JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, C.J. - This is an appeal by Mohd. Yasin, respondent, to challenge the order of the learned Single Judge of this Court allowing the writ petition of Amar Nath and thereby dismissing the suit which had been instituted by Mohd. Yasin before the revenue courts. The learned Single Judge not only quashed the orders of the Board of Revenue and of the Additional Commissioner, but restored with costs throughout the decree of the trial court. 2. It is rather unfortunate that the parties came to the courts of law with incorrect allegations of fact. For the disposal of the special appeal such wrong statements can be overlooked. The material facts of the case are that on 30-5-1966 Mohd. Yasin, a tenant of the holding situate in Roorkee town, executed a lease in favour of Nattha Singh for a period of five years. Amar Nath is the sister's son of Nattha Singh. Nattha Singh left Roorkee and died in Ludhiana sometime in 1959. Prior to his leaving Roorkee he executed a sub-lease in favour of Amar Nath sometimes in 1968. On 27-11-1958 Amar Nath purchased the land from the then zamindar. Zamindari in Roorkee town was abolished from 1-7-1961. It was, on 27-2-1966, that Mohd. Yasin instituted the present suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for the ejectment of Amar Nath. In the plaint it was mentioned that Mohd. Yasin had come to know of the death of Nattha Singh 4 or 5 years back. Considering that Mohd. Yasin took up wrong pleas and has not come with clean slate we can assume that death of Nattha Singh had come to the knowledge of Mohd. Yasin in or about February, 1961, a few months before the abolition of the zamindari, which is termed as the date of vesting. 3. Amar Nath was not one of the statutory heirs of Nattha Singh, and, therefore, from the date of knowledged at least the possession of Amar Nath became as a trespasser and not on behalf of the sub-tenant, Nattha Singh. In other words, the limitation for a suit for ejectment commenced from before the date of vesting and the limitation had not expired by that date. 4. In other words, the limitation for a suit for ejectment commenced from before the date of vesting and the limitation had not expired by that date. 4. The limitation for a suit under Section 209 is contained in serial No. 30 of Appendix 3 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. Clause (1) thereof prescribes a period of three years commencing from the date of vesting, where the person was in possession the land on the date of vesting and the period of limitation for ejectment specified in the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, had not expired. Clause (iii) thereof prescribes a period of six years commencing from the 1st of July following the date of occupation and governs cases where land taken possession of or retained unlawfully forms a part of the holding of a Bhumidhar, Sirdar, or Asami. 5. Where the period of limitation prescribed in the U. P. Tenancy Act has expired before the date of vesting, the trespasser acquires a right and the tenant loses his tenancy rights. For such a case it is not necessary to lay down a fresh period of limitation as one party acquires the right and the other is deprived of his right. There is no question of re-determination of the rights of the parties. It is only where the possession is not for a period to nature the rights that a fresh limitation has to be provided. Where the period of limitation has not expired, the tenant retains his rights and the trespasser continues to be a trespasser. The tenant under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act became a Bhumidhar, Sirdar or Asami. Consequently, if in such cases clause (iii) is applicable, clause (i) shall become redundant. The redundancy is not to be assumed. In fact, an attempt has to be made to harmonise the provisions so that all the parts of the provisions may be fully applicable. On the application of this rule it must be held as has been observed by the learned Single Judge also, that clause (i) applies to a trespasser in possession from before the date of wasting, where the trespasser has not acquired any right in the land; while clause (iii) apples to cases where the trespass is after the date of vesting. The prescribed period of limitation for a suit under Section 209 for the ejectment of Amar Nath was thus three years commencing from the date of vesting (1-7-1961). The suit was instituted long after the expiry of three years' period, The suit being barred by limitation was liable to dismissal. 6. The next point contended was that the learned Single Judge should not have usurped the jurisdiction by himself passing a final decree but should have left it for the Board of Revenue to pass an order in accordance with law keeping in mind the observations made by this Court. From practical point of view it is immaterial whether the High Court passes a final order dismissing the suit or such order is passed by the Board of Revenue itself but because a technical objection has been raised we would modify the order of the learned Single Judge to the above extent. 7. The special appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. It is hereby made clear that the suit instituted by Mohd. Yasin was barred by limitation. The order of the Board of Revenue is quashed so that it may pass a proper decree in accordance with law keeping the observation made above in mind.