S. K. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is by the plaintiff against the judgment of reversal. ( 2 ) THE facts according to the plaint are as follows : Ballygunge, Mohini Mohan Uchcha Vidyalaya is a Government Aided School recognized by the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education. The defendant was originally appointed since 14. 1. 68 as officiating Head Master and thereafter from 15. 5. 68 was appointed as Head Master provisionally for a period of one year. By a letter dated 25. 11. 68 addressed to the plaintiff, Secretary of the School, the defendant tendered his resignation from the post of Head Master. The said letter was placed at the meeting of the Managing Committee on 8. 12. 68 and on that day the defendant also made a prayer for two months' leave from 1st January, 1969 to 28. 2. 69 on medical ground. The resignation was accepted at the said meeting of the Managing Committee but the Committee allowed the defendant to continue in office till 31. 12. 68 and he was also granted two months' leave with pay subject to the approval of D. I. The defendant was further directed to make over charge on or before 23. 12. 68 to the newly appointed Head Master. The necessary resolutions were passed by the Committee at the said meeting when the defendant was present and signed the minutes as member of such committee. Gist of the resolutions was indicated to the defendant by a letter dated 9. 12. 68 and he was asked thereby to make over charge to the newly appointed Head Master on 23. 12. 68. the letter was received by the defendant on 10. 12. 68 but the defendant failed and neglected to hand over charge as required in spite of the demand and requests. By letter dated 30. 12. 68 the defendant requested the plaintiff to treat the leave as cancelled and declined to hand over the charge on flimsy ground. The defendant and his associates had been wrongfully and illegally disturbing with the normal duties of the Head Master who had been discharging the duties as officiating Head Master. The plaintiff in his report of 3. 1. 69 drew the attention of the members of the Committee to the illegal acts of the defendant. An emergent meeting of the Managing Committee was held on 5. 1. The plaintiff in his report of 3. 1. 69 drew the attention of the members of the Committee to the illegal acts of the defendant. An emergent meeting of the Managing Committee was held on 5. 1. 69 when its members passed a resolution asking the defendant again to make over charge to the said newly appointed Head Master or the Secretary. The defendant failed to comply with the said request and was interfering and creating disturbances with the function of the present Head Master/secretary. The defendant had no legal right or authority to interfere with the normal functioning of the school and accordingly the plaintiff instituted the present suit on 10. 1. 69 praying for an injunction restraining the defendant, his men and associates from entering into the school premises or disturbing the functioning of the school. There was a prayer for temporary injunction also and the plaintiff further prayed for leave under Order 1 Rule 8 for representing other members of the Managing Committee of the School. ( 3 ) THE defendant contested the suit filing a written statement and it was stated therein that while in office he detected many irregularities and malpractices committed by the Secretary in financial and other matters. The Secretary wanted to put the defendant into inconvenience by various methods and in hostile and difficult situation, the defendant wrote the letter on 25. 11. 68 giving vent to his difficulty and inconvenience in running the school, expressing his contemplation to resign from his post. The latter, actually meant for redress of the grievances, was not a letter of resignation and could not be treated as such and was not treated so by the Managing Committee who granted two months leave to the defendant as prayed for. It was denied that the resignation was accepted in his presence and it was stated that there were additions and alterations in the resolutions. On receipt of the letter of 9. 12. 68 the defendant made verbal protest to the plaintiff who then agreed to regularize the whole thing. The appointment of a new Head Master was also illegal and inoperative violating the provisions of law. The defendant thereafter cancelled his leave and the question of handing over charge did not arise. The defendant contended that he was a permanent teacher of the school and was still continuing as the Head Master in any circumstances. The appointment of a new Head Master was also illegal and inoperative violating the provisions of law. The defendant thereafter cancelled his leave and the question of handing over charge did not arise. The defendant contended that he was a permanent teacher of the school and was still continuing as the Head Master in any circumstances. Further the suit was not maintainable as framed and was barred under Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and should accordingly be dismissed. ( 4 ) IT appears that in course of proceeding a temporary injunction was granted by the trial court restraining the defendant from interfering with the functions of the Head Master appointed by the Managing Committee at its meeting on 8. 12. 68. The injunction was made absolute but on appeal it was reversed. Thereafter, a rule was obtained by the plaintiff, being Civil Rule No. 2667 of 1969. This rule was made absolute on 10. 10. 69 and the injunction granted by the learned Munsif was restored continue till the disposal of the suit. The court directed the defendant to take steps under Order 1 Rule 8 or to have the plaint amended to bring on record all necessary parties within a period specified in the order. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER, on 9. 12. 69 the plaintiff filed an application under Order 1 Rule 8 stating that the suit was filed by the plaintiff as the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the School and various persons namely fathers or guardian of the students, donors and persons otherwise interested by virtue of their office were also interested in the affairs of the school. Lists of guardians, donors and other members of the Managing Committee were annexed and it was prayed that the court be pleased to grant leave to the petitioner to continue the suit as a representative one and direction for advertisement be given inviting all persons having the same interest to join the suit either as plaintiff or as defendant under the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code. This application was opposed by the defendant who filed a written objection. By order dated 19. 12. 69 the learned Munsif for reasons recorded therein allowed the application in the view that the school being an unregistered society, there might be several persons namely the guardians, the donors etc. This application was opposed by the defendant who filed a written objection. By order dated 19. 12. 69 the learned Munsif for reasons recorded therein allowed the application in the view that the school being an unregistered society, there might be several persons namely the guardians, the donors etc. who would be interested to defend the suit or to join as the plaintiff in the suit. Leave was accordingly given to the plaintiff under Order 1 Rule 8 and he was directed to take all steps for advertisement which it appears was done. ( 6 ) I have quoted the above facts in details as contention was made on behalf of the defendant against the maintainability of the suit on the ground that provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 did not apply to the facts of the case. ( 7 ) THE learned Munsif on a trial on evidence held that the letter of 25. 11. 68 was a letter of resignation and the said resignation was duly accepted by the Managing Committee. The legal validity of the appointment of the new Head Master was outside the scope and ambit of the suit and it was unnecessary to enter into such question. The defendant having cancelled his leave the resignation was given effect to from 1. 1. 69 and position could not be challenged by the defendant. As to the objection that the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 were not attracted, it was held that the order allowing the application was not challenged and there was no bar in bringing the suit under the provisions of that section as the suit was also against the defendant and his associates and the direction given by the High Court was complied with. The suit in the circumstances was decreed. ( 8 ) AN appeal was preferred against this decision by the defendant and the appellate court was of opinion as to the objection under Order 1 Rule 8 that the learned Munsif viewed the suit from the point of view of the defendant which was not the plaint case. It was further held that there were twelve members of the Managing Committee who could not be said to numerous in number as contemplated under Order 1 Rule 8. It was further held that there were twelve members of the Managing Committee who could not be said to numerous in number as contemplated under Order 1 Rule 8. It was further held that section 38 of the Specific Relief Act was a bar to the suit as the defendant had no obligation to the Secretary. Further under Order 29 Rule 1 the suit must be brought in the name of the members of the Managing Committee as co-plaintiffs. It was accordingly held that the suit was not maintainable under Order 29 Rule 1. The learned appellate court further found that there was inconsistency in appointing two Head Masters for the same period of January and February, 1969 and further there were interpolations in resolution nos. 9 and 10 and possibly chemical ink was used to obliterate paragraph 10 of Ext. 2a (draft minute book of the Managing Committee) to insert other words regarding appointment of new Head Master. The appellate court was a further opinion that there was irregularity in holding the meeting in that J. P. Chakravarty who is stated to have presided over the meeting, was not proved to be a member at the time for not having attended any meeting since 25. 6. 67. The letter of 9. 12. 68 by the plaintiff to the defendant was not necessary if the defendant was present at the meeting and the defendant's case that the Managing Committee came to the conclusion that the Head Master should go on leave without any decision about his resignation or the appointment of the Head Master, was accepted. It was further found that the defendant acted as a Head Master till 11. 1. 69 which is established by the notice given by him declaring school holidays on 13/14th January, 1969. It was also held that the new Head Master did not come forward for any injunction against the defendant while there was some interpolation also in the minutes of the meeting of 30th March, 1969. The court was of opinion that the appointment of the new Headmaster was also relevant in the context of the circumstances and the suit for injunction was based on such appointment alleged to have been made on 8. 12. 68. For these reasons, the appellate court set aside the order of the learned Munsif and dismissed the suit. The present second appeal is against this decision. 12. 68. For these reasons, the appellate court set aside the order of the learned Munsif and dismissed the suit. The present second appeal is against this decision. ( 9 ) MR. Mukul Prasad Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has assailed the judgment on several grounds. His first contention is that the suit is maintainable under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code. He referred to the decision in (1) Hriday Nath v. Akhil Chandra Roy as Secretary of the Brahmasamaj, 49 Callj 357 wherein it was observed by Jack, J. in a concurring judgment that the Secretary of the Brahmasamaj which was an unregistered society was suing on behalf of a number of persons having the same interest in the suit and he could only do so under Order 1 Rule 8 with the permission of the Court. It was further held that Order 29 would be applicable only when the Corporation is registered under the Companies Act or is legally authorized to sue in the name of officer which was not the case there. Mr. Banerjee also referred to the decision in (2) Bimal Behari v. State of West Bengal, 66 CWN 912 in which it was held that provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 is an exception to the general rule that all persons interested in the suit must be made parties thereto. The provisions of the rule apply only (1) if the parties are numerous (2) they have the same interest and (3) necessary permission is obtained from court and notice given. Further numerous is not synonymous within numerable and the rule does fix any number and the same interest does not mean same beneficial or proprietary right in the subject matter. It was contended on these authorities that leave under Order 1 Rule 8 was duly obtained pursuant to directions of this Court, as persons interested in suit included father, guardians, donors and other members of the Managing Committee, a number too numerous, having same interest in the proper functioning of the School. Mr. Sadhan Ch. It was contended on these authorities that leave under Order 1 Rule 8 was duly obtained pursuant to directions of this Court, as persons interested in suit included father, guardians, donors and other members of the Managing Committee, a number too numerous, having same interest in the proper functioning of the School. Mr. Sadhan Ch. Gupta appearing for the defendant has contended on the other hand that Order 1 Rule 8 has no application inasmuch as only the members of the Managing Committee were the interested parties in this suit and they were twelve in number which certainly did not constitute numerous persons as contemplated in Order 1 Rule 8 while the suit could be instituted only by the members of the Committee. ( 10 ) ON a consideration of the rival contentions it appears that the plaintiff, in his application for leave under Order 1 Rule 8, stated that apart from and donors were also necessary parties and their number was numerous as would appear from the annexure in the petition as noted above. It has not been disputed that the plaintiff was the Secretary and obviously he as such Secretary must be taken to be in charge of the institution in regard to the administrative affairs constituting the vital link between the school and the Managing Committee while he himself in such capacity is also a member of the Managing Committee. If the plaint case that the resignation of the defendant was accepted by the Managing Committee is true, it would be for the plaintiff as such Secretary as for any interested person to ensure its implementation for the benefit of all interested persons. This he could do only by filing the suit in his own name in a representative suit inviting all interested persons to join as plaintiff or defendant, the school being an unincorporated body, under the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8. The leave was granted on that basis and it was obviously an error for the learned Munsif to note in his judgment that such leave was necessary because injunction was sought for against the defendant and his associates as rightly pointed out by the appellate court. The leave was granted on that basis and it was obviously an error for the learned Munsif to note in his judgment that such leave was necessary because injunction was sought for against the defendant and his associates as rightly pointed out by the appellate court. But the position still remains that leave was sought for in a suit by any interested person to implead all persons interested in the school either as members of the Managing Committee or as donors or as guardians of students to seek implementation of the resolution passed by the Managing Committee of the School. The appellate court's observation that there was no compliance with Order 29 Rule 1 is entirely misconceived as the Managing Committee was not a Corporation as contemplated in the said order, and, it must also be remembered that the suit is not by the Managing Committee or any un-incorporated society which would require the suit to be brought in the name of the members of the society. For these reasons, I am of opinion that the suit was maintainable in law and the appellate court committed an error in thinking otherwise. The cause title of the suit, though defective, is not, in my opinion, fatal to warrant its dismissal and it has not been so contended. ( 11 ) THE next question relates to the acceptance of the resignation by the defendant. Mr. Gupta has urged that the findings arrived at by the lower appellate court to the effect that the resignation was not accepted is a finding of fact and cannot be interfered with in this appeal. Normally it would be so but when it appears that the appellate court in coming to its conclusion did not consider the defendant's letter dated 9. 12. 68 to the defendant admittedly received by him as also his written statement, it has to be seen whether of non-consideration of these materials on record vitiated the judgment. There is no dispute that the defendant was present at the meeting of the Managing Committee and there was no categorical denial in the written statement that the resolution was not accepted by the Managing Committee. There is no reply to the plaintiffs letter dated 9. 12. 68 which is a contemporaneous document and the defendant did not ever dispute in writing that such resolution was not passed. There is no reply to the plaintiffs letter dated 9. 12. 68 which is a contemporaneous document and the defendant did not ever dispute in writing that such resolution was not passed. In this evidence also, the defendant had tried to give an explanation that he made verbal protest to the effect that there was no such resolution but there is no whisper about it in the written statement. On the other hand the defendant's case in the written statement is his denial that such resolution was passed in his presence. If the resolution was not passed accepting the resignation the defendant would have vigorously opposed and disputed the passing of the resolution as stated in the plaint during trial. In the absence of such protest, there is no escapes from the conclusion that his resignation was accepted by resolution no. 9 (a) Ext. 2 (a), and even according to the appellate court the interpolation starts from third line, which is after the acceptance of the resignation. The defendant would have no right to continue in active service after acceptance of resignation or to interfere with the functioning of the school with effect from 31. 12. 68. The leave granted to him for two months did not legally alter the position in any way because during the period of leave which was granted he was not to interfere with the functioning of the school and this period of service during that period would be one on leave, his active terminating on 30. 12. 68. ( 12 ) I have carefully examined the relevant documents, Ext. 2a and other exhibits as desired by the parties. The learned appellate court has found that there were possible interpolation and chemical ink was used for erasing some resolutions. It may or may not be so and it is not necessary for me to enter into any investigation in this matter, though it is to be desired that the minute book, though draft, should be maintained in such way as not to create any suspicion particularly when the institution is a school. As to the relevant portion of the resolution which is the acceptance of the resignation, there appears to be no interpolation which is also the finding of the appellate court. As to the relevant portion of the resolution which is the acceptance of the resignation, there appears to be no interpolation which is also the finding of the appellate court. There could thus be no dispute about the resolution which was acceptance of the resignation of the defendant once it is found that the resignation of the defendant was accepted, there was no other factor to deny the relief prayed for in this suit and to enter into the question as to whether another person was validly appointed as Head Master or not. ( 13 ) THE learned appellate court's observation is that J. K. Chakravarty was not, in law, the President of the Managing Committee at the relevant time has also no merit as it can not be said that he ceased to be a President for non-attendance of the meeting and no rule for forfeiture of office has been produced in support to warrant the conclusion. ( 14 ) FOR all these reasons, I am of opinion that the appellate court was wrong in allowing the appeal thereby dismissing the suit and the judgment under appeal must accordingly be set aside. The appeal accordingly is allowed and the judgment and decree under appeal are set aside and those of the learned Munsif are restored and the plaintiff's suit is decreed. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal. Appeal allowed. .