Judgment D.P. Gupta, J.-These two appeals arise out of a motor accident, which took place on May 3, 1966, Shri Rajbahadur Singh reached Kota Junction on the fateful morning by train and took a cycle rickshaw from the railway station to go to Bundi bus stand at Kota in order to catch the bus for Bundi. He had been selected at a competitive examination for the Rajasthan Judicial Service, occupying the fifth position ,and after undergoing the necessary training at Alwar, he was posted as Munsif Magistrate, Bundi. It was his first assignment in the State service and he was to join his duties as a Munsif Magistrate on May 3, 1966, at Bundi. But destiny willed otherwise and while the rikshaw in which Shri Rajbahadur Singh was sitting, was proceeding from Brij Talkies crossing on the slope leading towards the Bundi bus stand, a passenger bus, bearing registration No. RJR 915 came from behind. The bus collided in the first instance with Jeep No. DLJ 1329, which was at that time parked towards the left side of the road and thereafter the bus dashed against the rikshaw, which overturned as a result of the jolt and Shri Rajbahadur Singh was thrown out on the road and was run over by the aforesaid bus No. RJR 915. Shri ‘Rajbahadur Singh sustained multiple injuries as a result of the accident, his first three ribs were broken, the clavicle bones were fractured and the flame oflife blew off even before he could be removed to the hospital. 2. ShriRajbahadur Singh was a double M.A. and LL.B. and was 26 years of age. As mentioned above, he was appointed as a Munsif-Magistrate after being selected for the post in the Rajasthan Judicial Service. He left behind him a young widow of about 21 years of age and a daughter hardly 3 months old. His wife, who was at that time probably looking forward to a life of prosperity and married happiness, was informed of his sad demise and of the fact that Shri Rajbahadur Singh could not even reach his place of posting on account of the unfortunate accident, which overtook him at Kota. Thus all her plans and aspirations were shattered. 3. His wife, who was at that time probably looking forward to a life of prosperity and married happiness, was informed of his sad demise and of the fact that Shri Rajbahadur Singh could not even reach his place of posting on account of the unfortunate accident, which overtook him at Kota. Thus all her plans and aspirations were shattered. 3. Thewidow of Shri Rajbahadur Singh filed an application for compensation before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kota, on behalf of herself and her minor daughter and prayed that a sum of Rs. 3,25,000 be awarded by way of compensation. The appellants Messrs. Bhagchand Panjuram and Sobhag Singh, who are respectively the owner and driver of bus No. RJR 915, filed a joint written statement, accepted the fact that Shri Rajbahadur Singh died on May 3. 1966, but they denied any responsibility for the accident and his death. According to these defendants appellants the bus No. RJR 915 was not being driven rashly or negligently. Their story, as mentioned in para 9 of their written statement, is that Sobhag Singh was driving the bus carefully but the rikshaw in which. Shri Rajbahadur Singh was sitting, was going very fast on the slope ahead of their bus and on account of the jolting caused by the sudden application of brakes by the rikshaw-puller, Shri Rajbahadur Singh was thrown out, who struck against the bumper of the bus in question and then fell down on the road and thus got injured. According to their version, their bus did not strike against the rikshaw in which Shri Rajbahadur Singh was travelling nor any part of his body was run over by the bus. They claimed that they were not liable to pay compensation and in any event the amount of compensation claimed was highly exaggerated. 4. The bus No. RJR 915 was insured with the Life Insurance Corporation of India, who filed a separate written statement, in which it substantially reiterated the stand taken up by the owner and the driver of the bus and submitted, in the alternative, that if at all the Corporation was found liable to pay damages, its liability could not extend to more than half of Rs. 20,000 under the Motor Vehicles Act, the other half to be borne by the Indian Mercantile Insurance Co. 20,000 under the Motor Vehicles Act, the other half to be borne by the Indian Mercantile Insurance Co. Ltd., with which the bus in question was also alleged to have been insured, in addition to being insured with the Corporation. 5. Messrs. Indian Mercantile Insurance Co. Ltd., submitted in its written statement that after the accident in question had taken place in the morning of May 3, 1966, the owner of the vehicle No. RJR 915 approached the Agent of that Company at Kota and without disclosing that such an accident had happened, requested him for the issuance of an insurance policy. The Agent of the defendant No. 3 issued a cover note on that very day, but inadvertently mentioned the date of issuance as May 2, 1966, instead of May 3, 1966. It was further alleged by defendant No. 3 that the owner of the vehicle No. RJR 915, with the intention of saving himself from the liability of paying compensation and with the mala fide intention to unlawfully saddle upon the Company the liability for the payment of compensation in respect of of the said accident, got the cover note issued. The owner of the vehicle in question also failed to disclose to their Agent at Kota that the vehicle was already insured with the Life Insurance Corporation of India. It was alleged that the suppression of the fact of the accident which had already taken place and of the existence of insurance with the Life Insurance Corporation of India in respect of the bus in question for the same period, were fraudulent and mala fide acts on the part of the owner of the bus and further that on coming to know of these facts, the Company not only refused to issue a policy of insurance in respect of the vehicle in question, but also cancelled the cover note, which had already been issued. It was also pleaded that the cover note was void from its very inception on account of fraudulent non-disclosure of above mentioned material facts by the owner of the vehicle and as no certificate of insurance was issued and the cover note was also cancelled, the contract of insurance did not come into existence so far as the Company was concerned. 6. TheMotor Accident Claims Tribunal. 6. TheMotor Accident Claims Tribunal. Kota, after recording the evidence led by the parties, by its order dated September 8, 1967 awarded a sum of Rs. 1,20,000 as compensation to the widow and the minor child of the deceased Shri Rajbahadur Singh including Rs. 10,000 for pain and agony, against the owner and the driver of bus No. RJR 915 as well as against the Life Insurance Corporation of India. The claim petition against Messrs. Indian Mercantile Insurance Company Ltd. was dismissed. 7. The owner and the driver of the vehicle in question and the Life Insurance Corporation of India have preferred two separate appeals before us against the aforesaid decision given by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kota. It shall be convenient to decide both these appeals by a common order as they arise out of the same decision of the Tribunal. 8. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. On behalf of the owner and the driver of bus No. RJR 915 it was argued that the bus was not being driven by Sobhag Singh either rashly or negligently but on the other hand the rikshaw in which Shri Rajbahadur Singh was sitting, was being driven rashly and negligently, as it was proceeding with great speed and it was on account of the sudden application of breaks by the rikshaw puller that the rikshaw received a jolt and overturned and Shri Rajbahadur Singh was thrown out resulting in his death. It was also argued that the damages in the sum of Rs. 10,000 given for pain and agony could not have been legally awarded as Shri Rajbahadur Singh died immediately after the accident even before he could be removed to the hospital and further that the award of compensation by the Tribunal to the tune of Rs. 1,10,000 by way of general damages, was grossly excessive. 9. Onbehalf of the Life Insurance Corporation of India two submissions were made, firstly, that the liability of the Insurance Company was limited to the sum of Rs. 20,000 only in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward, in view of the provisions of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act and secondly, that the vehicle No. RJR 915 was also insured with the Indian Mercantile Insurance Co. 20,000 only in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward, in view of the provisions of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act and secondly, that the vehicle No. RJR 915 was also insured with the Indian Mercantile Insurance Co. Ltd., and as such even the amount of Rupees 20,000 should be shared equally by the said Company along with the appellant, Life Insurance Corporation of India. 10. Let us examine in the first instance as to whether Shri Rajbahadur Singh died as a result of the rash and negligent driving of bus No. RJR 915 by the appellant Sobhag Singh. It is the admitted case of the parties that Shri Raibahadur Singh was going in a rikshaw over the slope leading from the Brij Talkies crossing towards the Buridi bus stand at Kota on the morning of May 3, 1966, at about 10 a.m. when the accident took place and that Shri Rajbahadur Singh received multiple injuries and died as a result thereof even before he could be taken to the hospital. What is in dispute is as to whether the said accident was the result of rash and negligent act on the part of the driver of bus No. RJR 915. The evidence in this respect has been considered by the Tribunal in detail and we have ourselves looked into the evidence on record. Kastoor Chand (P.W. 1), whose Jeep was parked at the moment on the left side of the road leading to the Bundi bus stand, stated that he was standing on the road behind his Jeep at the time when the accident took place, as the driver of his Jeep had gone to a nearby restaurant for taking his meals. According to him, the bus in question which was full of passengers and was driven by Sobhag Singh appellant, came from behind without blowing any horn and in the first instance it knocked on the right side of his Jeep and then it dashed against the rikshaw, which was then going a little ahead of his Jeep and in which Shri Rajbahadur Singh was sitting. The rikshaw puller as well as the passenger (Shri Raibahadur Singh) were thrown out on the road and the front left wheel of the bus ran over the ribs of the passenger. The rikshaw puller Bhanwar Lal (P.W. 7) has also the same story to tell. The rikshaw puller as well as the passenger (Shri Raibahadur Singh) were thrown out on the road and the front left wheel of the bus ran over the ribs of the passenger. The rikshaw puller Bhanwar Lal (P.W. 7) has also the same story to tell. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of these two eye witnesses of the occurrence. Kastoor Chand (P.W. 1) is an independent person and his presence at the spot cannot be doubted, as his Jeep was parked at the moment near the place where the accident took place. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the statement of this witness should not be believed because there is some discrepancy between his statements before the Tribunal and in the criminal case relating to the accident, Whereas he stated before the Magistrate that the right side of the bus collided against the left side of the rikshaw, in his statement before the Tribunal, this witness stated that it was the left front side of the bus which struck against the right side of the rikshaw. We have read the statement of Kastoor Chand (P.W. 1) and have also looked into the photographs relating to the accident, which have been placed on record and have been marked Exs. 13 to 17 and have been proved by P.W 5 Mohammed Alladin, S. H. 0., P. S. Nayapura, Kota, and P.W. 6Bashir Mohammed, the police photographer, who took the photographs. We have no doubt that the bus No. RJR 915 struck against the left side of the rikshaw, as rear left wheel of the rikshaw appears to have been smashed and the tyre of that wheel was thrown away as a result of the impact of the accident. The discrepancy between left and right in the statement of P.W. 1 Kastoor Chand appears to have been caused owing to not unusual confusion between right and left and we are satisfied that it does not in any manner detract the veracity of his statement. Further P.W. 3 Surendra Singh, Mechanical Inspector, Transport Department stated that the bus No. RJR 915 was examined by him a day after the accident had taken place and he found that its brakes were not functioning properly and there was no brake oil in the master cylinder. Further P.W. 3 Surendra Singh, Mechanical Inspector, Transport Department stated that the bus No. RJR 915 was examined by him a day after the accident had taken place and he found that its brakes were not functioning properly and there was no brake oil in the master cylinder. He also found that the front number plate of the bus had a dent and was bent. It is admitted position that the brakes of the bus were hydraulic and without the availability of oil in the master cylinder, the brakes could not work properly. It is also in evidence that telegram Exhibit P/S was sent by the partner of the firm, Messrs. Bhagchand Panjuram who owned the bus, to the Life Insurance Corporation of India, which reads as under:-“Accident made by RJR 915 at Kota on 3rd May, 66 at 10 A.M. One person expired-Bhagchand”. This telegram is a version of this accident given at an early stage of the case where self interest had not been able to function inventively. We have no reason to distrust this significant admission which stands unambiguously corroborated by oral evidence and photographs. There is thus no doubt left in our mind that the brakes of the bus No. RJR 915 were not functioning properly and further that as it went down the slope towards the bus stand, it knocked with force against the rikshaw in which Shri Rajbahadur Singh was travelling on the morning on May 3, 1966, and this act on the part of Sobhag Singh, who was then driving the bus, was certainly rash and negligent. 11. The next important question to be determined is as to whether the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal to the petitioner respondents is excessive? They claimed, as already stated above, a sum of Rs. 3,25,000 by way of damages inclusive of Rs. 25,000 as damages for pain and agony. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 1,20,000 in all, inclusive of Rs. 10,000 on account of pain and agony and remaining amount for loss of expectation of life of the deceased. 12. Before proceeding to consider as to what amount of compensation would be reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it would be proper first to examine the principles which should be applied in estimating the amount of damages to be awarded. 13. 12. Before proceeding to consider as to what amount of compensation would be reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it would be proper first to examine the principles which should be applied in estimating the amount of damages to be awarded. 13. Winfield in his treatise on “The Law of Tort” (Eighth Edition) has stated the principles at page 679 thus;-“The basic principle for the measure of damages in tort as well as in contract is that there should be restitution in integrum. Where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of money to be given for reparation of damages you should as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation. In a case of personal injury this criterion can and should be applied to the pecuniary elements of the plaintiffs loss such as his loss of earnings. Indeed compensation in the literal sense is no more possible than restitution, and what is given has been described as notional or theoretical compensation to take the place of that which is not possible, namely, actual compensation.” 14. The learned author further observes:-“The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased was earning, the ascertainment of which to some extent may depend on the regularity of his employment. Then there is an estimate of how much was required or expended for his own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a datum or basic figure which will generally be turned into a lump sum by making a number of years’ purchase. That sum has to be taxed down by having regard to the uncertainties. The number of years’ purchase is left fluid and will vary according to the deceased’s expectation of working life as it was at his death, the probable duration of the dependency of the dependants and so on. There are in fact so many imponderables in each case that arithmetic, though a good servant, is a bad master and accordingly a round figure should be assessed.” 15. There are in fact so many imponderables in each case that arithmetic, though a good servant, is a bad master and accordingly a round figure should be assessed.” 15. Munkman in his book “Damages for personal injuries and death” (Third Edition) page 35 stated as under:-“In principle, the measure of damages for pecuniary loss is the exact amount of money which has been lost, or spent, in consequence of the injury Now it is easy enough to apply this rule in the case of earnings which have actually been lost, or expenses which have actually been incurred. But in the case of future financial loss, assessment is not so easy. In general, this financial loss is assessed in much the same way as prospective loss of earnings in the case of living plaintifl except, of course, that the basic figure, instead of being the net earnings of the plaintiff , is the net contribution to the support of the plaintiff which would have been derived from the future income of the deceased. In both cases, when the basic figure has been fixed, an estimate has to be made of the probable length of time for which the earnings, or contribution, would have continued; then a convenient multiple has to be determined--a number of years purchase--which will reduce the total loss to its present value. The ordinary chances and uncertainties of life should also be taken into account, but it does not necessarily follow that any deduction ought to be made for this reason. Where the injured man has been in good health and had excellent prospects, it would be legitimate for the Court to conclude that the risks were slight and might be disregarded. After all, the Court is not compelled to exercise its imagination for the benefit of the person who has caused the loss.” 16. Kemp & Kemp in their book on “The Quantum of Damages” (Second Edition) Volume 2 at page 19 have described the general principles as,--“The basic figure is the value of the dependency. It should usually be possible to assess the value of the dependency at the date of the deceased’s death with some accuracy. Kemp & Kemp in their book on “The Quantum of Damages” (Second Edition) Volume 2 at page 19 have described the general principles as,--“The basic figure is the value of the dependency. It should usually be possible to assess the value of the dependency at the date of the deceased’s death with some accuracy. Usually the most important factor will be the age and expectation of working lite of the deceased himself He is the source of the dependency, which could not be in any event have continued beyond the span of his working life. But one must also consider the expectation of life of the dependants, and in particular where a husband is killed, of his widow. The future prospects of the deceased, if he had not been killed, will also affect the multiplier. If the deceased had good prospects of attaining a much greater wage or salary, or of achieving promotion to a much better position, the Court will apply a higher multiplier. On the other hand the Court must take account of the uncertainties of life, particularly where the deceased was engaged in some especially hazardous employment. The Court will also make some discount on the ground that the dependants get a lump sum down and will be able to enjoy the interest on it. But in this connection, it is submitted, that regard should be had to the general depreciation in the purchasing power of the pound sterling over the last fifty years and more, a trend which, unfortunately shows no sign of altering. Regard should also be had to the fact that the interest will be taxed. Where the deceased had good prospects of considerably increased earnings, the Court must take into account that the value of the dependency would probably have increased as the deceased’s earnings increased. The assessment of damages in this type of case, if calculated in terms of the annual value of the dependency at the date of death, may represent a multiplier of twenty or more.” 17. Prof Harry Street in his book “Principles of the Law of Damages” page 59 discussing the law in England on the subject stated as under:-“The law protects the human personality in its psychic phases as well as in its economic ones. Prof Harry Street in his book “Principles of the Law of Damages” page 59 discussing the law in England on the subject stated as under:-“The law protects the human personality in its psychic phases as well as in its economic ones. A man has a legal interest entitling him to complain if the integrity of his life is impaired by tortious acts, not only in regard to pain, suffering and disability, but in regard to the continuance of life for its normal expectancy. A man has a legal right that his life shall not be shortened by the tortious act of another. In case of death, damages are recoverable for loss of pecuniary benefit. The right of each dependant is based on the reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage from the continuance of the life of the deceased, Obviously it is important to determine what contribution the deceased has made to the dependants from his earnings, and evidence of his household financial arrangements should be adduced. Equally obviously the discounted capital value of the total future contributions of the deceased based upon his work-life expectancy is relevant. Judges frequently speak of the loss of dependency or loss of contribution, as if this is all to which the dependants are entitled. The explanation is twofold: first, the judicial urge for simple calculation and secondly, the cynical attitude of the Judges to working class life.” 18. Mayne & McGregor on Damages summarised the law on the subject as under:--“The Court has restricted recovery to damages for the loss of the pecuniary benefit arising from the relationship which would be derived from the continuance of the life. In short, the measure recoverable by a dependant is what is often called the value of the dependency. Mayne & McGregor on Damages summarised the law on the subject as under:--“The Court has restricted recovery to damages for the loss of the pecuniary benefit arising from the relationship which would be derived from the continuance of the life. In short, the measure recoverable by a dependant is what is often called the value of the dependency. The basic rule, ever since accepted and acted upon, is that the damages are to be calculated “in reference to a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit, as of right or otherwise, from the continuance of the life.” This entails two consequences of importance: first, there is no need for the dependant to show that the deceased was under a legal liability to support him; second, there is no need to show that the dependant was receiving pecuniary benefit at the time of the death, a purely prospective loss being sufficient.” “The Courts have evolved a particular method for calculating the value of the dependency, or the amount of pecuniary benefit that the dependant could reasonably expect to have received. The basis is the amount of pecuniary benefit that the deceased would have conferred upon the dependant in the future. This may be calculated by taking the annual figure of the dependency, and multiplying it by the number of years that the dependency might reasonably be expected to last. This latter figure is generally referred to as the multiplier. The resulting amount must then be scaled down by reason of two considerations, first that a lump sum is being given instead of the various sums over the years, and second that contingencies might have arisen to cut off the benefit prematurely. The method adopted by the Courts to scale down is to take the figure intact of present annual dependency and reduce only the multiplier. The full amount of future contributions cannot be awarded, as this would put them in the dependant’s hands long before he would otherwise have got them and enable him to enjoy the interest in the intervening period. What must be calculated is the present value of the future contributions. The basic annual figure will be the amount of the wages the deceased contributed to the house keeping less the amount out of such contribution that has gone towards his own maintenance. What must be calculated is the present value of the future contributions. The basic annual figure will be the amount of the wages the deceased contributed to the house keeping less the amount out of such contribution that has gone towards his own maintenance. A multiplier is then applied to this annual value of the family dependency at the date of the death; this multiplier will generally represent the number of working years that would have remained to the deceased less a deduction in this number to represent the two factors already discussed. It is impossible to state with any precision what this multiplier should be because of the varying circumstances of each case : all that can be said is that the number of years’ purchase in an average case where the parties are not too old or ailing tends to be in the region of thirteen to eighteen. Where, however, the deceased had good prospects of increased earnings in the future by promotion or otherwise, this is accounted for by continuing to take the annual value of the family dependency at the time of death but applying a rather higher multiplier, generally in the region of twenty to twenty-two.” 19. In the“Restatement of the Law of Torts” (as adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute) Volume IV, paras 924-925, the law on the subject has been summarised as under:-“The extent of future harm to the earning capacity of the injured person is measured by the difference viewed as at the time of trial between the value of the plaintiffs services as they will be in view of the harm and as they would have been had there been no harm. This difference is the resultant derived from reducing to present value the anticipated losses of earnings during the period of the prospective life the plaintiff would have had but for the defendant’s act. In the majority of States, the English model has been followed and damages are determined by the present worth of the contributions and aid which the deceased probably would have given to the survivors had he lived. In the majority of States, the English model has been followed and damages are determined by the present worth of the contributions and aid which the deceased probably would have given to the survivors had he lived. Under this rule a widow and child of the “deceased can recover the value at the time of trial of the amounts which the deceased probably would have earned but for this death resulting from the defendant’s act, less the amount which he would have used for his own purposes. To this amount is added an amount to compensate them for the loss of the advice, assistance, training and guidance which they probably would have received, so far as those things would have had pecuniary value. The total represents the worth of the deceased’s l