt in the unamended form came into force only 1 41964 by notification No. 4408/N/64 Rev. published in Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No. 29 dated 25-3-64. S.1 (3) of the Act states: "The provisions of this Act, except this section which shall come into force at once, shall come into force on such date as the Government may by notification in the gazette appoint: Provided that different dates may be mentioned for different provisions of the Act, and any reference in any such provision to the commencement of the Act shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision." Therefore the "commencement of this Act" referred to in S.82 (4) can only be 14 64. Subsequent amendments to the Act, or its provisions, or the fact that different provisions have been brought into force on different dates, cannot, it seems to us, make any difference to the commencement of the Act on 14 64. By holding so we are not giving any retrospective operation to the amendment made to the section by Act 25 of 1971 to a date prior to 1-1-1970. By holding so we are not giving any retrospective operation to the amendment made to the section by Act 25 of 1971 to a date prior to 1-1-1970. As stated by the Supreme Court in Sham Rao v. Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay (1952 S.C.R. 683 at p. 687): "The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and constructed (except where that lead to a repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity) as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all." When the amending Act has to be applied subsequent to the date of amendment, the various unamended provisions of the Act have to be read alongwith the amended provisions as though they are part of it. As Justice Jagannadhadas pointed out in a subsequent Supreme Court decision in Sri. Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd. (1956 S. C. R.603 at p. 614) this is not the same thing as saying that the amendment itself must be taken to have been in existence as from the date of the earlier Act. S.83 by which no person was to hold land in excess of the ceiling area and S.85 which prescribes the modes of surrender of excess land came into force only from 1 14970. S.82 (4) though it came into force on 14 64 became operative only from 111970 when the ceiling provisions came into force. In fixing the ceiling area, the legislature says that conversion of land from one category to another from the date of 141964 will not be taken into account. There is no question of giving any retrospective operation to the amended portion prior to 1-1-1970 in this matter. 5. The rule of construction is to intend the legislature to have meant what it has actually expressed. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of the legislature and that will have to be deduced from the language used. When the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation is easy enough. 5. The rule of construction is to intend the legislature to have meant what it has actually expressed. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of the legislature and that will have to be deduced from the language used. When the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation is easy enough. As Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest said in Shop and Store Development Ltd. v. I.R.C. ( (1967) 1 A.C. 472 at 493: "The decision in this case calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory' language to particular facts as found. The desirability or undesirability of one conclusion as compared with another cannot furnish a guide in reaching a decision." 6. We do not find any conflict as such between S.81 of the Act which exempts a plantation from the application of the provisions relating to restrictions on ownership and possession of lands in excess of ceiling area and S.82 (4) which says that after the commencement of the Act, if any class of land specified in Schedule II is converted into another class of land specified in that schedule or into plantation, the extent of land liable to be surrendered will be determined without taking into effect such conversion. Even on the basis of the rule of harmonious construction the provision in S.82 (4) has to be given effect to. 7. We might also state that no question of hardship or injustice to the petitioner arises in this case as would be evident from the history of legislation. The Act as originally stood aimed at preventing conversion of any class of land specified in Schedule II to any other class of land specified in the same schedule. And plantation including Rubber Plantation was such specified class of land. No doubt, during a short period between the dates of the two amending Acts-Act 35 of .1969 and Act 25 of 1971 conversion of a specified class of land into a plantation would not have entailed the consequences provided in sub-section 4 of S.82, because of non-inclusion of plantation in the amended Schedule II. However the original state of affairs was restored by inclusion of the words "into a plantation" also in sub-section 4 of S.82. However the original state of affairs was restored by inclusion of the words "into a plantation" also in sub-section 4 of S.82. As Vadakkel, J., pointed out in 1973 KLT 918 both prior to 111970 as well as after that date "conversion of any class of land specified in Schedule II" into a plantation cannot be taken into account or consideration in determining the extent of the land liable to be surrendered. At the time when the petitioner converted the land into a plantation the petitioner should be held to have been aware of the then existing statutory provision which would render such conversion liable to be ignored in determining the ceiling area. 8. We are, therefore, of the view that the Taluk Land Board was perfectly justified in refusing to take into account the conversion of the land into a Rubber Plantation which conversion, according to evidence in the case was after the Act came into force on 141964. Non-exclusion of land which vested in Damodaran, son of the petitioner by partition and gift after 11-1970: Here also we are in agreement with the Taluk Land Board in not excluding the land which because vested in Damodaran after 1-1-1970 by a partition and gift, in fixing the ceiling limit of the family. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of our learned brother Mr. Justice Viswanatha Iyer J. in C.R.P. 734 of 1974 rendered on 10th October, 1974 (1974 KLT (S.N.) 54. The facts of that case are given in para 1 of the judgment and are as follows: "The petitioner filed a statement under S.85 (A) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act and in that he had shown that the statement relates to the family consisting of himself, his wife and children. Two of his children were minors on 111970. The ceiling area allowed under S.82 (I) of the Act for a family consisting of two or more but not more than five members is 10 standard acres which should not be less than 12 and more than 15 ordinary acres in extent. The petitioner will thus be entitled to have not less than 12 acres on the notified date, namely 1 170. The petitioner will thus be entitled to have not less than 12 acres on the notified date, namely 1 170. He is found to have a total area of 28.38 acres He alone is the owner of all of them though for the ceiling provision of the Act he can reckon them to file a return for a family. Out of that 3.87 acres were exempted under S.81. Excluding this 3.87 acres and another 12 acres for the ceiling area the excess land with him will be 12.51 acres. A draft statement showing this provisional determination was served on him and his wife. They were asked to file objections, if any, and to appear for a hearing before the Taluk Land Board on 5 41974. Two of his children a daughter and a son who were minors on 111970 attained majority in 1971 and 1973 respectively. On 28-3-1974 the petitioner executed three gift deeds transferring a total extent of 12,83 acres to his three children. To the eldest of them, a daughter, who was a major on 1-1-1970, he transferred 3.84 acres. To the second daughter who became a major in 1971 he transferred 3.85 acres and to his son who became a major in 1973 he transferred 5.14 acres. On doing this he filed an objection on 5-41974 stating that he and his wife who are the remaining members of the statutory family do not hold more than the ceiling area available to the family and therefore he is not liable to surrender any excess land. The Taluk Land Board recognised the gift to the eldest daughter who was a major on 111970 and ignoring the other two gifts required the petitioner to surrender 8.78 acres referred to earlier". There His Lordship held: "What has been done in this case is that lands in excess of the ceiling area are transferred by the petitioner to his son and a daughter after they attained majority and after they ceased to be members of the family. The validity of these transfers will have to be decided only on the basis of S.84 of the Act; and I have held that these gifts are not hit by that section. In this view, before the order which occasioned the vesting was passed, the petitioner ceased to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area. The validity of these transfers will have to be decided only on the basis of S.84 of the Act; and I have held that these gifts are not hit by that section. In this view, before the order which occasioned the vesting was passed, the petitioner ceased to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area. The excess land had been validly transferred to the two donees and hence the order of the Taluk Land Board requiring him to surrender 8.78 acres of land is incorrect. Therefore, the order of the Taluk Land Board cannot be sustained". 9. We find it rather difficult to agree with this view. Under S.83 of the Act, with effect from such date as may be notified by the government in the gazette, no person shall be entitled to own or hold or to possess under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area. The date so notified is 111970. Where a person owns or holds land in excess of the ceiling area on the date notified under S.83, such excess lands shall be surrendered as prescribed in S.85. Therefore any transfer a person effects of such excess land to whomsoever and in whatever manner, could only be subject to the liability of the transferor to surrender his excess land. The consequences arising from the transferor's liability to surrender his excess lands, the extent and identity of which are to be determined under S.85 (5) (c), on the basis of state of affairs existing as on 1 11970, cannot be avoided by any mode of transfer though such transfer may be valid under S.84 or by the fact that at the time of transfer, the transferor continued to be the owner of the property (as the excess land had not vested in the government under S.86 because no determination under S.85 (5) had taken place then). S.83 and 85 make it clear that the ceiling area will have to be determined on the basis of ownership and possession as on 1-1-1970. S.83 and 85 make it clear that the ceiling area will have to be determined on the basis of ownership and possession as on 1-1-1970. Such transfer may not be invalid for all purposes; but they will certainly have to be ignored in the matter of fixing the ceiling limit." S.84 appears to us to be intended for the purpose of dealing with transfers that have been effected after the date of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963 in the gazette up to the date notified as per S.83 from which date no person shall be entitled to own or hold or to possess under a mortgage, in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area. S.87 of the Act which states that where any person acquires any land after the date notified under S.83 by gift, purchase, mortgage with possession, lease, surrender or any other kind of transfer inter vivos or by bequest or inheritance or otherwise and in consequences thereof the total extent of land owned or held by such person exceeds the ceiling area, such excess shall be surrendered does not run counter to the view we are taking but is in conformity with the same. 10. Therefore, with due respect we have to state that the decision in C. R. P. 734/74 does not lay down the correct law on the matter. The Land Board's decision on the question has to be upheld. Whether the land is 'private forest' as defined in the Act: 11. On this question we are afraid the Taluk Land Board's decision is, to a great extent, coloured by the fact that the petitioner admitted that the area did not come within the purview of the M. P. P. F. Act. Private forest is defined in the Act as follows-S. 2 (47): "(47) "Private forest" means a forest which is not owned by the government, but does not include - (i) areas which are waste and are not enclaves with in wooded areas; (ii) areas which are gardens or nilams; (iii) areas which are planted with tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon; and (iv) other areas which are cultivated with pepper, arecanut coconut cashew or other fruit-bearing trees or are cultivated with any other agricultural crop". The Land Board will have to decide the question in the light of this definition. The Land Board will have to decide the question in the light of this definition. The Land Board in its order took into account the definition of private forest' as given m the M.P.P.F Act, forgetting or ignoring the definition of the same in the Act, provided in terms materially different. For that purpose we would remit the case to the Taluk Land Board for decision in accordance with law. If any portion of the land will come within the ambit of the definition of 'private forest' in the Act that will have to be excluded in fixing the ceiling area. C.R.P. 1027 of 1974 is allowed as indicated above and the matter is remitted back to the Land Board for the purpose of fixing the ceiling area after considering whether any portion of the petitioners' land is liable to be excluded in reckoning the 'ceiling area', as being "Private forests" as defined under the Act. No costs. C.R.P. 677 of 974 In this case the main question raised is that even if it is assumed that rubber plantation was raised after 1-4-64, it will not make the petitioners liable to surrender any portion of the plantation as excess land, as there was no fresh plantation or conversion after 1 1 7970. In the light of the view have taken in C.R.P. 1027/74 we have only to reject this contention. As regards the question whether the land was a rubber plantation before 14-64 we find no reason to differ from the view taken by the Taluk Land Board The learned counsel for the petitioners pleaded strongly for a remand of the case back to the Taluk Land Board as according to him the petitioners were not given sufficient opportunity to adduce oral evidence in the matter. From the proceedings of the Board it is clear that it is not a case of lack of opportunity for the petitioners to produce relevant evidence, but of failure to produce such evident in spite of sufficient opportunity. Therefore, we dismiss the C.R.P., but without costs in the circumstances. From the proceedings of the Board it is clear that it is not a case of lack of opportunity for the petitioners to produce relevant evidence, but of failure to produce such evident in spite of sufficient opportunity. Therefore, we dismiss the C.R.P., but without costs in the circumstances. Gopalan Nambiyar, J.: I add a few words of my own to the judgement Menon Just delieverd on behalf of the Bench, by my learned brother Chandrasekhara Menon J. Chapter III of the Land Reforms Act deals with restrictions on ownership and possession of land m excess of ceiling area and disposal of the said lands. As originally passed, the provisions of the Chapter were not to apply to plantations (cl.(e)); nor to 'kayal padasekharams' of Kuttanad area specified in Schedule IV, so long, as they are used for cultivation of paddy or such other crops as the Government may by notification in the Gazette specify (Clause (1)). The process by which'kayal lands' were brought within the Scheme and the provisions of agrarian reform will be found traced and dealt with in the judgment of this Court in M. T. Joseph alias Thomman Joseph v. State of Kerala (1973 KLT 701). That case decided that a transaction of gift effected the commencement of the Land Reforms Act in 1964, and before its amendment by Act 35 of 1969 on 1-1-1970 would not be retrospectively invalidated by reason of the amendment effected to S.84. That is an aspect which does not arise for consideration here. Plantations be it noted, are lands to which the provisions of the Land Reforms Act were applicable as such, from the very inception of the Act. S.82, Clause (4) of the pristine Act provided that where after the commencement of the Act, the lands specified in Schedule II, had been converted to any other class specified therein, the extent of land owned or held at the time of the conversion shall be determined without taking into account, such conversion. Turning to Schedule II, Part I of the pristine Act, it listed plantations of rubber, tea, coffee, cardamom, cinnamon and cocoa. It is thus clear that plantations were within the purview of the Act. Act 35 of 1969 substituted a new provision for S.82. It also omitted plantation from the classes of lands mentioned in Schedule II. But S.82 nevertheless retained the same tenor and purport as before. It is thus clear that plantations were within the purview of the Act. Act 35 of 1969 substituted a new provision for S.82. It also omitted plantation from the classes of lands mentioned in Schedule II. But S.82 nevertheless retained the same tenor and purport as before. The legislature apparently noticed, that by oversight, plantations had been omitted from the scope of S.82 (4), and this omission was further highlighted by the omission of the plantations from Schedule II. Hence by as amendment effected by Act 25 of 1971, the necessary words were added in S.82 (4), by inserting "or into a plantation" after the words "other classes' of lands specified in the schedule". The amendment only put back the position to what it was prior to Act 35 of 1969. Strictly, there is no question of any retrospective effect being given to the amendment. All that it says is that in reckoning ceiling area on and from 111970 the conversion of land into plantation effected after the commencement of the Act in 1964, has to be ignored. There seems nothing wrong or objectionable in principle in this provision. The legislature had intimated the, scheme of the provisions for reckoning ceiling area. S.83 could come into force only on a date to be notified. In the interregnum, if conversions of lands into plantations were effected, there was nothing wrong in the legislature seeking to ignore the same for computing ceiling. The decision of our learned brother Viswanatha Iyer J. seems to miss the real import and purpose of S.83 of the Act and also the legislative history and the objects of these amendments.