( 1 ) THE sharp point which arises for determination in this revision petition is, as to whether the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to grant relief to a party in respect of recovery of rent which has accured due prior to the amendment of the Mysore Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised occupants) Act 1961 (hereinafter called the Act),survives, or not. ( 2 ) A residential property bearing Block No,. 22 of Gokul Road, CTS no. 90, Ward III, Hubli Unit, was owned by the Plaintiff (Hubli-Dharwar) city Corporation. The same was let out to the defendant -revision petitioner originally on a monthly rent of Rs. 69, which was enhanced from 1-4-1967 to Rs. 70. The tenant, however, defaulted in payment of r,ents sines 1-12-67. Hence his tenancy was terminated and he was required tp deliver vacant possession of the premises-and also tor pay the arrears of rent due. However the, tenant did not comply with thes? demands, and hence the Corporation filed a suit for eviction, and also for recovery of arrears of rent up to 30-11-1970. ( 3 ) THE tenant resisted the suit on several grounds. One was that the civil Coiurt has no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff corporation. Issue No. 7 was framed by the trial Court as below: "whether the defendant proves that this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit in view of S. 11e of the Mysore Act 32 of 1969?" another issue, relating to Court fee was also framed as Issue No. 8. Both these issues were tried as preliminary issues by the trial Court. After considering' the, respective contentions of the parties and the arguments of the learned Counsel, the trial Court gave a finding on Issue No. 7, holding that it has got jurisdiction in respect of the claim for recovery of the rent of the suit premises from 1-12-67 to 3-12-69, and that it has no jurisdiction in respect of the cliim for recovery of rent of the subsequent period and alao to gfant the. relief of eviction. On Issue No,. 8 it hejd that the court fee paid is proper. ( 4 ) THOUGH the findings on both these issues were assailed in the revision petition, Sri R. U. Goulay, learned Advocate for the petitioner, did not press the challenge-to the finding on Issue No. 8. relief of eviction. On Issue No,. 8 it hejd that the court fee paid is proper. ( 4 ) THOUGH the findings on both these issues were assailed in the revision petition, Sri R. U. Goulay, learned Advocate for the petitioner, did not press the challenge-to the finding on Issue No. 8. We are concerned, therefore, in this revision petition solely with the finding of the trial Court on Issue No. 7. ( 5 ) THE Act above referred to was amended by the Mysore Act 32 of 1969. Sec. 2 of the original Act was amended so as to include premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of a 'local authority within the meaning of tha term 'public premises' in the Act. The explanation to s. 2 (b) was added as follows :" For purposes of this clause, local authority means- (a) a Municipal corporation. "in view of the amended definition of the term 'public premises' there can be no doubt that the, suit premises in this case, falls within the ambit fo fhat delnition. ( 6 ) SEC. 11e has been added by the amending Act 32 of 1969. This of that definition. " 11e. Bar of Jurisdiction.-No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or the recovery of the arrears of rent payable under sub-sec (1) of S. 7 or the damages payable under sub-sec (2) of that section or costs awarded to the State Govt or a, local authority under sub-sec (5) of S 10 or any portion of such rent, damages or costs. " ( 7 ) THE agreement of the learned Advocates for the parties revolva upon the interpretation of this Sec. 11e. ( 8 ) IT was contended by Sri Goulay that in view of this provision viz, she addpd by the amending Act 32 of 1969, the) Civil Court ceases to have iurisdiction not only in respect of grant of relief of eviction but also to grant a decree for arrears of-rent in favour of the Corporation. He therefore argued that the finding of the learned Munsiff on Issue No. 7 is erroneous. He therefore argued that the finding of the learned Munsiff on Issue No. 7 is erroneous. ( 9 ) IN support of his contention, Sri Goulay has mainly relied upon the decision in Northern India Caterers (F) Ltd v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1581 . That ruling was given in regard to the provisions of the Punjab Public premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Adt (31 of 1959 ). In that case the validity of S. 5 of that Act was attacked, and there was also the question of interpretation of statutes. The Supreme Court has held" The rule of construction is that where a statute provides in express terms tha,t its enactment will repeal an earlier Act by reason of its inconsistency with such earlier Act, the latter may be treated as repealed. Even where the later Act does not contain such express words, if the co-existence of the two sets of provisions is destructive of the object with which the later Act was passed, the Court would treat the earlier provision as impliedly repealed. A later Act Which confers a new right would repeal an earlier right if the fact of the two, rights co-existing together produces inconvenience, for. in such a case it is" legitimate to infer that the legislature, did not intend such a conser quence. If the twq Acts are general enactments and the later of the two is couched in negative terms, the inference would be that the earlier one was impliedly repealed. Even if the later statute is in affirmative, terms, it is of ten. found to involve that negative which makets it fatal to the, earlier enactment-"now, before the amending Act came into force on 4-12-1969, it was the civil Court that had the jurisdiction to grant the reliefs of eviction and recovery of arrears of rent in respect of premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation. But that right which the Corporation had of resorting to a Civil Court, has been substituted by a new right created by the, amending Act 32 of 1969. But that right which the Corporation had of resorting to a Civil Court, has been substituted by a new right created by the, amending Act 32 of 1969. The object of the Act, as amended, undoubtedly is to provide) for summary (eviction of unauthorised occupation of public premises as defined in Cl (e) of S. 2 of the Act and for recovery of rent and damages in respect thereof and to avoid the cumbersome, procedure involving the delay that would be the result of proceedings in a Civil Court. Therefore, having regard to the object of the Act, there can be no doubt that the right which the Corporation had of resorting to a Civil Court has been substituted by a new right created by the, amending Act 32 of 1969 as aforesaid. ( 10 ) THAT apart, normally, when jurisdiction is altered during the pendency of a litigation, the jurisdiction to be exercised is the jurisdiction which is newly created and not the, old. In the present Act, eyen after the, amendment, it does not appear that the intention of the, legislature was that the old jurisdiction should remain in respect of portions of claims. On the other hand, it is clear from a reading of S. 11e that the jurisdiction of Civil Courts has been taken away by reason of tha incorporation of that provision. ( 11 ) CERTAINLY, it cannot be the pbject of the Act after the amendment that a portion of the claim for arrears of rent, which alone according to the learned Munsiff, would be within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, should be adjudicated upon by a Civil Court, and the rest of the claim for arrears of rent after the amending Act came into force and for eviction shquld be, adjudicated upon by a different authority constituted under the act. Sri Gofulay also derives some support, and I feel rightly, from the, decisions oi this Court in C. Thammayya v. Thimaiya, (1968) 2 Myslj. 207 and Krishna narasimha v. Venkataraman, (1969) 1 Myslj. 516. ( 12 ) HOWEVER, Sri K. A. Swami, learned Advocate, for the respondent corporation, has in this connection, drawn my attention to the decision in Viswanath Venkatesh Nadgouda v. Basappa Appayya, 1959 Myslj. 883. That ruling was in regard to the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural lands Act (67 of 1948 ). 516. ( 12 ) HOWEVER, Sri K. A. Swami, learned Advocate, for the respondent corporation, has in this connection, drawn my attention to the decision in Viswanath Venkatesh Nadgouda v. Basappa Appayya, 1959 Myslj. 883. That ruling was in regard to the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural lands Act (67 of 1948 ). That Act came to be. amended on 1st of august 1956. By the said amendment several sections of the, Act of 1948 were substituted, by new sections. The, position, as it was before that cams to be attended, was as follows-if there is an agreement between the parties as to the amount off pent payable, the said amount would be, payable by the tenant, subject to, two conditions, viz, (a) that the amount does not exceed the; maximum rent to be fixed under 3. 6 of the said Act, and (b) if the tenant disputes that the amount so fixed is not reasonable, then the reasonable pent which has to be determined under S. 12 of the. Act shall be thq rent payable by the tenant and it shall be the duty of the mamlatdar to determine the maximum value of the crops as mentioned. in s. 6, and the reasonable rent as mentioned in Ss. 7 and 12 otf the Act. ( 13 ) SEC. 85 of the Act of 1948, inter alia, barred the, jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide any question which is by or under that Act required to be, settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar.- The amending Act of 1956 deleted Ss. 6, 7, 12 and 70 of the; 1948 Act, and in place of those provisions the new Ss. 6, 7, 8 and 9 were substituted. The new Ss. 6 and 7 deal with matters different from the matters which were dealt with in the, old sections. It was contended before the Division Bench of this High Court that the rents payable under the Act being of periods prior to the passing of the 1956 Act, the rights, privileges, obligations or liabilities of the parties to get the) saidi rents determined would b|e governed by the 1948 Act and thosje rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities would not in any way be affected by the sections repealed by ,thjand! 1956 act. This contention was upheld. 1956 act. This contention was upheld. Therefore, on the strength of this decision, Sri Swanu urged that the learned Munsiff was right in holding that he had jurisdiction to decide the question of arrears of rent prior tq the amending Act 32 of 1969. I ani unable to agree, It must be remembered that in that case, admittedly the rents that were claimed were all lor the period prior to the amending Act. But, in the instant case, the rents that are claimed are not entirely fcr the period prior to the amending act 32 of 1969. ( 14 ) AS already mentioned above it cquld not have been the intention of the legislature that in respect of a portion of the arrears of rent as on the date of the amending Act, the Court would continue to have jurisdiction to decide that question, and in respect of the, balance of the arrears of rent after the amending Act the, authority constituted under the amending Act would have jurisdiction to adjudicate, upon the other portion of rents. In fact, when the learned Munsiff has held that he, has no jurisdiction to decide the, question of eviction by reason of the amending Act 32 of 1969, which came into force during the pendency of the proceedings, he ought to, have held that he had no such jurisdiction also to decide) the question of recovery of arrears of rent both prior to and after the; commencement of the amending Act. ( 15 ) SRI Swami has also referred to the decision in Sripad Mahadavrao inamdar v. Kumber Bhumappa Chougla, 1961 Myslj. 71. Under S. 14 of the; BT and al Act,, as it stood before the amending Act of 1956, the landlqrd had the right to terminate the tenancy of his tenant on the grqund that the tenant had committed three defaults in the payment of rents before the date prescribed in S. 14. It was held in the above decision that where that right had been exercised before the amending Act came into force, the landlord acquired) a, right to obtain possession of thei property from the tenant and there was nothing in Section 25 (2) as it stood after its amendment which could have the effect of divesting the landlqrd of the right which had already accrued to. him. him. It was also held that S. 25 (2), after its amendment, does not govern the defaults committed by the tenant before the Bombay amending Act 13 of 1956 came into force. The interpretation of the amendted S. 25 (2) is governed by the Bombay General Clauses Act, and u s. 7 of that Act, the rights and liabilities of the tenant and the landlord as they existed) before the amending Act came, into force, remained valid and could be enforced. as if the amending Act had riot been passed. But, that undoubtedly was a case where substantive rights had been affected by the Bombay amending act 13 of 1956. In the instant case, S. 11e of the Mysore Act (32 of 1969), provides for only and change o| jurisdiction or forum and do not affect the substantive, rights of the parties. Hence that ruling can be of no assistance in the instant case. ( 16 ) IN the result, therefore, I hold that by reason of S. 11e of Mysore act 32 of 1969, the Civil Court ceases to have jurisdiction to decide the questions of not only eviction but also recovery of arrears of rent in pending proceedings, even though a portion of the arrears had accrued due prior to the commencement of the, amending Act (32 of 1969 ). ( 17 ) THE revision petition is therefore allowed, and the, order passed by the learned Munsiff is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs here. --- *** --- .