B. C. Misra ( 1 ) RESPONDENT No. 3 was allotted disputed premises in 1950. Later it was sought to be transferred to him. He had shown his father and 3 petitioners as family members. He gave part of the price of quarter and for balance he gave verified claim of his father. Due to latter, petitioners (widow and other sons) claimed a share. Managing officer held against petitioners on 24-3-65. Their appeal, revision and further revision were rejected. They then filed writ in High Court. Para 9 onwards, judgement is:- ( 2 ) THE counsel for the petitioners has raised the following contention :- 1. The statutory Rule 7 framed under the Act does not apply to the adjustment of the price of the property purchased in the instant case. 2. Shri G. D. Kshetrapal. Joint Secretary, was also the Chief Settlement Commissioner and so was purporting to revise his own order and so had no jurisdiction to exercise the powers of the Central Government under Section 33 of the Act. 3. The powers of revision conferred on the Central Government under section 33 are unfettered and unguided and so the impugned order is legally bad. 4. The adjustment of the claim of Daulat Ram deceased passed on to him a right and interest in the property which is heritable by all his legal representatives, including the petitioners. ( 3 ) A resume of the facts shows that the claim of Daulat Ram deceased had not been associated in the purchase of the property and so it could not be said that he had; joined in the purchase or was entitled to any share or interest in the property. The rehabilitation authorities have noticed that Daulat Ram during his lifetime, by a letter mentioned in the orders had agreed for the utilization of the claim in payment of the price of the property. The adjustment had, therefore, been made by the authorities under Rule 7 and not under Rule 90 (15) as amended. The material portion of clause (d) (hi) Section 2 of the Act defines public dues as including the amount of purchase money or any part thereof and any interest on such amount or part remaining unpaid and recoverable from the displaced person on account of transfer to him of any property or interest therein. The material portion of clause (d) (hi) Section 2 of the Act defines public dues as including the amount of purchase money or any part thereof and any interest on such amount or part remaining unpaid and recoverable from the displaced person on account of transfer to him of any property or interest therein. The relevant portion of Rule 7 framed under the Act lays down that the Settlement Commissioner would ascertain the public dues recoverable from the applicant and the members of his family and the same shall, after enquiry under another statutory rule be recoverable. Under Rule 7. public dues of the nature of unpaid instalments on account of any property purchased on instalment basis as well as any other dues payable to the Central Government or the State Government or the Custodian, which may be declared as public dues, shall be payable. Sub- rule (3) gives the definition of members of the family as including the father residing with the applicant. There is a proviso to sub-rule (3) which does not apply to the facts of the case and so we are not concerned with it. A perusal of the said provisions leaves no room for doubt that money was payable by the contesting respondent on account of the price of the property in dispute and the same could, therefore, be legally recoverable from the amount of claim payable to the father of the purchaser in accordance with the provisions of law. Daulat Ram, who was residing with the respondent, in fact consented to the said recovery and so the question of any further enquiry did not arise. The rehabilitation authorities are, therefore, right in their observation that the claim of Daulat Ram had been correctly adjusted against the price of the property under Rule 7 without conferring any right or interest in the property on Daulat Ram. The first contention of the counsel, therefore, fails. ( 4 ) THERE is absolutely no substance in the second contention of the learned counsel. Under Section 34 of the Act, a provision has been made for delegation of powers. Under sub-section (1 ). the Central Government can delegate any power exercisable by it under the Act upon any officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government * * * as may be specified in the notification. Under Section 34 of the Act, a provision has been made for delegation of powers. Under sub-section (1 ). the Central Government can delegate any power exercisable by it under the Act upon any officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government * * * as may be specified in the notification. Sub-section (2) authorises conferment of powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner on lower authorities. The Central Government, therefore, had power to delegate its powers of revision exercisable under Section 33 of the Act on its Joint Secretary who may or may not be occupying the office of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. There is, therefore, nothing wrong with the delegation of the powers. See Labh Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1970 Delhi 1971. The argument that he was exercising the revisional powers in respect of his own orders is simply misconceived. The order dated 27th October, 1965 had been passed by Mr. Rajni Kant who was not the Chief Settlement Commissioner but was a lower authority on whom again powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner had been conferred under Section 34 of the Act and so he was the authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner. As such the authorities which passed the aforesaid order in the first instance as well as the revisional order of the Central Government dated 21st December, 1965 were different. Consequently no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the petitioners by the impugned order and the contention is rejected. ( 5 ) SO far as the third contention is concerned, the provision of law contained in Section 33 of the Act lays down that the Central Government may at any time call for the record of any proceeding under this Act and may pass such order in relation thereto as in its opinion the circumstances of the case require and as is not inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder. We have in this Act; almost similar revisional power conferred upon the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 24 of the Act. It is obvious that the exercise of revisional powers over the orders and actions of the subordinate authorities is vested in very high officers or authorities and in the very high nature of things. We have in this Act; almost similar revisional power conferred upon the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 24 of the Act. It is obvious that the exercise of revisional powers over the orders and actions of the subordinate authorities is vested in very high officers or authorities and in the very high nature of things. the exercise of such power must be left to the discretion of the authorities exercising such power subject to the condition that it should be exercised according to the provisions of law and the principles of natural justice. No further restriction or fetter is really called for. Moreover the guidance needed for exercise of such power is furnished by the provisions of the statute and the statutory rules themselves. Not leaving the matter to chance the Parliament in enacting Section 33 has made explicit what was implicit that the Central Government will not act inconsitently with the provisions of the Act or the statutory rules made thereunder and it will exercise its revisional power to pass such orders. in relation to the matter as the circumstances of the case may require. I am of the view that this is not a case of excess delegation of power. The contention has no force and is rejected. ( 6 ) THE last contention of the learned counsel is devoid of any merit. As is obvious. from the earlier part of the judgment, Daulat Ram deceased had not associated himself ins the purchase of the property and he never claimed any right, title or interest in it during his lifetime which expired on 26th August, 1961, although the property had been allotted on 25th June, 1950 and had been agreed to be transferre 1 in July, 1951. Moreover the letter of the deceased dt. 27th March, 1958, on which. the rehabilitation authorities have relied and in respect of which the counsel for the petitioners has not raised any contention, has claimed no issue against the petitioners and establishes that the deceased never claimed any right or interest in the property but allowed his claim to be utilised in the conveyance of the property in favour of the third respondent who was his son. Another significant fact is that apart from the association of the said claim, the balance of the price tad all been paid by the third respondent either in cash or by associating other claims and at no stage did Daulat Ram deceased or the petitioners (legal representatives) either offered or attempted to pay any part of the price themselves. Moreover it was the third respondent only who had been recognised as an allottee and transferee of the property in dispute. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention that Daulat Ram deceased or for that matter his legal representatives petitioners had acquired any right, title or interest in the property in dispute. The contention, therefore, fails.