JUDGMENT H. N. Seth, J. - These three petitions by Mohd. Faruq raise common questions of facts and law. They have been heard together and can conveniently be disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The petitioner Mohd. Faruq and the main contesting respondent Smt. Zahida Bibi are related to each other in the manner disclosed by the following admitted pedigree :- The dispute between the parties relates to certain plots of land which originally were the sir and khudkasht of Mohd. Kamil. According to Smt. Zahida, in due course, after the death of Mohd. Kamil those plots developed on Mohd. Faruq, Kabirunnisa and herself, but in village papers the name of Mohd. Faruq alone was entered. Accordingly, Smt. Kabirunnisa filed a civil suit (number 588 of 1952), purporting also to be on behalf of Smt. Zahida, for a declaration that they were co-tenure holders of the plots in dispute along-with Mohd. Faruq. On 30th September, 1954, Smt. Kabirunnisa and Mohd. Faruq filed a compromise application before the court stating that she was giving up her claim to the plots in dispute. The Civil Court accepted the compromise and dismissed the suit in terms thereof, in so far as Smt. Kabirunnisa was concerned. However, as on that date no one appeared on behalf of Smt. Zahida, the suit, insofar as one was concerned, was also dismissed and the name of Mohd. Faruq alone continued to be recorded in the village papers. Subsequently, on 30th August, 1967, Smt. Zahida, filed suits numbers 973, 974 and 975, in the court of Assistant Collector first class, under Sec. 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and claimed declaration in respect of the disputed plots. The petitioner contested those suits on the allegation that he was the sole Bhumidhar of those plots and had in any case, perfected his title by adverse possession. He further pleaded that the civil suit filed by Smt. Zahida, had been dismissed for default on 30th September, 1954, the only remedy which she had, was to get that order revoked and that the present suit was barred by Order IX, R. 9, C. P. C. In order to meet the plea of her suits being barred by O. IX, R. 9, C. P. C. Smt. Zahida took up the stand that she had not joined civil suit No. 588 of 1952 as a plaintiff. 3. 3. The trial court held that Smt. Zahida was a plaintiff in suit No. 588 of 1952 and that her suit has been dismissed for default. The present proceedings were thus barred by O. IX, R. 9, C. P. C. On merits it found that Smt. Zahida had no right in the plots in dispute and that in any case her claim was barred by time. The Additional Commissioner dismissed the appeal filed by Smt. Zahida and affirmed the decrees passed by the Assistant Collector. Thereafter, Smt. Zahida filed three second appeals and took the matter up before the Board of Revenue. The Board allowed the three appeals and set aside the judgments and decrees passed by the two courts below and decreed Smt. Zahida's claim for a declaration that she was a co-tenure holder of the plots in dispute. It held that the present suits were not barred by O. IX, R. 9, C. P. C Smt. Zahida had a share in the property coming down from Mohd. Kamil and that in the circumstances, Mohd. Faruq did not nature title by adverse possession. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Board of Revenue manifestly erred in holding that the present proceedings were not barred by O. IX, R. 9, C. P. C. Relevant facts with regard to this controversy are that in spite of her denial all the three revenue courts have held that Smt. Zahida one of the plaintiffs in suit No. 588 of 1952. It has also been found that the other co-plaintiff in that suit, Smt. Kabirunnisa, step-mother of Smt. Zahida entered into a compromise with Mohd. Faruq and in so far as she was concerned, that suit was disposed of in terms of the compromise. As on that day, no one had appeared on behalf of Smt. Zahida, the suit in so far as she was concerned, was dismissed for default. Now, O. IX of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with appearance of parties and consequences of their non-appearance. As on that day, no one had appeared on behalf of Smt. Zahida, the suit in so far as she was concerned, was dismissed for default. Now, O. IX of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with appearance of parties and consequences of their non-appearance. O. IX, R. 8 runs thus :- "Where the defendant appears and the plaintiff does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed, unless the defendant admits the claim, or part thereof, in which case the Court shall pass a decree against the defendant upon such admission, and, where part only of the claim has been admitted, shall dismiss the suit so far as it relates to the remainder." Order IX, R. 10 which also is relevant in this connection reads :- "Where there are more plaintiffs than one, and one or more of them appear, and the others do not appear, the Court may, at the instance of the plaintiff or plaintiffs appearing permit the suit to proceed in the same way as if all the plaintiffs had appeared, or make such order as it thinks fit." It is true that according to the General Clauses Act unless there is something repugnant in the context, the words used in the statute in the singular manner include the plural and vice-versa. Reading Order IX, R. 8 and Order IX, R. 10 together and in the light of the provisions of the General Clauses Act, it becomes evident that Rule 8 caters for a situation where on the date fixed for hearing, the defendant appears but the plaintiff or if there are more plaintiffs than one all of them fail to appear. In such a case, the court is required to dismiss the suit unless the defendant admits the claims or part thereof. Rule 10, on the other hand, caters for a situation where there are more than one plaintiffs and some of them alone appear on the date fixed. In such a case the court has been empowered either to permit the plaintiff who has appeared to proceed with the suit in the same way as if all the plaintiffs had appeared or to make such orders as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. In such a case the court has been empowered either to permit the plaintiff who has appeared to proceed with the suit in the same way as if all the plaintiffs had appeared or to make such orders as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. It is obvious that in suit No. 588 of 1952, number of plaintiffs was more than one and all of them did not fail to appear on the date fixed. Accordingly, the provisions of Order IX, R. 8 did not apply to the facts of the case which was squarely covered by Order IX, R. 10 of the Code which, at the instance of the plaintiff, who has appeared before it enables the court either to permit him to proceed with the suit in the same way as if all the plaintiffs had appeared or to make such orders as it deemed fit. In this case, the court did not, at the instance of the plaintiff-appearing, permit the suit to proceed in the same way as if all the plaintiffs had appeared. Instead, it made an order as it thought proper, by dismissing the suit of Smt. Zahida and for preparing a decree in terms of the compromise arrived at between Smt. Kabirunnisa and Mohd. Faruq. Order IX, R. 9 of the Code runs thus :- (1) "Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under Rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. But he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfied the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit." (2) "No order shall be made under this rule unless notice of the application has been served on the opposite party." This rule, therefore, in so many words applies where a suit has been dismissed under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code. It does not apply to a case where a suit has been disposed of under any other provision. It does not apply to a case where a suit has been disposed of under any other provision. According to this rule, it is only when a suit has been dismissed under Rule 8 that the plaintiff is precluded from bringing a fresh suit on the same cause of action and the only remedy available to him would be to move an application for setting aside the order of dismissal after satisfying the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance. As stated earlier, since in this case all the plaintiffs did not fail to appear on the date fixed, the case was one which was not covered by Order I, Rule 8. It was a case which attracted the provisions of Order IX, Rule 10, C. P. C. In this view of the matter, there was no question of the present proceedings being barred by Order IX, Rule 9 C. P. C. 5. In support of his submission that dismissal of the suit filed by Smt. Zahida in such circumstances, would be one under Order IX, Rule 8, C. P. C., learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ulfat Rai v. Premvati, A.I.R. 1963 Alld. 412. In that case, on the date fixed for hearing only two out of five plaintiffs appeared before the Court. They, without purporting to act on behalf of the absent plaintiffs entered into a compromise with the defendants and a compromise decree was passed. This Court held that in such circumstances it could not be held that the suit had been decided in terms of compromise, so far as the absent plaintiffs were concerned the suit could only be held to have been dismissed for default. A dismissal for default does not amount to a decree, and therefore the appeal filed by the absent plaintiffs against the decree was not maintainable. The only remedy of the absent plaintiffs was to apply for setting aside of the dismissal so far as they were concerned and to have the suit restored to its original number. During the course of discussion learned Judges observed thus :- "In the present case, the appellant was himself not present when the case was called on the 21st May 1948. During the course of discussion learned Judges observed thus :- "In the present case, the appellant was himself not present when the case was called on the 21st May 1948. The other plaintiffs who were present and who had entered into the compromise did not purport to represent the appellant or the other absent plaintiffs. They did not move the court for permitting them to represent the other absent plaintiffs or that the case should proceed as if all the plaintiffs were present. What they did was that they filed a compromise in which they and the defendants alone were the parties and in which the other absent plaintiffs had not been impleaded. The court too did not pass any order under Rule 10 permitting the suit to proceed as if the absent parties had also appeared. In these circumstances the appearance of the two plaintiffs who had joined the compromise, in our opinion, be considered to be appearance for the absent plaintiff also and the absent plaintiff and the appellant must be deemed to have been absent on that date. If they were absent the suit could not have been dismissed on merits. It was particularly so because 21st May 1948 was not an adjourned date for which the plaintiff had undertaken to take any steps. Order XVII, Rule 3 of the C. P. C. thereof did not apply." Learned counsel urged that in the instant case, order dismissing Smt. Zahida's suit had been passed in circumstance as identical to that in which the suit of absent plaintiffs on the aforesaid case was dismissed. As no permission had been obtained by Smt. Kabirunnisa to represent Smt. Zahida and for proceeding with the suit on merits the case was not covered by Order IX, Rule 10, C. P. C. and so far Smt. Zahida was concerned the suit had been dismissed for default. Her only remedy was to apply for the setting aside the order dismissing her suit and to have the same restored. I am unable to accept petitioners argument based on Ulfat Rai's case. In that case main question that arose for consideration was whether if a suit has been dismissed in such circumstances, the plaintiffs who failed to appear on the date fixed and who did not enter into a compromise, could maintain an appeal as if the order dismissing the suit was a decree. In that case main question that arose for consideration was whether if a suit has been dismissed in such circumstances, the plaintiffs who failed to appear on the date fixed and who did not enter into a compromise, could maintain an appeal as if the order dismissing the suit was a decree. It is true that in that case this Court held that as the plaintiffs who had put in appearance and had entered into a compromise did not obtain permission of the Court to proceed with the suit as representing the absent plaintiffs, it could not, because of the provisions of Order IX, Rule 10, be said that the suit had been decided on merits and as if the absent plaintiffs were also present. In this case the Court did not interpret the provisions of Clause IX, Rule 8, C. P. C. and held that in such circumstances the dismissal of the suit would be one under that rule. It also did not hold that the order of dismissal could not be made within the fore corners of the expression" make such orders as it thinks fit", used in Or. IX, Rule 10, C. P. C. The observation that in such a case the remedy of the plaintiffs who did not appear on the date fixed would be to have the suit restored to original number by making an application for setting aside of the dismissal order, does not mean that in the opinion of the Court the suit had been dismissed under Or. IX, Rule 8 or that the application for setting aside the dismissal order was to be made under Order IX, Rule 9, C. P. C. 6. I may mention here that learned counsel for the contesting respondents, also urged that Order IX, Rule 9 merely disables a plaintiff, whose suits have been dismissed for default, from bringing a fresh suit on the same cause of action. It does not prevent him for filing a suit based on a cause of action different from that on which the suit which had been dismissed for default was based. According to him, in the instant case, suits under Sec. 229-B were based on a cause of action which were quite different from that on which suit No. 588 of 1952 was based. According to him, in the instant case, suits under Sec. 229-B were based on a cause of action which were quite different from that on which suit No. 588 of 1952 was based. As I find that the present suit was not dismissed under Order IX, Rule 8, C. P. C., the bar created by Or. A IX, Rule 9 did not come into play. It is unnecessary for me to go into the question whether the three suits under Sec. 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, filed by Smt. Zahida, were based on the same cause of action on which suit No. 588 of 1952 was based. In the result hold that the Board of Revenue was right in holding that present suits were not barred by the provisions of Order IX, Rule 9, C. P. C. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that before the Assistant Collector, it was accepted on behalf of Smt. Zahida that suit No. 588 of 1952, insofar as she was concerned, had been dismissed under Or. IX, Rule 9, C. P. C. Accordingly, the Board of Revenue was not justified in proceeding on the basis that the suit had not been dismissed under that rule. The question whether on admitted facts, the suit filed by Smt. Zahida stood dismissed under Or. IX, R. 8, C. P. C. or under any other provision of law is essentially a question of law. Accordingly, merely because the argument before the Assistant Collector proceeded on the footing that suit No. 588 of 1952 in so far as Smt. Zahida was concerned, had been dismissed under Or. IX, Rule 8, C. P. C., it cannot preclude her from urging before appellate court that Order IX, Rule 8, C. P. f C. had no application to the facts of the case and if at all the suit could be disposed of only under Or. IX, Rule 10, C. P. C. 8. Learned counsel for Mohd. Faruq then relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Barahi v. Board of Revenue, Writ No. 686 of 1968, decided on 13-2-1969, and contended that even if Or. IX, Rule 10, C. P. C. 8. Learned counsel for Mohd. Faruq then relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Barahi v. Board of Revenue, Writ No. 686 of 1968, decided on 13-2-1969, and contended that even if Or. IX, Rule 9, C. P. C. did not apply to the facts of the present case, still as Smt. Zahida's earlier civil suit, claiming co-tenure holders right in the plots in dispute had been dismissed for default the present suit will be barred by the principles of estoppel. It is well settled that a party relying upon the plea of estoppel has got to raise that plea at the earliest stage. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to issue No. 5 and contended that the plea of estoppel had been specifically raised. A perusal of the judgment of the Assistant Collector 1st Class shows that in this case the plea of estoppel was raised on the ground that Mohd. Faruq had taken possession of the plots in dispute without objection by Smt. Zahida long time back. The plea was not based on the ground that a judgment by default operated as estoppel. It does not appear that the aforesaid plea of estoppel was pressed before the Board. Moreover, the petitioner has not raised this plea in the present petition as a ground for attacking the order of the Board of Revenue. I am, accordingly not inclined to entertain or accept petitioners argument that in view of the judgment of the civil court, dismissing Smt. Zahida's suit for default, she estopped from maintaining the present suit. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner then tried to impugn the finding of the Board of Revenue that his title had not matured by adverse possession and that three suits were not barred by time. In my opinion, the conclusion arrived at by the Board of Revenue that Mohd. Faruq has failed to prove the ouster of Smt. Zahida, who was a co-tenure holders with him, is not vitiated by any error of law. In coming to the conclusion that Mohd. In my opinion, the conclusion arrived at by the Board of Revenue that Mohd. Faruq has failed to prove the ouster of Smt. Zahida, who was a co-tenure holders with him, is not vitiated by any error of law. In coming to the conclusion that Mohd. Faruq had failed to prove the ouster of Smt. Zahida or that he had acquired title by adverse possession, the Board of Revenue relied and acted upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 314. I am, accordingly, not satisfied that any case has been made out for interfering with the order of the Board on this account. 10. If the petitioner had failed to prove the ouster of Smt. Zahida one of the co-tenure holder's of the plots in dispute, no question of her suits becoming barred by limitation can possibly arise. 11. In the result, I find no substance in any of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. These petitions, accordingly, fail and are dismissed with one set of costs.