Judgement This appeal is by the defendants. 2. The plaintiffs had brought two suits, namely, Title Suit No. 18 of 1959 and Rent Suit No. 3 of 1959, the first one being for ejectment from the suit houses and the second one for rents, and obtained decrees in their favour. Ultimately these decrees were affirmed by the High Court. For the subsequent periods the plaintiffs filed three suits, namely, Money Suits Nos. 1/66, 3/69 and 73/62 for realisation of rents from the defendants. The suits were fixed for peremptory hearing on 13-5-1971 on which date on the prayer of plaintiff No. 1 the suits were ordered to be heard as analogous by the Assistant District Judge. Dibrugarh before whom the cases were pending. On that date the plaintiffs also filed an application for adjournment on the ground of illness and the suits were ultimately fixed for hearing on 1-7-1971. On that day a petition was filed on behalf of the defendants for adjournment on the ground that defendant No. 1 was lying ill at Calcutta. Plaintiff No. 1 filed objection to that petition, inter alia, on the ground that the allegation of defendant No. 1 that he was lying ill at Calcutta was false. The learned Assistant District Judge, after hearing, rejected the application and the suits were ordered to be taken up for hearing. The counsel for the defendants retired from the proceedings stating that he had no further instructions to proceed with the suits. Accordingly the suits were taken up exparte and the evidence of Sri Jogesh Chandra Das, plaintiff No. 1, was recorded in Money Suit 73/62 which was the main case and that evidence was taken into account in all the three suits already ordered to be heard as analogous. The suits were decreed ex parte by the same order. Separate decrees were ordered to be prepared. 3. The defendants then filed a single application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for revival of the suits decreed exparte. The plaintiffs filed objection. The material objections were- (i) that by one application the three exparte decrees cannot be set aside and as such the application was not maintainable in law, and (ii) that the impugned order was one under Order 17, Rule 3 against which only an appeal was competent and no application under Order 9, Rule 13 is maintainable. 4. The material objections were- (i) that by one application the three exparte decrees cannot be set aside and as such the application was not maintainable in law, and (ii) that the impugned order was one under Order 17, Rule 3 against which only an appeal was competent and no application under Order 9, Rule 13 is maintainable. 4. The plaintiffs filed an application for taking the evidence of defendant No. 1 on commission at Calcutta. Shri Jogesh Chandra Das, Plaintiff No. 1, submitted before the Court that he would confine his objection only to the two questions of law mentioned above and that defendant No. 1 need not be examined on commission. 5. The learned Assistant District Judge, after hearing both the parties, held that one petition under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the three exparte decrees was incompetent. On the second point he held that the impugned orders were under Order 17, Rule 3 and as such the application under Order 9, Rule 13 was incompetent. 6. Shri P. Choudhuri, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, submits that the order of the learned Court below is erroneous. On the first point he submits that although the petition under Order 9, Rule 13 was one it was in respect of all the three suits decreed ex parte. The petition at page 4 of the paper book shows that the defendants in the petition mentioned all the three suits and gave their numbers and in the prayer portion it was mentioned "your honour will be further pleased to restore the suits to file to be heard on merit". 7. In support of his contention Mr. Choudhuri cites AIR 1947 Nag 248, in which it has been held : ".........The legal effect of a de facto consolidation is usually achieved by two suits being tried together by consent of parties and with the approval of the Court. After consolidation there is only one case, and the suit consolidated has no independent existence for trial. Both the suits should be tried in one trial and should be disposed of by one judgment and decree. The fact that two judgments and decrees are passed at best shows an irregularity in following a correct and an ideal procedure, but not an absence of an intention to consolidate the two suits. Both the suits should be tried in one trial and should be disposed of by one judgment and decree. The fact that two judgments and decrees are passed at best shows an irregularity in following a correct and an ideal procedure, but not an absence of an intention to consolidate the two suits. In any case, the question of consolidation should not be looked at too technically and the party should not be deprived of the right to have an adjudication in appeal on a narrow and technical ground." 8. When consolidated suits between the same parties are dismissed or decreed ex parte, law does not provide whether one application may be filed or as many applications as there are suits; but, however, it is desirable that as many applications as there are suits should be filed for setting aside orders of ex parte decrees or dismissals. Nevertheless a mere procedural technicality, which is not of the essence of the law, cannot defeat real justice. Procedure is the handmaid of justice. In the instant case although there was one application, the defendants specifically mentioned the numbers of all the three cases and the reason of filing one application was that the suits had been consolidated. By one petition the defendants have deprived the State only of the court-fees requisite for two more applications, but the plaintiff was not at all affected thereby. At best the Court could have directed the petitioner either to pay the necessary court-fee and/or to put in two more formal applications. 9. Shri G. K. Talukdar, learned Senior Government Advocate, Assam, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents, submits that three applications are essential and in support of his contention, cites AIR 1964 SC 993 . 10. This decision of the Supreme Court is of no assistance to the respondents. In that case there were several suits and proceedings between the parties, who were not in the same capacities. Further the point that fell for consideration by their Lordships of the Supreme Court was not whether one application in such cases was sufficient (in fact three separate applications were filed) but whether the order passed in one case was res judicata in respect of another. 11. In my opinion the single application filed by the defendants in the instant cases was sufficient. 12. 11. In my opinion the single application filed by the defendants in the instant cases was sufficient. 12. The next point for decision is whether the impugned order is one under Rule 2 or Rule 3 of Order 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. Rules 2 and 3 of Order 17 may be quoted: "2. Procedure if parties fail to appear on day fixed.- Where, on any date to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the parties or any of them fail to appear, the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order IX or make such other order as it thinks fit. 3. Court may proceed notwithstanding either party fails to produce evidence, etc.-Where any party to a suit to whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witness, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which time has been allowed, the Court may, notwithstanding such default, proceed to decide the suit forthwith". Rule 2 envisages the absence of the parties or any of them. In such case the Court is to proceed to dispose of the case in one of the modes directed by Order 9 of the Code. while Rule 3 envisages that when time was granted to one of the parties to produce evidence or to cause the attendance of a witness or to perform any other act necessary for the further progress of the suit but fails to do so, in which case the Court may notwithstanding such default proceed to decide the suit forthwith. Rule 2 speaks of "to dispose" of a suit which may mean a mere dismissal under Rule 8 of Order 9 which is not a decision. Rule 3 speaks of "to decide which means to adjudicate it on merit and to "decide forthwith" meaning that adjudication forthwith is possible only when there is material already on record and that no further evidence has to be taken. 13. Shri Talukdar, in support of his contention cites AIR 1961 Assam 99. Rule 3 speaks of "to decide which means to adjudicate it on merit and to "decide forthwith" meaning that adjudication forthwith is possible only when there is material already on record and that no further evidence has to be taken. 13. Shri Talukdar, in support of his contention cites AIR 1961 Assam 99. This decision is of no assistance to him, inasmuch as in that case before the suit was decreed after the rejection of the defendants application for adjournment and upon retirement of his counsel, there had already been evidence of the plaintiff who had been examined and cross-examined. The above decision of this Court supports the view I have taken. In the instant case there was no evidence on record when the defendants counsel retired, and the learned Court below had to proceed, and did proceed, ex parte, and passed the ex parte decree after recording plaintiffs evidence. So he proceeded under O. 17, R. 2, and the application under O. 9. R. 13 was competent. 14. In the result the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Court below is set aside. The ex parte decrees passed in the suits in question are set aside, and the suits are directed to be disposed of in accordance with law. 15. Parties will bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.