JUDGMENT Chandrasekhara Menon, J. Defendant is the appellant. The suit, which has been decreed by the court below, giving rise to this appeal had been filed by the respondent on the following allegations: In pursuance of an agreement Ex. A-2 dated 8th June 1963, the defendant was to supply 5000 pieces of kolmaram at plaintiff depot at Kallai before 31st October 1963. The contract had provided for a commission to the plaintiff at rupee one per piece deducting expenses. By means of a cheque of the same date as Ext. A-2, defendant had been given Rs. 25,000 for carrying out the agreement. On 17th August 1963 the defendant again received a sum of Rs. 5000. However, he failed to supply the kolmaram. When he was called upon to supply the timber or refund the amount received by him, defendant approached the plaintiff and gave a letter admitting his liability aforesaid, namely Rs. 30,000 and agreeing to pay a sum of Rs. 5,000 in March 1965, Rs. 10,000 in May 1965 and the balance of Rs. 15,000 in September 1965. This letter dated 9th February 1965 is marked in this proceedings as Ext.A-3. On 2nd April 1965, the defendant gave another letter, Ext. A-4 in the case reiterating his promise to pay the amounts as agreed to above. As per the agreement the defendant is liable to pay damages for breach of contract at the rate of Re. 1 per piece of timber. This would come to Rs. 5,000. Relinquishing his claim for interest, the respondent herein filed the suit for Rs. 35,000 with future interest. The defendant appellant raised the following contentions resisting the plaintiff claim:” (a) The suit is not maintainable in law as the suit is brought by a firm which is not registered according to the provisions in the Indian Partnership Act; (b) The suit claim is barred by limitation and the documents relied on by the plaintiff for saving the bar of limitation are not in law acknowledgments of the liability in question; (c) The defendant had not in fact entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to supply kolmaram. The plaintiff agreement was with A.K. Kunhammad and M. Alikutty. These persons had agreed to supply the timber. The defendant was only a commission agent and Ex. A-2 was executed by him to secure the advances plaintiff had agreed to give to the two aforementioned persons. The plaintiff agreement was with A.K. Kunhammad and M. Alikutty. These persons had agreed to supply the timber. The defendant was only a commission agent and Ex. A-2 was executed by him to secure the advances plaintiff had agreed to give to the two aforementioned persons. As regards the letters mentioned in the plaintiff, they were all passed only to help the plaintiff in regard to some taxation proceedings against him. In respect of the defendant contention that the suit is not maintainable as the plaintiff firm have not produced therein certificates of registration of the partnership, the plaintiff depended on Ex. A-10 the certificate of registration which showed the name of the firm as Hajee P. V. Muhammed Baramy Sons whereas the details in the plaint showed the name of the plaintiff as Hajee P.V. Muhammed Baramy and Sons. The plaintiff sought an amendment of the plaint by correcting the name of the plaintiff as Hajee P. V. Muhammed Baramy Sons in accordance with the particulars shown in the certificate of registration. Along with the application for amendment which had been filed I.A. 1505 of 1971 an affidavit in support of the same had been filed sworn to by one K. R. Unnithan, an accountant of the plaintiff-firm wherein it had been stated that the correct name of the plaintiff is really Hajee P.V. Muhammed Barami Sons and not P.V. Mohammed Barami and Sons as originally described in the plaint. This mistake as well as certain other mistakes which were also sought to be corrected by the amendment, it was said, were due to clerical error (MALAYALAM). No counter was filed to this application and it was allowed by the order of the court below dated 15th December 1971. However it would appear this amendment was not carried out in the original plaint as required by law before the suit was finally decreed. In fact it was only after the appeal was filed and when the pleadings were sought to be sent for printing the non-carrying out of the amendment in the plaint was noticed. Then the plaint and I. A. 1505 of 1971 were forwarded to the court below. The Sub Judge was requested to see that the amendments were carried out in the plaint and the papers returned to the High court forthwith. Then the plaint and I. A. 1505 of 1971 were forwarded to the court below. The Sub Judge was requested to see that the amendments were carried out in the plaint and the papers returned to the High court forthwith. The Sub Judge was also asked to obtain and submit the explanations of the persons responsible for the same. It is in these circumstances that the amendment concerned was carried out in the plaint. The trial court decreed the suit for Rs. 30,000 but denied the plaintiff his claim for damages as it was held that part of the claim was barred by limitation. The defendant has come up in appeal against the decree of the court below while the plaintiff has filed Cross Objections to the same as regards the refusal by the court below to grant him damages. We have been taken through the oral and documentary evidence in the case and we might state that we do not find anything amiss in the appreciation of such evidence and conclusions drawn by the court below on the basis of the same as regards the several issues raised in the suit. However, we have to deal with one aspect in the case which was strongly pressed before us by Mr. K. P. Radhakrishna Menon, learned counsel for the appellant and which according to him at least requires an order remitting the case back to the trial court for fresh hearing and disposal. The application for amendment was allowed but the amendment was not carried out. Under Order 6, rule 18 C if a party who has obtained an order for leave to amend does not amend accordingly within the time limited for that purpose by the order, or if no time is thereby limited then within fourteen days from the date of the order; he shall not be permitted to amend after the expiration of such limited time as aforesaid or of such fourteen days, as the case may be, unless the time is extended by the court. The consequence of failure to amend within the time prescribed by the court or in its absence within 14 days would be that a party cannot amend his pleading afterwards unless the time is extended by the court. Here there is no extension of time granted by the court. It is also true as Mr. The consequence of failure to amend within the time prescribed by the court or in its absence within 14 days would be that a party cannot amend his pleading afterwards unless the time is extended by the court. Here there is no extension of time granted by the court. It is also true as Mr. Radhakrishna Menon said that the defendant could not have filed an additional written statement since no amended plaint was filed. In the circumstances Mr. Radhakrishna Menon contended that the suit has to be taken to be by an unregistered firm and the same is liable to be dismissed. The learned counsel made special reference to the entries in Ext. A-10 which will go to show that the name of the registered, firm is different from the name of the plaintiff-firm. It was urged that in seeking the amendment of the plaint which prayer had been allowed, the plaintiff has, in fact, admitted that the firm shown in Ext. A-10 is different from the plaintiff-firm as indicated by Ext. A-2. Ext. A-2 is proof positive of the fact that the defendant had entered into a contract with only the firm described in the original plaint and not with Hajee P. V. Muhammed Barami Sons, firm registered as per Ext. A-10. Mr. Menon contended that if the amended plaint had been filed in time his party could have filed an additional written statement that he had no contractor agreement with Haji P. V. Mohammed Barami Sons. This contention of the learned counsel would have been of considerable force and would have induced us to remit the matter to the trial court for allowing the defendant, to file an additional written statement to reply to the amended plaint but for one fact. That fact is that it is clear beyond doubt from the records produced in the case, and admitted in evidence as well as from his oral evidence, that the defendant has accepted P. V. Muhammed Barami and Sons and Hajee P. V. Muhammed Barami Sons as one and the same entity. If that be so even if there is a clerical error in the description of the firm in the plaint that will be of no consequence. As the Supreme Court said in another context (in A. I. 1969 S. C. 1267), Rules of procedure are intended to be a hand-maid to the administration of justice. If that be so even if there is a clerical error in the description of the firm in the plaint that will be of no consequence. As the Supreme Court said in another context (in A. I. 1969 S. C. 1267), Rules of procedure are intended to be a hand-maid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of proceduce. This is the principle behind the whole-some provision in section 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the court may at any time amend any defect or error in any proceeding in any suit. The merest technicality may not be allowed to stand in the way of substantial justice. This principle is also behind the decisions in Kutanraju v. Paripurnandan A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 282 Krishna Poduval v. Lakshmi Naithiari A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 751 wherein an application to amend the description of an item of property in the plaint schedule and the decree schedule in a suit by substituting for a wrong survey number the correct survey number had been allowed. It might be noted that the correction was made after the decree and in the second case the mistake which was corrected had its origin in the document of assignment in the plaintiffs favour from where the description of the property was incorporated in the plaint. In the first of these Madras cases Chief Justice Rajamannar had observed that the correction of an error need not always amount to an amendment of a pleading and an application of that nature could not be taken to be an application under O.6, R. 17. Which could refer evidently to material and substantial amendment of the pleading. No doubt in the case of an amendment which would come squarely within an amendment of pleading plaint under O.6, R. 17, if the amendment was not carried out in time, the plaintiff should not ordinarily be allowed to rely upon the amended plaint to urge his rights. The latest decision on the point appears to be B. C. Gowda v. State of Mysore. A.I.R. 1974 Karnataka 136. An exception to this rule can be seen in the case Gajkumar Chand v. Lachman Ram (1911) 14 Cal. L.J. 627=10 I.C. 503. The plaintiff in that case prayed for addition of the second defendant, subsequent alienee from the second defendant. A.I.R. 1974 Karnataka 136. An exception to this rule can be seen in the case Gajkumar Chand v. Lachman Ram (1911) 14 Cal. L.J. 627=10 I.C. 503. The plaintiff in that case prayed for addition of the second defendant, subsequent alienee from the second defendant. That application was granted and he was added as a defendant. The plaint however was not amended and did not disclose any cause of action against the second defendant. But no objection was taken by the added defendant in his written statement to the effect that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action against him. The trial proceeded on the assumption that the plaint had been amended and it was held that the defendant cannot take the plea in the appellate court that the suit ought not to have been allowed to proceed against him. Now we would refer to the relevant materials in evidence which would indicate positively that according to the defendant himself the plaintiff-firm (as described in the amended plaint) and the firm registered as per Ext. A-10 is one and the same entity. In Ext. A-2 the firm is described as Haji P. V. Mohammed Barami and Sons as described in the plaint itself. It is with this firm, therefore, the original contract as entered into. But in Ext. A-3 which is defendant letter to the firm where he acknowledged his liability to it for the amount of Rs. 25,000 received in pursuance of the contract Ext. A-2 and for the further sum of Rs. 5,000 received on 27th July, the communication is addressed to Haji P. V. Mohammed Barami and Sons the name in which the firm is registered as per Ext. A-10. In fact he writes this in the letter-pad of the firm itself where the name of the firm is shown as Hajee P. V. Mohammed Barami and Sons, Timber Merchants. .Ext. A-4 written by him dated 2nd April 1965 is however addressed to Mohammed Barami and Sons. That the defendant has sent both Exts. A-3 and A-4 to the plaintiff-firm itself is clear from his written statement and oral evidence. Para 2 of the plaint makes mention of Exts. A-3 and A-4 communications. .Ext. A-4 written by him dated 2nd April 1965 is however addressed to Mohammed Barami and Sons. That the defendant has sent both Exts. A-3 and A-4 to the plaintiff-firm itself is clear from his written statement and oral evidence. Para 2 of the plaint makes mention of Exts. A-3 and A-4 communications. In reply to that in the written statement what the defendant states in his written statement is this (in para six of the same): malayalam Letter of 9th February 1965 mentioned herein is Ext. A-3 which as stated earlier is addressed to Hajee P. V. Mohammed Barami Sons, the name of the firm in the registration certificate. When he is examined in chief he states: "Ext. A-3 and Ext. A-4- malayalam." Cross-examined he says: "30,000 malayalam A- 3 malayalam A-3 malayalam" Therefore, it is absolutely clear that the defendant makes no distinction between the plaintiff firm as described in the plaint and Hajee P. V. Mohammed Barami Sons, the firm registered as per Ext. A-10. That is why he did not oppose the application for amendment which was moved to correct the clerical error made in describing the plaintiff name in the plaint. It may also be noted that plaint is signed by the partner of Hajee P. V. Mohammed Baramy Sons with the seal of that firm (which is the registered firm under Ext. A-10.) No one was under any misapprehension as to who the real plaintiff was and the defendant had not been prejudiced in any manner by the error in the description of the plaintiffs firm in the cause title� portion of the plaint. In regard to the merits of the respective contentions raised by the parties stated earlier we see no reason to differ from the findings entered by the trial court. Exts.A-2, A-3, and A-4, besides the properly proved entries in Exts.A-6 and A-7 the regularly kept account books of the plaintiff-firm supported by the oral evidence adduced on the plaintiff side establish the plaintiff case. There is no bar of limitation also in respect of the claim for Rs. 30,000 as Exts.A-3 and A-4 letters admittedly passed by the defendant acknowledges his liability for the same. In regard to the plaintiff claim for damages which has been denied by the trial court, there also we are inclined to agree with the trial court that the said claim is barred by limitation. 30,000 as Exts.A-3 and A-4 letters admittedly passed by the defendant acknowledges his liability for the same. In regard to the plaintiff claim for damages which has been denied by the trial court, there also we are inclined to agree with the trial court that the said claim is barred by limitation. There is no acknowledgement of that liability either in Ext. A-3 or in Ext. A-4. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal as well as the cross objections, both with costs, and confirm the judgment and decree of the trial court. Before parting with the case we would like to point out that the manner in which the amendment was carried out after the appeal was filed and which appears to have been done without notice to the parties was neither proper nor correct. This is especially so in the light of the contentions raised in the appeal memo where stress was laid on the non-carrying out of the amendment in the plaint.