ORDER This judgment will dispose of the revision application of Jagdish Rao (Criminal Revision Application No. 42/73) and that of Alfred does Santos Braganza (Criminal Revision Application No. 49/73) as both these matters arise out of one and the same incident. The petitioner/accused Jagdish Rao is a journalist by profession. He was the editor, owner, publisher and printer of a fortnightly paper called "The Blade". He was prosecuted by Alfred dos Santos Braganza Respondent No. 1 complainant for the publication of a certain defamatory news items. It was alleged that in the issue of "The Blade" dated 10-7-1968 the accused published a news item in bold headlines captioned "Come Braganza, What's On ?", wherein the accused referred to the complainant as the most hated man of Diwar and alleged that the complainant had recently co-opted four or five members to the Association of St. Francis Xavier, commonly called as "Asilo" in a dictatorial fashion, who are "out and out" the complainant's stooges. It is also alleged that the imputations made in the said news item must have created a suspicion in the minds of the readers that the complainant has misappropriated the funds of "Asilo" under the garb of distributing them to the poor. At this juncture it may be mentioned that the complainant is a member of the said Asilo, a charitable institution in the village Piedade, from where the complainant hails. He was the President of the managing committee of the said "Asilo" at the relevant time. 2. According to the complainant he felt that the news item had damaged his reputation in the society and he therefore wrote a letter (Exhs. P-3(b) and (c)) to the accused giving certain facts by way reply to the said news item and made a request that the said letter be published in the next issue of "The Blade". Instead of publishing the said letter the accused published another news item in the issue of "The Blade" of 5-8-68 entitling it, "Racketeer Alfred Braganza", wherein he again reiterated in an insinuating manner that the complainant was the most hated man of Diwar for the alleged misuse of the funds of Asilo because of the said racket. The accused also called upon the readers to read the next issue of "The Blade". 3. The accused also called upon the readers to read the next issue of "The Blade". 3. Thereupon the complainant lodged a complaint on 3-9-68 before the J.M.F.C., Panaji, charging the accused with the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500 of the I.P.C. 4. In support of the case of the prosecution three witnesses were examined, one of them being the complainant. The accused was charged under Section 500 of the I.P.C. for having published in the newspaper "Blade" certain imputations knowing or having reason or believe that they would harm the complainant's reputation. 5. The accused has taken shelter under Exception IX to Section 499 of the I.P.C. His defence is that the news item published was done in good faith and for public good. There is no doubt that once an imputation is shown to be proved defamatory, it is for the accused to show that he is protected by any of the exceptions. The burden of proving that the publication was made in good faith for public good, therefore falls on him. 6. Shri Joshi, learned advocate appearing for the applicant, has raised some points in his arguments which pertain to the appreciation of the evidence by the lower courts, with which I need not be concerned as I am sitting in revision. I will consider his other arguments. 7. It was contended by Shri Joshi that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has erred in not holding that the imputations against the respondent No. 1 were substantially true and that he failed to take into account the acts of omission and commission of the complainant in the management of the Asilo. It was also contended by Shri Joshi that the Appellate Court has failed to consider the extent to which the burden of the accused for bringing his case within Exception IX, has to discharged. According to Shri Joshi the Appellate Court should have relied on the statement of the accused about the information given to the accused by the residents of Diwar which justified his belief about the conduct of the complainant as a public man. According to Shri Joshi this explanation given by the Accused is sufficient to bring his case within the Exception IX. 8. According to Shri Joshi this explanation given by the Accused is sufficient to bring his case within the Exception IX. 8. The authorship of the news item having been admitted, the points that I will have to consider are whether the prosecution has shown that the news item published are defamatory and substantially untrue and second whether the accused has discharged the burden that his action is covered by Exception IX. 9. As regards the first point the two courts below have held that it has been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt that the matter published in "The Blade", the author of which is undoubtedly the accused, is per se defamatory. They held that it has been established by the prosecution through the evidence of the complainant and his other witnesses that the complainant was the President of the "Asilo" at the relevant time, that he has been held in high esteem by the villagers; that this fact gets support from the fact that he has been a Sarpanch of the village panchayat for a number of years, elected by 70% of votes; that the accounts of the Asilo were audited once a year in the beginning by the Administrative Tribunal and then by the Mamlatdar, panaji. In the face of these findings which are based on evidence it clearly follows that the imputations made by the accused against the complainant were substantially untrue, and the contention of Shri Joshi that those imputations were substantially true is without any force. 10. However as we are concerned Exception IX what next matters to us is whether those imputations were made by the accused in good faith for the public good. It must be mentioned at this stage that the accused has not been able to produce any evidence either documentary or oral to show upon what material he had based the defamatory articles, he has in the course of his statement under Section 342, stated that for a long time residents of Piedade were coming to the office of the newspaper "Blade" and complaining against the complainant. He further stated that "they" had made some inquiries and found that the funds of Asilo were not handled properly and that there were reasons to believe that some bungling was going on, that they also found that most of the people were talking very badly about the complainant and that fort hat reason he thought that it would not be wrong to call the complainant, "the most hated man of Diwar". He has further stated that he has nothing personal against the complainant but that whatever he wrote was in the public interest. I fail to understand what public interest or public good could be served by calling the complainant, "the most hated man of the locality". This I think any reasonable man ought to know would harm the reputation of the person to whom such imputation is made and that it would for that reason be highly defamatory. Although the accused had stated that people from Diwar had complained to him against the complainant he has neither cited their names nor has been examined them as witnesses. It therefore follows, as rightly held by the Appellate Court, that the accused had acted in a reckless way and without due care and attention and without making any attempt to find the veracity of facts before publishing the articles. 11. Both the courts belows have considered in detail the pronouncements made by the Supreme Court and some other High Courts and the principles laid down by those courts as regards the extent of the proof which is required to discharge the burden which shifts upon the accused when he claims benefit of any of the exceptions. They have properly analysed the principles laid down, and applied those principles to the present case. They have referred to the recent ruling on this subject, namely, that of Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1966 SC 97 = (1966 Cri LJ 82), wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down that where the burden of an issue lies upon the accused he is not required to discharge that burden by giving evidence to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt and that the law treats the onus as discharged if he succeeds in proving the preponderance of probabilities. Both the courts have held that the extent of proof required in such case is a mere preponderance of probabilities and that it is not necessary, as in the case of the prosecution, to show beyond doubt to bring the case of the appellant within the exception. I do not find any infirmity in the application of the principles made by the two courts below to the present case. I therefore do not find that the contention of Shri Joshi, that the Appellate Court has failed to take into consideration the extent of the proof necessary to discharge the burden of the accused, has any force. 12. The Appellate Court has held that although the evidence which the accused is required to produce to discharge this burden is not of that standard as is required from the prosecution, yet there must be material on record to show that this burden has been discharged, and the court has further rightly held that there is no material on record whatsoever which can allow the court to conclude that this burden has been satisfactorily discharged by the accused. Shri Joshi was unable to point out to me material on record which could be said to support the defence pleaded by the applicant. In the above referred decision of the Supreme Court their Lordships have further laid down that simple belief or actual belief by itself is not enough and that it must be shown that the belief in the truth of the impugned statement had a rational basis and was not just a blind belief. I agree that in the present case the prosecution has not alleged any personal malice but the Supreme Court has also held that the absence of personal malice may be a relevant fact in dealing with the plea of good faith, but even then the accused will have to show that he acted with due care and attention. After applying the aforesaid principles the Appellate Court found that the accused failed to establish even a preponderance of probability. I am entirely in agreement with these findings. The conviction of the accused is well based. 13. After applying the aforesaid principles the Appellate Court found that the accused failed to establish even a preponderance of probability. I am entirely in agreement with these findings. The conviction of the accused is well based. 13. It was next contended by Shri Joshi that the learned Additional Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to enhance the sentence which was imposed upon the accused by the trial Court and that what he could do is only to make a report to this Court on the revision application filed by the complainant, praying for enhancement of sentence. I fully agree with this contention of Shri Joshi. It has however to be noted that the complainant has also filed a revision application challenging the order passed by the additional Sessions Judge for having enhanced the sentence by himself. He prayed that as the Additional Sessions Judge did not have jurisdiction to enhance the sentence, this Court should impose appropriate punishment upon the accused. 14. The order of the Additional Sessions Judge enhancing the punishment will have therefore to be set aside. However, I hold that the reasons given for passing the order is good and in exercise of my revisional powers, I adopt that reasoning. 15. In considering the quantum of sentence, this being a case of defamation a number of other factors such as the type of defamation, the manner in which defamation was made etc., will have to be taken into consideration. The accused is a journalist. He therefore wields a very powerful weapon in his hand which can mould the public very easily. The more powerful the weapon, the higher is the responsibility cast upon the person holding such weapon. A journalist is therefore required to attach more care and caution in publishing items which are likely to harm the reputation and good name of others. It is common knowledge that papers publishing scandalous articles sometimes get wide publicity and the circulation increases and consequently the income of the journalists also increases. This therefore calls for a deterrent punishment and a mere sentence of fine in such cases will not at all be adequate. For such person to pay the fine is very easy and it would not deter him from publishing again one equally libelous article. 16. This therefore calls for a deterrent punishment and a mere sentence of fine in such cases will not at all be adequate. For such person to pay the fine is very easy and it would not deter him from publishing again one equally libelous article. 16. Assassination of character has been considered by Courts from times immemorial as no less serious than assassination of persons because character of a person is one of the most valuable things that a person possesses. The conduct of the accused person subsequent to the publication of libel, before and during the trial may also have to be taken into consideration. In the present case we find that after the first defamatory item was published the explanation sent by the complainant with a request for publishing the same was not heeded to by the accused. This therefore aggravates the offence. The accused has throughout been justifying his action. The defence of justification of the libel has always been considered to be perilous for the accused because when-ever there is failure of proof it is deemed to be an aggravation of the offence. In the present case we find that and experienced journalist has without any basis or foundation published an article stating, inter alia, that the complainant had swindled money of a public institution. To this allegation the accused adhered till the end and made himself liable to a harsher punishment. In view of these facts, I am of the opinion that a sentence of 3 months of simple imprisonment and Rs. 1,500/- of fine meets the ends of justice. ORDER The revision application of the accused (Criminal Revision Application No. 42/73) is dismissed. The conviction of the accused under Section 500, Indian Penal Code is upheld. The accused is sentenced to 3 months of simple imprisonment and Rs. 1,500/- of fine, in default of payment of fine to undergo further 3 months of simple imprisonment. Out of the fine realized Rs. 500/- shall be paid to the complainant. The revision application of the complainant (Criminal Revision Application No. 49/72) stands allowed. Order accordingly.