TYAGI, J. —This habeas corpus petition of Hanuman Sahai raises a short question of law whether the impugned order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Jaipur on 28th of August, 1974 on the grounds which formed the basis for an earlier detention order quashed by this Court on 17th of August, 1974 on the ground that it had become invalid because of the contravention of the mandate contained in the provisions of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution is maintainable under sec. 14(2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the Act)? 2. This question arises like this: The petitioner was detained by the District Magistrate, Jaipur under sec. 3 of the Act on 29th April, 1974 and lodged in Central Jail, Jaipur. That detention order was challenged by the petitioner, inter alia, on the ground that the order of detention should be quashed because the Government failed to comply with the mandate of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution inasmuch as the Government did not consider the representation filed by the petitioner as expeditiously as possible. This Court, after hearing both the parties, quashed the detention order dated 27th of April, 1974 and ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith. It is alleged that instead of releasing the petitioner from jail he was handed over to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaipur in compliance with a warrant issued by him in certain criminal case filed against the petitioner under the Essential Commodities Act. Three remands were granted by the learned Judicial Magistrate. Before the period of third remand expired, the District Magistrate issued the impugned order on 28th of August, 1974, which is Annexure A on the record. The grounds of detention were served on the petitioner in jail. The petitioner made a representation to the Government on 8th of September, 1974 wherein the impugned order was challenged by the petitioner, inter alia, on the ground that the District Magistrate was not competent to pass an order under the Act detaining the petitioner on the same grounds on which earlier detention was ordered. In support of this objection the petitioner submitted along with his representation a certified copy of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pradip Kumar Dass vs. State of West Bengal (writ petitions No. 961, etc. of 1973, decided on 29th April, 1974). The Government rejected the petitioners representation. In support of this objection the petitioner submitted along with his representation a certified copy of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pradip Kumar Dass vs. State of West Bengal (writ petitions No. 961, etc. of 1973, decided on 29th April, 1974). The Government rejected the petitioners representation. The petitioner has, therefore, challenged his detention by preferring this habeas corpus petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution on various grounds, but the main ground that has been pressed before us is that u/s. 14(2) of the Act the petitioner could be detained only on fresh facts which must have arisen after the date of the revocation or the expiry of the first detention order. In para 6 of his petition, it has been mentioned by the petitioner "that the impugned order of detention passed on the basis of the same grounds which were the basis of earlier detention order dated 27-4-74 is in violation of sec. 14(2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 and also the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India." ln clause (vi) of para 12 it was further mentioned that the detention order was passed by the District Magistrate without applying his mind "and is a mechanical reproduction of the earlier grounds of detention dated 27 4 1974." 3. Other grounds have also been mentioned in the petition to challenge the validity of the detention order, but we need not reproduce them here as the petition can be disposed of on the ground that under sec. 14(2) of the Act the petitioner could have been detained only on fresh grounds after his earlier detention was quashed by this Court. 4. A reply has been filed by the State Government wherein an attempt has been made to justify the detention of the petitioner and the ground taken therein is that this Court while setting aside the earlier detention order did not enter into the merits of the grounds which formed the basis of the earlier detention order and, therefore, there was no bar for the District Magistrate and the Government to detain the petitioner on those grounds which were the basis for his earlier detention. It was also averred that the provisions of sec. It was also averred that the provisions of sec. 14(2} of the Act could be attracted only when an order of release was passed by the Government itself which comes within the term "revocation" but since in the present case the order of release was passed by the Court, that order cannot by any stretch of interpretation be taken to be a synonym with the revocation by the Government. Relying on a Federal Court decision in Basanta Chandra vs. Emperor (l), it was further averred that where an earlier order of detention was defective merely on formal ground there was nothing to preclude a proper order of detention being passed on the pre-existing grounds themselves, especially in cases in which the sufficiency of the grounds is not examinable by the Courts. 5. While dealing with the allegation that the Distt. Magistrate has detained the petitioner by issuing the impugned order on the grounds which are identical to the grounds mentioned in the previous detention order, it has been averred by the State Govt. specially while replying to the averments made by the petitioner in clause (vi) of para 12 that the detention order was passed after full and due appreciation of record and after full and proper application of mind, and it was not a mechanical reproduction of the earlier grounds of detention served on 29th of April, 1974. In the opinion of the Government, the grounds now supplied to the petitioner contain full details and particulars. However, it has not been denied that the grounds which have now formed the basis for the detention of the petitioner are substantially the same though mentioned in a different language which formed the basis for the issue of the earlier detention order dated 27th April, 1974. 6. It is a common ground between the parties that after the petitioner was detained by virtue of the order issued by the District Magistrate on 27th of April, 1974 the petitioner in spite of the order passed by this court quashing the earlier detention order remained behind the bars on one pretext or the other till the petitioner was served with a subsequent detention order dated 28th of August, 1974. 7. Mr. 7. Mr. Agrawal, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, urged that the order passed by this Court quashing the earlier detention order dated 27th April, 1974 whcreunder the petitioner was directed to be released forthwith shall come within the ambit of the terms "revocation" and "expiry" as used by the legislature while enacting sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 of the Act. He further urged that this sub-section is an enabling sub-section which gives power to the Government to detain a person whose earlier detention order is either revoked or expired but that can be done only in terms of this section, that is, where fresh facts have arisen after the date of revocation or expiry on which the detening authority may be or is satisfied that such an order should be made. According to Mr. Agrawal, in the present case no such fresh facts have arisen which may give rise to the detention of the petitioner and, therefore, the impugned order is passed by the District Magistrate in clear violation of the provisions of sec. 14(2) of the Act which also creates a bar for the Government not to detain a person whose detention has already been revoked or expired except on fresh facts. In support of this proposition of law, Mr. Agrawal has placed reliance on the following Supreme Court decisions: — (1) Hadi Bandhudas vs. District Magistrate, Cuttack, (2) Pradip Kumardas vs. State of W. Ben.(3) Chotka Hembram vs. State of W.Ben. (4) Baidya Nath Mandi vs. State of W. Ben and (5) Mrinal Roy vs. State of W. Ben. 8. In support of this contention that the order passed by this Court quashing the earlier detention order under which the petitioner was formally released also falls within the purview of the term "expiry" reliance has been placed by him on a Supreme Court case in Shibapada Mukherjee vs. State of W. Ben.(7). 9. Learned Additional Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of the State, on the other hand, contended that the order can be said to be revoked under sec. 14(2) of the Act only when the Government that passed the order had set aside the detention order and released the petitioner. If the order of release has been passed by the Court then, in the scheme of the Act, such an order cannot have the effect of revoking the earlier order of detention. 14(2) of the Act only when the Government that passed the order had set aside the detention order and released the petitioner. If the order of release has been passed by the Court then, in the scheme of the Act, such an order cannot have the effect of revoking the earlier order of detention. Similarly, it was argued by Mr. Shishodia that the expiry of the detention order can be claimed only when under the scheme of the Act the order has expired by virtue of efflux of time. According to him, if the Court declared the earlier order illegal on account of the violation of certain provisions of the Constitution, then in that event it is difficult for the petitioner to urge that the earlier order had expired because of the declaration by the Court that the order was invalid or illegal. 10. In Ujjal Mandal vs. The State of West Bengal (8) the order of detention was challenged by the detenu before the Supreme Court on the ground that his detention was not confirmed by the appropriate Government under sec. 12(1) of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent activities) Act, 1970 (which contained a similar provision as is incorporated in the Act) on the ground that the confirmation was made after the expiry of three months from the date of detention and, therefore, the detention beyond that period was without the authority of law and was illegal. While quashing the order of detention, the Supreme Court took into consideration the provisions of Art.22 (4) of the Constitution that specify the maximum limit of initial detention as three months. It is provided in the Constitution that detention for a longer period than three months can only be made on the basis of the report of the Board, therefore, if the Government wanted to detain a person for more than three months, then it was incumbent on the Government to have referred the matter to the Board and it was only when the Board had made its report justifying further detention of the detenu that the appropriate Government could fix the period of detention under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 12 of that Act. 11. (1) of sec. 12 of that Act. 11. While considering this objection of the detenu, four authorities were cited before the Supreme Court, namely, Aswini Kumar Banerjee vs. The State: (1971) 75 Cal W.N. 866, Kaur Singh vs. The State: AIR 1952 Pepsu 134, Sangappa Mallappa vs. State of Mysore : AIR 1959 Mysore 7 and Bhupati Goswami vs. C. R. Krishnamurti: AIR 1969 Assam 14. The Supreme Court also considered its own decision is Deb Sadhen Roy vs. State of West Bengal (W. P. No. 218 of 1971, decided on 7-12-71) wherein a view was taken by the Court that the order of detention must be confirmed within three months of the date of detention as the detention beyond that period would become illegal. It was on that basis that the impugned order in that case was declared illegal as the confirmation order could not be passed by the appropriate Government within a period of three months. 12. It is true that in this authority the learned Judges did not anywhere hold that the effect of the declaration of the impugned order as being illegal will be the revocation of the order of detention, but in a later case in Pradip Kumar Das vs. State of West Bengal (3), this question was directly agitated whether the declaration of the order of detention as illegal by any competent Court would bring that order within the purview of the term "revocation" as used by the legislature while enacting sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 of the Act. The learned Judges in para 19 of the judgment considered the scope of these two terms "revocation" and "expiry" as used in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 of the Act and expressed as to what meaning could be given to these two terms. Chief Justice Ray observed: as follows: "The word revocation means annulling, rescinding, withdrawing. In the facts and circumstances of the case orders of release cancelling orders of detention, amount to revocation of orders of detention. The word expire means to come to an end or to put and end to or to terminate or to become void, or to become extinct. The orders of release show that the Government accepted the position that the previous orders terminated and came to an end and the petitioners were released." 13. The word expire means to come to an end or to put and end to or to terminate or to become void, or to become extinct. The orders of release show that the Government accepted the position that the previous orders terminated and came to an end and the petitioners were released." 13. The Supreme Court while dealing with the contention whether the order passed by the Court declaring the detention order as illegal for the non compliance of the mandatory provisions of Art. 22(4) of the Constitution would have the effect of revoking the detention order, made it clear in Pradip Kumar Dass case (3) that the order of detention which was not confirmed in Ujjal Mandals case (8) before the expiry of three months, would amount to revocation of the earlier order. Mr. Shishodia urged that the observations of the Supreme Court in Pradip Kumar Dass case should be treated as obiter as it was nowhere expressly held by the Court in Ujjal Mandals case (8) that the non-confirmation of the detention by the appropriate Government within a period of three months would amount to revocation We cannot accept this argument of Mr. Shishodia as we find that the Supreme Court referred with approval the following observations from the Pepsu case while deciding Ujjal Mandals case(8)— "The argument that the law does not enjoin that there must be an order of confirmation and that the mere fact that it continues to detain the person means that the Govt. had decided to confirm the initial detention order, ignores a very important and the most effective part of sec. 11. What sec. 11 provides is that the| Government may confirm and continue detention have their own significance and they obviously mean that if the Government decided to continue the detention it must confirm the order of detention, and that the non-confirmation of the order would result in the revocation and termination of the detention." 14. 11. What sec. 11 provides is that the| Government may confirm and continue detention have their own significance and they obviously mean that if the Government decided to continue the detention it must confirm the order of detention, and that the non-confirmation of the order would result in the revocation and termination of the detention." 14. It is true that this question was not directly in issue in Ujjal Mandals case(8) whether the declaration of detention by the Court as illegal for the non confirmation of the same within the specified period of three months would have the effect of revoking the impugned order, but the aforesaid observations of the Pepsu High Court reproduced in the judgment delivered in Ujjal Mandals case (8) show the approval of the Supreme Court regarding the proposition of law enunciated therein which positively indicate that the effect of the declaration of detention order as illegal would amount to revocation. In this view of the matter, we cannot accept the contention of Mr. Shishodia that the observations of the Court that the non confirmation would amount to revocation of the earlier order were obiter. 15. While deciding the case of Pradip Kumar Das vs. State of West Bengal(3), the learned Judges also took into consideration its own judgment is Masood Alam etc. vs. Union of India(9). In that case, Masood Alam was detained on June 15, 1972 in pursuance to an order of detention passed by the District Magistrate on June 14, 1972 under sec. 3(1) a)(i) and (ii) of the Act. Somehow the order could not get approval of the State Government till 25th of June, 1972 and, therefore, the Superintendent, District Jail, Aligarh informed the detenu that he was released under the detention order passed by the District Magistrate, but since he was arrested under the provisions of other Acts also, he was informed that he was detained in jail as undertrial under sec. 107/117 Criminal Procedure Code and if he so desired he could arrange for his bail. The Government issued a fresh order of detention which was dated 25th of June, 1972 and that order was based on the same grounds on which the order of the District Magistrate detaining the detenu Masood Alam was issued. 107/117 Criminal Procedure Code and if he so desired he could arrange for his bail. The Government issued a fresh order of detention which was dated 25th of June, 1972 and that order was based on the same grounds on which the order of the District Magistrate detaining the detenu Masood Alam was issued. The subsequent order passed by the Government was challenged on the ground that once the detenu was released, the fresh order for detention could not be passed unless fresh facts were made the basis for the subsequent order. The learned Judges relying on various authorities cited before them, observed as follows: "In our opinion, this submission does possess merit and deserves to be accepted. Sec. 14 speaks of revocation or expiry of a detention order. The principle under lying this section has its roots in the vital importance attached to the fundamental right of personal liberty guaranteed by our Constitution.The Act fixes the maximum period of detention to be 12 months from the date of the detention with the proviso that the appropriate Government can revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time : Sec. 13. It is to effectuate this restriction on the maximum period and to ensure that it is not rendered nugatory or in effective by resorting to the camouflage of making a fresh order operative soon after the expiry of the period of detention as also to minimise resort to detention orders that sec. 14 restricts the detention of a person on given set of facts to the original order and does not permit a fresh order to be made on the same grounds which were in exis tence when the original order was made............ The submission on behalf of the State that the petitioners activities are so highly communal and prone to encourage violent communal activities that it was considered absolutely necessary to de tain him in the interest of security of the State and maintenance of public order cannot prevail in face of the statutory restrictions and the guaran teed constitutional right which is available to all persons. The rule of law reigns supreme in this Republic and no person on the soil of free India can be deprived of his personal liberty without the authority of law." 16. The rule of law reigns supreme in this Republic and no person on the soil of free India can be deprived of his personal liberty without the authority of law." 16. In this case the subsequent order of detention passed by the State Government was declared illegal by the Supreme Court on the ground that the earlier order passed by the District Magistrate had actually expired after a period of 12 days in the absence of its approval by the appropriate Government and, therefore, if the detenu was to be detained then it could be done only on the basis of fresh facts that would arise for sustaining the fresh order of detention. 17. In view of the observations of the Supreme Court in the above referred cases, we can conveniently say that the order passed by this Court declaring the earlier petention order as illegal for want of consideration of the representation of the petitioner as expeditiously as possible as required by clause(5) of Art. 22 of the Constitution has the effect of revoking the earlier order of detention and also it can be said that the detention of the petitioner under the earlier order came to an end and, therefore, the detention had expired. Sec. 14(2) of the Act is, in these circumstances, attracted to the present case and the detention of the petitioner after his earlier order of detention was declared illegal could be ordered by the competent authority only on the basis of fresh facts. The facts which formed the basis for issuing the earlier order could not be made the basis for issuing the subsequent order. 18. Learned Additional Government Advocate tried to urge that the facts which have been made the basis for issuing the impugned order are not exactly the same but he could not say that the facts on which reliance has been placed by the District Magistrate had arisen after the order of release was passed by this Court. We regret, we cannot accept this contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate at this stage, especially when no controversy has been raised by the State Government while filng its reply. We regret, we cannot accept this contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate at this stage, especially when no controversy has been raised by the State Government while filng its reply. However, we would like to refer to certain observations of the Supreme Court in this behalf in Har Jas Dev Singh vs. State of Panjab(lO), where the learned Judges have clearly stated that a fresh order of detention can only be made if fresh grounds come into existence after the expiry or revocation of the earlier order of his detention. No such fresh order could be made on the grounds which existed prior to the revocation or expiry of the earlier order of detention. These observations of the Supreme Court make it very clear that a subsequent order of detention can be passed only on the basis of such fresh facts which have arisen after the first detention comes to an end. If any facts, which were then in existence, were not taken note of by the detaining authority when the earlier detention order was passed, then those facts cannot be made the basis for issuing fresh order of detention after the first detention was declared illegal. 19. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, we do not find any substance in the submission of the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State that the order shall be taken to be revoked only when the order is passed by the competent authority under sec. 13 or sec. 14 of the Act. In the cases referred to above when the order was declared illegal for the non-compliance of certain provisions of the Constitution, for example, for not confirming the order within a period of three months as prescribed by clause(4) of Art. 22 of the Constitution, that order, according to the Supreme Court, has the effect of revoking the order of detention and, therefore, it is not necessary that in order to come within the purview of the term "revocation" the order of release must be passed by the authority mentioned in sec. 13 or sec. 14 of the Act. 13 or sec. 14 of the Act. If the Court declared a particular order of detention as illegal for want of compliance with the requirements of the constitutional provisions, then in that event that order would squarely fall within the ambit of the term "revocation" and thereafter if fresh order of detention is considered necessary by the appropriate Government or the District Magistrate, then such an order can be passed only on the grounds which have arisen after the detenu was released under the orders of the Court. In our opinion, the Supreme Court has given an enlarged meaning to the terms "revocation" and "expiry" used in sec. 14(2) of the Act. Since the Act authorises the preventive detention of the citizens without trial, the Supreme Court finds it necessary that the material provisions of the Act must be strictly construed and the safeguards which the Act has deliberately provided for the protection of citizens must be liberally interpreted. (See Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan AIR 1964 SC 334 ). It is on the basis of this rule of interpretation that the Supreme Court has given a wider connotation to the terms "expiry" and "revocation". 20. In view of this discussion, we feel that the impugned order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Jaipur on 28th of August, 1974 cannot be sustained. It is, therefore, quashed and we order that the petitioner Hanuman Sahai Choudhary be released forthwith. The habeas corpus petition is accordingly allowed 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the certified copy of the release order is not acceptable to the jail authorities and, therefore, the release order may be sent immediately to the jail authorities by the Registrar. The Registrar will see that the release order is despatched without any delay.