JUDGMENT Datta J: This is an appeal against the judgment and order of B.N. Banerjee, J. dated March 15, 1965 in Civil Revision Case No. 2240 of 1958. The facts as stated in the petition are as follows. The petitioner had been the owner of land described in Schedules A and B to the petition which were the subject matter of acquisition in L.A. Case No.7 of 1950-51 under sections 4 and 6 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to also as 1948 Act) for the purpose of settlement of immigrants who had migrated into the State of West Bengal. The petitioner challenged the said acquisition by an application under Article 226 of the Constitution leading to C.R. No. 3167 of 1951. This rule was discharged on July 25, 1952, but an appeal was preferred therefrom being F.M.A. No. 255 of 1952. The said appeal was disposed of on March 2, 1955 in terms of a petition of settlement filed in Court on that date. The relevant order is as follows: "By consent the appeal is disposed of in terms of settlement signed by the Advocates for both the parties in Court to day. The terms of settlement will form part of the order drawn." Terms of settlement referred to above are as follows: Terms of settlement 1. The appellant agrees and the respondents confirm the acquisition of lands described in the Schedules A and B below belonging to the appellant. 2. The respondents agree and undertake to acquire the balance of the land including homestead, orchards etc. described in the schedules B-1 and C below. 3. The respondents undertake to this Hon'ble High Court to make and publish duly an award for the compensation for the lands so acquired as hereinbefore described (more fully described in Schedules A, B, B1 and C hereunder) under the Land Acquisition Act as speedily as possible with requisite notice to the appellant. 4. The appellant agrees to deliver and the respondents agree to take amicable possession of the lands described in Schedules B1 and C below immediately. 5. The respondents undertake that the acquisition proceedings and the award thereunder will be completed at an early date. 6. Subject to above terms the appeals shall stand dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs throughout. 2. 5. The respondents undertake that the acquisition proceedings and the award thereunder will be completed at an early date. 6. Subject to above terms the appeals shall stand dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs throughout. 2. The respondents delayed the matter and started a proceeding for an award for compensation in respect of lands of Schedules A and B, the acquisition of which was confirmed in the aforesaid• terms of settlement without taking steps for acquisition of lands of Schedules B (1) and C. An award was made in the meantime for lands of Schedules A and B but it was not disclosed if the award was made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or 1948 Act. The petitioner however made a reference under Section 18 of the Act which was pending. Thereafter on the representation of the petitioner the Government made a notification dated January 20, 1956 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the purposes of acquiring the said lands of Schedules B (1) and C in terms of the settlement referred to above. The said notification however was not followed by any declaration under section 6 of the Slid Act. Curiously the Government published a notification dated May 18, 1957 cancelling the said notification under section 4 in respect of B (1) and C schedules lands without assigning any reason. 3. Soon thereafter the Government published a fresh notification dated May 21, 1957 under section 4 of the 1948 Act stating that the lands described therein being lands of schedules B (1) and C were likely to be needed for a public purpose, viz for settlement of immigrants who had migrated into the State of West Bengal on account of circumstances beyond their control. This notification, it was eon tended, was not bonafide and legal as thereby the Government was trying to avoid payment to the petitioner of due compensation under the Land Acquisition Act to which the Government agreed in terms of the settlement in the said appeal. This impugned notification was in breach of the settlement as also of the order passed thereon by this Court in the said appeal. 4. The petitioner objected to the acquisition and was informed of the date of local enquiry on the objection under section 4A (2) of 1948 Act as fixed on November 4, 1956. This impugned notification was in breach of the settlement as also of the order passed thereon by this Court in the said appeal. 4. The petitioner objected to the acquisition and was informed of the date of local enquiry on the objection under section 4A (2) of 1948 Act as fixed on November 4, 1956. A local enquiry was made on that date by a Kanungo, when the petitioner was present. The petitioner thereafter did not hear from the respondents inspite of representations. The petitioner in the circumstances on June 11, 1958 served a final demand of justice to which there was no reply. The petitioner contended that the subsequent notification on May 21, 1957 for acquisition of the lands under the West Bengal Act of 1948 was a fraud on the order of this Court, and was illegal, malafide and in breach of the undertaking given by the Government in this, Court in the above appeal. It was based on a contract between the Government and the petitioner on the representation that the lands of schedules B (1) and C were to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the purported acquisition under notification on May 21, 1956 under the 1948 Act was illegal, ultravires and beyond the powers of the respondents. It was also in breach of the fundamental principle of natural justice. 5. On these allegations and contentions, the petitioner moved this Court under Article 226 (1) of the Constitution whereon a Rule was issued calling upon the respondents to show cause why they should not forbear from proceeding further with the proposed acquisition under Notification dated May 21, 1957 and also why a writ of Mandamus should not be issued directing the Government to effect the acquisition under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act in terms of the order made by this Court in appeal. The respondents were also asked to show cause why a writ in the nature of Certiorari should not be issued quashing the proceeding under the notification dated May 21, 1957. 6. On this application, the rule was issued by this Court as already stated and an affidavit-in-opposition was filed on behalf of the respondent No.3 opposing the rule. It was stated therein that it was not under the terms of the compromise petition that the Government would acquire the lands under the and Acquisition Act. 6. On this application, the rule was issued by this Court as already stated and an affidavit-in-opposition was filed on behalf of the respondent No.3 opposing the rule. It was stated therein that it was not under the terms of the compromise petition that the Government would acquire the lands under the and Acquisition Act. It was further stated that the notification made under the West Bengal Act of 1948 for acquisition of the said lands was in terms of the settlement and was bonafide, legal and valid. It was also stated that as provided in the compromise petition that award was to be made under the Land Acquisition Act as specifically provided under section 8 of the West Bengal Act. The objection against acquisition raised by the petitioner was considered by the Land Acquisition Collector, Howrah and was overruled. It was submitted that the application under Article 226 was not maintain in law. 7. The petitioner filed an affidavit-in-reply reiterating the allegations made in the petition. 8. The rule came up for hearing before Banerjee, J. and it was held that there was nothing in consent order which prevented the State Government from withdrawing from the acquisition proceeding already started, the only condition being that if there was to be an acquisition it must be expeditiously completed. It was further held that there was no power in this Court to prevent the State Government from making a notification under section 4 of the 1948 Act. The Court found that by making a notification under section 4 of the 1948 Act none of the terms agreed upon were violated. The rule accordingly was discharged. The propriety of the order is challenged in this rule. 9. Mr. S.K. Rai Chowdhury, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent, State, submitted that at the highest there was a contract between the parties as ratified by the Court's order. Nonetheless it was a contract and no legal right floated from the contract for which the writ jurisdiction of this Court could be invoked. It was further submitted that the contempt proceeding which was initiated by the petitioner for alleged violation of the terms of the agreement having failed the petitioner was not entitled to achieve the same object by the writ petition. 10. Mr. Ranjit Kr. It was further submitted that the contempt proceeding which was initiated by the petitioner for alleged violation of the terms of the agreement having failed the petitioner was not entitled to achieve the same object by the writ petition. 10. Mr. Ranjit Kr. Banarjee, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner appellant, submitted that the application is maintainable as here there was an estoppel by judgment for acquisition by any other law. He has referred to the decision in (1) Sunderabai v. Devaji, reported in AIR 1954 SC 82 (4) in which it was held that a consent decree raises an estoppel as much as a decree passed in invitum. Reliance was also placed in the case of (2) D.F.O., South Kheri v. Ram Sanchi Singh, AIR 1973 SC 205 in which it was held that the action of a public authority invested with statutory power can be challenged in writ proceeding even though the right to relief arises out of an alleged breach of contract. Reliance was also placed in the case of (3) Union of India v. Anglo Afgan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718 where it was held that when a person has acted upon representation made in the Export Promotion scheme that import licence upto the value of the goods exported will be issued and had exported goods, his claim for import licence for the maximum value permissible by the scheme could not be arbitrarily rejected. It was further held that it was open to a party who had acted on representation made by the Government to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it even though the promise was not recorded in formal contract as required under Article 299. It may be mentioned here that the petitioner made the case that if lands of Schedules A and B were only acquired leaving aside lands of Schedules B(1) and C which were adjacent it would cause serious prejudice to the petitioner as the land of the latter schedules would be of no use to the petitioner. Only because the Government agreed to acquire also the lands Schedules of B(1) and C the petitioner waived his objections to the acquisition of lands of Schedules A and B and the agreement found expression in the consent decree. Only because the Government agreed to acquire also the lands Schedules of B(1) and C the petitioner waived his objections to the acquisition of lands of Schedules A and B and the agreement found expression in the consent decree. On these authorities it was submitted that the action of the Government in not honouring its obligation under the contract ratified by Court's order should be secured by an issuance of writs prayed for. 11. Assuming that the writ petition is otherwise maintainable for, securing enforcement of the contract referred to above, it would be convenient for us to examine the terms of the contract to see the real intention of the parties behind the same in the attending circumstance. The petitioner's case before us, it is to be remembered, is that the acquisition of lands of B(1) and C Schedule-lands is to be done under the Land Acquisition Act and not under West Bengal Act of 1948. There is no dispute that the lands of Schedules A and B were already under acquisition under the West Bengal Act of 1948. This Act provided that for acquisition of lands for settlement of immigrants compensation shall be payable for the lands acquired on the market value of the lands determined under Land Acquisition Act provided that if such market value exceeds by any amount the market value of land on December 31, 1946, if the land was in the same state, the amount of such excess shall not be taken in consideration. This provision came up for consideration of the Supreme Court in the decision of (4) State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee, AIR 1954 SC 170 decided on December 11, 1953. It was held that the latter part of proviso (b) to section 8 of 1948 Act which fixes the market value on December 31, 1946 as the maximum compensation for lands acquired under it offends against the provisions of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution and is unconstitutional and void. The law accordingly at that point of time was that the compensation for acquisition of land under 1948 Act, would be on the basis of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 unfettered by any other condition. The law accordingly at that point of time was that the compensation for acquisition of land under 1948 Act, would be on the basis of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 unfettered by any other condition. It is in the context of this position in law that the parties entered into the contract on May 2, 1955 which provided for continuance of the acquisition of lands of Schedules A and B under the West Bengal Act of 1948. The settlement also provided for further acquisition of lands of Schedule B(1) and C, obviously under the same Act for the same purpose, as it would be inconceivable that some portion of land under the settlement would be acquired under one Act while the other portion of land under the settlement would be by another Act. The agreement provided that the award for the acquisition is to be made and published under the Land Acquisition Act, the provisions whereof were engrafted in the 1948 Act, and in view of the decision in Bela Banerjee's case without any fetter or restraint. The petitioner while entering into the settlement on such basis was assured of compensation for lands of all schedules under the Land Acquisition Act. 12. Unfortunately for the petitioner the amendment of Article 31 (2) by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 which came into force on April 27, 1955 removed the eclipse cast by the Bela Banerjee's decision over the latter part of proviso (b) to section 8 of the 1948 Act. By the same Act the 1948 Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution bringing it within the protection of Article 31B with retrospective effect. Accordingly in the changed position in law, the petitioner will undoubtedly put to loss but in view of the changed position in law, the State of West Bengal can hardly be blamed, as the maximum compensation for land acquired under the law is the market value of land of December 1946. 13. The notification in respect of lands of Schedules B(1) and C under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated January 20, 1956 was in the light of the settlement between the petitioner and the Government as discussed above was obviously an error and was rightly cancelled. 13. The notification in respect of lands of Schedules B(1) and C under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated January 20, 1956 was in the light of the settlement between the petitioner and the Government as discussed above was obviously an error and was rightly cancelled. Further, the steps taken by the Government for acquisition of the said lands under the 1948 Act by the issue of notification on May 21, 1957 under section 4 thereof was a proper step in terms of the said settlement. Accordingly, even assuming that the petitioner was entitled to relief otherwise, on merits, as we have seen, the petitioner has not been able to make out any case for issuance of writs prayed for by him. 14. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed without however any order as to costs. All interim orders, if any, are vacated. Ray, J.: I agree.